1982K98 (PLP)
SHERSHAH INDUSTRIES LTD.‑Petitioner Versus THE GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 4 OTHERS‑Respondents
| Citation | 1982K98 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | Art. 199‑Constitutional petition‑Question of fact‑Decision on writ petitions being undertaken on admitted facts and not involving any investigation into disputed facts‑Contentions raised on question of maintainability of constitutional petitions, held, irrelevant . Question of fact. |
| Bench Members | Nasir Aslam Zahid and Ajmal Mian, JJ |
| Parties | SHERSHAH INDUSTRIES LTD.‑Petitioner Versus THE GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 4 OTHERS‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1982K98 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1982K98 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the Art. 199‑Constitutional petition‑Question of fact‑Decision on writ petitions being undertaken on admitted facts and not involving any investigation into disputed facts‑Contentions raised on question of maintainability of constitutional petitions, held, irrelevant . Question of fact. bench comprising: Nasir Aslam Zahid and Ajmal Mian, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1982K98 (PLP) (SHERSHAH INDUSTRIES LTD.‑Petitioner Versus THE GOVERNMENT OF SIND AND 4 OTHERS‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Tariq Hussain, Haider Mota, Abbas Ali, Muhammad Akram Zuberi, Mohsin Tayabally, Khurshid Anwar Shaikh, Mustafa Lakhani, Azhar Ali Siddiqui, Hassan Inamullah, A. Sattar Silat for Petitioners.
- All Ahmed Fazeel, S. M. Muslim Naqvi and Abdul Sattar Shaikh Addl. A.‑ G. for Respondents.
- Dates of hearing : 7th, 12th and 13th October, 1981.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑ Art. 199‑Constitutional petition‑Question of fact‑Decision on writ petitions being undertaken on admitted facts and not involving any investigation into disputed facts‑Contentions raised on question of maintainability of constitutional petitions, held, irrelevant . [Question of fact]. Province of East Pakistan v. Kshiti Dhar Roy P L D 1964 S C 636 ; Mohomed Anwar v. Alahwasaya 1969 S C M R 178 ; Mehboob Alam v. Secretary Government of Pakistan 1969 S C M R 217 ; Nawaza v. Additional Settlement Commissioner P L D 1970 S C 39 ; Nawazish Ali Shah v. Merajdin 1970 S C M R 196 ; Yasin Sakaffshah v. Government of Pakistan 1970 S C M R 494 ; Pakistan v. Province of Punjab P L D 1975 S C 37 ; Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner P L D 1973 S C 24 and Irshad Ahmed v. Settlement Authority Punjab 1981 S C M R 758 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ‑‑‑‑ Art. 199‑‑Other remedy available ‑Writ jurisdiction‑Extraordinary jurisdiction‑When to be exercised‑Question discussed.‑‑[Jurisdiction]. A review of the case‑law shows that in certain cases the superior Courts of Pakistan did not allow the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy by way of appeal or otherwise, but on the other hand, in other cases, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal or availability of an alternate remedy, the Courts did not hesitate to exercise such writ jurisdiction and in fact granted relief to the petitioners. It may be expressed as a generally accepted principle, however, that just because an alternate remedy by way of appeal or otherwise is available to a petitioner the High Courts will invariably decline to exercise their extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. The mere availability of an alternate remedy does not debar the High Courts from exercising such jurisdiction. The question whether a writ should be entertained when an alternate remedy is available is always one within the discretion of the Court. In cases of total lack or absence of jurisdiction or authority, or apparent excess of ,[jurisdiction the Courts in general would not hesitate much in entertaining a constitutional petition although an alternate remedy may will be available. In other cases, the Courts would generally direct the party to avail and exhaust the alternate remedies available first before entertaining the writ, if in the opinion of the Courts the alternate remedy is an adequate remedy. Whether the alternate remedy available to the applicant who is seeking the constitutional remedy, is adequate or not depends on the special or particular circumstances of the individual case, and it is precisely for this reason that in one case the High Court may not entertain the petition under its constitutional jurisdiction and in another case the same may be entertained. 