1979 PLP 446 (PLC)

11. Mr. Ismail Taj (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3780/S/78) is a Cameraman belonging to Group‑

7. He was charge‑sheeted on 16th April, 1978. It was alleged, inter alia, that he had struck work illegally and that he did not attend office from 16th February, 1978, to 20th February, 1978, in sympathy with Union Leaders, who were arrested on 16th February, 1978. He was suspended on the same day. He continues to be under suspension although he is getting subsistence allowance equal to 50% of his basic pay.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the charge‑sheet, the suspension and the entire proceedings before the Inquiry Officer on a number of grounds: Firstly, it is submitted that under the West Pakistan Industrial & Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner within one month of the alleged misconduct. In the present case, however, the alleged misconduct had taken place on the 16th of February, 1978, while the charge‑sheet was served upon the petitioner on 10th April, 1978, clearly beyond the period of one month as contemplated in the afore mentioned provision. Secondly, it is submitted that the suspension order, at the most, could be for a maximum period of four weeks as laid down in Order 15 (5) of the aforesaid Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Thus the suspension of the petitioner in the present case is illegal and void ab initio. Thirdly, it is submitted that according to Regulation 13‑03 of the Regulations framed by the P. Tv. Corporation, Officer competent to charge‑sheet the petitioner in the instant case is either the Head of the Division or the Managing Director of the Tv. Corporation. It is contended that there is no order for the issuance of the charge‑sheet under the orders of Managing Director. At least no such order has been placed on the file of this Court. Fourthly, it is submitted that the conduct of the petitioner complained of in the present case does not come within the mischief of "misconduct" as defined in Order 15 (3) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. It is submitted that there is nothing on the record of this case to show that the petitioner was absent from duty wilfully for more than 10 days. It is established on the record that the petitioner was arrested on 16th of February, 1978 and was released on bail on 8th March, 1978. He reported for duty on the 11th March, 1978. In fact this pint is noticed in the second charge levelled against the petitioner. Thus the petitioner was prevented from attending his duty by circum stances beyond his control. It is submitted that even the orders of suspension have not been passed by competent authority. Fifthly, it is submitted that the second charge is vague. The particulars of the subversive activities have not been supplied. Lastly, it is submitted that the petitioner is being given discriminatory treatment in so far as other "workmen" who were involved along with the petitioner namely, Messrs Muhammad Younis, Manzoor Hussain and Qaisar Abbas, have not even been charge‑sheeted and the petitioner has been victimized for his Trade Union Activities.

13. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submit ted that the employees of Pakistan Television Corporation were declared to be members of the Essential Services by means of Government Notification dated 23rd June, 1975, issued under section 3, subsection (3) of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 and that Labour Laws would cease to be applicable to the employees of the concern from that date. According to him the laws applicable to the petitioner on 23rd, June, 1975, were the Regulations of the Pakistan Television corporation which were framed by the Corporation itself and the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 and the Rules of 1962 under the said Act. Thus the guarantees under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 were no longer available to the petitioner. It is further submitted that the Rules framed by National Industrial Relations Commission under section 6 of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 were notified by the Government in the Gazette of Pakistan (Extra ordinary) on 25th of May, 1978. They were given retrospective effect by another Notification issued on 28th August, 1978 and were made effective from 25th January, 1978, following the addition of section (1‑A) to section 6 to the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978. According to the learned counsel, case of the petitioner was covered by these Rules and none others. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Writ Petition was premature as suspension was not a punishment and that mere service of a charge‑sheet is not a punishment under the Standing Orders Nos. 15 (4) and 12 (3), and that an employee could only got to a Labour Court after orders of dismissal has been passed by an employer. No such order has been passed in this case. Writ Petition was pre‑mature 'and deserved to be dismissed on this ground alone. Learned counsel then argued that Writ Petition was not an appropriate remedy in case of a Private Limited Company like Pakistan Television Corporation, where the employees do not have any Constitutional safeguards available to them. According to the learned counsel, Pakistan Television Corporation was a private Corporation. It was not performing any function in connection with the affairs of the Province or the Federation and that no Writ could issue to it, and that the law of "Master and Servant" would be applicable in the case. Lastly it was submitted that even if the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was applicable to the case of the petitioner the charge‑sheet could be issued within one month of the date of the alleged misconduct or of the date on which the alleged misconduct came to the notice of the employer. According to the learned counsel, the Pakistan Television Corporation and the respondents came to know of the alleged misconduct in this case on 6th April, 1978, when the Managing Director ordered the issuance of the charge‑sheet to the petitioner and others. Thus it was within time.

