1992 PLP 613 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J.

This appeal through leave to appeal, directed against the judgment dated 17-5-1987, rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, involves the interpretation of section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that both the sides are owners of land falling in Square No. 64, Chak No. 163/R.B, Tehsil and District Faisalabad, and for the purposes of irrigation of their lands are shareholders of outlet No.22981/R, Rajbah Makhiana, Hafizabad Division, Faisalabad. The respondent moved an application before the Divisional Canal Officer that a watercourse existing between Killas Nos. 23 & 24 of Square No. 64, which irrigated his land comprising Killa No. 17, was demolished by the appellants, and prayed for its restoration. The latter contested the application inter alia on the ground that the land bearing Killas Nos. 23 & 24 was owned by them, the watercourse was their private property meant for irrigation of Killa No. 24 and ran up to half of that Killa only. The Divisional Canal Officer by his order dated 14-1-1980 allowed the respondent's application and ordered the restoration of the watercourse purportedly in exercise of powers under section 68-A of the Act.

2. The appellants filed a suit for declaration challenging the respondent's right to excavate watercourse through their land and assailed the validity of the D.C.O.'s order dated 14-1-1980. The learned trial Court decreed the suit. The reason which prevailed with it was that section 68-A is an ancillary to section 68 and contemplates grant of interim restoration of dismantled water-course till the final settlement of the dispute under section 68; and as no such dispute was pending, assumption of jurisdiction under section 68-A was illegal. With these findings, the First Appellate Court did not differ and dismissed the respondent's appeal on 7-11-1984. He then invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court and his revision petition was accepted. The operative part of the High Court's judgment is as follows: "Unluckily the Courts below did not see provisions of section 68-A carefully. It authorises the D.C.O. to pass only an interim order which had to be made final after observing the procedure laid down in section

68. Further, a suit would lie only to challenge an order finally passed under section

68. For this reason the interim order dated the 14th of January, 1980, passed by the D.C.O. could not have been assailed in the civil suit . . . . . . Section 68-A itself is clear. It has a cross reference to section 68 to the extent that the interim order passed initially may be confirmed in any final order to be passed after an inquiry envisaged by section

68. Admittedly, the D.C.O. was not allowed in this case to continue with the inquiry and pass final orders. The reason was that the present suit was filed prematurely and the proceedings were stayed. The two sections are interconnected; one meant for interim and the other for pending a final order."

3. Leave to appeal was granted "to determine the questions as to whether it not the watercourse in dispute is a private one, and therefore, in a dispute pertaining to that whether or not proceedings should be taken under section 68 or 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act:"

4. Section 68-A was incorporated in the Canal and Drainage Act by the Canal and Drainage (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1975, whereby section 68 and certain other sections of the Act were also amended. Section 68 deals with settlement of disputes between the persons interested in the use of water from a canal outlet. Such disputes, inter alia, may relate to construction, use and maintenance of watercourse and clearance of soil deposits therefrom. These are adjudicated upon by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer, unless the matter is transferred by him to the Collector. An appeal against the order of the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer and the Collector, as the case may be, lies before the Divisional Canal Officer. The orders of the departmental authorities remain in force until set aside by a decree of a Civil Court.

5. For proper interpretation of section 68-A and to ascertain the legislative intent for which it was brought on the Statute Book, it is appropriate to reproduce it hereunder:

"68-A. Powers of Canal Officer to restore interrupted supply--If canal water supply of any land is interrupted by dismantling a watercourse or internal Khal, the Divisional Canal Officer may, upon application made to him in this behalf and after such enquiry as he may deem necessary order interim restoration of the dismantled watercourse or the internal Khal and the interrupted supply of water at the cost of person who interrupted the supply and if necessary by use of such agency or force as may be called for and such order shall remain in force until the dispute is finally settled under section 68 and if necessary a watercourse link is constructed under this Act. Any charge determined for restoration of the watercourse or internal Khal shall be recoverable from the person at fault as arrear of land revenue." It is noteworthy that before the enactment of section 68-A, no power vested in departmental authorities to prevent the mischief and give an immediate relief to the person whose supply of water through watercourse or internal Khal for irrigation purposes, was interrupted by his opponent, by dismantling it, or otherwise. Under section 68-A, such power has been conferred on the Divisional Canal Officer, who upon the application of an aggrieved party, after holding such enquiry, as deemed fit by him, can order interim restoration of dismantled watercourse or internal Khal; and the interrupted supply of water. The order under this section does not conclude the rights of the parties, but is merely provisional in character. It remains in force until the final settlement of the dispute under section

