P L D 1958 (W (PLP)

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers con ferred by subsection (1), an order made thereunder may provide . . . . (c) for controlling the prices at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold . . . . (e) for regu lating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity . . . . (g) for requiring any person holding stock of an essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock at such prices and to such persons or class of persons or in such circumstances, as may be specified in the order . . . . (i) for collecting any information or statistics with a view to regulating or prohibiting any of the aforesaid matters. (j) for requiring persons engaged in the production, supply or distribution of, or trade or commerce in, any essential commodity to maintain and produce for inspection such books, accounts and records relating to their business and to furnish such information relating thereto, as may be specified in the order." Section 4 provides for delegation by the Central Government of the power to make orders under section

3. By section 2 Artificial Silk Yarn was classified as essential commo dity. On 3/5/55 the Central Government in the exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of Ordinance X of 1955 made the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order, 1955. Section 6 empowers the Textile Commissioner to direct, by notification in the Gazette, importers, dealers, or consumers to obtain licenses for the import, sale, or purchase of Artificial Silk Yarn. Admittedly no such notification has been issued. Section 7 of the Order provides that the Textile Commissioner may for the purpose of proper distribu tion of Artificial Silk Yarn or of securing due compliance with this order direct any importer or dealer or class of importers or dealers to sell to such persons or class of persons such quantities of artificial silk yarn as the Textile Commissioner may specify. Section 8 empowers the Textile Commissioner with the approval of the Central Government to exempt any person or class of persons from all or any of the provisions of the preceding clauses. In addition, the order empowered the Textile Commissioner to fix maximum prices above which no importer or dealer should sell any specified kind of artificial silk yarn and empowered the Textile Commissioner to require any person to give information regarding his stocks of yarn etc. After the enactment of the Constitution Ordinance 1V was passed on the 25th of April 1956. Admittedly the statement in the preamble that the National Assembly is not in session was mistaken and hence on 10/5/56 Ordinance V of 1956 was pro mulgated. This Ordinance repealed Ordinance X of 1955 and Ordinance 1V of 1956, but saved any order made under Ordin ance X of 1955 and inforce immediately before 25/4/56. This Ordinance V of 1956 stated that it was expedient to provide for price control and trade and commerce between the Provinces and between a Province and the Federal Capital in respect of certain commodities and it is common ground that in material respects the operative portion of this Ordinance was identical with Ordin ance X of 1955. Ordinance V of 1956 was due to cease to operate in virtue of Article 69 of the Constitution on 19/11/56. On 17/11/56 Ordinance XXI of 56 was promulgated in the same material terms including a saving clause as Ordinance V of

56. Finally we reach Central Act 3 of 1957 which received the President's assent on 6/3/57. This contains no saving clause for the Ordinance XXI of 56 which it repeals and re‑enacts, but presumably the Legislature relied on S. 24 of the General Clauses Act so as to make unnecessary an express saving clause. On 25/4/56 the President purporting to act under sub‑Article 2 of Article 211 passed the President's Order 3 of 56, as the preamble states, to provide for the continuance of power to control production, treatment, keeping; storage, movement, transport, supply, distribution, disposal, acquisition, and trade and commerce in certain commodities within the Federal Capital. We have before us many petitions challenging the validity of what are called release orders, namely directions to persons having stocks of artificial silk yarn to sell at controlled prices to persons specified in the direction. Most of these orders are subsequent to the date of Act 3 of 1957 but in Writ Petitions 488, 536, 152 and 172 of 1957 these orders precede the Act of (1957) (sic). Writ Petitions 341, 324 and 347 of 1957 concern prosecutions which were started or threatened in respect of failure to declare stocks on 6/5/55. During the course of argument certain issues were clarified. The vires of Ordinance X of 1955 are no longer challenged, that Ordinance having been issued under the powers granted by the Government of India Act, 1935. The Attorney General of A Pakistan pointed out that Article 224 preserved the life of this Ordinance until its repeal by the appropriate legislature, and this position has not been challenged by the Petitioners in view of Jibendra's case (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 9 at 44). Ordinance V of 1956 which was promulgated after the coming into force of the Constitution purported to repeal Ordinance X of 1955. The Petitioners, founding upon Article 69, contended that Ordinance V of 1956 was due to cease to operate on 19/11/56, that its life could not be prolonged by a further Ordinance, and that therefore Ordinance XXI of 1956 was void. As regards Act 3 of 57 they contended that the powers of Parliament extended to item 4 of the Federal List (trade and commerce between the Provinces and the Foreign countries) and to item 7 of the Con current List (price control), but the powers of Parliament did not extend to item 42 of the Provincial list (trade and commerce within the Province). The petitioners further contended that the President's power under sub‑Article 2 (b) of Article 211 did not extend to legislation such as President's Order 3 of 56, and even if those powers did so extend, yet they were confined to the Federal Capital and the President had no power to legislate in respect of trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan. Turning first to the question whether the President has the power under Article 69 to extend the life of an Ordinance beyond the period therein mentioned and whether repeal and re‑enactment amount to such extension, we may first note the decision in Tamizuddin v. Province of East Bengal (P L D 1949 Dacca 1). There the Governor had promulgated an Ordinance under section 88 of the Govern ment of India Act. That section like Article 69 provided that an Ordinance shall be laid before the Legislature and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the next meeting of the Legislature or if a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Assembly upon the passing of that resolution. It was held that a further Ordinance extending the life of the previous Ordin ance beyond that period was barred by S.

