1994 PLP 119 (SCMR)

Although nothing in the text or the legislative history of the statute explicitly indicates whether Congress expected that the $100 million cap would ever be exceeded, in fact it never was. The Government reports that the first and only excess occurred in fiscal year 1989, when the cap stood at $125 milli6n and receipts were between $133 million and $134 million, Brief for United States 21, n 21, a claim respondent does not dispute, Brief for Respondent 19, n

16. Moreover, only a small percentage of any excess paid into the General Treasury can be attributed to the special assessments. The legislative history of the special assessment provision indicates that Congress anticipated that "substantial amounts [would] not result" from that source of funds. S Rep No. 98‑497, p. 13 (1984). reality has accorded with Congress" prediction. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, Victims of Crime Act of 1984: A Report to Congress by the Attorney‑General 12 (1988) ( 3013 revenues accounted for four per cent of all deposits into the Fund received by United States Attorneys' Offices for fiscal year 1987). Four per cent of a minimal and infrequent excess over the statutory cap is properly considered "incidents[1]". As in Nebeker and Millard, then, the special assessment provision was .passed as part of a particular program to provide money for that program‑‑the Crime Victims Fund. Although any excess was to go to the Treasury, there is no evidence that Congress contemplated the possibility of a substantial excess, nor did such an excess in fact materialize. Any revenue for the general Treasury that 3013 creates is thus "incidents[1]" to that provision's primary purpose. This conclusion is reinforced, not undermined, by the Senate'Report that respondent claims establishes that 3013 is a "Bil[1] for raising Revenue". That Report reads: "The purpose of imposing nominal assessment fees is to generate needed income to offset the cost of the [Crime Victims Fund]. Although substantial amounts will not result, these additional amounts will be helpful in financing the‑ program and will constitute new income for the Federal Government." S Rep No. 98‑497, supra, at 13‑14 (emphasis added). Respondent's reliance on the emphasized portion of the quoted passage avails him nothing. Read in its entirety. The passage clearly evidences Congress' intent that 3013 provide funds primarily to support the Crime Victims Fund. Respondent next contends that even if 3013 is directed entirely to providing support for the Crime Victims Fund, it still does not fall within the ambit of Nebeker or Millard. Respondent accurately notes that the 3013 assessments are not collected for the benefit of the payors, those convicted of federal crimes. He then contends, citing Nebeker and Millard, that any bill that provides for the collection of funds is a revenue bill unless it is designed to benefit the persons from whom the funds are collected. Respondent misreads Nebeker and Millard. In neither of those cases did the". Court state that a bill must benefit the payor to avoid classification as a revenue bill. Indeed, had the Court adopted such a caveat, the Court in Nebeker would have found the statute to be unconstitutional. There,. the Court expressly identified the "people" generally, rather than the banking associations required to pay the tax, as the beneficiaries of the system of currency at issue. 167 US, at 203, 42 L Ed 134, 17 S Ct

766. It nevertheless found that the 'bill was not a revenue bill, stating that a bill creating a discrete governmental program, and providing sources for its financial support is not a revenue bill simply because it creates revenue, a holding that was reaffirmed by Millard. See supra, at 397‑398, 109 L Ed 2d, at