14. Before embarking upon the adjudication on merits it would be appropriate to dispose of the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents to the jurisdiction of this Court. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that Pakistan Television Corporation being a Corporation was not amenable to Writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. This question came up for adjudication before a Full Bench of this Court in Muhammad Aslam Saleemi v. Pakistan Television Corporation (P L D 1977 Lah. 852). The following conclusion at page 871 is reproduced below:‑‑

"We have given our anxious thought to the matter and have carefully considered all the above‑noted contentions. We feel that the learned Deputy Attorney‑General was justified in omitting to assert that the two Corporations are "persons performing function in connection with the affairs of the Federa tion, a Province or a Local Authority", because respondent No. 2 is clearly a Statutory Corporation, which is fully control led by the Government. Similarly, although respondent No. 1, i. e. the Pakistan Television Corporation is incorporated as a Limited Company, under the Companies Act, 1913, yet the Government has the controlling shares in it from its very incep tion and it is fully controlled and run by it. In support of the fact that the two Corporations are controlled by the Govern ment it may be mentioned that no Radio or T. V. Station can be installed without the prior permission of the Government as required by section 3 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933, it is the Government which appoints the General Manager or the Managing Director, respectively, of these two Corporations and their salaries are paid from public exchequer. Moreover, the Government levies fees for issuing licences for keeping radio and television sets and also has the power to make rules under section 10 of the above‑mentioned Act of 1933. These rules have actually been made. The rules relating to television are known as the Television Receiving Apparatus (Possession and Licensing) Rules, 1970. In these Rules the Government has provided for levying of fees for issuance of licences for the possession of television sets on the payment of a specified fee. The contravention of the said provision (Rule No. 3) has been made punishable under rule 15 of these Rules. Moreover in a Government Publication titled "The Budget, 1976‑77", it is stated at pages 194 and 351 respectively, that a demand of Rs. 5,75,00,000 was made and sanctioned in favour of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and a demand of Its. 63,83,000 was sanctioned for "Investment in Pakistan Television Cor poration for repatriation of foreign equity." Although the actual repatriation of the foreign capital has not yet been effect ed but the intention to do so is quite evident from the provision of the funds for that purpose, in the annual budget. It is also noteworthy that clause (f ), section 10 (1) and subsection (2) of section 10 of the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation Act (XXXII of 1973) and Article 111 (3) of the Memorandum of Association of the Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd.. read with the Provisions of Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 show beyond doubt that both the Corporations are being controlled and run under the directions of the Government. In this connec tion it is also pertinent to refer to Article 159 of the Constitu tion. This Article, read with items Nos. 7 and 31 of the Federal Legislative List, provides that broadcasting and telecast ing are Federal subjects. Article 253 (1) of the Constitution provides that the Government can take over and run any such Corporations. The respondent‑Corporations are clearly public services and, as shown above, they are being controlled and administered by the Government. As a result, we feel that the learned Deputy Attorney‑General was justified in not pressing that the respondent‑Corporations are not performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or Local authority." At page 883 it was observed :‑

"The present Corporation squarely fulfils the aforesaid require ments and, looked at from whatever angle, it is manifestly a public utility Corporation or to be exact a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation within the meaning of this concept and amenable to writ jurisdiction as contemplated in Article 199 of the Constitution." Respectfully following this Full Bench Judgment of this Court I hold that Pakistan Television Corporation was performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation and was amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The objection, therefore, has no force and is overruled.

15. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the ordinary law of "Master and Servant" is applicable to the petitioner has no relevance. The mere fact that a person is not a civil servant of the State and is not entitled to Constitutional guarantees would not always lead to the result that he is governed by the ordinary and general law of "Master and Servant". Wherever there are statutes or statutory rules governing the relationship between an employer and employee and there are restrictions placed in such provisions which are contrary to the e concept of the ordinary law "Master and Servant", it is those statutory provisions and rules which would apply and not the so‑called general law of "Master and Servant". In such a case the employer would have the power to terminate the employment and initiate other proceedings only in the manner and in the circumstances in which the statute or the rules clothe it with authority to do so. Admittedly parties in the case are governed by the statutory rules. Therefore the ordinary law of Master and Servant would not be applicable in the case. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Abdur Razzaq v. WAPDA (P L D 1973 Lah. 188) and Muhammad Ashraf Parvaiz v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (P L D 1973 Lah. 425).

16. Employees of Pakistan Television Corporation were declared to be members of Essential Services for the first time by means of Ministry of Interior's Notification No. S. R. O. 659(1)/75, dated 23rd June, 1975. This notification had been issued in the exercise of powers conferred on the Federal Government by section 3, subsection (4) of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. The Notification was to remain in force for a period of six months. However, by subsequent Notifications which are being issued after every six months the employees of Television Corporation continue to be governed by section 3, subsection (3) of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952. The last Notification was issued on 19th December, 1978 and commenced. with effect from 23rd January, 1976 for a further period of six months. Pakistan Television Corporation had framed its own rules and regulations which covers the terms and conditions of its employees. These were merely rules for domestic use of the Corporation. They had no statutory force. In the year 1968, however, West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was issued which provided a number of rights and privileges/ protections to a workman. It is applicable to every industrial or commercial establishment wherein 20 or more workmen were employed. Commercial establishment has been defined in the following manner :‑-- "Commercial establishment" means an establishment in which the business of advertising, commission or forwarding is conducted, or which is a commercial agency, and includes a clerical department of a factory or of any industrial or commercial undertaking, the office establishment of a person who for the purpose of fulfilling a contract with the owner of any com mercial establishment or industrial establishment, employs workmen, a unit of a joint stock company, an insurance company, a banking company or a bank, a broker's office or stock‑exchange, a club, a hotel, a restaurant or an eating house, a cinema or theatre, and such other establishments or class thereof, as Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a commercial establishment for the purposes of this Ordinance; "Workman" has also been defined and it means person em ployed in any commercial or industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Petitioner has averred that he is a "workman" within the meaning of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and that the Pakistan Television Corporation is a commercial establishment as defined in the said Ordinance. The respondents have not contested this factual and legal position in so far as the Pakistan Television Corporation is a "commercial establishment". It is, however, contested that (apart from Ghulam Mustafa) the petitioners are "workmen".

17. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that apart from Ghulam Mustafa, petitioner, others namely Messrs Muhammad Babar Zaman, Muhammad Naseem Siddiqui, Zahoor Nazim and Ismail Taj are not "workmen" within the meaning of section 2, subsection (i) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, The workmen has been defined as; " `Workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward." Muhammad Babar Zaman (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3333/S/78 is a News‑Producer. He works under the direct control and instructions of News Editor who is head of the Department. It is his duty to collect the news items from teleprinters with his own hands and then draft and translate them into other languages (either in Urdu and Punjabi) as per directions of the News Editor. 1t is the case of the petitioner that this work is done by him manually and with the exercise of his technical and mental skill which was acquired by him when he underwent‑‑a technical course under the auspices of his employer. He has no mana gerial or supervisory duties. The managerial powers vest with the General Manager of Lahore Television Centre. He is also subject to supervisory control of the Director of News. According to the General Manager, Pakistan Television, Lahore, the News Producer obtains the news from the teleprinters and then composes the news. A teleprinter operator and a translator and typists works under the authority of the News‑Producer. It is stated that his main duties are of administrative, managerial or supervisory nature and if there is any clerical work, it is incidental to his main duties. The real duties of the News‑Producer have been given in paragraph 1 of the counter affidavit filed by the General Manager of Television in these terms :‑ "A producer assigned with responsibilities on the desk is supposed to go through the creeds of different agencies like A. P. P., P. P. I. which he obtains from the Teleprinter and takes a decision as to which news is worthy of telecast. He prepares the news. For this purpose a Teleprinter Operator, Translator and the Typists work under his authority." Not a word has been said in the counter affidavit about the officer incharge of the News Section as such. It appears that the petitioner being News‑Producer collects the news from teleprinters which is creeded by various Press and news agencies. He prepares and composes the news, get them typed and then also translate them into Urdu or Punjabi. He may have some supervisory control over a translator or a typist. He does manual work. This work also requires mentaltoil and mere performance of supervisory function over a typist or a translator would not take him outside the definition of "workman". Muhammad Nasim Siddiqui (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3043 of 1978) is a Senior Make‑up Artist in Group VI. He is under the administrative control of the Programme Manager of Pakistan Television, Lahore Centre. He works with his hands. There are other Make‑up Artists working under him. Naturally when making‑up an Artist for a particular role, the Make‑up Artist has to use his skill and imagination and prepare the actor in such a manner so that he really looks like the character he is called upon to portray. Thus his work is essentially manual in nature. This work also requires mental toil, technical skill and imagination and the mere fact that he exercises some kind of super visory control over other artists working under him would not militate against his being a "workman" within the meaning of law. Zahoor Nazim (Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 2954‑S/78) is a calligraphist belonging to Group V. He works with his own hands and creates imaginative lay‑outs on large canvases as well as on a miniature scale. This work requires imaginations and mental skill. Ismail Taj (Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3780‑S of 1978) is a Cameraman belonging to Group VII. There are two Cameramen belonging to his category. Other Cameramen (numbering 27) belong to Groups V and VI. The petitioner works as a shift‑incharge according to the administrative arrangements. He is essentially a manual worker. He operates the camera with his own hands. According to the averments in the Writ Petition, the camera is fitted upon a pedestal which weighs about three maunds and he has to move it and push it around the set/stage personally with his own hands when it is in operation. In view of the above discussion I hold that M/s. Muhammad Babar Zaman, Muhammad Nasim Siddiqui, Zahoor Nazim and Ismail Taj are all "workmen" as defined in the West Pakistan Industrial and Employ ment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.

18. Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that the Standing Orders could be modified by means of a collective agreement and not other wise and that no such agreement could have the effect of taking away or diminishing any right or benefit available to the workmen under the provisions of the Schedule. Under section 8 of the Ordinance, Government is empowered to exempt any industrial or commercial establishment or class of establishments from all or any of the pro visions of this Ordinance by a Notification in the official Gazette. Ad mittedly no such Notification has been issued in the present case vis‑a‑vis the Pakistan Television Corporation. Standing Order 15(4) lays down that no order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concern is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct (within one month of the date of such misconduct or of the date on which the alleged mis conduct comes to the notice of the employer) and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. Standing Order 15(5) empowers the employer if he considers necessary for the purpose of conducting an inquiry into the alleged misconduct of workmen to suspend him for a period not exceeding four days at a time provided that the period of suspension does not exceed 4 weeks except where the matter is pending before an Arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or Conciliator etc. It is the case of the petitioner that the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 are applicable to him and that under section 15(4) proceedings for any alleged misconduct could only be initiated against him by the Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. within one month of the date of such misconduct or of the date on which the alleged mis conduct came to the knowledge of the employer. According to him he was arrested from the premises of Lahore Television Station on 16th February, 1978. The General Manager Incharge of the Lahore Television Centre was responsible for informing the Police and initiating criminal proceedings against the petitioner and his other colleagues. According to rule 1.05 of the Pakistan Television Rules, General Managers of Television Centres are administrative head of their Centres and exercise all administrative powers in respect thereof. Thus the respondent- Corporation had the knowledge of this so‑called "misconduct" on 16th February, 1978. According to him proceedings for misconduct could be initiated against him within one month of the said date, i.e. till 16th March, 1978, while in the instant case he was charge‑sheeted on 10th April, 1978.

19. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has submitted that the alleged misconduct of the petitioner came to the knowledge of Pakistan Television Corporation on 6th April, 1978 when it was decided to issue charge sheet to the petitioner. As stated earlier the charge sheet is dated 10th April, 1978. The relevant file of the case has been produced by the learned counsel for the respondents and I have perused it with the help of the learned counsel for the parties. The factual position as stated by the learned counsel for the respondents does not appear to be correct. File reveals that the Pakistan Television Corporation and the other respondents were aware from the very beginning of the activities of the petitioner and his other colleagues. In fact the respondents had apprehended rouble at the hands of the Union (petitioner was a Joint Secretary of Pakistan Television Headquarter Employees Union, Rawalpindi), even before 16th February, 1978. Mr. A. Nasir Siddiqui, Assistant Controller, Administration and Personnel, vide his note dated 3rd March, 1978 had prepared the list of employees whose services were sought to be terminated. In this note he refers to the undesirable activities of the employees at various Television Centres which admittedly corrupted on 16th February, 1978. Thus it is not correct to say that the employer in this case became aware of the alleged misconduct of the petitioner on 6th April, 1978. In my view the employer had the knowledge of the alleged misconduct, if any, of the petitioner on 16th February, 1978 when he was arrested from the Television Centre, Lahore.

20. The petitioner was also placed under suspension on the same day, i.e. on the 10th April, 1978. It was also ordered that during the period of suspension he would get subsistence allowance equal to 50% of his pay. Initially this suspension was for a period of 4 days, i.e. with effect from 10th April, 1978 to 13th April, 1978. It had been extended eversince by various subsequent orders. However, no flesh order of suspension has been passed after December, 1978. The peti tioner is under suspension from 10th April, 1978 till today. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in terms of the provision of the Standing Order 15(5) the period of suspen sion could not exceed 4 weeks and that suspension in the present case was clearly violative of the aforementioned provision and was illegal.

21. Case of the petitioner is covered by the "Pakistan Television corporation Limited Employees Service Rules" framed by National Industrial Relations Commission under section 6 of Pakistan Essential Ser vices (Maintenance) Act, 1952 read with Essential Services (Maintenance) Rules, 1962. These rules were gazetted on 25th May, 1978. They were made effective from 25th January, 1978 by subsequent Notification issued by the Ministry of Interior on 28th August, 1978. This Notification was issued under section 6 (1‑A) which was added by means of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1978. Accord ing to the learned counsel for the respondents these rules are, therefore, effective and in operation with effect from 25th January 1978. Even if this be accepted as the position the case of the petitioner would still be covered by the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Rule 2.11 of the aforesaid rules provides; "2.11.‑Nothing in these rules shall deprive the employee/employees of any right or privilege guaranteed by or under any law, settle ment, agreement or award." In other words these rules although operative with effect from 25th January, 1968 would not take away the benefits or privileges or rights which were available to the petitioner under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that section 7‑A of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 and the rules of 1962 framed thereunder amounts to a clear ouster of provisions of any other enactment and that whenever there is any overlapping between the provi sions of the Act (Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act) and those of any other enactment, provisions of the Act would prevail. He has cited a number of judgments of Karachi High Court and of the National Industrial Relations Commission in support of this proposition. A Division Bench of this Court in General Manager, Heavy Mechanical Complex, Textile v. Mamoon A. Kazi (1977 P L C 532), however, has taken the view that if the provisions of the Act are not in conflict with the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 then' the later would prevail to that extent. In the present case the rules framed by the National Industrial Relation‑: Commission under section 6 read with section 3 subsection (2) specifically provide that nothing in these rules would deprive the employee/employees of any right, privileges guaranteed by or under any law, settlement, agreement or award. Admittedly the Pakistan Television Corporation Limited Employees' Service, Rules were framed and agreed to after prolonged negotiations between the various Employees Unions of Pakistan Television Corpora tion and the Pakistan Television Corporation i.e. between the employees and the employer. It was with the mutual consent of the parties that the aforesaid rule 2.11 was agreed to and was gazetted to the Gazette dated 25th May, 1978. A similar rule is available in the shape of rule 3 (2) (b) of the Essential Services (Maintenance) Rules, 1962. Under rule 3 (2) (b) the previous terms and conditions have been guaranteed and the specified authority cannot alter these terms and condi tions to the disadvantage of an employee. 'The Act specifies employments to which it applies and confers power on Central Government or an officer authorised in this behalf by it under section 4 to direct by a general or special order any person engaged in any employment not to depart from any area or areas as may be specified in such order. Section 5 creates offences which may follow the disobedience of Act/Order issued under section

4. There is nothing on the record to indicate that there has been any violation of any of the sections of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 or the rules of

