1997 SCMR 209 (PLP)

(2) It shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Pakistan Penal Code or other law under which the accused is convicted, and punishment to which he is sentenced. (3) Judgment in alternative.‑‑When the conviction is under the Pakistan Penal Code and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of two parts of the same section of that Code the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment in the alternative. (4) If it be a judgment of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty. (5) If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed. (6) For the purposes of this section, an order under section 118 or section 123, subsection (3), shall be deemed to be a judgment."

9. A perusal of the above‑quoted section 366, Cr.P.C. indicates that it provides a detailed procedure as to how a judgment by a Criminal Court shall be pronounced; whereas section 367 thereof provides as to the contents. It is not necessary to deal in detail the above sections as they are not applicable to the High Courts which is evident from the contents of section 369, Cr.P.C. which provides that "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or, in case of a High Court by the Letters Patent of such High Court no Court when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error". It is evident that in case the judgment in a criminal matter is delivered by a High Court, it is to be regulated by the Letters Patent of such High Court and not by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of Anwar Ahmad v. Abdullah Ahmad and others PLD 1963 (W.P.) Karachi 313 and the case of Ali Akbar v The State 1969 PCr. LJ 1307. In the first case, a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan has held that sections 366 and 367, Cr.P.C. are not applicable to the High Courts, whereas in the second case, another learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan has concluded that principles of sections 366 and 367, although not applicable to the High Courts, nevertheless, they are accepted principles of jurisprudence and practised by the High Courts and, therefore, judgments must be pronounced in open Court and a draft sent by one Judge after his retirement to his companion Judge on the Bench, could not be pronounced as a judgment.

10. We may now refer to some case‑law on the subject:‑‑‑ (i) Firm Gokal Chand‑Jagan Nath v. Firm Nand Ram Das‑Atma Ram AIR 1938 Privy Council 292 in which the facts were that the matter came up before the Privy Council in the form of an appeal against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. The appeal was heard by a Bench comprising Harrison and Agha Haider JJ, The judgment was delivered on 22‑2‑1933, but Harrison, J. went or leave before signing the judgment, which was signed by Agha Haider, J. The Deputy Registrar of the High Court appended a note that Harrison, J. had gone on leave before signing the judgment he delivered. It was urged before the Privy Council that since the High Court failed to comply with the provision of Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C. inasmuch as one of the Judges of the Division Bench had not signed the judgment, the judgment was liable to be set aside. The above contention was repelled by the Privy Council as under:‑‑‑ "The Rule does not say that if its requirements are not complied with the judgment shall be a nullity. So startling a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed the Rule does not even state any definite time to which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The Rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty to the ascertainment of what the Judgment was. It is a rule which Judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A Judge may die after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it the Court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but even so the convenience of the Court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely en irregularity. But in truth the difficulty is disposed of by sections 99 and 108, Civil P.C. Section 99 provides that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. That section comes in the part dealing with appeals from original decrees. But section 108 applies the same provision to appeals from appellate decrees and it is always in the discretion of the Board to apply the principle on appeal to His‑Majesty‑in‑Council. In their lordships' judgment the defect here was an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, and is no ground for setting aside the decree." (ii) Amin Sharif v. Syeda Khatoon and another PLD 1962 SC 97: In the above case the facts were that the appellant was convicted of an offence under section 406 of the Penal Code, 1860. Before this, the Magistrate who was trying the case, at one stage had written out a judgment of acquittal with the intention of delivering it, but before it was delivered the complainant put in an application for the stay of proceedings on the ground that he wanted to apply for a transfer of the case. The Magistrate thereupon stayed the proceedings without delivering the judgment the matter eventually came up in appeal before this Court. It was urged on behalf of the appellant/convict that under section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, once a judgment has been signed by a Magistrate, it cannot be altered and henceforth the Magistrate ceased to have any further jurisdiction in the case. It was further urged that the acquittal of the accused in the judgment drafted by the Magistrate was a bar to any further proceedings and that his subsequent conviction was not maintainable. The above contention was not accepted inter alia for the following reasons:‑‑‑ "As already stated on the strength of this section it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the signing of the judgment makes a judgment unalterable. But the judgment which is referred to in this section means a judgment which has been delivered in accordance with section

