P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

16. Having disposed of these preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents we now proceed to examine the contentions raised by Mr. Mehboob Elahi to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

17. The first contention is that the particulars of the land and property to be acquired as mentioned in the various notifications issued in this case are so vague and incomplete as to make it practically impossible for any person residing in the city of Lahore to identify the land in question. Mr. Mehboob Elahi has pointed out that in the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (copy at page 65 of part III of the Commissioner's file) it is only generally mentioned that the land measuring I, kanal and 18 marlas is likely to be acquired in village Naulakha, Tehsil and District Lahore, for a public purpose, namely, the construction of .a factory and workshop by Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers at Lahore. Further, in the notification issued under section 5 (copy at page 91 of the same file) the specifications of the land given are amplified so as to include Khasras Nos. 4789 & 4796, but no other description is given. The same is the case with the notification issued under section 6 of the Act (copy at page 135), with ,the difference that there is a recital that the plan of the said land can be inspected in the office of the Collector, Lahore District.

18. Now, the compulsory acquisition of land by the Govern ment for its own purposes. or for the purposes of a company is a drastic measure as, it seriously encroaches on the citizens' right to hold private property. It is for this reason that the producer outlined in the Land Acquisition Act contemplates a series of steps and notifications at successive stages so as to publicize the Governments intention to acquire land and to give an opportunity to all interested persons to object to the acquisition if they so desire. We have, therefore, to see whether in the present case the notifications issued could have achieved this object.

19. The notification under section 4 is intended to give a general notice in the nature of an advance information that land is likely to be acquired for a public purpose in a particular locality. The section does not contemplate that detailed particulars of the piece of land to be acquired‑should be given at this stage, but it does contemplate that the notification shall clearly mention the locality in which the land to be acquired is situated. As already indicated, the notification issued under section 4 in this case mentions that land is likely to be acquired in village Naulakha in the Tehsil and District Lahore. While it is true, as pointed out by Mr. A. R. Sheikh, the learned counsel for the respondent firm, that the land in question is situated in the revenue estate of Naulakha, we think it legitimate to pose the question as to whether this kind of description is appropriate to describe the property situated in the heart of the city of Lahore. To say the least, the description is vague and misleading except to those initiated in the practices of Revenue Law and Administration. The object of the notification it seems to us, is not merely to D prescribe technicalities but to achieve a substantial purpose, namely, to notify interested persons of Government's intention to, acquire land. Ass a mere technical description of the locality, the words "village Naulakha" may be correct, but it does not serve the purpose which the Legislature had in mind in prescribing the necessary notification under section 4 of the land Acquisition Act. With regard to property and land situated in urban town, particular by large ones, like Lahore, it is clear to us that an appropriate description, intelligible to all concerned would be to indicate the name of the road, Mohalla or municipal ward, where the property is situated, besides mentioning the revenue estate concerned. Only when this is done, can it be reasonably presumed that the residents of the locality have notice of Govern ment's intention to acquire land situated in that part of the town. We consider, therefore, that the notification issued by the Commis sioner, Lahore Division, under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was defective to the extent that it did not give that description of the locality which would be understood by the residents of Lahore.

20. The position is still more unsatisfactory with regard to the notification under section 5 of the Act. The only addition made in this notification, as compared to the one issued under section 4, is that the Khasra numbers of the land are mentioned. This is not a compliance with the requirements of section 5, which is to the following effect: ‑ "When the Provincial Government is satisfied, after consider ing the result of the survey, if any, made under section 4, sub section (2) or if no survey is necessary at any time, that any particular land included in a locality notified under section 4, subsection (1), is needed for a public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, stating the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and situation and where a plan has been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected and the Collector shall cause public notice to be given of the substance of the notification at convenient places on or near the land to be acquired."