399. Thus, the beneficiaries of the bill are not relevant. [A different case might be presented if the program funded were entirely unrelated to the persons paying for the program. I lere, 3013 targets people convicted of federal crimes, a group to which some part of the expenses associated with compensating and assisting victims of crime can fairly be attributed. Whether a bill would be "for raising revenue" where the connection between payor and program was more attenuated is not now before us.] Section 3013 is not a "Bil[1] for raising Revenue". We therefore need not consider whether the Origination Clause would require its invalidation if it were a revenue bill. Nebeker,167 US, at 203, 42 L Ed 134,17 S Ct 766 (holding consideration of origination question "unnecessary" in light of finding that bill was not a revenue bill). We hold that this case does not raise a political question and is justiciable. Because the bill at issue here was not one for raising revenue, it could not have been passed in violation of the Origination Clause. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consisted with this opinion. So ordered. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, concurring in the judgment. In my opinion, a bill that originated unconstitutionally may nevertheless become an enforceable law if passed by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President. I therefore believe that it is not necessary to decide whether 18 USC 3013 [18 USCS 3013] was passed in violation of the Origination, Clause. The Originatiop Clause appears in Article I, 7, of the Constitution, which describes the procedures that the two Houses of Congress and the President shall follow when enacting laws. [ The first two paragraphs of 7 provide in full: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two‑thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that‑House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Ycas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted)] The Origination Clause is the first of three Clauses in that section. The Clause provides that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives", but it does not specify what consequences follow from an improper origination. The immediately following Clause, however, does speak to consequences. The second Clause of 7 says, among other things, that "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States." An improperly originated bill passed by both Houses would seem to be within a class comprising "Every" bill passed by both Houses, and it therefore seems reasonable to assume that such an improperly originated bill is among those that "shall. . . be presented to the President". The Clause further states that if the President returns to Congress a bill presented to him, and if two thirds of each House thereafter approves the bill, "it 'shall become a law". No exception to this categorical statement is made for bills improperly originated. The second Clause of 7 later provides that "any Bill". not acted upon by the President within 10 days "shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it". In this instance, one express exception is made: If Congress adjourns before the 10‑day period expires, the bill "shall not be a Law". Again, no exception is‑made for bills improperly originated. It is fairly inferred from this language that some bills may become law even if they are improperly originated. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the bill now at issue became law even if improperly originated. That bill is not governed by the provisions just discussed, because it was signed by the President and hence did not become law by virtue of either Presidential inaction or the override of a veto. The language in 7 dealing with bills signed by the President speaks in terms of necessary, rather than sufficient, conditions: The Clause states only that bills must be presented to the President and that if "he approves he shall sign it". The Clause does not say that any bill signed by the President becomes law, although 'it does later say that a bill not acted upon becomes law "in like Manner as if he had signed it". In my view, the sufficiency of the procedural conditions in the Second Clause is reasonably supplied by implication. I accordingly interpret Ss7 to provide that even an improperly originated bill becomes law if it meets the procedural requirements specified later in that section. My reading of the text of 7 is supported by examination of the Constitution's purposes. I agree with the Court that the purpose of the Origination Clause is to give the most "`immediate representatives of the people'"‑‑Members of the House, directly elected and subject to ouster every two years‑‑an "effectual weapon" for securing the interests of their constituents. Ante, at 395, 109 L Ed 2d, at 397, quoting The Federalist No. 58, p. 359 (C. Rossiter ed 1961). For four reasons, I believe that examination of this purpose supports the view that the binding force of an otherwise lawfully acted bill is not vitiated by an Origination Clause violation. First, the House is in an excellent position to defend its origination power. A bill that originates in the Senate, whether or not it raises revenue, cannot become law without the assent of the House. The House is free to rely upon the Origination Clause to justify its position in a debate with the Senate, regardless of whether Constitutional concerns alone drive the House's position. See Bessette & Tulis, The Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency 8‑16, in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order (J. Bessette & J. Tulis, eds, 1981) (discussing ways, aside from judicial enforcement, in which the Constitution shapes political behaviour). The Senate may expect that an improperly originated bill will confront a coalition in the House, composed of those who oppose the bill on substantive grounds and those who would favour it on substantive grounds but regard the procedural error as too important to ignore. Taxes rarely go unnoticed at the ballot box, and there is every reason to anticipate that Representatives subject to re‑election every two years will jealously guard their power over revenue‑raising measures. [The Court properly observes that the House has an interest in upholding "the entire Constitution, not just those provisions that protect its institutional prerogatives". Ante, at 392‑393, 109 L Ed 2d, at 395 (emphasis in the original). I agree. It is, however, true that even if the House should mistake its Constitutional interest generally, it is unlikely to mistake its more particular interest in being powerful: That specific interest is instrumental to any broader conception the House might have of its duties and interests. Nevertheless, the Court is again correct to say that the possibility of legislative enforcement does not supply a prudential, non‑constitutional justification for abstaining from constitutional interpretation. Ante, at 392‑393, 109 L Ed 2d, at 395

396. My point is rather that this possibility is relevant to the substantive task of interpreting . 7 itself.] Second, the House has greater freedom than does the Judiciary to construe the Origination Clause wisely. [ Respondent observes that the I louse "has not assumed that it is the final arbiter of the Origination Clause", but has instead "looked to Court decisions for guidance in determining whether to return bills to the Senate." Brief for Respondent

