2025 PLP (Trib (PTD)

DR. HUMA SODHER, MEMBER.

The Appellant Department instituted the present appeal in 2019 and assailed the Order dated 09.09.2019 passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), whereby the sales tax demand of Rs.33,855.642 (Million), along with a penalty equal to the principal amount and default surcharge, as raised vide Assessment Order No. 02/2019 dated 03.07.2019, was deleted.

2. Per record, the case originates from an analysis of the Respondent's audited accounts and e-filed sales tax returns for the tax periods from July 2004 to June 2014, which revealed non-payment of sales tax amounting to Rs.33,855.642 (Million) on Price Differential Claim ("PDC") receipts aggregating Rs.199,158.768 (Million) received from the Government of Pakistan. Consequently, show-cause notices dated 09.05.2017 and 30.06.2017 were issued. Thereafter, Assessment Order No. 02/2019 dated 03.07.2019 was passed under Sections 11(2) and 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, raising a demand of Rs.33,855.642 (Million) as allegedly evaded sales tax, along with default surcharge (to be calculated at the time of payment), and imposing a penalty of Rs. 33,855.642 (Million) under Section 33(13) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Aggrieved by the said Assessment Order, the Respondent preferred an appeal before the CIR (Appeals), who vide Order No. 29 dated 09.09.2019 (the "Impugned Order"), deleted the entire demand. The Department, being dissatisfied, has preferred the instant appeal challenging the Impugned Order.

3. On the date of hearing, Mr. Gul Badshah appeared as Departmental Representative (DR) on behalf of the Appellant Department while. Mr. Haris Tufail (FCA) as Authorized Representative (AR) appeared on behalf of the respondent/registered person.

4. The learned Departmental Representative (DR) submitted written submissions wherein it was contended that the Impugned Order passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), Karachi, is vitiated by legal and factual infirmities. It was further contended that the learned CIR (Appeals) erred in allowing the Respondent's appeal and deleting the sales tax demand of Rs. 33,855.642 (Million) on the ground of limitation under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, without properly appreciating that the case involved elements of tax fraud, thereby attracting the statutory exception to the limitation period, as affirmed by the Honourable Lahore High Court in W.P. No. 163/2010 dated 21.04.2010. It was argued that the learned CIR (Appeals-II) erred in holding that the PDC received by the Respondent did not fall within the ambit of taxable supplies under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, without properly appreciating that such payments were made by the Government of Pakistan on behalf of the end consumers, i.e., the general public, and were funded through public revenues generated from taxes paid by the general public. Accordingly, the PDC formed part of the value of supply within the meaning of Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. In support of this position, reliance was placed on the decision of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Lahore Bench (Camp at Multan), in STA No. 247/LB/2013 dated 19.12.2014, wherein an identical issue concerning TDS subsidy in the power sector was adjudicated in favour of the Department. Additionally, it was contended that the deletion of default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33(13) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was unjustified, as the Respondent was manifestly in default by committing tax fraud and failing to charge sales tax on PDC receipts. Hence, the instant appeal has been preferred to assail the Impugned Order.

5. In rebuttal, the learned Authorised Representative (AR) also submitted written submissions and argued that the learned CIR (Appeals) had lawfully deleted the impugned demand on both legal and factual grounds. It was contended that the plea of limitation was rightly upheld, rendering tax periods prior to 30.06.2012 time-barred under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It was underscored that the PDC constitutes a subsidy paid by the Government when Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) are mandated to supply petroleum products at regulated prices below actual cost and does not amount to consideration for taxable supplies. It was further argued that, since no supply is made to the Government and no tax invoices are issued in respect of the Price Differential Claims (PDC), such receipts do not fall within the ambit of the charging provisions or the definition of "value of supply" under the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and therefore cannot be subjected to sales tax within the statutory scheme. It was further contended that the allegation of tax fraud is devoid of evidentiary support, as the DCIR failed to establish any fraudulent intent or deliberate concealment on the part of the Respondent. The invocation of Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was alleged to be mala fide, intended solely to bypass the statutory bar of limitation. Without prejudice, it was submitted that the matter involves a question of legal interpretation rather than willful evasion, and therefore does not fall within the purview of "tax fraud" as defined under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Lastly, it was submitted that, in the absence of mens rea and any established tax fraud on the part of the Respondent, the deletion of default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, was lawful and legally sustainable.