962. In my view, therefore, there is no conflict in the instant case bet ween the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 and the rules with the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that rule 2.11 of Pakistan m Television Corporation Limited Employees Service Rules confer more protection to the petitioner than contemplated by rule 3 (2) (b) of the Rules, 1962 and for that reason Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) rule 2.11 is ultra vires is not tenable and is repelled. No authority has been cited in support of this proposition. 22.Contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner should have waited for the final dismissal/termination order before moving this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is devoid of any force. A Writ of Prohibition, as its name indicates, is issued to prohibit an inferior body or tribunal from continuing to act in relation tot matter which is beyond its authority or jurisdiction. Certiorari proceedings are commenced with a view to quashing orders passed by inferior bodies or tribunals, and prohibition will go to stop them from going on further with proceedings that are adjudged to be without foundation. Lord Atkin observed in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners Ex Parte London, etc. ((1924) 1 K B 171) "Prohibition restrains the tribunal from proceeding further in excess of jurisdiction; certiorari requires the record or the order of the Court to be sent up to the King's Bench Division, to have its legality inquired into, and, if necessary, to have the order quashed. It is to be noted that both writs deal with questions of excessive jurisdiction, and doubtless in their origin dealt almost exclusively with the jurisdiction of what is described in; ordinary parlance as a Court of Justice. But the operation of the writs has extended to control the proceedings of bodies which do not claim to be, and would not be recognized as, Courts of Justice. Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are sub ject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in. these writs. I can see no difference in principle between certiorari and prohibition, except that the latter may, be invoked at an earlier stage. If the proceedings establish that the body complained of is exceeding its jurisdiction by entertaining matters which would result in its final decision being subject to being brought up and quashed on certiorari, I think that prohibition will lie to restrain it from so exceeding its jurisdiction." Thus prohibition lies only in respect of a judicial or quasi‑ judicial body which has legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially. Further it has been held in that there is one fundamental distinction between prohibition and certiorari namely, that they are issued at different stages of the proceedings before an inferior Court or tribunal. When an inferior Court/Tribunal takes up for hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, the person against whom the proceedings are taken can move the superior Court for a writ of prohibition, and on that, an order could issue forbidding the inferior Court/tribunal from continuing the proceedings. On the other hand, if the Court/tribunal hears that cause or matter and gives a decision the party aggrieved would have to move the superior Court for a writ of certiorari, and on that, an order would be issued quashing the decision on the ground of want of jurisdiction. If, however, such a decision does not completely dispose of the matter, it would be necessary to apply both for certiorari and prohibition, certiorari for quashing what had been decided, and prohibition for arresting the further continuance of the proceedings. Where, however, the proceedings before a tribunal have termi nated, it is too late to issue prohibition, and certiorari to quash the deci sion is the proper remedy to adopt. It follows from this that prohibition cannot issue to a tribunal which has become functus officio but it is other wise with certiorari. Again, where the defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the proceedings and the application is made by an aggriev ed party, the order of prohibition goes as a matter of right and is not discretionary, and also that the existence of an alternative remedy is no bar. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Farquharson v. Morgon ((1894)Q B 552). Thus the petitioner could legitimately move this Court against pro ceedings which were initiated against them before the Inquiry Officer if they could establish that they were beyond his authority or jurisdiction.

23. In view of the afore‑mentioned discussion I hold that the rights/, privileges and benefits which were available to the petitioner under West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, i.e. Standing Orders 15 (4) and (5) are still available to the petitioner and that he could be proceeded against for any alleged "misconduct" within one month of the date of such misconduct or of the date on which the alleged misconduct came to the notice of the employer and that he could not be suspended for a period beyond 4 weeks in terms of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. I also hold that the alleged misconduct, if any, in this case took place on 16th February, 1978, and that it was within the knowledge of the employer who was instrumental in the arrest and pro secution of the petitioner and his other colleagues and that they could be proceeded against within one month of the said date and not on any subsequent date in terms of Standing Order 15 (4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Proceedings before the Inquiry Officer/respondent No. 2 are declared to be beyond his authority and jurisdiction. Without entering into other objections which the learned counsel for the petitioner took in the case, this Writ Petition is accepted. There would be no order as to costs. Petition accepted.