21. It will be seen that section 5 requires that not only should the district or other territorial division in which the land is situated be mentioned, but its approximate area and the situation. It seems to us that the intention of the Legislature in indicating the additional requirement of mentioning the situation of the land, besides giving the name of the district and territorial division in which the land is situate, was to ensure that a detailed description of the location of the land shall be given in this notification. This view is also re‑enforced by the further direction contained in the section that where a plan has been made of the land the notification should disclose the place where such plan may be inspected, and, finally, that the Collector shall cause public notice to be given of the substance of the notification at convenient places on or near the land to be acquired. The section contains a comprehensive direction so as to ensure that all concerned shall have clear notice of the exact property intended to be acquired. This being so, we consider that it was incumbent on the relevant authority to indicate in the notification under section 5 of the Act the exact place where the land was situated, and this could have, been easily done in the present case by mentioning that the land was situated on Brandreth Road, Lahore, and that it bore certain property numbers, it is well known, and judicial notice can certainly be taken of this fact, that in urban areas property is much more easily identified with reference to the property numbers, allotted to it by the Local Body, rather than merely by the mention of Khasra number as contained in the revenue records. The fact that the acquisition was being ordered by a Revenue Officer, namely, the Commissioner, Lahore Division, does not alter the object underlying section 5 of the Act and is not an argument for saying that the requirements of law are met simply because the Revenue description is given in the notification.

22. We might here give an example to make our meaning clear. Suppose there was a proposal to acquire any of the well known properties or premise's situated on the Mall, Lahore, for example, the office of the daily Civil & Military Gazette, or the building which houses the Y. M. C. A., and the notification issued under section 4 merely said that the Government intended to acquire land for a public purpose in the village Mozang, and the notification under section 5 contained a further recital regarding the Khasra numbers of the land but nothing else. We are quite clear in our minds that the residents of Lahore City in general and even the persons closely interested in these properties, would not be easily able to connect such a description with these premises. We are of the view that such a description would be practically useless from the point of view of achieving the object with which the notifications have been prescribed in the Land Acquisition Act, namely, to apprise persons interested of the proposal for acquisition. It is obvious that if indeed the intention is to give a clear and unambiguous notice of any, proposal to acquire land in an urban area, then a notification under section 4 must not only mention the revenue estate in which the land is' situate but also indicate the road on which it is situated and they name of the Mohallah or Municipal Ward concerned. Similarly, notifications under sections 5 and 6 should indicate not only the name of the road, the Mohallah or the Municipal Ward but also the property number assigned to the land by the Local Body concerned, the premises or the building (if any) which is standing on the land and the purpose to which it is being put for the time being‑in addition to the revenue Khasra numbers which the land may bear in the revenue records. It is only when all these particulars are mentioned in the notifications that the requirement of law can be said to have been fully complied with.

23. In the present case, the notification issued under section 5 does not contain the essential particulars as indicated above. 'It does not even mention that any superstructure is standing on the site. The description of land given therein is utterly inadequate and vague, with the result that the petitioner and other interested persons were seriously prejudiced in regard to their right to bring forward objections to the acquisition of the land, as required by section 5‑A of the Land Acquisition Act.

24. More or less the same observations apply to the notification issued under section 6 of the Act, although, as already stated, this notification contained a recital that the plan of the land to be acquired could be inspected in the office of the Collector. This additional recital did not, in our view, make any material difference as the description of the land given in the notification still remained inadequate and incomplete.