1n taking a decision whether the alternate remedy in a given case is adequate or not to enable the High Court to take the further decision relating to entertaining the constitutional petition, the Court, in the back. ground of the particular facts of the case before it, considers several factors, The question of speed and expense of the: alternate remedy may be considered. Whether the alternate remedy is as effective or efficacious as the constitutional remedy is also a relevant factor. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the alternate remedy or the writ would be the appropriate remedy can also be a pertinent consideration. Habib Ahmed v. Income‑tax Officer 1972 S C .M R 556 ; Zuhair. Sidiqi u. M. H. Sufi P L D 1964 Lah. 453 ; Beco Industries v. K. M. C. P L D 1976 Kar. 1011 ; Mehboob All v. Mubina Khatoon P L D 1977 Kar. 568 ; Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty P L D 1961 S C 119 ; Nagina Silk Mill v. Income‑tax Officer P L D 1963 S C 322 ; Usmania Glass Sheet Factory v. Sales Tax Officer P L D 1971 S C 205 ; Murree Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan P L D 1972 S.C 279 ; SITE Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue P L D 1975 Kar. 123 ; Municipal Committee, Multan v. Burmah‑Shell P L D 1976 Lah. 726; 9egum Nusrat Bhutto v. Inco te tax Officer P L D 1980 Lah. 449 ; Syed Riaz Husain Zaldi v. Md. Iqbal P L D 1981 Lah. 215 ; Premier Cloth Mills Ltd. v. .Sales Tax Officer 1972 S C M R 257 ; All Mahomed v. Husain Bux P L D 1976 S C 37 ; Ghuldm Ali v. Commissioner, Lahore P L D 1981 Lah. 368 ; Tarlq Transport Co. v. Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service P L D 1968 9 C 437 ; S. A. Haroon v. Collector of Customs P L D 1959 S C-177 and Hassan Ali v. Muhammad Ahsan Baloch 1980 C L C 412 ref. , (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑ Art. 199 and West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964, rr. 48 & 216‑Writ jurisdiction‑Other remedy by way of appeal under rr. 48 & 216 of Octroi Rules available to petitioners‑Appeals in some cases pending while in others not filed and petitioners straightway approaching High Court‑Constitutional petition, held, appropriate remedy and appeals under rr. 48 & 216 ‑not adequate and efficacious remedy in circumstances. [Appeal (civil)]. (d) West Pakistan Octroi Rules, 1964‑ ‑ R. 2(i), (m) & (n)‑Words and phrases‑Words "import" and "octroi"‑Definition of words as given in Rules‑Import within octroi limits, held, must also be coupled with purpose of consumption, use or a sale within octroi limits.‑[Words and phrases]. (e) West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964‑ 8. 2(i) & (m)‑Octroi tax on goods coming from abroad and entering Municipal octroi limits for purpose of consumption, use or sale within octroi limits, held, cannot be equated 4h duties of customs. ‑Pakistan Textile Mill Owners Association v: Administration 'of Karachi P L D 1`963 S C 137 ; Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. K. M. C. P L D 1967 S C 241 ; Nawab Brothers v. Collector of Customs P L f3 1977' Kar. 94.7 ; Universal Merchants v. Commissioner of Karachi 1980 C L C 704 ; Attorney‑General v. McDonald Murphy Lumber Co. A I R 1930 P C 173 ; A. H. Alberta v. A. G. Canada A 1 R 1943 P C 76 ; Lahore Municipality v. Daulat Ram A I R 1942 P C.14 and A. G. Canada v. A: G. Quebec A I R 1947 P C 44 ref. (f ) Sind Local Government Ordinance (XII of 1979)‑ S. 62 and West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964, r. 2‑Octroi‑Held, can be levied by Province on goods imported by sea or air route from abroad and which enter Municipal limits for purpose of consumption, use or sale within such limits. (g) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑ ‑‑ Art. 199 read with West Pakistan Municipal Committees Octroi Rules, 1964, r. 2‑Question of fact‑Jurisdiction--Whether or not vessels at all entered K. M. C. Octroi Limits‑A question of fact to be decided by appellate authority under rr. 48 & 216 before whom evidence could be recorded‑Constitutional jurisdiction, held, not appropriate to decide such questions.