6. Upon examination of the Impugned Order and available record, the following key issues crystallize for determination: (i) Whether the limitation prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is inapplicable in view of the Department's claim of tax fraud; (ii) Whether the Price Differential Claims (PDC) received by the Respondent from the Government of Pakistan constitute "value of supply" within the meaning of Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and are therefore liable to sales tax-particularly in view of the Department's position that such payments were made on behalf of end-consumers and fall within the scope of value of supply as interpreted in the Tribunal's decision in the MEPCO case. (iii) Whether the imposition of default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33(13) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is legally sustainable, in view of the Department's stance that the Respondent committed tax fraud by not charging sales tax on Price Differential Claims (PDCs) on petroleum products. (i) Whether the limitation prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is inapplicable in view of the Department's claim of tax fraud

7. A review of the Impugned Order and available record reveals that the core legal issue, as framed in Ground No. 22 of this appeal, concerns whether the case is time-barred under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Appellant Department asserts that limitation does not apply in cases of tax fraud, relying on W.P. No. 163/2010. However, the original Assessment Order contains no evidence establishing fraudulent intent under Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The allegation rests solely on an unsubstantiated assertion3 by the DCIR, a fact acknowledged by the learned CIR (Appeals) in the Impugned Order, which states: "The factual submissions by the AR of the appellant show that majority of the demand have been raised on the tax periods which is time barred in accordance with the Sales Tax Act, 1990. However, the DCIR has not considered the plea of the AR on the time limitation on the ground that he believes the appellant has committed tax fraud. In this concern, I have gone through the assessment order and the only observation I have found in the order by the assessment officer on this subject is on page No. 19 of the order which is as under: "The second stance taken by the learned counsel regarding time limitation, it is pertinent to mention here that the instant case falls under the ambit of Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It has been proved beyond any doubt that the registered person has deprived the national exchequer from sales tax amounting to Rs. 35,696.013 (Million) fraudulently during the tax periods i.e. 2005 to 2014, since it involves an issue of tax fraud. Thus, the time limitation provisions are not applicable in this case, in the light of Honourable High Court, Lahore decision vide W.P. No. 163-2010 dated 21.04.2010. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced as under: "With regard of limitation of time for investigative audit in a tax fraud case, which is a moot point here, the Act does not impose any time constraint or the past period for which the record of an accused may be scrutinized." .Consequently, since allegation of tax fraud has not been proved by the DCIR on part of the appellant, the time limitation stipulated under the Sales Tax Act, 1990 stands and squarely applied in the instant case. Thus, the appeal in respect of time limitation contested by the appellant is also decided in favour of the appellant and tax periods before 30.06.2012 are hereby declared barred by time limitation." The learned CIR (Appeals) found that W.P. No. 163/2010 was inapplicable, as it concerned investigative audit under a different factual matrix, whereas the present proceedings arise under Section 11(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. He, therefore, concluded that the limitation plea was valid and that the tax demand for periods prior to 30.06.2012 was time-barred.