68. The object of section 68-A is to stop continuation of wrongful state of things and endangering of the rights in controversy between the parties in the proceedings under section

68. Such an order terminates on the final decision of the dispute by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer under subsection (2) of section 68; and in case the application under subsection (1) of section 68 is not accepted and appeal under subsection (3) is filed, on the decision of the appeal by the Divisional Canal Officer. An interim order made as to the construction of a link watercourse remains in force until it is constructed.???????

6. It will thus be seen that the pendency of dispute under section 68 is sine qua non for entertaining an application under section 68-A, and, commencement of further proceedings on its footing. Action under section 68 can be initiated by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer, only on the application in writing, of the person complaining an infringement of his rights. The High Court was not wrong in maintaining that under section 68-A only an interim order can be made which remains in operation till final order is passed, after observing the procedure laid down in section 68, but it failed to notice that in the instant case the respondent did not file any application under section 68 and, therefore, no proceedings under this section were pending when he moved' the Divisional Canal Officer for grant of interim relief. As the condition precedent for invocation of jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer was missing, the respondent's application under section 68-A was not sustainable. But, the argument of his learned counsel, however, is that such application was competent even without the pendency of the proceedings under section

68. According to him, a person adversely affected by the illegal act of his adversary, may immediately stand in need of interim relief, for aversion of the mischief to which he is exposed. If he cannot approach the Divisional Canal Officer, without first commencing proceedings under section 68, action under section 68-A would be unduly delayed and grant of interim relief hindered, resulting in frustration of the purposes for which this section has been incorporated in the Act. In his submission, that party against whom an interim order is rendered by the Divisional Canal Officer may take the dispute to the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer through an application under section

68. It is not, possible to accept the construction put on section 68-A by the learned counsel for the respondent, without violence to its language. It seems to us, that for correct interpretation of this section, it must be read alongwith section 68, both being interdependent and one qualifying the other. It is well-settled that if two interpretations are possible, the one which will be consistent with the smooth working of the Statute and eliminates uncertainty, confusion and contradiction should be adopted. Thus, efforts should be made to harmonize the two provisions and one construed with reference to the-other, so that conflicting meanings are avoided. It is to be remembered that section 68-A speaks of an interim order, and interim relief is always a step in aid of grant of main relief on the conclusion of the trial by a Court or a Tribunal. This jurisprudential concept of interim relief when viewed in the context of the expression "until the dispute is finally settled under section 68" appearing in section 68-A, unequivocally leads to the conclusion, that the proceedings under section 68 must be in existence before an application under section 68-A for grant of interim relief is entertained. The award of interim relief, before commencement of proceedings for grant of main relief, will be a sheer anomaly.

7. The other question posted in leave granting order remains to be answered. The record before us amply reflects that the land comprising Killas Nos.23 & 24 in which the watercourse in dispute existed belonged to the appellants. The watercourse which more appropriately may be called an internal Khal prima facie was the private property of the appellants. The question is, whether such a private Khal can be used, as a matter of right, by another person. There are only three eventualities where a private water?course or a Khal may be thrown open by the Canal authorities for use by another person for passage of water, for irrigation of his lands and lend hum paid if any obstruction is caused in the user thereof. Firstly, such right is obtained under a mutual agreement between the parties; secondly, it is secured as an easement and thirdly after acquisition of the land, in pursuance of an application under section 21 of the Act on payment of compensation to the land owner. Unless the land owner gives his consent or a right of easement in respect thereof is acquired by another person, orders by the Canal authorities for utilization of his property without payment of compensation would be violative of his Fundamental Rights granted under Article 24 of the Constitution. The order dated 14-1-1980 reveals that while dealing with the respondent's application, this aspect of the case, much less being adverted to, was not even present in the mind of the Divisional Canal Officer.