‑[Question of fact‑Jurisdiction]. (h) West Pakistan Municipal Committee Octroi Rules, 1964‑ 8. 2‑Import‑‑Octroi‑Ships imported into Pakistan for scrapping and brought to a place in Province B dismantled there and their scraps imported from province via Highway to a place in Province S‑‑Ships imported for scrapping, held, by being dismantled and scrapped no longer remained ships imported for consumption, use or sale within Octroi limits of place in Province S petitioners accordingly, held, liable to pay Octroi according to rates prescribed in Schedule B of Octroi Schedules of Municipal Corporation of Province . Pakistan Textile Mill Owners' Association v. Administrator of Karachi and others P L D 1963 S C 137 ; Ram Krishna Ramnath v. Secretary Municipal Committee; Kamptee A I R 1950 S C 1`1 and Burmah‑Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Belgaum Borough Municipality A I R 1963 S C 906 ref. (i) Sind Local Government Ordinance (XII of 1979)‑‑ S--62 and Constitutions of Pakistan (1972) & (1973)‑Levy of Octroi under a Provincial Ordinance by Provincial Government, in respect of goods entering Municipal limits of its seaport, held, not ultra vires Constitution of 1972 or 1973.
Judgment & Decree
(c) Lahore Municipality v. Daulat Ram (A I R 1942 P C 14). (d) A. G. Canada v. A. G. Quebee (A I R 1947 P C 44). These four judgments no doubt deal with the questions of competence of the provincial and central legislatures. However, none of them is specifically on the point in issue here. We have already observed that we agree with the Division Bench Judgment of‑'this Court reported in 1980 C L C 704 and learned counsel was not able to pursuade us to take a different view on the basis of any of the aforesaid four judgments.
16. Another contention was raised by Mr. Haidermota for declaring the notification of 15‑6‑1973 ultra vires of the Sind Legal Government Ordinance, 1979. It was argued that section 120 (2) of the 1979 Ordinance which is the saving clause is subject to the proviso "if not inconsistent with the pro visions" of the 1979 Ordinance and section 60 of this Ordinance requires the taxes to be levied by the Municipal Corporation whereas the said notifica tions were issued by the Government of Sind itself, In the circumstances it was contended that the notifications of 15‑6‑1973 were inconsistent with section 60 of the 1979 Ordinance and, therefore, ueltra vires of the Ordinance. We do not see any inconsistency. The notification were lawfully issued and in any case section 62 of the 1979 Ordinance depicts the powers of the Provincial Government. Section 62 reads as follows :‑ "62. (1) Government may direct any council‑ (a) to levy any tax, rate, toll or fee which the council in competent to levy under this Ordinance ; (b) to increase or reduce any rate, tax, toll or fee to such extent as may be specified ; (c) to suspend or abolish the levy of any tax, rate, toll or fee ; (2) if a direction issued under subsection (1) is not complied with, within the specified time, if any, Government may make an order giving effect to the direction." The contention that the notifications dated 15‑6‑1973 and 7‑11‑1973 are 104 ultra vires of the 1972 or 1973 Constitution or the 1979 Ordinance is not accepted and we hold that the said notifications have been lawfully made and octroi can be levied by the Province on goods imported by sea or air‑route from abroad which enter the municipal Octroi limits for the purpose of con sumption, use or sale within these limits. The power to levy the Octroi tax is given by section 71 of the 1972 Ordinance read with item No. 1 of Part I of Schedule VII of the said Ordinance. Under the 1979 Ordinance the charging provision is section 60 read with item No. 3 of Part II of Schedule V thereof.