8. However, it is observed that at all tiers of proceedings before the CIR (Appeals), and now before this Tribunal the department has consistently confined its arguments to the assertion that the present case involves elements of "tax fraud" under Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and that consequently, the limitation under Section 11(5) of the Act does not apply. This line of argument, however, not only stands on tenuous legal footing but is squarely barred by the binding precedent-particularly the unreported judgment of the Honourable High Court of Sindh in M/s Hascol Petroleum Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others4 (Hascol). In that case, the Department miserably failed to persuade the Court that the non-levy of sales tax on Price Differential Claims (PDCs) received from the Government of Pakistan for supplies of oil products constituted tax fraud, or that such a claim could justify the bypassing of the limitation prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

9. What is particularly significant is that the Appellant Department was itself the petitioner in the Hascol (supra) case before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan5, and the respondent in the proceedings before the Honourable High Court of Sindh. In both forums, the Department advanced substantially identical arguments to those now before this Tribunal

namely, that the issuance of show cause notices beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, could be justified on the basis of alleged "tax fraud" under Section 2(37) of the Act. The Honourable High Court, in a detailed and reasoned judgment, categorically rejected this contention, holding as follows: "On facts, it has not been disputed that the impugned Show-Cause Notices have been admittedly issued after the statutory period of five years provided under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Though the tax period in all cases are different; however, it is an admitted position that the Show-Cause Notices issued are beyond the period of 5 years as above; hence, the proceedings of recovery are apparently time barred and cannot be allowed to be acted upon. Moreover, the argument that it is a case of tax fraud in terms of Section 2(37) ibid also appears to be misconceived on two grounds. First, even if we were to accept the allegation that there is an element of tax fraud involved, it would not ipso facto enhance the limitation as provided in Section 11(5) of the Act as contended. It would still remain the same. The Principle that no limitation runs against a void order (tax fraud here) is of no relevance; rather an attempt on the part of the respondent to cover their inefficiency by asking this Court to condone the limitation. It is not a question of exercising any discretion in the matter. Secondly, with utmost respect the present case on perusal of the Show-Cause Notice8 does not even otherwise seems to be a case of tax fraud per se. In Show-Cause Notice the only allegation is that Sales Tax has not been charged on Price Differential Claims received from the Government of Pakistan against supplies of oil products. We are unable to understand as to how could such a transaction be a case of tax fraud. Nonetheless, all short payment(s) of Sales Tax would not ipso facto fall under Section 2(37) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. At least in the present case, we are unable to agree with this proposition as raised on behalf of the Department." (emphasis added) The Department subsequently assailed this judgment before the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan vide Civil Petitions Nos. 88-K to 92-K of 2021. On the date of hearing, the said petitions were argued by the learned counsel for the department whereas none represented the respondent registered persons. The honourable apex Court, vide its Order dated 05.07.2021, declined to interfere with the Hascol (supra) judgment, and dismissed the petitions in the following unequivocal terms: "No case is made out for our interfering with the impugned judgment. The petitions are dismissed." Thus, the legal proposition advanced by the Department in the present case whether delayed show-cause notices for sales tax on Price Differential Claims could be salvaged from the bar of limitation on the basis of alleged tax fraud- has already been squarely addressed and definitively answered in negative in Hascol (supra) case by the Honourable High Court of Sindh. Furthermore, the dismissal of the civil petitions by the Honourable Supreme Court, without interference, has conferred finality upon the said pronouncement,

10. It is deeply concerning that the Department, while contesting the present appeal on the identical issue of time-barred sales tax demand arising from Price Differential Claims (PDC), did not disclose the binding, albeit unreported, judgment rendered by the Honourable High Court of Sindh in Hascol (supra)

a decision in which the Department was not only the respondent before the High Court but also the petitioner in the civil petitions subsequently dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. This omission amounts to material concealment of a directly relevant and adverse judicial precedent. It is a well-settled principle of law that concealment of material facts or legal authority, particularly precedent directly binding upon a party, is antithetical to the duty of candour incumbent upon a public authority. Such conduct not only undermines the integrity of the adversarial process but may also invite judicial censure. The Department, being an arm of the state, is under an elevated obligation to assist the Tribunal with full disclosure, especially where judicial authority squarely covers the legal issue in question.

