2026 PLP 78 (CLD)

MOHAMMAD ABDUR RAHMAN, J.

This application has been maintained by White Crystals Limited (hereinafter referred to as the "WCL") under Section 6 of the Recognition of Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 2011") seeking enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award dated 13 December 2023 passed by the London Court of International Arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the "LCIA") in LCIA Claim No.235925 (hereinafter referred to as the "Award"). A. Ownership Structure

2. WCL is a company that is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and which is a subsidiary of a company named Pergola Holdings Inc. and which company itself is a subsidiary of another company known as Al-Jomaih Holding Company that is incorporated in Saudi Arabia. WCL entered into a partnership with Infrastructure Growth Capital Fund General Partner Limited (hereinafter referred to as "IGCF"), which is a fund also established in Cayman Islands and in which partnership WCL contends it made an investment of $10,000,000 (United States Dollars Ten Million). It is contended that IGCF invested the above mentioned amount in another company known as IGCF SPV 21, that is also incorporated in the Cayman Islands, by acquiring 70.6% shareholding in that company and further that IGCF SPV 21 owns 53.8% of shareholding in another company known as KES Power, that is also incorporated in the Cayman Islands the remaining 46.2% shareholding in KES Power being held by a consortium comprising of Al-Jomaih Power Limited, a subsidiary of Pergola Holdings Inc. and Denham Investment. KES Power owns 66.4% of the shareholding of K-Electric a company Incorporated in Pakistan. The ownership structure, as it stands today, is clarified figuratively in the following chart: The remaining investment in IGCF was made by the now defunct Abraaj Group and the liquidation of which has led to an impasse inter se some of the shareholders and has culminated in arbitration proceedings being instituted in the Cayman Islands and consequentially this Application under Order. B. Sage Venture Capital Group Limited

3. On the liquidation of Abraaj Group, it is contended that their share in IGCF was acquired by Sage Venture Group Limited (hereinafter referred to as "Sage"), which is a wholly owned subsidiary of AsiaPak Investments Limited (hereinafter referred to as "AsiaPak") and which gave control over the entire voting shares that were previously held by the Abrraj Group in IGCF SPV 21 to Sage. It seems that the change in control of IGCF and IGCF SPV 21 marginalised WCL and whereafter certain information that was requested by WCL from IGCF, was apparently not provided by IGCF to WCL and which WCL contends violated both its contractual rights as well as its statutory rights.

4. It would therefore seem that while the ownership structure remained the same, the change in ownership from the Abraaj Group to Sage has had an impact on the relationship as between the partners in IGCF, leading to an impasse, and which led to an arbitration being Instituted before the LCIA. C. The Arbitration

5. A letter was written by WCL to IGCF on 4 June 2023, inter alia stating as hereinunder. . The Report of the GP for the period ended 31 December 2022 (dated 18 April 2023) (the "GP report") details developments in [the Fund] s investments and management which appear to be detrimental to the interests of all Limited Partners ("LP"). As an LP in the Fund, we have significant concerns as to the manner in which many of these developments came about particularly because they do not appear to be in the interests of all LP's. We request you to provide a copy of this demand to all LP's...." As the information required was not forthcoming WCL instituted arbitration proceedings before the LCIA seeking access to various information from IGCF and in which proceedings the Arbitrators passed an Award in the following terms: . For the REASONS set out above, we, Alan Steinfeld KC (Presiding Arbitrator), Robert P and Hussein Haeri, AWARD (as the Tribunal's. Final Award) as follows: (1) It is declared that the Respondent is in breach of Clause 9.1 of the LP Deed; (2) It is ordered that the Respondent do specifically perform its obligations under clause 9.1 of the LP Deed in compliance with the cl.9 access notice served by the Claimant by granting the Claimant by its authorised agent(s) access to the Respondent's books and records within 5 days of the date of this Award; (3) It is declared that that the Respondent is in breach of Section 22 of the Cayman Exempted Limited Partnership Act ("the Act") by failing to provide the information demanded of it by the Claimant's letter to it dated 4 June 2023; (4) It is ordered that the Respondent do respond fully and truthfully to the said letter dated 4 June 2023 within 5 days of the date of the Award and that it thereafter do comply with its duties under Section 22 of the Act in regard to any subsequent request(s) by the Claimant for true and fully information regarding the state of the business and financial condition of the Fund; (5) It is declared that the Respondent is in breach of section 29 of the Act; (6) It is ordered that the Respondent do comply with Section 29 of the Act by granting the Claimant by its authorized representative(s) access to the section 29 Register within 3 days of the date of the Award; (7) It is ordered that the Claimant's claim that the Respondent is in breach of section 30 of the Act be dismissed; (8) It is declared that the Respondent is in breach of section 31 of the Act; (9) It is ordered that the Respondent do comply with Section 31 of the Act by granting the Claimant by its authorised representative(s) access to the section 31 Register within 3 days of the date of the Award, (10) It is ordered that the Claimant's claim that the Respondent is not entitled to be indemnified out of the Fund for its costs and expenses of this Arbitration pursuant to clause 5.8 of the LP Deed be dismissed; (11) It is ordered that the Counterclaim be dismissed; (12) It is ordered that the Respondent do pay to the Claimant within 7 days of the date of this Award the sum of 728.414.17 towards the Claimant's Legal Costs (as defined in the LCIA Rules) and the sum of 47,191.51 by way of reimbursement of the Claimant's Arbitration Costs (as also so defined) already paid by the Claimant."