366. Sections 366, 367 and 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code are to be read together. At the same time, the signing which is referred to in section 369 is the signing in open Court at the time of the pronouncement of the judgment and not a signing at home. In fact, it can be argued that the signing at home is not a signing in accordance with law and is therefore of no effect. If the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant were accepted a judgment signed long before the date of hearing fixed in a trial would conclude the trial and any stay order issued by a superior Court, after the signing would be wholly inoperative. We do not think this result was intended. We would, therefore, hold that the simple writing and a signing the judgment was wholly ineffective and did not operate as a bar to further proceedings." (iii) Qazi Mehar Din (deceased) represented by Muhammad Rafig and others PLD 1964 SC 446: in which the facts were that a suit for possession of certain lands was instituted by one, Qazi Mehar Din, against the respondents. The suit was decreed by the learned District Judge, Rahimyar Khan. An appeal was taken by the respondents to the High Court at Baghdad‑ul‑Jadid, which was heard by Syed Ghulam Murtaza Shah, a Judge of that Court. The appeal was allowed, the decree of the learned District Judge was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. Qazi Mehar Din then presented a Constitutional appeal in the High Court. The appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of the Chief Justice and Sardar Mahmud Khan, J. A technical objection to the competency of the appeal, owing to a necessary party not being impleaded within time, prevailed with the Division Bench. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on 27‑2‑1950. It may be pointed out that before We judgment was announced in that appeal, a regular Constitutional civil appeal was also presented on behalf of the plaintiff on 28‑12‑1949 alongwith an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, praying for extension of time for the presentation of the appeal. Qazi Mehar Din also preferred an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Bahawalpur State from the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 27‑2‑1950. The said appeal was still pending, when the parties were given notice to appear in High Court in connection with application and the Constitutional appeal preferred by the plaintiff on 28‑12‑1949. After hearing the parties, the said appeal was dismissed on the ground that it was not competent as the previous appeal of the plaintiff having been duly disposed of. An objection had been taken in the High Court that the judgment which was pronounced by the learned Single Judge, Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Shah, had been written and signed by him after he handed over the charge and had become a Minister of the Bahawalpur State and that consequently the judgment was not a valid judicial pronouncement. Mr. Ghulam Murtaza Shah was replaced by S. Mahmud Khan, J. The above factual position was not controverted, but the High Court while placing reliance on the case of Baramdeo Pandey v. Debi Dat Singh AIR 1931 All. 90 held that the judgment was not vitiated by the fact that the learned Judge had written and signed it after he had retired from the Court. The matter came up before this Court in the form of an appeal, which was allowed. It may be instructive to reproduce the following observations:‑‑‑ "The cases, therefore, in which judgments written by a person after transfer or on leave, were held to be valid, would not be sufficient authority for the view that a judgment written by a Judge who had ceased to hold his office would also be immune from exception. Such a view has potentialities of great mischief and if by reasonable construction of the statutory provision it could be avoided, the result would .most probably be in conformity with the intention of the Legislature. I am, therefore, disposed to think that the narrower construction of Order XX, Rule 2, C.P.C. should be adopted and it should be held that a Judge who has become functus officio, after being relieved of his office, should not be allowed to have anything to do with the judicial work of the Court over which he previously presided. I would, therefore, allow the appeal with costs and set aside the orders passed by the Division Bench of the Bahawalpur High Court. The result would be that the first appeal in the High Court would still be deemed to be pending as it was not disposed of, in accordance with law. " (iv) Mahboob Ali v. Syed Oamar Ali and another 1972 SCMR 109; In the above case the facts were that one, Syed Qamar Ali i.e. respondent No. 1, was prosecuted on a police challan under section 324, P.P.C. in the Court of Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Old Town, Karachi, on the charges that he had caused injuries to the appellant Mahboob Ali on 11‑1‑1967. The case was first tried by Mr. Azizuddin Ahmad, S.D.M., who recorded the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses but died thereafter. He was succeeded by Mr. Jamaluddin Jumani, who concluded the evidence and also heard the arguments on 28‑6‑1967. On 30‑6‑1967 Mr. Jumani, without having written out his judgment in the case, announced the acquittal of respondent No.