88. We presume that the draftsman of the Constitution was aware of this decision and that the repetition of the material words of section 88 in Article 69 has the effect of endorsing that decision. But apart from this authority, the provisions of Article 69 are clear. The President's powers of making Ordinances are to be exercised only when the Assembly is not in session, and only if he is satisfied that immediate action is necessary. The Assembly may after meeting cut shot the life of an Ordinance by a mere resolution without the President's assent, and in any case its life shall cease six weeks after the Assembly's meeting. The normal legislative authority is Parliament. The President's powers of making Ordin ances are confined to emergencies which require immediate legisla tion and which arise when the Assembly is not in session. After the Assembly meets six weeks' time is allowed to the Government to promote a bill and obtain an Act to meet the legislative requirements of the circumstances. This being the scheme of the' section, there can be no doubt that the words "shall cease to operate" are, they purport to be, mandatory and that they contain by necessary implication a prohibition against extending the operation of an Ordinance beyond the statutory limit of time. In Tamizuddin's case the Governor purported expressly to extend the life of the Ordinance. Here the Ordinance has been repealed and re‑enacted in materially identical terms, and this process attracts mutatis mutandis the application of the words of Viscount Caldecote L. C. Board of Trustees of Lethbridge Irrigation District v. Independent Orders of Fresters (1940 A C 513 at p. 534). "This Board has never allowed such colourable devices to defeat the provisions of Ss. 91 and

92. Reference may be made to Lord Halsbury's statement in delivering the decision of the Judicial Committee in Madden v. Nelson (1899 A C 626). "It is very familiar principle that you cannot do that indirectly which you are prohibited from doing directly. The substance and not the form of the enactment in question must be regarded." In form Ordinance V died on its repeal in form Ordinance XXI is a fresh Ordinance but in substance Ordinance XXI by repeatingl8 the contents of Ordinance V extended the life of Ordinance V, qt process prohibited by Article

69. Ordinance XXI was therefore void: Though however Ordinance XXI has thus been declared void by us, we have to consider the effect of Act 3 of 1957 in repealing and re‑enacting the Ordinance. The Act contains no express saving clause, but section 24 of the General Clauses Act provides that when a Central Act (which expression in virtue of section 30 includes an Ordinance) is repealed and re‑enacted with or without modification then unless it is otherwise expressly provided, every appointment, notification, order, scheme or rule form or by‑law made or issued under the repealed Act shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re‑enacted continue in force and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re‑enacted. It was argued for the petitioners that since Ordin ance XXI of 56 was void therefore it was an impossibility to repeal that Ordinance. In our opinion this argument is founded on a wrong view of the effect of declaring an Act or Ordinance void. The Courts do not legislate though on appropriate occasions they may and must declare an Act void, yet such declaration does not wipe that Act off the Statute Book. Provided an Act of Parliament conforms to the legislative procedure laid down by the Constitution and falls within the powers of Parliament as respects subject‑matter and fundamental rights, then the duty o the Courts is to ascertain the intent of Parliament and give effect thereto, and it is not within the competency of the Courts to deny effect to that ascertained intent on the ground that the Legislature should have expressed its intent in a different form. Ordin ance XXI had not been declared void in any Court of law so far as counsel and we are aware : the presumption is that the Legis lature considered the Ordinance valid, and that it relied upon S. 24 of the General Clauses Act in order to obviate the necessity of again making orders to the same effect under the new Act. Therefore we conclude that in so far as Parliament had power to legislate on these topics, to that extent the Yarn Control Order was validated with effect from the date of Act 3 of 1957. Neither Ordinance V nor Act 3 purported to control trade and commerce within the Federal Capital. The President's Order 3 of 1956 purported to do‑ so. We do not propose to go into the question to what extent Sub‑Article 2 (b) of Article 211 confers legislative powers on the President. We may observe that the petitioner's argument founded on the similarity of language in section 289 of the Government of India Act, 1935 was not presented to our learned brothers in Muhammad Ali v. Chief' Commissioner (1), and hence that case may possibly require review by a full bench unless a decision of the Supreme Court is given in the meantime in the appeals which we understand are pending. The reason why it is unnecessary to deal with this question is that the petitioners are in a dilemma. Either the President's Order 3 of 1956 is good or if it is not good then pro tanto Ordinance X of 1955 still holds good by virtue of Article 224, and in either case the Yarn Control Order is saved as regards trade and commerce within the Federal Capital. As regards however trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan both Ordinance, V and Act 3 appear to us to be in excess of the powers of the President and of Parliament. The Federal Capital is part of the Province of West Pakistan (vide S. 2 (1) and (2) of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act and Article 1 of the Constitu tion and its explanation). The Supreme Court has said in Remington Rand's case (2) "The Federal Capital is clearly a part of the Province of West Pakistan territorially". It is true that its administration rests in the President (vide Article 211,) and that the Central Legislature is given power to legislate for the Federal Capital (except as regards the High Court). But it appears to us that trade and' commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province is an intra‑Provincial matter, and comes squarely under the item trade and commerce within the Province and thus within the sphere of the Provincial Legislature. It is to be noted that the Constitution has vested the residuary powers of legisla tion in the Provincial Legislature, and thus if a subject does no fall within the items applicable to Parliament it is the Provincial Legislature that has the powers to legislate. Pro tanto therefore Ordinance X of ,1955 stands unrepealed. The net result is that the Yarn Control Order in so far as it concerns the Federal. Capital and intra‑Provincial trade and commerce has never ceased to have validity. As regards intra -Provincial trade and commerce the Yarn Control Order was validated by Act 3 of 1957 after the gap between that Act and Ordinance V of 1956. We need not consider the question whether, (1) P L D 1957 Kar. 320 (2) P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 170 at p. 179 this validation was given retrospective effect, since according to the chart supplied to us by the Attorney General and giving details of the various petitions the release orders passed before Act 3 of 1957 related to orders to sell to persons outside Karachi within the Province of West Pakistan. This then brings us to the question of fundamental rights which, the petitioners argued, have been invaded by the Yarn Control Order and by the directions issued thereunder: The background of this legislation according to the respondents is that in order to conserve foreign exchange and to ensure its wise expenditure and to ensure the equitable distribution of artificial silk yarn, none of which is produced in this country, it is necessary to have a system whereby a person must have a licence to import artificial silk yarn and after import he must declare his stock and obey such orders regarding its distribution and price as the Textile Commissioner may issue. We agree that where an essential commodity must be imported and is in short supply it is reason able that the Legislature should control its import, distribution, and price. If foreign exchange is not sufficient to import all the goods that the people of this country, would like to import then it is reasonable that the Legislature and Government should be able to step in to say in what directions and for what purposes foreign exchange should be used. Furthermore if some persons have import licences it would be inequitable that they should be able to make use of their favoured position to charge prices inflated by an excess of demand over supply or to favour certain customers at the expense of others. Thus as regards Article I1 of the Constitution we think that the Yarn Control Order was a reasonable restriction upon the disposal or acquisition of property. As regards Article 12 we think that since an integral part of the scheme is that licences should be obtained for imports the carry ing on of the trade by these petitioners, namely dealing in artificial silk yarn, was regulated by a licensing system. It is true that so far as the Yarn Control Order is concerned no system of licensing under section 6 had been imposed, but the persons hit by the F Yarn Control Order or at least the petitioners in this case are persons who have been licensed to import. The Yarn Control Order is therefore we think a part of a licensing system, and this is not abnoxious to Article 12 of the Constitution. Difficult questions may well arise under Article 12 since unlike the corresponding Article in the Indian Constitution and unlike certain other Articles of our own Constitution there are no words in Article 12 saving reasonable restrictions. It is difficult to say what is the true ambit of Article

12. It guarantees the right to conduct trade and it also contains provisions that nothing shall prevent its regulation by a licensing system or a government monopoly. The Article itself does not say that a person shall have the right to conduct trade unhampered by any legislative interference. And so far as directions to report stocks to Textile Commissioner, are concerned there seems to be nothing inconsistent with the right of conducting trade. When however one comes to directions that a trader shall sell to specified persons at a specified price these directions might well amount to a prohibition of trade if the prices are such that no reasonable profit can be made and if the trader would be sentenced to bankruptcy. In the present case however it is not the case of the petitioners that the prices do not contain a suitable margin of profit and we think therefore that the directions of the Textile Commissioner do not go beyond regulation by a licensing system. The result is that the petitions are dismissed. No order, as to costs. QADEERUDDIN, J.