6. As is apparent that the award passed directed that IGCF was to provide WCL: (i) access to the Respondent's books and records, (ii) the information demanded of it by the Claimant's letter to it dated 4 June 2023, (iii) access to a Register maintained under Section 29 of the Cayman Exempted Limited Partnership Act within 3 days of the date of the Award, (iv) access to a Register maintained under Section 29 of the Cayman Exempted Limited Partnership Act within 3 days of the date of the Award. D. Objection as to Jurisdiction

7. I had on 7 April 2025 put the Applicant on notice as to the maintainability of this application keeping in mind that both the parties to the arbitration before the LCIA were based in the Cayman Islands, the performance of each of the contractual and statutory obligations was personal and that the information that was required was also outside of the jurisdiction of this Court. Reference was made to Section 3 of the Act, 2011 and which reads as here-in-under:

3. Jurisdiction of Court-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate and settle matters related to or arising from this Act. (2) An application to stay legal proceedings pursuant to the provision of Article II of the Convention may be filed in the Court, in which the legal proceedings are pending. (3) In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Court shall, (a) Follow the procedure as nearly as may be provided for the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), and (b) Have all the powers vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908)." The Jurisdiction of a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is regulated by Sections 16 to 20 of the that code. To elaborate, Sections 16 to 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deal a Courts jurisdiction over immovable property and Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 dealing with jurisdiction of a court in respect of matters under the law of tort. The only possible section that could regulate the jurisdiction of a court in respect of the enforcement of a foreign arbitration, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would be Section 20 and which reads as hereinunder:

20. Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction. (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are mom than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either of the Court is given, or the defendants who reside, or carry on business, or personally work as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. Explanation I.- Where a person has- a one place and also a temporary residence shall be deemed to reside at both places in action arising at the place where he resides. Explanation II.-A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." E. Contentions on Behalf of WCL

8. Mr. Farjad Ali Khan entered appearance on behalf of WCL and conceded that to determine jurisdiction, premised on clause (a) of subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 2011, the Court would have to have recourse to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to determine whether or not it had jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award under the provisions of the Act, 2011. In this context he conceded that the provisions of Sections 16 to 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 had no relevance in determining jurisdiction in the enforcement of the Award and recourse could only be made to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Further conceding that subsection (a) and (b) of the section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would also not have any relevance, Mr. Farjad Ali Khan premised his submission on subsection (c) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by contending that as the investments made by WCL in IGCF were used to acquire K-Electric, hence the veil as between each of the entities, identified in the ownership structure above, should be lifted and hence this court would have jurisdiction to entertain this Application.