17. The first contention on merits raised by Messrs Tariq Hussain and Haidermota, which was adopted by other counsel for the petitioners, wasp that the vessels in question were never imported within the Octroi limits of K. M. C. As observed earlier, in some cases the petitioners have taken the factual stand that their vessels remained at the outer anchorage and in some cases ' that the vessels had come within the Karachi Port, whereas in some cases it was alleged that the vessels had gone directly to Gadani. It was contended that in none of the cases the vessel entered the K. M. C. Octroi limits. On behalf of the K. M. C. these factual assertions were denied. The K. M. C. has taken the position that the vessels in question had come within their Octroi limits and then they were taken to Gadani for scrapping. All the `'counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as the counsel for the K. M. C. had relied upon the Notification dated 11‑10‑1960 of the Government of Pakistan regarding the extent of K. M. C, limits and man had also been produced in Court on behalf of the K. M. C. (not kept on the file) on which, according to the K. M. C., the limits of K. M. C. ‑‑were shown in accordance with the Notification dated 11‑10‑1960 as regards the areas covered by sea waters. In the face of the serious disputes on facts about the exact octroi limits of K. M. C. and whether the vessels had at all entered the K. M, C Octroi limits or not, and on account of hardly any evidence on record to be in a position to decide with certainly these two questions of fact, we do not consider. it appropriate in these .:;institutional petitions to decide these questions. In any case, without recording evidence, which may include expert evidence for reading and understanding the Notification dated 11‑10‑1960 about the K. M. C. limits these questions cannot be decided. The proper forum before whom such evidence could be recorded is the appellate authority under rules 48 and 216 of the 1964 Octrci Rules.
18. The next contention on behalf of the petitioners was that for being liable to pay Octroi, there must be physical importation of the vessels within the Octroi limit and reference was made in this respect to rule 2 (1) of the 1964 Octroi Rules. Reliance was also placed on Pakistan Textile Mill Owners Association v. Administrator of Karachi and others P L D 1963 S C 137, for the proposition that no artificial meaning can be given to the word "import" and there should be an actual physical importation of the article in question within the Octroi limits. The contention is no doubt correct but this contention is connected with the contention of the learned counsel referred to in the previous paragraph and as we have decided not to take any decision on a disputed question of fact, this point has become irrelevant.
19. The next contention of Messrs Tariq Husain and Haidermota, which was also adopted by all the other counsel for the petitioners, was that octroi was liable to be charged on the type of goods which enter the Munici pal limits, and, in the present case, the type of goods which were being imported by road via R. C. D. Highway, was iron scrap and, therefore, the K. M. C. could only charge octroi at the rate of Rs. 3'50 per ton which was the prevalent rate according to the relevant Octroi Schedule. With this con tention, the argument of Mr. Haidermota, who appeared for certain peti tioners, may also be referred. According to him, even if it was conceded that there was an import of the vessels initially within the K. M. C. Octroi limits, the import was not for "consumption, use or sale within the Octroi limits" of K. M. C., but the vessels were imported for scrapping and which scrapping wag done entirely in Gadani, District Lasbela, Baluchistan. Now, it is an admitted position that the dismantling and scrapping of ,all the‑ vessels in question was done or is being done at Gadani. After scrapping the vessels, the scrap recovered from the vessels is loaded on trucks and is brought by road to Karachi from Gadani via R. C. D. Highway by the petitioners on trucks. When this is done, the trucks are intercepted by the Octroi Post of K. M. C. at R. C.. D. Highway. As observed earlier, we have decided neither to go into any disputed questions of fact nor decide such disputed questions in these constitutional petitions. However, it is an admitted position of all the parties that the vessels in question were imported for purposes of scrap ping and that the process of their dismantling and scrapping had taken place at Gadani in Baluchistan. On the basis of this factual admitted position we propose to decide the contention relating to the interpretation of rule 2 (i) of the 1964 Octroi Rules.
