2008 PLP 1988 (PTD)
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, ISLAMABAD Versus Messrs DEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED, HATTAR
| Citation | 2008 PLP 1988 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Islamabad High Court |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Munir Peracha and Dr. Sajid Qureshi, JJ |
| Parties | COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, ISLAMABAD Versus Messrs DEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED, HATTAR |
| Primary Law | 6. The question involved is whether order dated 7-1-1997 passed by the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax under section 62 of the Ordinance suffered from "mistake apparent from the record". The Phrase "mistake apparent from the record" has been examined in a number of judgments. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as "Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies II, Karachi v. National Food Laboratories 1992 SCMR 687 = 1992 PTD 570". At page 261 of the report declared the law as under: |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2008 PLP 1988 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: 6. The question involved is whether order dated 7-1-1997 passed by the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax under section 62 of the Ordinance suffered from "mistake apparent from the record". The Phrase "mistake apparent from the record" has been examined in a number of judgments. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as "Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies II, Karachi v. National Food Laboratories 1992 SCMR 687 = 1992 PTD 570". At page 261 of the report declared the law as under: as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2008 PLP 1988 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Islamabad High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Munir Peracha and Dr. Sajid Qureshi, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2008 PLP 1988 (PTD) (COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, COMPANIES ZONE, ISLAMABAD Versus Messrs DEWAN SALMAN FIBRE LIMITED, HATTAR). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ms. Shahina Akbar for Petitioner.
- Date of hearing: 2nd July, 2008.
- Hafiz Muhammad Idrees for Petitioner.
Headnotes / Summary
Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)--‑
S. 156
Scope
"Mistake apparent from the record" would not cover a "mistake" committed at time when the law was not clear
If two interpretations were possible when the original assessment was made and the Assessing Officer adopted one of those interpretations, it cannot be said that "mistake was apparent from the record"
Assessing Officer could not have invoked S.156(2), Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 in circumstances. 1992 SCMR 687 = 1992 PTD 570; Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Messrs Shadman Cotton Mills Ltd. Karachi through Director 2008 PTD 253 and 1998 PTD (Trib.) 1379 ref. JUDGMENT MUHAMMAD MUNIR PERACHA, J.
The respondent assessee, a Limited Company, derives income from manufacture and sale of polyester fibre. In the assessment year 1995-96, it filed a return of income with audited accounts. For the above mentioned period, the statement under section 143-B was also filed along with the return. In this statement, interest income has been declared at Rs.3,48,91,250 and tax deduction at Rs.34,89,
125. Assessment was finalized under section 62 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979, whereby tax was not charged at the normal rate by the Assessing Officer on the interest income of the respondent company and the deducted tax Rs.34,89,125 was taken as final discharge of the tax liability. However, the Assessing Officer gave a notice under section 156(2) of the Ordinance to show cause as to why its case should not be rectified under section 156(2). After hearing representative of the assessee, the Assessing Officer came to the conclusion that the interest income of Rs. 3,48,91,250 is liable to income tax at the normal rate. The assessee challenged the order of the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax through an appeal filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). Learned Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) vide order dated 16-10-2002 allowed the appeal filed by the assessee holding that section 156(2) of the Ordinance could not have been invoked in the case. The order of the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax was annulled and the original order passed under section 62 was resorted. The Commissioner of Income Tax challenged the above said order dated 16-10-2002 through an appeal filed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 16-9-2006 dismissed the appeal.
2. The Commissioner Income Tax has approached this Court through the present reference.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Ms. Shaheena Akbar, Advocate.
4. According to her, the following questions of law arise from the order of Income Tax Tribunal:--‑ "(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned ITAT was justified to hold that incorrect application of rate of tax is not mistake apparent on the surface of the record, rectifiable under section 156 of the Repealed Ordinance? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the learned Tribunal was justified in annulling order passed under section 156 of the Repealed Ordinance on the ground that being a debatable issue the provision of section 156 of the Repealed Ordinance was not attracted notwithstanding the fact that mistake regarding incorrect application of tax rate was a mistake of fact as well as mistake of law which falls within the purview of section 156 of the (Repealed) Income Tax Ordinance, 1979? (3) Without prejudice to questions Nos.1 and 2 whether annulling of order passed under section 156 of the Repealed Ordinance by the ITAT does not tantamount to restricting the scope of section 156 of the Repealed Ordinance in contravention of various judicial pronouncement of superior Courts?"