1. He also died a few days later with the result that although the respondent was acquitted by him orally, there was no written judgment on record as required by law. The appellant‑complainant took the matter to the High Court by a petition under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. for quashment of the oral acquittal order of the Magistrate. A learned Single Judge of the High Court declined the above petition. Reliance was placed by him on the case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and others PLD 1967 SC

317. This Court set aside the above judgment of the High Court and remanded the case to the S.D.M. for trial by holding as under:‑‑‑ "The learned Single Judge, in his order, has refused to give relief under section 561‑A, because, in his view, the alternative remedy of an application under section 350, Cr.P.C. should have been invoked by the applicant. Section 350, Cr.P.C. does not by itself give any right to the complainant to demand the resummoning of the witnesses by the successor Magistrate but leaves it to the option of the Magistrate himself, or, alternatively, to the choice of the accused person, if he so decides. Of course, there was no bar for the applicant‑complainant to move an application to the Magistrate to exercise his duty in the matter and to conclude the case, which was still pending on the file of that Court. We feel that this was a case where the learned Single Judge should have given the direction under section 561‑A in the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court that the proceedings in this case should be continued by the trial Court in accordance with law, although the same purpose has been served by his directing the complainant‑applicant to make an application to that effect before the trial Court. However, the result, even according to the orders of the learned Single judge in the High Court, is that the case against the respondent, which is still pending, has to be concluded, and we affirm that direction, with the variation that instead of the appellant making an application in this behalf, the trial Magistrate, in whose Court the case is still pending, i.e. S.D.M. Old Town, Karachi, should issue process for the appearance of the accused‑respondent further proceedings, so that the case is concluded in accordance with law. Order accordingly." (v) Muhammad Ramzan v. The State and others 1979 SCMR 200; in which the facts were that a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court allowed petition for quashment of proceedings under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. read with Article 199 of the Constitution in the absence of the respondent by an oral order. After that, the learned counsel for the respondent filed an application for re‑hearing and reconsideration of the matter, which was allowed. The learned Judge in Chambers, after hearing the parties, at this time dismissed the above petition. The matter came up before this Court. It was contended that since the learned Judge in Chambers had pronounced the oral order, he could not have changed the same by re‑hearing the above petition. The above contention was not accepted by this Court in the following words:‑‑‑ "