11. In any event, the factual matrix of the case

as evidenced by the tabulated data reproduced in Assessment Order No. 02/2019 dated 03.07.2019, which remains uncontroverted by the Department across all stages of adjudication, including during proceedings before the learned CIR (Appeals) and in its written submissions before this Tribunal

clearly establishes that the impugned demand predominantly pertains to tax periods falling outside the five-year statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The legal issue of limitation in the context of sales tax liability on PDC receipts has already been conclusively adjudicated in Hascol (supra), wherein the Honourable High Court of Sindh held

and the Honourable Supreme Court affirmed by declining to interfere

that, even if tax fraud is presumed, it does not, by itself, extend the limitation period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. It is observed that the limitation period prescribed under Section 11(5) of the Act is mandatory, not merely directory, as consistently and unequivocally affirmed by the superior judiciary, including the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in WAK Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue and others (judgment dated 14.05.2025), which upheld the principle established in Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia Mohammad Din6.

12. In the light of binding judicial precedents and the foregoing analysis, the Department's continued reliance on the unsubstantiated exception of 'tax fraud' to circumvent the statutory bar of limitation is legally untenable and without merit. Accordingly, the findings of the learned CIR (Appeals) that the tax periods prior to 30.06.2012 are time-barred under Section 11(5) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, are affirmed and do not warrant interference. (ii) Whether the Price Differential Claims (PDC) received by the Respondent from the Government of Pakistan constitute "value of supply" within the meaning of Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and are therefore liable to sales tax-particularly in view of the Department's position that such payments were made on behalf of end-consumers and fall within the scope of value of supply as interpreted in the Tribunal's decision in the MEPCO7 case.

13. As regards the residual impugned demand-pertaining to tax periods not hit by limitation-it becomes necessary to determine whether Price Differential Claims (PDCs) qualify as "value of supply" under Section 2 (46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. This issue requires a careful examination of the legal character of PDCs and an interpretation of the statutory contours of the term "value of supply" to assess whether such receipts fall within the ambit of sales tax.

14. The Department's stance

that PDCs fall within the scope of "value of supply" under Section 2(46)-is principally based on FBR letter No. 1(17) STR/20008, which as once interpreted as bringing PDCs within the sales tax net. However, as rightly pointed out by the learned AR, reliance on this letter is legally ustenable, se it was explicitly withdrawn through FBR circular C.No.1(30)STR/99 (Vol-II), thereby extinguishing any interpretative value it may, if any, have once held. Notably, both the withdrawn letter and the subsequent circular pertain solely to PDCs paid to oil refineries. The Department's attempt to extend the rationale applicable to refineries to OMCs is devoid of doctrinal and statutory foundation-particularly given that the very classification of PDCs, as consideration under Section 2(46) of the Act, was expressly reconsidered and reversed by the later FBR circular C.No.1(30)STR/99 (Vol-II). The said later FBR Circular, issued by the Revenue Division, Central Board of Revenue (Sales Tax Wing), clearly delineates the scope of "value of supply" and expressly excludes governmental subsidies, in the form of PDCs, from that definition in the case of oil refineries. The relevant clarification reads: "So far as the question of taxability of the value of supply is concerned, it has to be as per section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 on the consideration in money, including Federal and Provincial duties and taxes, which the supplier (oil refineries) receives from the recipient for that supply. As the word 'recipient' is the key word, it is to be seen who is the recipient of the petroleum products. Undisputedly, the recipient in the case in hand are the OMCs and not the Government. Thus, any price paid by OMCs to the oil refineries shall be the value of supply, which constitutes the basis of tax, and any subsidy received from the Government is not a value of supply." This clarification aligns with the statutory definition of "value of supply" in Section 2(46) of the Act, which provides that the value of supply in respect of a taxable supply is the consideration in money including all Federal and Provincial duties and taxes, if any, which the supplier receives from the recipient for that supply.