5. Section 156 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 reads as:-‑ "Rectification of mistakes.
(1) Any income tax authority or the Appellate Tribunal may amend any order passed by it to rectify any mistake apparent from the record on its own motion or on such mistake being brought to its notice by any other income tax authority or by the assessee. (2) No order under subsection (1), which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee, shall be made unless the parties affected thereby have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) Where any such mistake is brought to the notice of any income tax authority by the assessee and no order under subsection (1) is made by such authority before the expiration of the financial year next following the date in which it was so brought to its notice, the mistake shall be deemed to have been rectified and all the provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect accordingly. (4) No order under subsection (1) shall be made after the expiration of four years from the date of the order sought to be amended." Section 35 of the repealed Income Tax Act, 1922, hereinafter referred to as "The Act" confers a power to rectify any mistake in the order which is apparent from the record. Such power can be exercised Suo Motu or if it is brought to the notice by an assessee. Therefore, essential condition for exercise of such power is that the mistake which may be seen floating on the surface and does not require investigation or further evidence. The mistake should be so obvious that on mere reading the order it may immediately strike on the face of it. Where an officer exercising power under section 35 enters into the controversy, investigations into the matter, reassesses the evidence or takes into consideration additional evidence and on that basis interprets the provision of law and forms an opinion different from the order, then it will not amount to `rectification' of the order. Any mistake which is not patent and obvious on the record, cannot be termed to be an order which can be corrected by exercising power under section
35. In this regard reference can be made to Shaikh Muhammad Iftikharul Haq v. Income Tax Officer, Bahawalpur, (1966) 13 Tax 203(S.C. Pak) = PLD 1966 SC 524 and Pakistan River Steamer Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1971) 23 Tax 236 (H.C. Dacca) 1971 PTD
204. In the present case the mistake pointed out by the petitioner was not of a nature to attract section 35 and, therefore, the High Court has correctly answered the first question in the negative."
7. In a recent judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in case reported as "Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Messrs Shadman Cotton Mills Ltd. Karachi through Director" (2008 PTD 253), it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in Para-7 at page 259 of the report:--‑ "Having heard learned Member (Legal) and examined the above provisions, we have not been able to find out any substance in this petition. The perusal of the orders of the Assessing Authority, Commissioner Income Tax (Appeals) and the order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal as well as the order passed by the High Court would make it clear that exercise undertaken by the Assessing Officer under section 156 of the Ordinance was not simply in respect of a mistake apparent on the face of the record within the contemplation of section 156(ibid), rather it was re-assessment of the tax liability of the assessee on the basis of existing record. The expression "mistake apparent on record" means the error or mistake so manifest and clear which, if is permitted to remain on record, may have material effect' on the case. But an error of fact or law, which having direct nexus with the question of determination of rights of parties affecting their substantial rights or causing prejudice to their interest, is not a mistake apparent on the record to be rectified under section 156(ibid). The mistake must be of the nature, which is floating on the surface of record and must not involve, elaborate discussion or detailed probe or process of determination."