11. Although respect for our power of judicial review is a constitutional necessity in the ordinary case, it is not clear that the house's deference is either necessary or wise with respect to this issue. Indeed, a decision by this Court to pass upon Origination Clause questions may be an unfortunate inducement to the house to forbear from an independent inquiry into the interpretive issues posed by the Clause.] The House may, for example, choose to interpret "Bills for raising Revenue" by invoking a test that turns largely upon the substantive economic impact of the measure on society as a whole, or may determine the House of origination by identifying the legislators who were most responsible for the content of the final version of the bill. If employed by the House, rather than the Judiciary, inquiries so searching obviously create no tension between enforcement of the Origination Clause‑ and the democratic principle of the legislative process‑‑a principle which the 'Clause itself is designed to serve. The House may also examine evidence. including informal private disclosures, unavailable (or incomprehensible) to the Judiciary. Third, the House is better able than this Court to judge the prejudice resulting from an Origination Clause violation, and so better able than this Court to judge what corrective action, if any, should be taken. The nature of such a power may be comprehended by analogy to our own recognition that a Constitutional defect in courtroom procedure does not necessarily vitiate the outcome of that procedure. See Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 17 L Ed 2d 705, 87"S Ct 824, 24 ALR3d 1065 (1967), I see nor reason to believe that a defect in State‑house procedure cannot also be harmless: A tax originated in the Senate may nevertheless reflect the view of the people as interpreted by the House, whether because of a coincidence in the judgment of the two branches or because the House directly influenced the Senate's labour. The House's assent to an improperly originated bill is unlikely to be given if its Members believe that the procedural defect harmed the bill's substance. Yet, it would be difficult to imagine how this Court could reasonably assess the prejudice resulting from any particular Origination Clause violation. On my interpretation of 7, the Constitution confides this responsibility to the House of Representatives instead. One consequence of this interpretation is that an expensive construction of the Clause by the House need not impose spurious formalities, since spurious violations may be ignored. Fourth, the violation complained of by respondent is unlike those Constitutional problems which we have in the past recognized as appropriate for judicial supervision. [This observation bears upon the plausibility of an interpretation of the Origination Clause that effectively insulates origination problems from judicial review. See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 2h4, 384‑385, 5 L Ed 257 (1821).] This case is not one involving the constitutionality of statutes alleged to effect prospective alterations' in the' Constitutional distribution of power., See INS v. Chadha, 462 US 919, 77 L Ed 2d 317, 103 S Ct 2764 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U$ 714 92 L Ed 2d 583, 106 S Ct 3181 . (1986); Morrison v. Olson. 487 US 654, 101 L Ed 2d 569, 108 S Ct 2597 (1988). No defect in the representative process threatens to impede a democratic solution to the problem at issue. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 US 486, 23 L Ed'2d 491, 89 S Ct. 1944 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 12 L Ed 2d 506, $4 S Ct 1362 (1964). No claim is made that this statute deals with subjects outside the sweep of congressional power, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 83 L Ed 2d 1016, 105 S Ct 1005 (1985), or that the statute abrogates the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1, 46 L Ed 2d 659, 96 S Ct 612 (1976). Nor, finally, does respondent contend that the Constitution has been violated because action has been taken in derogation of structural bulwarks designed either to safeguard groups specially in need of judicial protection; or' to tame the majoritarian tendencies of American politics more generally. See Chadha, ' supra; Powell, supra; United‑States v. Carotene Products,‑304 US 144, 152, n 4, 82 L Ed 1234, 58 S Ct 778 (1938), Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 US 88, 48 L Ed 2d 495, 96 S Ct 1895 (1976). Indeed, this case presents perhaps the weakest imaginable justification for judicial invalidation of a statute: Respondent contends that the judiciary must intervene in order to protect a power of the most majoritarian body in the Federal Government, even though that body has an absolute veto over any effort to usurp that power. The democratic structure of the Constitution ensures that the majority rarely if even needs such help from the Judiciary. [ I agree with the Court that the Origination Clause is intended to "safeguard liberty". Ante, at 395, 109 L Ed 2d, at