25. Having found that the notifications under sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act issued in this case suffer from vagueness and inadequacy of description and were no such as were likely to achieve the object which underlies their prescription, we have no hesitation in holding that the entire acquisition proceedings stand vitiated because of these defects. The notifications did not give a clear indication of the land to be acquired and thus operated to the prejudice of the person interested. In this regard we agree with the view taken by learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case relied upon by Mr. Mehboob Ilahi, namely, Asghar Eli v. State of Uttar Pardesh and others (AIR 1959 All 792). In that case there was a misdescription of the area in the notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The relevant observations may be reproduced here with advantage:‑ "The result .was that the notification remained vague and incapable of conveying a clear description of the land sought to be acquired. The very foundation of the proceedings for acquisition thus suffered from vagueness. It amounted to an illegality. The notification under section 6 will not, therefore, help the respondents. * * * * * ' * * * * * The acquisition proceedings, in the present case are attended with an error apparent on the face of the proceedings, They are, therefore, liable to be quashed." Mr. A. R. Sheikh contended that an omission in the description of land in the various notifications should not be held to vitiate the acquisition proceedings and in his support he referred us to Mahanta Sri Sukdev Saran Dev v. Raja Nripendra Narayan Chandradhvarjee (1942 (76) CLJ 430). We find, however, that the authority cited does not help the respondents before us, as in that case it was observed that where there is no ambiguity or doubt as to what land was proposed to be acquired, a minor error regarding the boundary lines between the two districts did not invalidate the subsequent proceedings. In the present case however we are not dealing with a minor misdescription of the land, but with major omissions.

26. The next contention is that narcotics were served on the petitioners as required by law with the result that the proceedings were conducted in secrecy and the petitioners had no opportunity to object to the acquisition. This contention needs to be examined with reference to the various provisions iii the Act which require service of individual notices on interested persons.

27. Section 4 of the Act requires only a public notice of the substance of the notification. Subsection (2) of this section no doubt mentions an individual notice on the occupier, but that its only for the purposes of entering on the land to carry out survey, etc., and is not relevant in the present context. At pages 65‑66 of the file there is a report that proclamation has been done and notices have been pasted on the spot. In view of this report we are bound to hold that the require ments of section 4 with regard to the public notice have been complied with.

28. The next step in the acquisition proceedings is a notification under section 5 of the Act, which has to be published in the official Gazette. Besides the notification, the Collector has to cause public notice to be given of the substance of the notification at convenient places on or near the land to be acquired. This section also does no contemplate any individual notices. There is no doubt that at pages 91 and 92 of the file, referred to there is a direction by the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore that the service of the notification should be effected on the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired but this was not a legal requirement. As regards the public notice to be given on or near the land to be acquired there is a report on pages 92 and 93 of the file that this has been done. We conclude, therefore, that the requirements of section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act were fulfilled.

29. The next stage for the service of notices is under section 9 of the Act regarding the intention of the Government to take possession of the land about which a declaration has been made under section 6 of the Act. The section requires a public notice as well as individual notices to the occupier and all persons known or believed to be interested in the land or to be entitled to act for persons so interested. In pursuance of the orders of the Collector the Tehsildar of Lahore prepared a list of the persons to whom notices should go, and this is to be found on pages 15 to 20 of the Urdu portion of the file started by the Tahsildar. Notices were issued to the following eight persons : (1) Shaukat Ali, (2) Abdur Rashid, (3) Feroze Din, (4) Muhammad Siddique, (5) Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers, (6) Abdul Khaliq, (7) Allah Rakha, and (8) Nazir Ahmad (for Ahmad Din and Siraj Din). The proceedings in the Urdu file shows that Feroze Din, Abdul Khaliq, Nazir Ahmad and Messrs Siraj Din‑Muhammad Dig were not served in the first instance and, therefore, notices were issued again in their names. Then there is a report that these persons could not be served as they were evading service and accordingly notices were pasted on their property. A third attempt was also made to serve these persons but with the same results. Sheikh Mehboob Ilahi has argued that there is no reason why the petitioners Feroze Din and others should have evaded service' of these notices, and has strenuously contended that all the reports' of evasion of service have been manipulated by the same revenue official who must have been in league with the respondent firm. This may or may not be the correct explanation of the non‑service of notices on Feroze Din and others, but we are trot in a position to go beyond the reports made by the officials and accordingly we cannot hold that the petitioners were deliberately kept in the dark regarding proceedings under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. This position, however, does obtain with regard to the petitioners Waheed‑ud‑Din and Salah‑ud‑Din as there is no indication that any notices were ever issued in their names.