20. It has been urged by the learned counsel appearing for the peti tioners that the import of vessels in all these petitions was for purposes of scrapping and the dismantling and scrapping of the ships is also a `use' or consumption of the ships and, therefore, if at all there has been any "use" or "consumption" of the ships, it was in Lasbela District Baluchistan outside the K. M. C. Octtoi limits. It was contended that after the vessels were scrapped, the scrap which was recovered could not possibly be treated as a "ship" or "vessel"; and if any scrap recovered from any of the said ships or vessels was being brought by road from Baluchistan to Karachi, it would be an import of the scrap and not the import of the vessels from which the scrap was recovered. On the other hand, Mr. A. A. Fazeel, learned counsel for the K. M. C., contended .that the ultimate purpose of impor ting the vessels was that the scrap of the vessels was to be consumed or used in Karachi and, therefore, when the vessels initially came to Karachi, the importers of these vessels become liable to Octroi although the vessels after entering into the K. M. C. Octroi limits were taken out of the Octroi limits to Gadani and were scrapped there. Mr. S. Muslim Naqvi, who had also appeared for the K. M. C., had urged that dismantling and scrapping of the vessels in Gadahi is to be considered as a part of the use of the said vessels in Karachi, and further that as soon as the vessels initially entered the K. M. C. Octroi limits, a presumption arose that after these were dismantied at Gadani every part of the scrapped vessels would be sold or used or consumed within the octroi limits of K. M. C. According to Mr. Naqvi, the importation of the ships initially within the Octroi limits ,of K. M.. C. was for the purpose of use and/or presumption of the ships at Karachi. As observed earlier, it is an admitted position that the ships in question have not been dismantled or scrapped within the octroi limits of K. M. C. but were dismantled and scrapped at Gadani in Lasbela District Baluchistan. It is also an admitted position that the ships were imported for purposes of scrapping. In our view, there is great force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that when the scrap was being imported from Baluchistan via R. C. D. Highway to Karachi, it was scrap which was being imported and not the ship. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that when the scrap of a ship is being imported, it could be treated as the import of the ship itself. Secondly, even if it is (assumed that the ships in question had entered the K. M. C, Octroi limits which is denied by the petitioners), at the time of the initial import of the ships within the Octroi limits of K. M. C., it could not be presumed that the ships had been imported for consumption, use or sale within the Octroi limits of K. M. C., as admittedly the ships were imported for scrapping and further admittedly the entire dismantling and scrapping was being done at Gadani. It, therefore, follows that the ,ships themselves were not imported for con sumption, use or sale within the K. M. C. Octroi limits, and further after the ships had been scrapped or dismantled, they no longer remained ships and became scrap. If in these circumstances, the scrap recovered from the ships was brought within the Octroi limits of K. M. C. by roads, as observed earlier, it could .not be said that the ships were being brought within the K. M. C. Octroi limits. By bringing the scrap of the ships within the Karachi , Octroi limits there was no "consumption, use or sale" of the ships within the Octroi limits of K. M. C. It may be added that if similar provision for levy of Octroi were to exist in Lasbela and the ships were first brought to Karachi and then dismantled and scrapped in Gadani it would not have been open to the importers to urge that no Octroi was payable to the local authority of Lasbela on the ground that only dismantling or scrapping was being done in Gadani, Lasbela, but the scrap recovered from the ships was being sold at Karachi. We are of the view that the ships were imported for scrapping and by dismantling and scrapping the ships, the same are consumed and no longer remain ships.