15. The learned AR underscored that further support for non-levy of sales tax on PDCs is found in the Sales Tax Notification S.R.O. 911(I)/2007 dated 10.09.2007, issued by the Revenue Division, which expressly excluded PDCs-"as notified by the Federal Government"

from the import value and value of supply of High-Speed Diesel (HSD) for the purposes of sales tax on both imports and local supply. It is notable that HSD also forms is part of the subject matter of the impugned assessment order dated 03.07.2019. No subsequent legal instrument repealing or modifying the 2007 Notification has been placed on record by the Department. When confronted with this Notification during the hearing of instant appeal, the learned DR did not dispute its issuance, validity, or applicability. Accordingly, the Department's reliance on outdated/withdrawn administrative interpretations, such as FBR Letter No. 1(17) STR/2000, stands legally refuted.

16. The Department has also relied on Multan Electric Power Company v. CIR, Zone-II, RTO, Multan (2016 PTD 1829)9, which was set aside10 by the Honourable Lahore High Court, hence, the same is not in field. However, such reliance of the Department demonstrates that it equates the legal character of PDCs with that of TDS, which was elaborated in Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) v. CIR, RTO, Peshawar (2020 PTD 1068), in the following terms: "

8. It is evident that subsidy is universally considered to be a welfare measure taken by the State to keep down the prices and to ameliorate the hardship faced by the society ..Subsidy granted by the government and any tax relating thereto cannot be collected from the consumers and thus the contention of subsidy being taxable is not tenable in view of basic philosophy of V.A.T. It is submitted that NEPRA fixes the price of electricity under a law and PESCO is bound to bill the consumers in accordance with that price. The sales tax is not payable on the amount of tariff subsidy received from the government as Social Welfare measure to keep the price of electricity at a lower level and uniform all over the cuntry ."

17. A significant statutory development reinforcing the exclusion of subsidies from the value of supply is the insertion of an Explanation to sub-clause (i) of clause (46) of Section 2 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which expressly affirms that such subsidies are not, and never were, chargeable to sales tax. The Explanation provides: "Explanation.

It is clarified that the value of supply does not include the amount of subsidy provided by the Federal Government or Provincial Governments to the electricity or natural gas, including re-gasified liquefied natural gas, consumers and has never been chargeable to tax under the Act." This amendment reflects the legislative intent that government-provided subsidies

such as Tariff Differential Subsidies (TDS) paid to the DISCOs (Distribution Companies) in Power sector

are excluded from the value of supply. With the enactment of this Explanation, the issue of non-levy of sales tax on TDS payments stands conclusively settled, leaving no scope for contrary interpretation under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. By necessary implication, this also applies to analogous mechanisms such as PDCs.

18. Akin to TDS, PDC payments are unilateral fiscal support measures intended to shield consumers from market fluctuations. They are disbursed by the State to regulated intermediaries (such as OMCs or DISCOs) to compensate for losses incurred due to adherence to state-imposed price controls. These subsidies are not paid under any bilateral contract with the Government, which acts neither as the purchaser nor the recipient of the supply. The absence of a reciprocal legal arrangement or direct quid pro quo precludes PDCs from qualifying as "consideration" as envisaged under Section 2(46) of Sales Tax Act, 1990.

19. Though the Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not define "subsidy," authoritative legal lexicons, such as P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon11, define it as: "money granted by the State or a public body to keep down the prices of commodities." This description aptly captures the nature of PDCs, which are compensatory payments by the Government to OMCs for selling fuel at State-regulated prices below the OGRA-determined ex-refinery or import parity rates, and not for any supply made to the Government.