30. But we find that the notices under section 9 are issued at a stage where the question as to whether the property should or should not be acquired has already been decided and concluded by the publication of a notification under section 6 of the Act. It seems to us, therefore, that the question of service, or non‑service of notices issued under section 9 of the Act has no direct bearing on the issue which is being agitated before us, namely, the legality of the acquisition itself. The object of notices under section 9 of the Act is to enable the persons interested to claim compensation. We are not directly concerned with the quantum of compensation assessed or awarded in this case.

31. Similarly, notices are prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of the Act, but those are also in connection with the assessment of compensation, and we do not think it necessary to examine as to whether such notices were served on any of the petitioners or not. Finally, section 12 (2) of the Act also requires a notice of the award to be served on the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives when the award was made put it is clear that these notices again do not deal with the question of the acquisition of land.

32. From the above analysis, it would appear that the notices prescribed under sections 4 and 5 of the Act, which alone are relevant for determining the legality of the acqui sition itself, must be deemed to have been served according to law, and the acquisition proceedings cannot be questioned on this ground.

33. The next contention is that the notifications tinder , sections 4 and 5 as well as under section 6 of the Act do not contain any mention of the superstructures which were standing on the evacuee land in question and, therefore, these super structures could not legally be acquired in these proceedings. Mr. A. R. Sheikh has, however, referred us to the definition of the expression "land" in clause (a) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act and argued that it was not necessary to mention the superstructures separately in the notifications issued in this case. The expression "land" has been defined in the Act as including benefits to arise out of land and the things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. 1n 'view of this definition, it is correct that the superstructures could be described as land, but we have already observed that inter alia the failure to mention the existence of these superstructures or buildings in the notifications tinder sections 4 and 5 has resulted in a major misdescription of the land to be acquired, and for that reason vitiated the entire acqui sition proceedings. In view of that finding, it is not really necessary to examine the present contention any further.

34. The, fourth point made by Sh. Mehboob Ilahi is that Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers have procured this acquisition by misrepresenting facts before the relevant authorities in three respects. In the first place it is alleged that the application presented by the firm for the acquisition of the land, a copy of which is at annexure 3, did not mention the fact that a major part of the land to be acquired was on lease with the petitioners Feroze Din, Wahid‑ud‑Din and Salah‑ud‑Din and that these persons had built some superstructures over it. Instead the application mentioned that the superstructures over the land had been built by the firm some twenty‑six years ago. It is conceded by Mr. A. R. Sheikh that the application did contain a mis‑statement of fact with regard to the erection of the entire superstructure by the firm or their predecessor lchhra Ram. He accepts the factual position that Ichhra Ram was only a sub‑tenant under the petitioners and that he built only a part of the superstructure which is now standing on the land. The second allegation against the respondent‑firm is that they wrongly stated that their factory or workshop was spread over an area of 1 kanal 18 marlas and 7 square‑feet, whereas the true position was that the area in their actual possession did not exceed 13 marlas, and the remaining area was in the possession of the petitioners and others, including the tenants of the petitioners. This allegation also cannot be refuted by the respondents as in actual fact they were not in possession of the entire area for the acquisition of which they had applied. The third misrepresentation of fact pointed out by Sh. Mehboob Ilahi is that in the application at annexure 3 the respondent firm did not at all mention the road on which the land was situated, nor did it give any other particulars of the property or the persons who were occupying it. We have already dealt at some length with the question of the misdescription of the property while dealing with the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners and we do not, therefore, propose to say any thing more on this aspect of the matter.