8. In this petition before us the learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to support his contention to the effect that the High Court was not competent to re‑hear and re‑consider the order orally passed by it on the 12th of April 1977. The pronouncement having been made orally and in (he light of the provisions contained in sections 366 and 369, Cr.P.C. the High Court was competent to have re‑heard the case before the judgment was actually signed and sealed by the Court. (vi) Surendra Singh and others, Appellants v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 194; In the above case, a criminal appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh. However, the Judge, who prepared the judgment, expired before its delivery. The question arose, as to whether the above‑draft of judgment could be delivered by the other Judge. The Indian Supreme Court answered the above question in the following terms:‑‑‑ "(12) Now up to the moment the judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind. There is a sort of 'locus paenitentiae and indeed last minute alterations often do occur. Therefore, however, much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. Only then does it crystallise into full‑fledged judgment and become operative. It follows that the Judge who "delivers" the judgment, or causes it to be delivered by a brother Judge, must be in existence as a member of the Court at the moment of delivery so that he can, if necessary, stop delivery and say that he has changed his mind. There is no need for him to be physically present in Court but he must be in existence as a member of the Court and be in a position to stop delivery and effect an alteration should there be any last minute change of mind on his part. If he hands in a draft and signs it and indicates that he intends that to be the final expository of his views it can be assumed that those are still his views at the moment of delivery if he is alive and in a position to change his mind but takes no steps to arrest delivery. " (vii) Abdur Rahim v. Tai Muhammad PLD 1970 Lahore 294; The facts of the above case were that Mr. Nabi Ahmed, Settlement Commissioner, heard a revision petition under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and allowed the same by an order dated 16‑9‑1961. He recorded the following short order in Urdu saying: "The file has been put up for judgment today. As per English order the revision petition has been accepted. Order pronounced. File may be consigned to the record room after completion." The above order was impugned before a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court through a Constitution petition, which was accepted and it was held that Mr. Nabi Ahmed had not passed any legal and valid order before he expired. The matter then was taken up in a L.P.A., which was heard by a Division Bench comprising A.R. Sheikh and Shafiur Rehman, JJ. The above L.P.A. was upheld and it was held that the aforesaid order of the Settlement Commissioner was valid for the following reasons:‑‑‑ "We following with respect the aforementioned dictum of their Lordships of the Privy Council, hold that a judgment is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and world at large by formal pronouncement or delivery in open Court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. The decision which is so pronounced or intimated must be a declaration of the mind of the Court, as it is at the time of the pronouncement. Minor irregularities as to the mode of delivery or manner of pronouncement do not matter as these can be cured. Up to the moment the judgment is delivered, the Judges have the right to change their mind, but once the judgment is delivered, the irregularity of non‑signing of, the judgment (the reasons for the decision) in no way detracts from the binding character of the judgment. The instant case is rather on a stronger footing. Here we have the clear embodiment of the case by Mr. Nabi Ahmed, Settlement Commissioner, rejecting the revision petition, contained in the Urdu order signed by Mr. Nabi Ahmad and after this pronouncement there was no occasion for Mr. Nabi Ahmad to change his mind or have second thoughts about the decision of the case. It was due to ill‑luck of the parties that after having pronounced the decision and dictating the judgment, the said Presiding Officer breathed his last and the order remained unsigned. In view of the fact that the judgment had been delivered by Mr. Nabi Ahmad, the unsigned order is very much in existence and operative between the parties and is in no manner invalid. We accordingly hold that the revision petition had been finally disposed of by Mr. Nabi Ahmad by his order dated the 16th September, 1961, and recall the writ issued by the learned Single Judge. The appeal is allowed in the terms above. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs." (viii) In re: Office Reference dated 28‑4‑1981. PLD 1982 Karachi 250; ' This matter was taken up by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh comprising Zaffar Hussain Mirza and Nasir Aslam Zahid, JJ. upon a reference, in which the following three questions were framed:‑‑‑ "(1) What is the effect of a decision orally announced in Court without recording an order signed by the Judge or the Judges concerned? (2) What is the effect of a decision in which a short order has been recorded signed by the Judge or the Judges concerned, but the detailed reasons are not recorded subsequently? (3) In case falling under No.2 above, what procedure should be adopted i.e. whether reasons can be recorded by Judges who are available as sitting Judges of this Court?" Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. spoke on behalf of the Bench and referred to an earlier judgment on the controversy in issue in the following terms:‑‑‑ "We have heard the learned Advocate‑General, Mr. Azizullah Shaikh and Mr. Khalid Anwar as amicus curiae to assist us in disposing of these References. We have been referred to a similar situation that arose in Confirmation Case No.42 of 1976/Criminal Appeal No.300 of 1976, Ghulam Hussain v. State in which a D.B. of this Court had considered the question whether an appeal which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court by a short order, for reasons to be recorded later in the judgment, but which reasons could not be recorded by the Bench, could be reheard by another Bench. In this case one of us was sitting as a Member of the Bench with late Jamaluddin Ahmad, J., but before the latter could record his reasons in the judgment, he suddenly passed away. After a thorough review of case‑law and I say so with respect, their Lordships reached the following conclusion. We are accordingly of opinion that as the Division Bench had not only signed its short orders, acquitting the appellant, but further in pursuance of that order, the writ of release for the appellant had been issued, neither the said order can be modified or revised nor can the appeal be reheard, as the order of the Division Bench was passed with jurisdiction. and after hearing the parties concerned. " The above questions were answered as follows:‑‑‑ "In view of the above, we have reached the conclusion that in cases where verbal orders were announced without recording them even by way of a short order with the signature of the Judge or Judges concerned, no operative decision in law can take effect and these cases must be deemed to be pending to be disposed of after rehearing the parties. The cases in which short orders have been recorded and signed by the concerned Judges, these cases stand disposed of as these orders are fully operative in law. In the last‑mentioned cases the Judges who have ceased to hold office cannot record reasons, but in cases in which one of the Members of the Bench was a Judge who is still available, he may be requested to record his reasons in support of the decision which will, however, serve as minutes of his individual opinion for use as deemed fit by the Supreme Court in case appeals are filed against such orders."