8. It is a general rule that no Tribunal of limited jurisdiction can give; jurisdiction unto itself, in the absence of the state of facts on the existence whereof its jurisdiction is dependent. In the instant case, as already observed, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Divisional Canal Officer under section 68-A was contingent upon the pendency of the proceedings under section 68, but no such proceedings had been commenced by the respondent. The Divisional Canal Officer, therefore, acted without lawful authority and his order could competently be assailed before the Civil Court. This appeal is, therefore, accepted, the judgment of the High Court set aside and that of the First Appellate Court restored. As there is no reported judgment of this Court on the issues involved in this appeal, the parties are left to bear their own costs. RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.--I have read the judgment of my learned brother Muhammad Afzal Lone, J., but since I do not agree with his findings, I wish to record my views separately.

2. The basic question in the case is whether an order passed under section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, VIII of 1873 (hereinafter called `the Act'), is substantially an intervening final order which settles the rights between the parties regarding the interrupted supply of water arising out of the dismantling of the watercourse or internal Khal, till such time that any affected party does not desire to have the same set aside by proceedings under section 68 of the Act, or whether the interim order under section 68-A of the Act is basically interlocutory, till the Canal Officers have finally sorted out the matter in proceedings initiated under section 68 of the Act by the same person who initially moved the case under section 68-A of the Act.

3. The word `interim' inter alia means one for the time being; one made in the meantime and until something is done; an interval of time between one event, process or period and another; belonging to or taking place during an interim; temporary; something done in the interim; a provincial arrangement adopted in the meanwhile; done, made, occurring etc. in or in the meantime; provisional. The word `interlocutory' inter alia means pronounced or made during the course of a suit, divorce, trial or the like; order pronounced during the course of an action, not finally decisive of a case or suit; provisional decision in a case.

4. Where a difference arises between two or more persons with regard to the distribution of water from a canal outlet, construction, use or maintenance of the watercourse supplied with water from an outlet, or deposit of soil from watercourse clearance, or mutual rights and liabilities in that regard any such person can apply in writing to the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer for the resolution of the said dispute under section 68 of the Act. In such a case the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer has to give notice to all persons interested and liable to be affected as to the date of hearing and after such inquiry he can pass his order thereon, unless he transfers the matte; to the Collector who can then inquire into the case and pass his order on the said matter. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer can prefer an appeal before the Divisional Canal Officer within fifteen days of the passing of such order. Where an appeal has been preferred, the order of the Divisional Canal Officer is final as to the use or distribution of water for any crop sown or growing at the time when such order was made, and thereafter remains legally in force until it is set aside by a decree of a Civil Court. Under section 68-A of the Act, if canal water supply of any land is interrupted by the dismantling of a watercourse or internal Mal, the affected party can apply to the Divisional Canal Officer for redress in that behalf, in which case, after inquiry as he may deem necessary, the Divisional Canal Officer can order interim restroration of the dismantled watercourse or the internal Khal and the interrupted supply of water at the cost of the person who interrupted the supply, and if necessary, by use of such agency or force as may be called for and such order remains in force until the dispute is finally settled under section 68 of the Act.

5. The disputes covered by section 68 of the Act are:

(i) distribution of water from an outlet,?? (ii) construction, use or maintenance of a watercourse supplied with water from an outlet, (iii) deposit of soil from watercourse clearance, and (iv) mutual rights and liabilities covering (i) to (iii) above. The nature of the matter covered by section 68-A is:

(i) interruption of the water supply arising out of the dismantling of a watercourse or internal Khal. The dismantling can be set right under section 68-A or the wrongdoer dealt with under section 70(2) and (7) without any dispute remaining pending. The restoration under section 68-A may still leave a dispute pending over to be dealt with under section

