2026 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

MUHAMMAD NAJAM-UD-DIN MENGAL, J.

The instant Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 ("the Constitution"), whereby the petitioner is seeking the relief as under: "In view of above it is, therefore, accordingly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased; a) To declare that the impugned order of de novo inquiry dated 19.02.2024 is contrary to law and facts. b) To set aside the impugned order of de novo inquiry dated 19.02.2024. c) Any other and better relief deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court, in the interest of justice, equity and fairplay."

2. Briefly stated that the petitioner is a civil servant of the Education Department, was proceeded against through statement of allegations dated 6th May 2019 on multiple charges of misconduct. The first inquiry culminated in her dismissal, vide notification dated 23rd April 2020. The petitioner challenged the said dismissal before the Balochistan Service Tribunal by means of filing Service Appeal No. 178 of 2020, which was allowed on 8th September 2021; whereby the dismissal was set aside and she was reinstated in service. Thereafter, on issuance of a fresh statement of allegations, another inquiry was conducted by the inquiry officer, who exonerated the petitioner from all charges. The Anti-Corruption Establishment also closed the matter on the same allegations prior to the decision of Balochistan Service Tribunal, vide letter dated 26th April 2021. Instead of deciding the matter in accordance with law, the respondent No.1 issued the impugned order dated 19th February 2024, once again directing a de novo inquiry on identical allegations. Whereafter, the petitioner filed the instant Constitutional Petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that once the inquiry officer had exonerated her, and the Anti-Corruption Establishment had also closed the matter, the competent authority was bound to accept such recommendations, and initiation of repeated inquiries is violative of Articles enshrined in the Constitution; that the impugned de-novo inquiry falls within the ambit of double jeopardy, hence prayed for setting aside the impugned de-novo inquiry.

4. Conversely, learned Assistant Advocate General has supported the impugned order, submitting that the competent authority under Section 13(6) of BEEDA, 2011 is the Chief Secretary, who is empowered to disagree with the inquiry report and order a de-novo inquiry. It is further submitted that in the present case, the initial proceedings were initiated by the Secretary Education, who is not the competent authority, therefore, the Chief Secretary, upon examination of the matter, lawfully exercised his authority to order afresh inquiry.

5. Arguments heard. Relevant record perused.

6. The perusal of record reveals that initially an inquiry was conducted against the petitioner, which culminated in her dismissal, vide notification dated 23rd April 2020. Being aggrieved, the petitioner assailed the referred dismissal in the Balochistan Service Tribunal by means of filing Service Appeal No. 178 of 2020, which was allowed by reinstating the services of petitioner and also directed the respondents for initiation of de novo departmental disciplinary proceedings, vide judgment dated 8th September 2021, for facilitation the operative para whereof is reproduced as under: "As a sequel of above discussion, we hold that the imposition of major penalty of dismissal from service on the appellant is illegal, failed the test of judicial scrutiny and as such not sustainable in the eye of law. Consequently, this appeal is allowed, the impugned Notification No. SO-II(Inq)1-1/Edn:/2018/1360-72 dated 23-04-2020 is set-aside and appellant is reinstated in service. Respondents are directed to initiate de novo departmental disciplinary proceedings against appellant and any other employee suspected to be involved in the case. De novo disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted by appointment of an Officer as Inquiry Officer who is well-versed with the provisions of BEEDA, 2011."

7. The bare reading of record further transpires that instead of placing the matter before the competent authority i.e. the Chief Secretary, while the Secretary Education on his own initiated disciplinary proceedings and appointed Mr. Akhtar Muhammad Khetran, Divisional Directed of Education (S), Sibi Division at Sibi, vide order dated 12th October 2022. That inquiry resulted in the exoneration of the petitioner. However, the Law and Parliamentary Affairs Department declared such inquiryproceedingscoramnonjudiceon the ground that under Section 2(h)(ii) of Balochistan Employees Efficiency and Discipline Act ("BEEDA") 2011 read with Notification dated 22nd March 2017, the competent authority for employees of the petitioner's cadre is the Chief Secretary, not the Secretary Education.