8. Section 80B of the Income Tax Ordinance provides:-‑ "Tax on income of certain persons from dividends and bank profits, etc.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, where any amount referred to in subsection (2) is received by or accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to an individual, unregistered firm, association of persons, Hindu undivided family or artificial juridical person referred to in clause (32) of section 2, the whole of such amount shall be deemed to be income of such person and tax thereon shall be charged at the rates specified in the First Schedule. (2) The amount referred to in subsection (1) shall be the following, namely: (a) dividend on which tax is deductible under subsection (6A) of section 50; (b) Interest or profit on which tax is deducible under sub-section (2A) of section 50; (bb) the amount received on encashment of bearer certificates on which tax is deductible under subsection (5B) of section 50; (c) Interest or profit on which tax is deductible under sub-section (7D) of section 50; and (d) Prizes and winning on which tax is deductible or collectable under subsection (7C) of section 50. (3) Nothing contained in this Ordinance shall be so construed as to authorise any allowance or deduction against the income as determined under subsection (1) or any refund of tax deducted or collection under section 50 or set off of any loss under any provision of this Ordinance. (4) Whether the assessee has no income other than the income referred to as subsection (1) in respect of which tax has been deducted or collected, the tax deducted or collected under section 50 shall be deemed to be the final discharge of the tax liability of the assessee under this Ordinance and he shall not be required to file the return of total income under section 55. (5) In a case to which subsection (4) applies, an order under section 59A shall be deemed to have been made in respect of income referred to in subsection (1)."
9. It appears that before the decision of a case by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal reported as 1998 PTD (Trib) 1379, a debate was going on whether a company is covered by the provisions contained in section 80B of the Income- Tax Ordinance. It was finally settled in this judgment that the company is not covered by the provisions contained in section 80B of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax itself shows that it was issued on the basis of the judgment of Income tax Appellate Tribunal dated 19-10-1998. Before the judgment reported in 1998 PTD 1379, two different interpretations were being made by different Income Tax Authorities on section 80B of the Ordinance.
10. In our view, "mistake apparent from the record" would not cover a "mistake" committed at time when the law was not clear. If two interpretations of law were possible when the original assessment order was made and the Assessing Officer adopted one of those interpretations, it cannot be said that the mistakes is apparent from the record.
11. In view of what has been said above, we are of the considered view that the Assessing Officer could not have invoked section 156(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, therefore, we answer questions Nos.1 and 2 in positive and question No.3 in negative. M.B.A./C-17/ISL Order accordingly.
Judgment & Decree
MUHAMMAD MUNIR PERACHA, J
The petitioner is a Private Limited Company, which derives income from manufacturing, sales of vaccines and pharmaceuticals. The return for the tax year, 2007 was filed by the petitioner company under Universal Self-Assessment Scheme declaring total Income of Rs.69,24,474 from the business. Vide notice, dated 19-4-2008, Commissioner of Income Tax Audit-II, Large Tax Payer's Unit, Islamabad, informed the petitioner that it has been selected for audit. The grounds on the basis whereof, the petitioner Company was selected were mentioned in the notice. On 5-5-2008, an application was made on behalf of the petitioner-Company requesting that the case of the petitioner be excluded from the selection. On 7-5-2008, the Commissioner Income Tax Audit-II, Large Tax Payers, Islamabad replied the petitioner company that the case of the Company has been rightly selected in accordance with provisions of section 177 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The petitioner invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court with the prayer that:-- "It is therefore, respectfully prayed that an appropriate writ may graciously be issued by declaring section 177 illegal, ultra vires against the Constitution of Pakistan, intimation latter for selection issued by the respondent No.1 be declared illegal and without any jurisdiction and proceedings initiated by respondent No.2 have no legal footing or grant any other relief which is fit to compensate the petitioner."
2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and with his help, examine the different provisions of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under section 120 of the Ordinance, if a tax-payer has furnished a complete return of income, the Commissioner shall be taken to have made an assessment of taxable income for that tax year and the tax due thereon, equal to those respective amounts specified in the return. According to the learned counsel, since under clause (b) of section 120(1), the return furnished by the Tax Payer becomes the assessment order issued to the taxpayer by the Commissioner, the day the return is furnished, the Commissioner can amend the assessment order only under section 122 of the Ordinance and for the amendment of the assessment order, under subsection (5) of section 122, it is a condition precedent that the Commissioner must be satisfied on the basis of definite information that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, or total income has been under assessed, or assessed too low a rate, or has been the subject of excessive relief or refund, or any amount under a head of income has been misclassified.