68. The wording of section 68 does not limit the nature of the order that can be passed under that section; that under section 68-A limits the order to an interim restoration of the dismantled watercourse and the interrupted supply of water. Whilst the dispute under section 68 falls within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer for decision, the matter under section 68-A of the Act falls within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer. Whilst dealing with the dispute under section 68, the Sub?-Divisional Canal Officer is duty bound to give notice to all persons interested and liable to be affected with regard to the date of hearing and to hold an inquiry, before he passes the said order, but when dealing with the matter under section 68-A of the Act, the Divisional Canal Officer is only called upon to hold such inquiry as he may deem necessary before passing the interim h order. I would imagine that whilst doing so, the Divisional Canal Officer would give notice to the person or persons concerned or responsible for the dismantling of the watercourse or internal Khal or the interruption of the water supply arising therefrom, in view of the short matter before him. Section 68-A does not state that an application under that section has necessarily to be made in proceedings initiated under section 68 of the Act, unlike provisions under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure where applications for different interim reliefs have to be made in proceedings in the main suit. And last but not least, whilst an order under section 68 remains effective until it is &t aside by a decree of the Civil Court, the order under section 68-A remains in force until the dispute is finally settled under section 68.

6. It is clear from the above resume that whilst section 68 of the Act relates to a serious dispute, section 68-A relates to an interim matter relating to restoration of status quo ante, which may not lead or give rise to any dispute, or which may be the subject of a dispute. This accounts for the fact why the inquiry under section 68 of the Act is substantive, whilst that under section 68-A is somewhat summary. The only question that remains is the future effect of the order. The order passed in respect of a dispute under section 68 of the Act by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer is final as to the use or distribution of water for any crop sown or growing at the time when such order is made and thereafter remains effective until it is set aside by a decree of the Civil Court. However, the interim order passed under section 68-A of the Act by Divisional Canal Officer, remains in force until the dispute is finally settled under section 68 and if necessary a watercourse link. is constructed under the Act. The question remains whether the words "shall remain in force until the dispute is finally settled under section 68.." in section 68-A refer to the order under that section as being interlocutory. As already stated, section 68-A does not state that an application under that section has to be made in proceedings under section

68. The order under section 68-A is therefore not intended to be strictly interlocutory. How can the two sections be reconciled in view of the peculiar wording of section 68-A. The only clear answer that can be culled out is that section 68-A is intended to provide a speedy and summary remedy to restore status quo ante where canal water supply has been interrupted by a watercourse or internal Khal having been dismantled, that where such interim order is passed and no dispute is left. The conflict is at an end, but where there is a serious dispute, recourse to section 68 has to be made, in which case the interim order would remain in force until the dispute is finally settled under section

68. Thus, the party aggrieved by the interim order would have the right to move the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer to have the dispute resolved, in which case the interim order shall remain in force till the case is finally decided under section 68.

7. There is no doubt that the appellants were annoyed with the interim order on the ground that the respondents could irrigate their Killa No.17 through an alternate watercourse and that there was no reason for the same to be irrigated by the Khal passing between Killas 23, 24, which was their own private Khal, and that there was thus a serious dispute between the parties. If this be so, they were duty bound to move the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer, under section 68 of the Act and to have the same finally resolved; the interim order remaining effective till the final decision. The appellants did not move the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer concerned, but the Civil Court. In the absence of a final order under section 68, the Civil Court was not competent to decide the dispute. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court therefore deserves to be sustained.

8. In view of the above, there being no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J

The two learned Judges hearing the above appeal having disagreed on the interpretation of the provisions of sections 68 & 68 A of the. Canal and Drainage Act (VIII of 1873) resulting in rendering opposite opinions as to how the appeal should be decided; the matter has been laid down before me for resolution of this difference of opinion. The facts, which form the background, have been given quite concisely in the judgment of the learned Single Judge which is impugned in this appeal as follows:

"The dispute related to dismantling of an internal watercourse through which the petitioner (respondent herein) had been till recently receiving canal water for his lands. Allegedly, the respondents (appellants herein) dismantled it. The petitioner (appellant herein) made an application under section 68-A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, for its restoration whereupon the D.C.O. (Divisional Canal Officer) in his order dated the 14th of January, 1980, restored it temporarily. The respondents (appellants herein) challenged this order in the Civil Court contending mainly that the `Khala' could not have been carved out through their lands. On the other hand, the petitioner (respondent herein) contested the suit reiterating that the `Khala' existed for a long period and that its dismantling by the respondents was against law. He challenged the competency of the suit as well as on the ground that the order under section 68-A being merely interim could not be assailed in Civil Court. The two Courts below spurned this objection and decreed the respondent's (appellant's) suit:' The learned Judge in the High Court while accepting the appeal of the respondent herein observed in his judgment that under Section 68-A the Divisional Canal Officer could pass only an interim order "which had to be made final after observing the procedure laid down in Section 68". He went on to observe that a "suit would he only to challenge an order finally passed under section 68". On this view of the relevant law the learned Judge concluded: "For this reason the interim order dated 14th? January, 1980 passed by the Divisional Canal Officer could not be assailed in the Civil Suit". The same view was further elaborated as follows:

"Section 68-A itself is clear. It has a cross reference to section 68 to the extent that the interim order passed initially may be confirmed in any final order to be passed after an inquiry envisaged by section

68. Admittedly, the D.C.O. was not allowed in this case to continue with the inquiry and pass final orders. The reason was that the present suit was filed prematurely and the proceedings were stayed. The two sections are interconnected; one meant for interim and the other for passing a final order. Civil Court comes in after the order is made final and, therefore, the present suit did not lie." The view taken up does not appear to lay down the correct law. While it is correct that the Divisional Canal Officer may, on an application submitted to him, order interim restoration of the interrupted water supply by the interim restoration of the dismantled watercourse or the internal Khal at the cost of the person who interrupted the supply and if necessary by use of such agency or force as may be called for. However, such an order "shall remain in force until the dispute is finally settled under section 68 and if necessary a watercourse link is constructed under this Act.". Now under section 68 a difference between two or more persons in regard, inter alia, to the use, construction or maintenance of a watercourse is to be settled by the Sub-Divisional Canal officer (whose order is subject to appeal before the Divisional Canal Officer). Such an order however, is final and shall remain in force until it is set aside by a decree of the Civil Court. The learned Judge in the High Court was not, therefore, right in opining that final orders in the matter were to be passed by the Divisional Canal Officer and the suit would be competent only against such a final order. His observation to the effect "admittedly the D.C.O. was not allowed in this case to continue with the inquiry and pass final orders." And the conclusion expressed that in so far as the Civil Court comes in after the order is made final which order could not be passed because the suit was filed prematurely in this case and the proceedings stayed and in these circumstances "the present suit did not lie", appears to be a complete misreading of the law and the factual position in this case. This appeal can succeed on this short ground. However, coming to the real controversy namely whether in the absence of an application filed by the respondent before the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer under section 68 seeking a settlement of the dispute regarding the dismantling of the watercourse or internal Khal constructed by him for supplying water to his land which Khal passed through the lands of the appellants, could any order for restoration be made? In other words whether any interim order for restoration of the dismantled watercourse could be made despite the fact that no application about this dispute had been brought before the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer under section 68? The opinion of Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone in relation to this question had been expressed thus: "It will thus be seen that the pendency of dispute under section 68 is sine qua non for entertaining an application under section 68-A, and commencement of further proceedings on its footing. Action under section 68 can be initiated by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer, only on the application in writing, of the person complaining an infringement of his rights. The High Court was not wrong in maintaining that under section 68-A only an interim order can be made which remains in operation till final order is passed, after observing the procedure laid down in section 68 but it failed to notice that in the instant case the respondent did not file any application under section 68 and, therefore, no proceedings under this section were pending when he moved the Divisional Canal Officer for grant of interim relief. As the condition precedent for invocation of jurisdiction of the Divisional Canal Officer was missing, the respondent's application under section 68-A was not sustainable. But, the argument of his learned counsel, however, is that such application was competent even without the pendency of the proceedings under section

68. According to him, a person adversely affected by the illegal act of his adversary, may immediately stand in need of interim relief, for aversion of the mischief to which he is exposed. If he cannot approach the Divisional Canal Officer, without first commencing proceedings under section 68, action under section 68-A. would be unduly delayed and grant of interim relief hindered, resulting in frustration of the purposes for which this section has been incorporated in the Act. In his submission, the party against whom an interim order is rendered by the Divisional Canal Officer may take the dispute to the Sub-Divisional Officer through an application under section 68." The learned Judge did not agree with this submission observing:

"that for correct interpretation of this section, it must be read alongwith section 68, both being interdependent and one qualifying the other." and went on to add:-- "It is to be remembered that section 68 speaks of an interim order, and interim relief is always a step in aid of grant of main relief on the conclusion of the trial by a Court or a Tribunal. This jurisprudential concept of interim relief when viewed in the context of the expression "until the dispute is finally settled under section 68" appearing in section 68-A, unequivocally leads to the conclusion, that the proceedings under section 68 must be in existence before an application under section 68-A for grant of interim relief is entertained." His conclusion is as follows:

"In the instant case, as already observed, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Divisional Canal Officer under section 68-A was contingent upon the pendency of the proceedings under section 68, but no such proceedings had been commenced by the respondent. The Divisional Canal Officer, therefore, acted without lawful authority and his order could competently be assailed before the Civil Court." Mr. Justice Rustam S. Sidhwa, on the other hand, after discussing the provisions of sections 68 and 68-A went on to say:

"How can the two sections be reconciled in view of the peculiar wording of section 68-A. The only clear answer that can be culled out is that section 68-A is intended to provide a speedy and summary remedy to restore status quo ante where canal water has been interrupted by a watercourse or internal Khal having been dismantled, that where such interim order is passed and no dispute is left, the conflict is at an end, but where there is a serious dispute, recourse to section 68 has to be made, in which case the interim order would remain in force until the dispute is finally settled under section

68. Thus, the party aggrieved by the interim order would have the right to move the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer to have the dispute resolved, in which case the interim order shall remain in force till the case is finally decided under section 68." After referring to the relevant facts he further observed:

"The appellants did not move the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer concerned, but the Civil Court. In the absence of a final order under section 68, the Civil Court was not competent to decide the dispute. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, therefore, deserves to be sustained." Accordingly, in his opinion there being no force in the appeal it merited dismissal and he so ordered. I am inclined to agree with the view taken by Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone in his judgment. The facts of this case show that while according to the respondent since the status of the watercourse or internal Khal passing through their land was similar to that of other parts of their land over which they had complete dominion, they were at liberty to deal with it in any manner they wanted; while according to the appellants as they were getting water supply to their land through this watercourse for over thirty years and they had acquired easement rights in respect thereof any interruption of water supply to their land by dismantling the watercourse would give them a right to seek it restoration by applying to the Divisional Canal Officer under section 68-A. But under section 68-A, the Divisional Canal Officer can only order interim restoration of the dismantled watercourse or the internal Khal and the interrupted supply of water and such order shall remain in force until the dispute is finally settled under section

68. In this case, the relevant part of the order of the Divisional Canal Officer dated 14-1-1980 states; ?(Sd.) D.C.O. 14-1-1980 This is a final order so far as the matter of restoration of water supply by restoration of the dismantled Khal is concerned. But under section 68-A ad interim orders of restoration can only be passed which enure until the dispute is finally settled under section

68. Obviously, such ad interim orders can be passed only if an application seeking settlement with regard to differences over the construction, use or maintenance under section 68 is already pending. The view that the party aggrieved by the interim order of restoration would have the right to move the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer under section 68 to have dispute resolved does not in my humble opinion, appear to be correct because it implies that the grievance of the party moving the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer under section 68 has arisen not because of the existence of differences between him and some other parties (with regard to the construction, use or maintenance of the watercourse) but the cause of action for moving the Sub-?Divisional Canal Officer has arisen on account of the passing of the interim order by the Divisional Canal Officer restoring, ad-interim water supply by restoring the dismantled Khal. This does not, in my humble view, appear to be the intention underlying the addition of section 68-A, in 1975, to the Canal and Drainage Act of 1873. This section appears to have been added in order to provide relief to the aggrieved parties, pendente lite, during the period taken by the Sub-Divisional Canal Officer in settling the dispute referred to him under section

68. But where no such dispute under section 68 was at all pending settlement before him the question of issuance of an interim order would not arise because there was no dispute pending which is required to be settled finally. Accordingly, agreeing with the view expressed by my learned brother Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Lone, I would accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 17-5-1987 and restore the judgment of the two Courts below. No costs. In accordance with the opinion of the majority this appeal is accepted, the judgment of the High Court passed in Civil Revision No. 33-D of 1987 dated 17-5-1987 is set aside and judgment of the Courts below restored, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M.BA./A-912/S?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal accepted.