-- ‑I agree with the conclusion of my learned brother but would like to state the reasons for arriving at the conclusion. The orders in dispute were issued between the 30th of October 1956 and the 31st of August 1957 and contain directions to the petitioners for declaring stocks and for selling them to specified persons at certain prices. These directions relate to trade within the Federal Capital as well as to trade between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan. They were issued under the Artificial Silk (Yarn Control) Order 1955, to which I shall hereafter refer as `the Silk Order.' This order was passed in exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Government by section 3 of Ordinance X of 1955. The validity of the orders issued to the petitioners is questioned on the ground that the Silk Order itself is unconstitutional. The main grounds for questioning the vires of the Silk Order are that : Firstly, the parent legislation namely, Ordinance X of 1955 ceased to operate by virtue of its repeal by Ordinance V of 1956 ; Secondly, there is no legislative authority for the present in Pakistan, which can legislate for the control of trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan and thirdly, the President's Order No. III of 1956 which purports to control trade and commerce within the Federal Capital is ultra vires of his legislative authority. Ordinance X of 1955 admittedly empowered the Central Government to control trade and commerce within and among Provinces because it was issued by virtue of a proclamation that a grave emergency existed in terms of s. 102 of the Govern ment of India Act, 1935. The Federal Legislature was empowered under these circumstances to make laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List as well as Federal and Concurrent Legislative Lists. The legal situation changed when the Constitution came into force on the 23rd of March 1956 and the emergency proclaimed under S. 102 of the Government of India Act carne to an end. Ordinance X of 1955 was in force when the Constitution came. It was substituted by Ordinance IV of 1955 but the latter Ordinance was discovered to be invalid because it was issued at a time when the National Assembly was in session. Ordi nance V of 1956 was therefore issued. It repealed Ordinance X of 1955. The repealing Ordinance was itself to expire in terms of Article 69 of the Constitution on the 19th of November 1956 and therefore two days before its expiry Ordinance XXI of 1956 was promulgated. It is argued that Ordinance XXI of 1956 is unconstitutional because it defeats the purpose and violates the provision of Article 69 of the Constitution. Despite its unconstitutionality it was repealed by Act III of 1957. I am in respectful agreement with Sir George Constantine, J., that Ordinance XXI of 1956 was unconstitutional in terms of Article 69 H ‑of the Constitution. This being so the argument of the learned I counsel of the petitioners is that Ordinance X of 1955 ceased to operate when it was repealed by Ordinance V of 1956 and the Silk Order, which was issued under it did not survive because according to subsection (2) of s. 16 of Ordinance V of 1955 only those orders issued under Ordinance X of 1955 were to remain in force, which were not inconsistent with the provisions of the repealing Ordinance. In the attempt to establish these pro visions of law the learned counsel of the petitioners forgot that Article 224 of the Constitution extended the life of all those Ordinances which were in force at the time when the Constitu tion was enforced and that under this Article they were to continue in force until altered, repealed or amended by proper legislature or competent authority. Ordinance X of 1955 which was admittedly in force when the Constitution came could not therefore expire in terms of Article 69 of the Constitution. It was repealed by s, 16 of Ordinance V of 1956 but all those orders which were issued under it and which were not inconsistent with its provision were saved. The real point for consideration therefore is whether the Silk Order which was issued under Ordinance X of 1955 is inconsistent with the provisions of Ordinance V of 1956... In this connection it is to be observed that Ordinance X of 1955 dealt with inter‑Provincial as well as infra‑Provincial trade and commerce and similarly the Silk Order dealt with both types of trade and commerce. The next question therefore is whether Ordinance V of 1956 which did not deal with intra‑Provincial trade and commerce repealed Ordinance X of 1955 and the Silk Order with respect to both intra‑Provincial and intra‑provincial trade and commerce or not. Before finding, an answer to these questions it is necessary to determine whether the orders which are in dispute relate to inter‑Provincial or intra‑p;ovin9iat trade and. commerce, some of them admittedly relate to trade and commerce within the Federal Capital and most of them relate to trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan. This being so it is necessary to determine whether these two types of trade should be classified as inter‑Provincial or intra‑Provincial and which is the legislative authority which has the power to legislate for the control of these types of trade and commerce. All the Provinces which were situated in West Pakistan were integrated by the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955 on 14th of October 