4. The second submission of the learned counsel is that before selecting the case of a taxpayer for audit, the taxpayer has to be given a show-cause notice. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, reported as (2006) 94 Tax 317 (S.C. Pak.) titled Commissioner of Income Tax and others v. Fatima Sharif Textile, Kasur and others". The third contention of the learned counsel is that the grounds mentioned in section 177(4) are vague.
5. Section 120 of the Income Tax Ordinance is reproduced:-- Section
120. Assessments (1) Where a Taxpayer has furnished a complete return of income (other than a revised return under subsection (6) of section 114) for a tax year ending on or after the 1st day of July, 2002:-- (a) The Commissioner shall be taken to have made an assessment of taxable income for that tax year, and the tax due thereon, equal to those respective amounts specified in the return; and ' (b) the return shall be taken for all the purposes of this Ordinance to be an assessment order issued to the taxpayer by the Commissioner on the day the return was furnished. (1-A) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), the Commissioner may select a person for an audit of his income tax affairs under section 177 and all the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly. (2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
In my view, subsection (1-A) of section 120 of the Ordinance is an exception to section 120(1). The return filed by a taxpayer shall be deemed to be an assessment order only if the case of the taxpayer has not been selected for an audit under section 177 of the Ordinance. In case a taxpayer has been selected for an audit, his return call not be deemed to be an assessment order because under subsection (1-A), the Commissioner has been given a power to select a person for an audit notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1). Subsection 122 of the Ordinance empowers the Commissioner to amend the assessment. Section (1-A) was inserted in section 120 by Finance Act, 2005. By insertion of section 1-A, the legislature conferred a power in addition to the powers under section 122 already possessed by the Commissioner. No limitation has been provided in section 120 for invoking sub-section (1-A). Although, subsection (6) of section 120 is confined to notice under section 120(3), however, by analogy, it can be assumed that Commissioner may not select a person for an audit under subsection (1-A) after the end of the Financial year. The legislature may examine the necessity of enacting an express provision for the purpose.
6. So far as the requirements of a show-cause notice before the selection for audit is concerned, in the present case, the requirement is satisfied. A notice was given to the petitioner company on 19-4-2008 informing him the grounds on the basis whereof the case of the petitioner has been selected for audit. The petitioner applied for exclusion of his case from audit vide letter, dated 5-5-2008 and the learned Commissioner after taking into consideration the letter of the respondents, rejected the request of the petitioner company to exclude the petitioner's case from audit. There is no express provision of issuing notice before the selection of the case for audit and the arguments of the petitioner is based on principle of natural justice. If there is no express provision in relevant law, the mode of affording opportunity of showing cause against action proposed to be taken varies from case to case. Personal hearing is not required in each case. A notice informing the petitioner of the fact its case being selected and the grounds therefore was given to the petitioner. It gave an application to exclude the case from audit and after considering the ground mentioned in the application for excluding the case from audit, the Commissioner rejected the application. This is sufficient compliance of the principle of natural justice.
7. The arguments of learned counsel that the grounds mentioned in section 177(4) are vague looks very attractive on its face. However, when deeply analyzed, it did not impress me. The consideration mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c) of subsections (4) of section 177 of Ordinance give a good idea of the honesty of the taxpayer and his willingness to pay tax. On the basis of the criteria mentioned in the above said clauses, the Commissioner can make up his mind to select a person for audit.
8. This petition is liable to be dismissed on another ground and that is that if income of the petitioner company is assessed after the audit, the order of assessment is appealable firstly to the Appellate Commissioner and then to the Tribunal. A reference is also competent before the High Court. In an appeal against the order of assessment, the petitioner will have a right to urge that its case was wrongly selected for audit. The petitioner therefore, has an adequate remedy. In Article 199 of the Constitution, the phrase used is "adequate remedy" and not "immediate remedy". It may be true that petitioner has no immediate remedy but he has an adequate remedy to challenge the order sought to be set aside through this writ petition before the Appellate forums after the order of assessment is made.
9. In view of what has been said above, this writ petition is dismissed in limine. M.H./A-42/ISL Petition dismissed.