21. Mr. A. A. Fazeel, learned counsel for K. M. C., had relied upon two reported judgments of the Indian Supreme Court during his arguments. First is the case of Ram Krishna Ramnath v. Secretary, Municipal . Committee, Kamptee AIR 1950SC
11. In that case, the appellant, who was a manufacturer of bidis in Kamptee, had brought tobacco from outside to Kamptee to make bidis. As the tobacco was brought within the Municipal limits of Kamptee for use and Consumption therein, he wag asked to pay Octroi at the concerned Municipal outpost which was paid by him but he recorded his protest. He challenged the levy on the ground that excise duty was levied on tobacco by the Central Government and the levy of Octroi on tobacco in question was covered by excise duty and, therefore, it was illegal and not recoverable. Supreme Court of India held that there was a separate entry in the Provincial Legislative List which covered octroi duty levied by the concerned Municipalities Act and, therefore, the levy of Octroi was not ultra vires. It was observed in para. 9 of the judgment as follows :‑ "The case however is different where as in the‑Constitution Act there are two complementary powers, each expressed in precise and definite terms. There can be no reason in such a case for giving a broader interpretation to one power rather than to the other ; and there is certainly no reason for extending the meaning of the expression "duties of excise" at the expense of the provincial power to levy taxes on the sale. of goods." This judgment of the Indian Supreme Court supports the view that we have taken in the instant cases that the levy of Octroi under a provincial ordinance by the Provincial Government in respect of goods entering the K. M. C., limits from sea is not ultra vires the Constitutions of 1972 and 1973. The other judgment relied upon by Mr. Fazeel was Burmah‑Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Belgoum Borough Municipality AIR 1963 S C
906. Reliance was placed on this judgment in support of the contention that in the instant cases Octroi was leviable on the ships in question on ad valorem basis at the rate prescribed against item No. 89 of Octroi Schedule 'A'. In the aforesaid case the appellant company dealt in petrol and other petroleum products which it manufactured in its refineries situated outside the Octroi limits of the respondent municipality. It brought these products inside the municipal limits of the respondent, either for use or consumption by itself or for sale generally to its dealers and licensees who in turn sold them to others. In the Bombay Municipality Boroughs Act of 1925 the word 'sale' had not been mentioned in relation to levy of Octroi but mentioned only "consump tion and use". The word 'sale' was added later on by an amendment of 1954. Supreme Court of India, on the facts of that case, held that the appellant company was liable to pay Octroi tax on goods brought into local area (a) to be consumed by itself or sold by it to consumers direct and (b) for sale to dealers who in turn sold the. goods to consumers within other Municipal area irrespective of whether such consumers brought them for use in the area or outside it. It was, however, held that the company was not liable to Octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re‑exported. While discussing the meaning of `consumption' it was observed that this word in its primary sense means the act of consuming and in ordinary parlance means the use of an article in a way which destroys, wastes or uses up that article. In para. 22 of the Judgment it was observed as follows; "In our opinion, even without the word 'sale' ..in the Boroughs Act the position was the same provided the goods were sold in‑ the local area to a consumer who bought them for the purpose of use or consumption or even for. re sale to others for the purpose of use or consumption by them in the case. It was only when the goods were re‑exported out of the area that the tax could not legitimately be levied and in this case the municipality has agreed to refund the amount of tax op goods re‑exported without being used or‑consumed in the Municipal area. In this view of the matter it was not necessary for the Municipality to follow the procedure for imposing taxes when the section was amended. The tax still remained the same. Its nature, incidence or rates were not altered." In our view the above judgment of the Indian Supreme Court does not help the contention of learned counsel for K. M. C. as the facts and points involved are clearly distinguishable from the instant cases. Secondly the ships in the instant cases had been imported for scrapping. If they were all brought within the K. M. C. Octroi limits, they were taken out of the limit for scrapping in Baluchistan. By dismantling and scrapping the ship had been "destroyed" or to use the relevant parlance "consumed". As observed earlier, on the scrap recovered from these ships, Octroi would be payable if the same was brought within the K. M. C. Octroi limits by road according to the rates prescribed in Schedule 'B' of the Octroi Schedule.