35. It will be seen, therefore, that the application for acquisi tion presented by the respondents, Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers, did contain a misrepresentation of facts on two important points, namely, the extent of area occupied by them and the ownership of the superstructures standing on the entire land to be acquired. The narration of facts already given in the earlier part of this judgment would show that only a very small part of the superstructure standing on the land to be acquired was built by Ichhra Ram. We think it is possible that if these two misre presentations of fact had not been made by the firm, the relevant authorities may have refused to acquire the land, as the acquisition was bound to raise the problem regarding the rehabili tation of those who were occupying the existing superstructures. Mr. A. R. Sheikh has, however, strenuously contended that the misrepresentations; if any are not material, as it is not shown that in actual fact the Commissioner has been misled in any manner, nor is there any evidence to the effect that the Commissioner would have refused to proceed with the acquisition if the true facts had been made known to him. Mr. Ata Ullah Sajjad has supplemented these submissions by adding that due publicity was given to the acquisition proceedings at various stages by the publication of the notifications in the official Gazette and by issuing public notices required by law and there fore, no question of practising any fraud on the statute arises in this case.

36. Sheikh Mehboob Ilahi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has referred. us to The Queen v. Gillyard (1). That was a case where a maltster Thomas Haigh had obtained the conviction of his servant Gillyard in respect of certain offences for having taken a quantity of barley out of a cistern in Haigh's malthouse at another time than between the hours of seven in .the morning and four in the afternoon, in violati )n of Statutes 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 52, section

46. The principal ground urged before their Lordships was that the conviction was procured collusively between Gillyard and Haigh in order that the conviction might enure to the protection of the latter under a proviso contained in the section. It was .held that the con viction was a fraud and mockery and when the Court observes such dishonest practices, it will interfere although judgment has been given. It was further added that the Court had authority to correct all irregularities in the proceedings of inferior tribunals, which in this case had been resorted to for the purpose of fraud. The learned counsel also relied on a decision of this Court in Diwan Ziaul Haq v. The Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1956 Lah: 358) where the following observations appear :‑ "'Certiorari will be appropriate to quash the decision of a tribunal which has assumed a jurisdiction that it does not possess, or where bias by interest or want of good faith is alleged, or where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice or where there is fraud and perjury."

37. We have already observed that the application submitted by the firm Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers for starting the acquisition proceedings does contain misrepresentations of fact with regard to the area in their possession and also with regard to the persons who had built the major of the super-structures standing on the land. While there is no doubt that there is no positive evidence on the record to show as to what has been the actual effect of these misrepresentations on the mind of the Commissioner who ordered the acquisition of the land in question, we think it is legitimate to observe that if the applica tion had made it clear that the firm was in possession of only 13 marlas of land and that the major portion of the super -structure standing on the land was neither in its possession no was it erected by the firm or its predecessor, the course of events might have been different. The entire noting of the file proceeds on the basis that the firm was in possession of the whole of the area and the superstructure standing thereon. We think, therefore that this is a case where the acquisition proceedings are vitiated/ by perjury and fraud, and liable to be quashed on that ground.

38. The next contention which needs examination is that the firm Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers was not registered at the time it applied for acquisition of the land nor at the time the notifications under sections 4 and 5 were issued, with the result that it could not be regarded as a company as defined under the Land Acquisition Act, and no land could be acquired for it. The relevant dates, have already been mentioned in paragraph 5 above, but they may be recapitulated here. The application for acquisition was made by the firm Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers on 6th June 1955, the notification under section 4 was issued on the 19th of May 19‑58 and under section 5 on the 5th of February 1959. The firm was registered under the Companies Act on 5th of June 1959. These facts are admitted, but the contention is sought to be repelled by arguing that it is unnecessary that the firm should be a registered one at the time of the preliminary notifications under sections 4 and 5, if it is so registered at the time the agreement is executed between, it and the Government and the notification under section 6 is issued, because section 39 of the Land Acquisition Act requires that provisions of sections 6 to 37 can come into . play only if the necessary agreement has been executed.