8. The parawise comments filed on behalf of the official respondents further show that the petitioner by misrepresentation and connivance with certain officials, managed to obtain an inquiry at departmental level in violation of law. Whereas, the competent authority i.e. the Chief Secretary, therefore, set aside the illegal report and in exercise of powers under Section 13(6) of BEEDA, 2011, directed initiation of a de novo inquiry by appointing Mr. Abdul Wali Barrech, PAS/B-19 as inquiry officer, vide order dated 19th February 2024.

9. Even otherwise, subsection (6) of Section 13 of BEEDA, 2011 explicitly empowers the competent authority to disagree with the findings of the inquiry officer and for reasons to be recorded or order further proceedings including a de-novo inquiry. For convenience the relevant proviso of the ibid Act is reproduced as hereinbelow: "(6)Where the competent authority is satisfied that the inquiry proceedings have not been conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the facts and merits of the case have been ignored or there are other sufficient grounds, it may, after recording reasons in writing, either remand the inquiry to the inquiry officer or the inquiry committee, as the case may be, with such directions as the competent authority may like to give, or may order a de novo inquiry."

10. It is an admitted position that the first inquiry was initiated at the behest of the Secretary Education, who is not the competent authority within the meaning of Section 13 of the ibid Act. Therefore, the Chief Secretary was well within his jurisdiction to order afresh inquiry in order to ensure transparency and accountability in public service. The plea of the petitioner is that she stood exonerated loses legal force in view of the statutory competence of the Chief Secretary to disagree with the inquiry report. Since the subsection (6) of the Section 13 of the BEEDA, 2011 made it crystal clear that the Chief Secretary being the competent authority, who can agree or disagree with the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer, thus the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner with regard to double jeopardy is turned down, as no vested right of the petitioner has been infringed. The view of the Hon'ble Superior Court of the country is crystal clear about the de-novo inquiry and the maintainability of the Constitutional petition in its landmark judgment passed in the case titled as "FederationofPakistanthroughSecretaryEstablishmentDivision,Islamabadv.Shafqat-ur-Rehman Ranjha and others (2021 SCMR 153)" wherein it has been held as follows: "

12. The learned High Court has held that in case of the Respondent de novo inquiry could not have been ordered as this amounts to "Double Jeopardy" envisaged in Article 13 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, we are unable to agree. In our opinion, considering the facts and circumstances of the instant case the action ordered against the Respondent does not fall within the purview of double jeopardy; for the reason that, as per Rule5(iv), a final order could only have been passed by the Authority. Admittedly, no such final order waspassed. Further, the Authority had the power toagree with the recommendation disagree with therecommendation and either pass a final order on thebasis of the record before it after providing the accused of opportunity of a hearing or it dissatisfied with the inquiry order a de novo inquiry for valid and recorded reasons. In the instant case valid and justifiable reasons were recorded by the Authority, and such exercise of executive power, in the absence of mala fides or malice could not have been interfered by the High Court. The cases relied upon by the honourable High Court are distinguishable on points of law as well as facts. In those cases, definitive orders had been passed by the competent fora, which is not the case in the instant matter.

11. As far as the maintainability of the instant petition is concerned, in such regard, it has also been observed that the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court regarding services matters is barred under the Article 212 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the matters pertaining to civil servants are to be dealt with under the statutory framework of BEEDA, 2011 and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, while the petitioner has made an attempt to bypass the statutory forum by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, which is not permissible. While, view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan with regard to maintainability of the Constitutional Petition before the High Court is also cleared in the supra judgment, thus relevant para in this regard is described hereinunder:

13. The next question before us is whether aConstitution Petition before the High Court wasmaintainable before the High Court in exercise of itsextra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of theConstitution. Having held that no fundamental right of the Respondent had been violated the answer tothe said question has to be in the negative. Further perusal of Rule 2(a)(iii) of the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the "Appeal Rules") provides that an order by the Prime Minister is appealable to the President. In the instant petition, no such appeal was filed. Instead the Respondent chose to file a Writ Petition before the High Court. A right of appeal being available under the ruleswhich was admittedly not availed, the High Court should have refrained from exercising inextraordinary constitutional jurisdiction which isequitable and discretionary in nature. We havefound the exercise of discretion by the High Court inthis matter not in consonance with settled principlesof law on the subject considering the specific factsand circumstances of this case. The issues raised clearly fell within the ambit of Federal Service Tribunal in terms of Article 212 of the Constitutionof Islamic Republic of Pakistan." [EMPHASIS ADDED]

12. Similar view regarding Article 212 of the Constitution has also been taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in its latest reported judgment passed in the cases of "Muhammad Hassanullah (OMG/B-18), Acting Additional Secretary, Health Department, Balochistan v. Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, Quetta and another (2025 SCMR 134)" for facilitation the relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinbelow: "

5. Article 212 starts with a non obstante clause and provides that the appropriate legislature may, by the Act, provide for establishment of one or more administrative courts or tribunals, inter alia, to exercise jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons who are or have been in the service of Pakistan, including disciplinary matters. Sub-Article (2) of Article 212 also begins with a non obstante clause and expressly provides that no court other than an administrative court or tribunal shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter of which the jurisdiction of such administrative court or tribunal extends. The Constitution has, therefore, expressly declared that the administrative court or tribunal established pursuant to the command under Article 212 shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the matters within its jurisdiction. The non obstante clause in Article 212 gives it an overriding effect and thus bars the jurisdiction of a High Court vested under Article 199 of the Constitution. The ouster curtails the jurisdiction of a High Court in respect of matters which fall within the ambit of the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative court or tribunal. It is noted that in order to make a matter exclusively within the domain of the service tribunal under the Tribunals Act, and thus create a bar contemplated under Article 212, it must be shown that the grievance has been agitated by a civil servant and relates to the terms and conditions of service and does not attract the exceptions set out in clause (b) of section 4 of the Tribunals Act. The Act of 1974 and the Tribunals Act provide for a comprehensive mechanism for agitating a grievance by a civil servant and specific forums have been provided for seeking remedies. The exclusive jurisdiction of theservice tribunal and the bar contained under Article 212 are of such a nature that that they are attracted even if the grievance arises from an order whichmay involve questions of mala fide, corum nonjudice or having been passed without jurisdiction. InI.A. Sherwani's case, a larger Bench of this Court has held and observed that a civil servant cannot bypass the jurisdiction of the service tribunal by adding aground of violation of fundamental right(s). The service tribunal will have exclusive jurisdiction in a case founded on the terms and conditions of service even if it involves the questionof violation of fundamental rights. It has beenfurther held that the service tribunal will be vested with jurisdiction even where the case involves the vires of a statutory rule or notification. It was held that if a statutory rule or notification adversely affects the terms and conditions of a civil servant the same will be treated as a final order for the purposesof the jurisdiction of a service tribunal. The questions and grievances relating to transfer and postings of a civil servant fall within the ambit of theterms and conditions of service of a civil servant and thus are within the exclusive domain of anadministrative tribunal established under the command of Article 212.3 The bar under Article 212is complete in respect of the cases in which the Tribunal hasjurisdiction under the Tribunals Act." [UNDERLING AND BOLD ADDED]

13. We are fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court that emphasis that the competent authority is empowered either to agree or disagree with the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer. It is by now settled that inquiries are not permissible unless justified under statutory authority. In the instant case, the authority flows directly from Section 13(6) of BEEDA, 2011 and from the competence of the Chief Secretary as per notification dated 22nd March 2017. Hence, the impugned de novo inquiry order dated 19th February 2024 has been passed strictly in accordance with law and competence. The reliance so placed on the citations by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable from the scenario of the instant petition, thus same are not helpful to the petitioner. In view of the above discussion, this petition is dismissed. The respondents shall proceed with the de-novo inquiry strictly in accordance with Balochistan Employees Efficiency and Discipline Act, 2011, ensuring due process and affording the petitioner an adequate opportunity of defence as guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution. SA/153/Bal. Petition dismissed.