1955. All the orders which are in dispute relate to dates which are subsequent to this date. The orders in dispute should therefore 'be taken to relate to intra‑Provincial trade. A complication, however, arises because the territories of the Federal Capital were excluded from the Province of West Pakistan for purposes of administration from the Province of West Pakistan and were left to be administered in terms of sub section (2) of section 2 of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955 in accordance with the provisions of section 290‑A of the Government of India Act, 1935 and thereafter the administration was vested in the President by virtue of Clause (2 of Article 211 of the Constitution. Moreover, Parliament way empowered by Clause (3) of the Article to make laws for the Federal Capital with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial List. The Provincial Legislature of the Federal Capital is therefore Parliament. The area of the Federal Capital is thus distinguishable from the area of the rest of West Pakistan for the purposes of administration as well as Legislation. Parliament which is the Legislature for the Federal Capital includes the President in terms of Article 43 of the Constitution and there fore the Legislative powers, which are exercisable by the President with respect to the Federal Subjects, under Art. 69 read with Clause (i) of Article 106 of the Constitution, are exercisable by him for the Federal Capital with respect to the subjects which are enumerated in the Provincial List. The President can issue ordinances for the Federal Capital relating to Provincial Subjects in the same manner as he can issue Ordinances for Pakistan with respect to Federal Subjects. Parliament including the President can thus legislate for the Federal Capital both with respect to the Federal Subjects as well as Provincial Subjects but it cannot ordinarily legislate on Provincial Subjects for tire rest of the West Pakistan. This means that Parliament including the President could repeal Ordinance X of 1955 for the Federal Capital both with respect to inter‑Provincial and intra‑Provincial trade and commerce but could repeal it for the rest of West Pakistan with respect to inter‑Provincial trade and commerce only. The result is that Ordinance X of 1955 has not been repealed with respect to intra‑Provincial trade and commerce for the rest of West Pakistan and as such the Silk Order is in force in these areas with respect to intra‑Provincial trade and commerce. The Silk Order remains in force in the Federal Capital with respect to intra‑Provincial trade and commerce for another reason. The reason is that sub‑sec. (2) of s. 16 of the repealing Ordinance namely, Ordinance V of 1956, has left unrepealed, unaltered and unamended in terms of clause (1) of Article 224 of the Constitution all those orders which were issued under Ordinance X of 1955 in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the repealing Ordinance. Under this subsection the surviving order is to be deemed to be an order made under the Ordinance. The subject matter of the repealing Ordinance is trade and commerce among the Provinces and between the Provinces and the Federal Capital. Trade and commerce within a Province is not its subject, and therefore the surviving order in so far as it relates to trade and commerce within the Federal Capital could not be an order made under it, yet by a legislative fiction it can be deemed to be such an order. It survives because there is no inconsistency between trade and commerce among the Provinces and these two pursuits can be followed and can flourish side by side. This being so the Silk Order in so far as it relates trade and commerce within a Province is in force in the Federal Capital. Ordinance X of 1955 in so far as it relates to trade and commerce within the Federal Capital has perhaps not been repealed because, although it has been repealed by sub‑sec. (1) of s. 16 of Ordinance V of 1956 and the President could repeal it under Article 211 of the Constitution . . . . . in respect of the internal trade of the Federal Capital, yet one can see that this aspect was not in the mind of the legislature and there was no intention to repeal it with respect to the internal trade of the Federal Capital, because the repealing Ordinance has not been issued under Article 211 of the Constitution though President's Order No. III of 1956 which relates to the internal trade of the Federal Capital has been issued under Article

211. The above discussion can be summed up by saving Ordinance X of 1955 and the Silk Order are in force in the rest of tic' Province of West Pakistan with respect to intro‑Provincial trade and commerce, and they, or, at least the Silk Order is in forced in the Federal Capital with respect to trade and commerce within the Federal Capital. Trade and commerce within the entire area of the Province of West Pakistan can thus be controlled in terms of the Silk Order. It is necessary to, note two subsidiary arguments of the learned counsel in this connection. It was contended firstly that trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan is not intro‑Provincial, because the two areas have different administrative systems and different Legislatures; secondly the subject‑matter of Ordinances IV of 1956, V of 1956 and XXI of 1956 is control of trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the other Provinces which suggests a recognition by the Legislature that the Federal Capital