397. Indeed, this must be true, in a general sense, of almost every constitutional provision, since the Constitution aims to "secure the Blessings of Liberty". US Const, Preamble. Of course, the Constitution aims as well to create a Government able to "promote the general Welfare". but liberty and welfare should ultimately coincide. I also believe, however, that some Constitutional provisions are designed to protect liberty in a more specific sense: They protect the rights of individuals as against the majority. Other provisions give the majority sufficient power to act effectively, within limits. In this sense, the First Amendment secures liberty in a way that the Origination Clause does not.] These considerations reinforce my construction of the text of Ss 7 and lead me to conclude that the statute before us is law regardless of whether it was improperly originated. As a practical matter, this reading of the Constitution precludes judicial review of alleged violations of the Origination Clause. It is up to the House of Representatives to enforce that provision by refusing its consent to any revenue bills that originate in the Senate. [The President obviously might choose to enforce the provisions by vetoing an improperly originated bill. It seems clear that the President has the power to do so; it is less clear whether the President has any Constitutional duty to police the internal processes of the Congress, or whether he has instead a constitutional duty to defer to Congress on such matters. These issues must be determined by the President; they are not ones we need resolve. It is noteworthy, however, that Article I, Ss. 7, does supply a textual basis for inferring that the President has some Constitutional responsibility with respect to matters of origination. Upon vetoing a bill, the President must return it to the House "in which it shall have originated". That phrase is manifestly ambiguous in the case of a improperly originated bill.] The Court's holding, however, may itself be not too far removed from such a consequence: The Court's essential distinction between revenues allocated to particular programs and those allocated to the General Treasury, ante, at 397 398, 109 L Ed 2d, at 399, tends to convert the Origination Clause into a formal accounting requirement, so long as the House consents. [The Court's interpretation of the Clause does not appear to prevent the mouse from interpreting the Clause more aggressively, although the Court does effectively deny the (louse the power to "deem harmless" a violation of the Clause.] In all events, I think that both a liberal and a practical interpretation of the Origination Clause is consistent with the conclusion that a revenue bill becomes a law whenever it is passed by both Houses of Congress and duly signed by the President. Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment. Marshall Field and Co. v. Clark, 143 US 649, 36 L Ed 294, 12 S Ct 495 (1892), held that Federal Courts will not inquire into whether the enrolled bill was the bill actually passed by Congress: "The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by the President of the Senate "in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable....The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated: leaving the Courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution." Id., at 672, 36 L Ed 294, 12 S Ct

495. This salutary principle is also supported by the uncertainty and instability that would result if every person were "required to hunt through the journals of a legislature to determine whether a statute, properly certified by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, and approved by the governor, is a statute or not." Id., at 677, 36 L Ed 294, 12 S Ct 495 (quoting Weeks v Smith, 81 Me 538, 547, 18 A 325, 327 (1889)). The same principle, if not the very same holding, leads me to conclude that Federal Courts should not undertake an independent investigation into the origination of the statute at issue here. The enrolled bill which, when signed by the President, became the Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 98 Stat 2170, bore the indication "H J Res 648." The designation "H J Res" (a standard abbreviation for "House Joint Resolution") attests that the legislation originated in the House. Such an attestation is not explicitly required by the Constitution, but is reasonably necessary to the operation of Art I, 7, cl 2, which requires the President, if he desires to veto a bill, to "return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated". The President can hardly be expected to search the legislative Journals (if they have even been printed by the time his veto must be cast) in order to determine where to direct his veto message. Indeed, it can be said that the attestation is reasonably necessary to the operation of Art. 1, 7,cl. 1 (the Revenue‑Origination Clause), itself. The President, after all, is bound not to sign an improperly originated revenue bill by the same oath that binds us not to apply it, so he must have a ready means of knowing whence it came. The enrolled bill's indication of its House of origin establishes that fact as officially and authoritatively as it establishes the fact that its recited text was adopted by both Houses. With respect to either fact a Court's holding, based on its own investigation, that the representation made to the President is incorrect would, as Marshall Field said, manifest a lack of respect due a coordinate branch and produce uncertainty as to the state of the law. I cannot imagine this Court's entertaining a claim that purportedly vetoed legislation took effect because, although the President returned it to the House of origination indicated on the enrolled bill, that was not the real house of origination. It should similarly accept the congressional representation in the present case. We should no more gainsay Congress' official assertion of the origin of a bill than we would gainsay its official assertion that the bill was passed by the requisite quorum, see Art. 1, 5, cl. 1; or any more than Congress or the President would gainsay the official assertion of this Court that a judgment was duly considered and approved by our majority vote. Mutual regard between the coordinate branches, and the interest of certainty, both demand that official representations regarding such matters of internal process be accepted at face value. This disposition does not place for ever beyond our reach the only issue in this area that seems to me appropriate for judicial rather than congressional resolution: what sort of bills constitute "Bills for raising Revenue," Art. I, 7, cl.

1. Whenever Congress wishes to preserve‑ the possibility of a judicial determination on this point, all it need do is originate the bill that contains the arguably revenue‑raising measure in the Senate, indicating such origination on the enrolled bill, as by the caption "S J Res". This Court may thereby have the last word on what constitutes a bill for raising revenue, and Congress the last word on where a particular bill has originated‑‑ which seems to me as it should be. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.