39. The machinery of the Land Acquisition Act is set into motion by publishing a notification under section 4 of the Act to the effect that it appears to the Provincial Government (or to the Commissioner, according to the latest amendment of the. Act) that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose. The section as such does not mention the requirement of land for the purpose of a company, but it is clear that this notification is the foundation or the basis of the proceedings which have to follow. If, therefore at the tune of issuing of this notification the institution for which land is to be acquired is not one for which provision is made in the statute, the notification must be regarded as invalid, for the simple reason that the acquisition of land in such a case would not be authorised by the Land Acquisition .Act. In the present case the notification issued under section 4 recites that land is likely to be acquired by Government for a public purpose, namely, for "the construction of a factory and a workshop‑ by Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers at Lahore." On the date of the publication of this notification the firm, Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers, not being registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, could not be regarded as a company within the meaning of the definition given .in clause (e) of section 3 of the Act, with the result that no land could be acquired for it on that day.

40. The next step is the publication of a notification under section 5 of the Act to the effect that any particular land included in a locality notified under section 4, subsection (1) is needed for a public purpose or for a company. In this notification again the name of. Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers is mentioned. The firm being unregistered even at the date was again not entitled to ask for compulsory acquisition ,of land in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It is true that when the notification under section 6 was publicised, the firm had been registered and had become a company as defined in the Act, but the notification under section 6 was a culmination of the process which had commenced with the publication of the first notification under section 4 of the Act. The notification under section 6 cannot stand by itself. The provisions of section 39 of the Act to the effect that sections 6 to 37 of the Act shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any company unless with the previous consent of the Government nor unless the company shall have executed the agreement, cannot be construed to mean that the previous notifications under sections 4 and 5 can be issued for a firm or an association of persons which is not a company within the meaning of the Act. The language of section 39 is very clear and its scope and application must be confined to the plain meaning of the words used therein, namely, that the final declaration under section 6 and the subsequent steps for completing the acquisition shall not be taken unless the two conditions mentioned in section 39 are fulfilled. The section, however, has no effect on the question of the validity or other wise of the notifications which have already been issued under sections 4 and 5 of the Act. Mr: A. R. Sheikh was not able to cite a single authority to support the proposition put forward by him. We have no doubt at all that if those notifications are issued for the purpose of acquiring land for a firm which cannot be regarded as a company by virtue of being non‑registered on the relevant dates, the notifications must be regarded as invalid and falling outside the purview of the Land Acquisition Act. That being the case, all the subsequent proceedings would also stand vitiated as, there will be no valid foundation for them.

41. In view of .our findings on the first, fourth and fifth contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, we do not consider it necessary to examine the next ground urged by Sh. Mehboob Ilahi against the legality of the acquisition proceedings, namely, that the acquisition in this case was not for a public purpose nor did it fall within the ambit of section 40 of the Land Acquisition Act. A consideration of this question would have been .necessary only if we had found the acquisition proceedings otherwise valid and in accordance with law. As regards the final point raised by Sh. Mehboob llahi that the price assessed is much too low, we need only observe that this is not a circum stance which would be directly relevant to the question of the legality of the proceedings.

42. To sum up, our findings are that the acquisition pro ceedings in the present case are materially vitiated for the follow ing reasons :‑ (a). The notifications issued under sections 4 and 5 of the Act suffer from vagueness and inadequacy of description of a serious nature with the result that the persons interested could not come to know of the acquisition proceedings and were thus deprived of exercising their statutory right of objecting .to the acquisition under section 5,‑A of tile Land Acquisition Act. (b) there was a misrepresentation of facts by the respondent firm Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers in regard to the extent of area in their possession as well as the owner ship of the superstructures standing on the land to be acquired, and (c) the firm Messrs Muhammad Bakhsh & Brothers was not registered under the Companies Act at the time it made the application for acquisition and on the dates the notifications under sections 4 and 5 of the Act were issued, with the result that under the law no land could be acquired for this firm on those dates, and accordingly the notifications in question were illegal and clearly outside the purview of the Land Acquisition Act. All the subsequent proceedings must also be regarded as illegal and without jurisdiction for want of a legal foundation. For all these reasons, we issue a writ of certiorari, quashing the acquisition proceedings. All the three petitions are, therefore, accepted with costs. A. H. Petitions accepted.