20. To comprehend the true nature of Price Differential Claims (PDCs), it is necessary to consider the regulated pricing framework governing Pakistan's petroleum sector. The petroleum supply chain in Pakistan is functionally segmented into upstream12, midstream13, and downstream14 sectors. Within this framework, petroleum pricing

comprising the Ex-Refinery Sale Price15 and the Ex-Depot Sale Price16

is determined by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) on a fortnightly basis, pursuant to a structured "Price Build-up Formula"17, embedded in a complex regulatory scheme. The Appellant, being an Oil Marketing Company (OMC) engaged in the downstream petroleum sector, procures products at the Ex-Refinery Import Parity Price and supplied them to end-consumers at the regulated, and often lower, Ex-Depot Sale Price. This pricing disparity resulted in a shortfall, which was compensated by the Government through Price Differential Claims (PDCs). Such payments are not recovered from consumers, nor do they arise from any reciprocal supply made to the Government. Rather, they constitute fiscal support extended in furtherance of public policy objectives. Accordingly, they do not fall within the ambit of "value of supply" as defined under Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990.

21. In view of foregoing, treating PDCs as taxable consideration would result in multiple anomalies: taxing entities on amounts not derived from taxable supplies; violating tariff notifications that cap prices; and retrospectively burdening regulated entities with tax liability despite no supply being made to the Government. It would also exacerbate circular debt. These consequences were similarly observed in PESCO v. CIR (2020 PTD 1068)18 "11. .Looking at subsidy issue from another angle, assuming without conceding, if the subsidy amount paid by the government is taxable, then the sales tax relating thereto should also be paid by the Government and the Federal Board of Revenue should sort out this issue with the relevant Ministry. It is evident that subsidy paid by the Government of Pakistan is not the consideration received from the recipient of the supply. As the subsidy provided by the Government is sort of compensation rather than revenue in nature, therefore, the same cannot be brought under the ambit of taxable supplies, under Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Hence, the question of levy of sale tax on amount of subsidy received from Government does not arise."

22. Hence, the taxability of Price Differential Claims (PDCs) must be determined with reference to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which defines "value of supply" as the consideration in money received by the supplier from the recipient for that supply. This definition requires that the value of supply must be tied to consideration received from the recipient of the supply, and a direct transactional nexus between the supplier and the recipient involving mutual obligations should exist. PDCs, however, are unilateral disbursements by the Government, not consideration for any supply made to it, nor payments made on behalf of a recipient in the statutory sense.

23. In view of foregoing findings recorded under this Issue, the Department's stance that PDC payments were made on behalf of end-consumers and fall within the scope of value of supply as interpreted in the Tribunal's decision in the MEPCO19 case (already set aside20 by the Honourable Lahore High Court), is misplaced. Since the value of supply must involve a direct transactional relationship between the supplier and the recipient. Accordingly, PDCs, being unilateral payments without such a relationship, fall outside the purview of "value of supply". This legal position has been consistently upheld

21. Even assuming arguendo without conceding that sales tax was hypothetically applicable, liability could only attach to the Government of Pakistan as payer, not to the Respondent OMC, since there is no supply made to the Government nor any consideration received from it as a recipient of supply.

24. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, and in interpretation of Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, it is held that the Price Differential Claims (PDCs) received by the Respondent do not fall within the ambit of "value of supply" under Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and are not chargeable to sales tax. Accordingly, the Order of the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), whereby the levy of sales tax on PDCs was deleted, warrants no interference and is hereby upheld. (iii) Whether the imposition of default surcharge under Section 34 and penalty under Section 33(13) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is legally sustainable, in view of the Department's stance that the Respondent committed tax fraud by not charging sales tax on Price Differential Claims (PDCs) on petroleum products.

25. In the light of the findings recorded under Issue (ii) above, the order of the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) deleting the principal demand stands affirmed. As the principal demand does not survive, the consequential penalty and default surcharge also cease to have any legal basis. We, therefore, find no justification to interfere with the Impugned Order passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), and the same is accordingly upheld. Conclusion

26. In view of the foregoing, the appeal stands disposed of in the manner delineated hereinabove with respect to each of the three issues considered. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the Impugned Order passed by the learned Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) on these three issues, and the same is accordingly upheld.

27. Order pronounced accordingly. This order comprises fourteen (14) pages, each bearing my signature. MQ/19/Tax (Trib) Appeal dismissed.