22. In these admitted circumstances, we hold that the petitioners are no liable to pay octroi at 2 % ad volorem of the duty paid value of the ships, question according to Schedule 'A' of the Octroi S9hedules and the demand of the K. M. C. authorities for the same from the petitioners are declared to b without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petitioners are, however, liable to pay Octroi on the scrap or any other part or article recovered from the scrapped ships and brought by road into the K. M. C. Octroi limits a the rates prescribed in Schedule 'B' of the Octroi Schedules and in the manner laid down in the 1964 Octroi Rules. These 130 petitions are allowed to this extent with no orders as to costs. This judgment disposes of the following 130 Constitutional petitions; S. No. No. of petition Name of petitioners 1. 1736/79 Shershah Ind.Ltd. 2, 227/80 Messrs Abbas Steel Ind. . 3. 311/80 Ditto. 4. 390/80 Habib Maritime Ltd. 5. 671/80 Messrs Jilani Corporation 6. 613(80 Messrs Baloch Associates 7. 666/80 Messrs Al‑Noor Steel Ind. 8. 708/80 Zulfiqar Metals Ltd. 9. 758/80 Messrs Dada Steel Corporation 10. 765/80 Messrs Rahmatullah Ossain Ltd. 11. 812/80 Haji Abdul Karim & Co. 12. 867/80 Messrs Dada Steel Corporation 13. 882/ 80 Messrs Dada Steel Mills 14. 939/80 Messrs Pakistan Molasses Co. 15. 957/80 Ahmad Ship Breakers Ltd: 16. 1075/80 "Al‑Noor Enterprises 17. 1121/80 Messrs Kohinoor Traders. 18, 1188/80 Adam Corporation Ltd. 19, 1242/80 Yashma Ltd. 20. 1243/80 Premier Ship Breaking Co. 21. 1256/80 Dewan Sons 21. 1322/80 Messrs Adam Corporation Ltd. 23. 1362/80 Messrs Rashid Ltd. 24. 1424/80 Messrs Adlam Trading Co.' Ltd. 25. 1429/80 Hyderi Steel Ind. 26. 1430/80 Hyderi Trading Agency Ltd. 27. 1433/80 Messrs Noori Trading Corp. Ltd. 28. 1452/80 Dilawar and Sons 29. 1474/80 Diwan Sons 30. 1494/80 Al‑Murtaza Metals Ltd. 31. 1495/80 Wahid Abdul Sattar 32. 1524/80 Messrs Karim Ship Breaking Ltd. 33. 1527/80 Messrs Paruma Ind. 34. 1548/80 Bay Trading Corporation 35. 1587/80 Messrs Admiral Ltd. 36. 1586/80 Habib Builders Ltd. 37. 1603/80 Messrs Cotim Ltd. 38. 1627/80 Messrs Ahmad Ship Breakers Ltd. 39. 1635/80 Messrs M. R. & Co. 40. 1679/80 Abdul Karim Sakarwala 41. 1698/80 M. F. C. Ship Breakers Ltd. 42. 1699/80 Messrs Dada Steel Mills 43. 1740/80 Messrs Zulfiqar Metals Ltd. 44. 1741/80 Messrs Al‑Noor Steel Ind. Ltd. 45. 6/81 Messrs Firdous Traders 46. 12/81 Cake & Oil Products Ltd. 47. 14/81 Muslim Rolling Mills Ltd. 48. 22/81 Messrs Golder Pickers & Leather Ind. 49. 29/81 S. Z. Enterprise Ltd. 50. 35/81 Messrs Indus Rice Mills Ltd. 51. 36/81 Ghulam Ali Kassim Ali Co. 52. 46/81 Messrs Ahmad Maritime Ltd. 53. 47/81 Habib Maritime Ltd. 54. 48/81 Tawwakal 55. 50/81 Rehmat Investment Co. Ltd. 56. 56/81 Sea Interprises Ltd. 57. 57/81 Messrs Haji Abdul Karim. 58. 66/81 Gilani Timber Mart. 59. 73/81 Indus Oil Expellers Ltd. 60. 74/81 Muhammad Iqbal Goawala Co. Ltd. 61. 77/81 Messrs Shershah Ind. Ltd. 62. 83/81 Messrs Rehmatullah Hossain Ltd. 63. 