11. From the above case‑law, following legal principles are deducible. (i) That though the provisions of sections 366 and 367, Cr.P:C. are not applicable to the High Courts but in the absence of any contrary rule in the Letters Patent of the High Court concerned or any other High Court Rules, the principles contained in above provisions of the Cr.P.C. to the extent which foster the cause of justice can be pressed into service by the High Courts; (ii) That signing of a draft of a proposed judgment without pronouncing in open Court upon or after the conclusion of trial of an accused person by a Magistrate is not a judgment in terms of sections 366, 367 and 369, Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it can be altered but once it is signed and pronounced in terms of section 366, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate becomes functus officio. (iii) That an oral order of acquittal or of conviction pronounced in open Court by a Magistrate upon or after the conclusion of trial of an accused person is not a judgment in terms of sections 366 and 367, Cr.P.C. and, therefore, is inoperative and of no legal effect and is liable to be declared as .such by a High Court under section 561‑A, Cr.P.C. (iv) That in all cases up to the moment a judgment is delivered and signed in accordance with the relevant law/rules, the Judges/other Judicial Officers have the right to change their mind as there subsists locus poenitentiae subject to the qualification that if the judgment was already orally announced, the propriety and dictates of justice demand that the view may be changed after re‑hearing the patties. (v) That there is a marked distinction between a Judge, who is transferred to another Court or is on leave and a Judge who ceases to be a Judge on account of retirement or for any other reason inasmuch as the former may record reasons in support of a short order, but the latter having ceased to be a Judge cannot perform any judicial work like recording of reasons in support of a short order. (vi) That the omission of one of the Judges of a Division Bench of a High Court to sign a judgment in a civil appeal as required by Order 41, Rule 31, C.P.C. though authored by him for an explainable reason, shall not vitiate such a judgment in view of sections 99 and 108, C.P.C. so long as the above irregularity does not affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court provided the Judge concerned remains in service. (vii) That verbal orders without recording them even by way of short orders with the signatures of the Judge or Judges concerned cannot be treated as judgments and will have no operative effect in law. (viii) That the short orders which have been recorded and signed by the Judges concerned and have been pronounced in Courts shall be fully operative in law and in consequence thereof, the cases in respect of which the same have been passed shall stand disposed of in law.