is to be treated as different from all other Provinces including the Province of West Pakistan. Without examining this argument in detail, one can, see that it is in direct conflict with the Explanation to Article 1 of the Constitution read with sub‑sec. (1) of section 2 of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955 and has no force. These subsidiary arguments lead to the next main contention of the petitioners that there ‑is no legislative authority which cart legislate for the control of trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan. Parliament can legislate for inter‑Provincial control and it can legislate under clause (3) of Article 211 of the Constitution to control trade and commerce within the Federal Capital but cannot legislate for controlling trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan because these areas are the areas of one and the same Province tend ordinarily Parliament has no power to make laws for controlling trade and commerce within a Province. If this argument is correct then it points to a formidable situation with respect to the power of legislation for exercising any control over transactions between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan, but perhaps there is a solution to be found in the absence of any provision in Article 211 of the Constitution similar to the provision of sub‑sec. (1) of sec. 290‑A of the Government of India Act, 1935 that .the Provincial Legislature shall have no power to make laws in respect of the Capital of the Federation." The exclusion from Article 211 of the Constitution of this negation of legislative authority of the Provincial Legislature for making laws for the Federal Capital may have the meaning that the Provincial Legislature can legislate for the Federal Capital on the subjects on which Parliament cannot in the ordinary circumstances legislate. For the present purposes, how ever, it is not necessary to decide as to which Legislature or, authority is competent to make such laws, because the Silk Order which is a legacy of s. 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 is preserved by Article 224 of the Constitution, and trade and commerce in silk yarn can be controlled within the entire area; of the Province of West Pakistan under it. Reverting now to the third main argument of the counsel of the petitioner, namely; the President cannot make laws under clause (2) of Article 211 of the Constitution for the Federal Capital, I may point out that this argument was raised with a view to challenge the validity of the President's Order No. III of 1956, which are issued to control trade and commerce within the Federal Capital. Mr. Sharifuddin has addressed us able arguments in support of the contention that the power of the President under clause (2) (b) of Article 211 "to make such provision as he may deem necessary or proper with respect to the laws, which are to be in force" in the Federal Capital, is confined to declaring at the time of the determination of the territories of the Federal Capital as to what laws are to be applicable to them and does not include the power to make fresh laws. He has referred to s. 289 of the Government of India Act, 1935 by which the Provinces of Sind and Orissa were created and to sec. 290‑A of the same Act by which the Capital of the Federation was created and compared these provisions and objects of these two sections with the provisions of Article 211 of the Constitution in order to substantiate the point of his argument. He has hot advanced any argument to show why the President as a part of Parliament cannot legislate on Provincial Subjects for the Federal Capital under clause (3) of Article 211 of the Constitution. I see no bar to it. It is however not necessary to decide this question for the present purposes, because the President's Order No. III of 1956 is redundant in view of the decision that the Silk Order issued under, Ordinance X of 1955 serves the purpose of the President's Order as well as the purpose of giving legal authority to exercise control of trade and commerce between the Federal Capital and the rest of the Province of West Pakistan. The learned counsel of the petitioners have advanced elaborate arguments to challenge the control of trade and commerce in terms of the Silk Order on the basis of Articles 11 M and 12 of the Constitution. I am in agreement with my learned brother that the Silk Order and the orders issued under it are not hit by Article 12 of the Constitution. I may add with respect that I had the occasion of expressing my views on Article 12 in Shahabuddin and others v. Pakistan and another (P L D 1957 Kar. 854) which is probably pending for decision before the Supreme Court. Extensive portions of the judgment were read out by the learned counsel of the petitioners in support of their contentions that the Silk Order and the orders issued under it violate Article 12 of the Constitution. I think that it is not so and need not add further arguments to what my learned brother has written to show that there is a licensing system by which the trade in question is regulated. I may add that the Court is not concerned with the system being good, bad or indifferent in quality. The restrictions which are imposed on the trade are imposed by law and are reasonable in terms of Article 11 of the Constitution and are a consequence of the licensing system. The petitions are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. A. H. Petitions dismissed.