88/81 Messrs Pakistan Moolasses Ltd. 64. 103/81 Messrs Deen Corporation 65. 108/81 A. Rehman & Co. 66. 109/81 Asghar Ali & Co. 67. 121/81 Messrs Jamal Enterprises 68. 167181 Al‑Murtaza Metals Ltd. 69. 168/81 Abbas Steel Ind. Ltd. 70. 169/81 Lucky Traders 71. 174/81 Mushtaq Traders 72. 190/81 Messrs Abbas Steel Ind. Ltd. 73. 19''1/81 Abbas Steel Ship Breaking Ind. 74. 194/81 'Zulfiqar Metals Ltd. 75. 230/81 Abbas Steel Ind. Ltd. 76. 231/81 Abbas Steel Ind. Ltd. 77. 239/81 Messrs Sayani Agencies 78. 265/81 Messrs Cotmin Ltd. 79. 266/81 Messrs Sombals Shipping Agencies 80. 299/81 Messrs H. M. Ishaq Ltd. 81. 313/81 Messrs Pak. Mehran Ltd. 82. 321/81 Messrs Capricon Enterprise Ltd. 83. 325/81 Messrs Inter Marine Ltd. 84. 329/81 Messrs'Seigfried Becon 85. 335/81 Messrs Karim Ship Breaking Ind. Ltd. 86. 370/81 Messrs Baloch Techno Consultants 87. 377/81 Commercial Centre of Pakistan 88. 379/81 Messes Dada Steel Mills 89. 380/81 Mohammad Ishaq & Co. 90. 389/81 Dewan Sons 91. 392/81 Abbas Steel Industries Ltd. 92. . 404/81 Messrs Gujranwala Steel Ind. 93. 405/81 Messrs Zarat Development Ltd. 94. 406/81 Messrs Unitra Ltd. 95. 409/81 Messrs Idris & Bros. 96. 419/81 Habib Maritime Ltd. 97. 424/81 Messrs M. R. & Co. 98. 425/81 Hyderi Trading Agency. 99. 431/81 Moslasses Trading & Export Ltd. 100 447/81 Vaiversal Business Associates 101 . 465/81 Messrs Muhammadi Re‑Rolling Mills, 102. 441/81 Goafman International 103. 476/81 Fairdeal Commercial Corporation 104. 477/81 Messrs Karim Ship Breaking Ind. 105. 526/81 Muzzammilullah Khan 106. 527/81 Arshad Ali & Co. 107. 536/81 Messrs Zulfiqar Metals Ltd. 108. 538/81 Jamal Younus 109. 539/81 Continental Trading Corp. Ltd. 110. 542/81 Kohinoor Trading Ltd. 111. 565/81 Gulf Trading Agency 112. 609/81 Hyderi Trading Agency Ltd. 113. 610/81 Abbas Steel Ind. 114. 643/81 Messrs Rashid Ltd. 115. 654/81 Messrs Olympia Trading Co, 116. 665/81 Mercantile Trading Co. 117. 671/81 Golden Pickers & Leather Ind. 118. 674/81 Messrs Gbanchi Re‑Rolling Mills 119. 680/81 Dilawar & Sons 120. 687/81 Messrs Cotmin Ltd. 121. 689/81 Messrs Paruma International 122. 694/81 Messrs Ahmed Ship Breakers 123. 698!81 Messrs M. R. & Co. 124. 701/81 Messrs Shershah Industries 125. 710/81 Messrs Salahuddin Bros. 126. 711/81 Geofman International 127. 70/81 Noor International 128. 730/81 Geofman International 129. 815/81 Messrs Steelmen Ltd. 130. 816/81 Muhammad Jqba1 Goawala Co. Ltd. In these petitions consent orders were passed on Stay applications whereby the Petitioners were allowed to bring the ship scrap to Karachi by road on payment to K M. C. of a portion of the amount claimed by K. M: C: and on furnishing a bank guarantee for the balance amount to the satisfaction 61 the Nazir of this Court. Bank guarantees given in these petitions shall stand canceled and discharged on the expiry of 60 days of the date of this judgment, This time limit has been provided to enable the respondents in these petitions to approach the Supreme Court of Pakistan for obtaining a stay against this judgment.