12. In the case in hand, Shoukat H. Zubedi, J., one of the learned Judge of the Division Bench which heard the above matters and passed short orders, was not confirmed as a permanent Judge on 24‑2‑1994 and, therefore, had ceased to be a Judge. It was not possible to have reasons of the above Division Bench as a judgment in support of the above short orders. However, it was open to the other learned Judge available, namely, Muhammad Aslam Arain, J. to have recorded reasons in terms of Rule 3 in Chapter 4‑H under the sub‑heading "Rules of Procedure in Appeals" in Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the High Court, quoted hereinabove in para. 3, which would have been deemed to be minutes and not judgment. This was not done by the above learned Judge. On the contrary, on 7‑7‑1994 he ordered that the short orders in appeals passed on 24‑2‑1994 be treated as final orders. He also ceased to be a Judge with effect from 11‑5‑1995 upon his retirement. The position which has now emerged is that none of the two Judges of the Division Bench concerned is available and, therefore, the reasons in terms of above Rule 3 cannot be recorded. The point in issue is, as to whether the above short orders whereby the convicts' appeals were allowed and the acquittal appeals were dismissed, can be treated as final orders for the purpose of disposal of the appeals concerned. The answer of the above controversy is very aptly provided in the judgment in the case of In re: Officer Reference dated 28‑4‑1981 (supra) decided by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh comprising Zafar Hussain Mirza and Nasir Aslam Zahid, JJ. (as their lordships then were), namely, that the cases in which short orders have been recorded and signed by the concerned Judges, stand disposed of and the said short orders are fully operative. The above view is in line with the view earlier taken by another Division Bench of the same High Court quoted hereinabove in para. 10(viii). Somewhat similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court comprising A.R. Sheikh and Shafiur Rehman, JJ. in the case of Abdur Rahim v. Taj Muhammad (supra), in which short order recorded in Urdu allowing a revision petition by the Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was treated as a final order.

13. We are inclined to hold that the short orders under reference passed by the above Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, which were duly signed and pronounced by the learned Judges, for all intents and purposes in view of the situation obtaining, are final orders. The same cannot be set aside and the cases cannot be remanded for re‑trial of the accused who stand acquitted in some of the above appeals by the High Court and in some of the appeals by the trial Court as well as by the High Court. Our above view is supported by a well- settled proposition of law that a party should not be made to suffer on account of an act/omission on the part of Court or other State functionaries. In this regard, reference may be made to the case of Muhammad Hanif and others v. Muhammad and others PLD 1990 SC 859, the case of Fateh Khan v. Boze Mir PLD 1991 SC 782, the case of Abdul Rashid v. Adbul Salam and others 1991 SCMR 2012 and the case of Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR

584. In the first case, on account of a wrong objection of the Lahore High Court office, regular appeals were treated as civil revisions. The matter came up before this Court. It was held that "If the office of the High Court would not have committed this initial mistake of raising a wrong objection these cases might not have been before this Court today. Be that as it may, the office represented the Court and no party should be allowed to suffer so long as the harm can be prevented." In the second case, the Court below failed to specify the words "pre emption money be deposited on or before a specified' date" in terms of Order XX, Rule 14(1)(a), C.P.C. The pre‑emptor deposited the pre‑emption money not before the specified date but on the specified date. The High Court dismissed the suit. This Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and restored the judgment of the Appellate Court. In the context it was observed that "a successful pre‑emptor cannot be penalised as no party has to suffer on account of an act of the Court. In the present case, as the Court has not directed the deposit of amount within the terms of Order XX, Rule 14(l)(a), the suit could not be dismissed". In the third case, there was a mistake as to the number of property mentioned in the judgment. In that context this Court retreated the above principle by holding that "An error committed by the Court cannot be utilized for the benefit of the respondents. A party cannot be non‑suited on account of an erroneous order of the Court". In the last case, this Court while dealing with a Civil Appeal has dilated the above legal proposition in detail after referring in to the case‑law of the Courts of foreign jurisdiction and quoted the following extract from the judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Jai Behram v. Kedar Nath AIR 1922 PC 269. "One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Courts does not cause injury to any of the suitors and when the expression 'the act of the Court', is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of Appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case."

14. In the instant case, the reasons could not be recorded in support of the short orders on account of act/omission. on the part of the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court and/or the Government as Shoukat H. Zubedi J. was dropped and was not made a permanent Judge unexpectedly. The convicts, therefore, cannot be made to suffer on account of the above act/omission. We have, therefore, declined to grant leave in the above petitions as no purpose will be served by keeping the above petitions or appeals arising there from pending in view of the above factual and legal position. Leave is refused. M.B.A./S‑1083/S Leave refused.