9. In this context he referred the Court to a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Bank of Credits and Commerce and others v. Asrar Hassan[1] in which where a suit was maintained for redemption of a mortgage in respect of an immovable property located in Karachi but where the banking company with whom the property had been mortgaged was under liquidation proceedings outside of Pakistan, on a question as to whether a court had territorial jurisdiction or not, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that: The preliminary decree passed in the suit for redemption of mortgage was kept intact with the exclusion of claim for the adjustment of provident fund whereas the regular suit in respect of rest of the claim of the respondent is pending before the High Court of Sindh:, At Karachi on the original side in which the petitioners may raise all question of law and facts and in view thereof the High Court had tight refrained from dilating on the question relating to the territorial jurisdiction and maintainability of the suit against the Petitioners in Pakistan. This may be noted that the question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact, cannot be effectively decided without recording the evidence and learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to satisfy that in facts of the present case, the question relating to the jurisdiction of Court in Pakistan to entertain the Suit and adjudicate the claim of respondent against the petitioners is patently a question of law. ..." Premised on such a finding Mr. Farjad Ali Khan contended that the issue of territorial jurisdiction was therefore a mixed question of law and fact and hence could not be determined summarily. Mr. Farjad Ali Khan next referred to a judgement of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported as a Syed Ashraf Aqha v. Muhammad Sarwar[2] in which the Court when considering whether a decree could be transferred from one court to another, on account of the residence of the judgement debtor being in another jurisdiction, had allowed such a transfer under Rule 6 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on account of difficulty being faced by the Judgement Debtor in enforcing the Decree. He next relied on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported as Ghulam Fareed v. Shahid-ud-Din Tughlag[3] wherein in a suit that was instituted for specific performance in respect of an immovable property located in Tando Adam but where the Agreement had been executed in Karachi, this Court was pleased to return the plaint contending that this Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. He concluded by relying on an unreported judgement passed by myself in Suit No. 921 of 2014 entitled Ansar Hussain Siddiqui and others v. Abrar Hussain Siddiqui and others in which while interpreting subsection (c) of Section 20 in the context as to whether a suit for administration would be maintainable in the jurisdiction of the Court where the deceased resided at the time of his demise or as to the location of the property, I had examined two decisions reported as Yusuf Abbas and others v. Mst. Ismat Mustafa and others4 and Muhammad Ramzan (Deceased) through L.R. and others v. Nasreen Firdous and others5 and had concluded that the jurisdiction of a court would vest where the deceased resided at the time of his demise.

10. Mr. Farjad Ali Khan concluded by stating the Award had in fact been enforced by the Court of the Cayman Islands, Financial Services Division in Cause No. FSD NO. 394 of 2022 (MRHCJ) in which orders have been passed for its enforcement and also before the High Court of Justice Business and Property Courts of England and Wales in Claims No CL: 2023-000876. F. Order of the Court

11. I have Mr. Farjad Ali Khan and have perused the record. (i) The Application of clause (a) of subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 2011

12. The provisions of clause (a) of subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 2011 provides that while exercising jurisdiction under the Act, 2011, this Courts is bound to "follow the procedure as nearly as may be provided for the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908." The subsection and was interpreted by a Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court in a decision reported as China International Water and Electric Corporation (CWE) P.R. China v. National Highway Authority6

59. The mere fact that in terms of Section 3(3)(a) of the 2011 Act, this Court is to follow the procedure " as nearly as may be" provided for in the C.P.C. does not mean that the application under Section 6 is to proceed strictly like a suit or that an order for the recognition of a foreign arbitral award is to be accompanied or followed by a decree. The expression "as nearly as may be" makes it permissible for this Court to deviate from the procedural requirements in the C.P.C. In the case of Mehmood-ul-Hassan Babar Khan v. Liaqat Ali Kareem (2002 YLR 2227), the Hon ble Lahore High Court, while interpreting Rule 76(1) of the Punjab Local Government Elections Rules, 2000, which provided inter alia that every election petition shall be tried "as nearly as may be" in accordance with the procedure for the trial of suits under the C.P.C., held as follows:‑ "From bare perusal of the abovesaid rule it is crystal clear that the election petition has to be tried as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure for the trial of suits under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the C.P.C. is not applicable with all four corners and is applicable "as nearly as may be". These wordings show that the Election Tribunal can adopt any procedure to conclude the election petition without following the Civil Procedure Code stricto sensu. I am in agreement with the arguments of the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 that in election petition the Procedure of Civil Code may be used preferably and Supreme Court had held that C.P.C. is not applicable in stricto sensu. am fortified by the view taken by this Court in case Cooperative Bank, Haripur v. Tahir Mehmood (1999 MLD 2074). The learned Counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 has referred to Bashir Ahmad v. District Judge, Malakand and others (1985 SCMR 533) to substantiate the said view. From the perusal of these cases it has become crystal clear that C.P.C. though is applicable but is not strictly applicable and the Election Tribunal can decide the election petition by following C.P.C. as nearly as possible. Therefore, non-framing of issues is not an irregularity and contrary to the procedure to be adopted by the Election Tribunal."

60. Additionally, in the case of Farooq Ahmed Sheikh v. Privatization Commission (2006 CLD 1130), the Hon ble Lahore High Court held as follows:- "

24. At this point we would like to say a few words about the procedure which we have adopted in deciding this appeal. Section 29 of the Privatization Commission Ordinance, 2000 requires the High Court to "follow the procedure, as nearly as possible as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure". It is important to bear in mind that the C.P.C. itself is not made applicable to suits filed under the Privatization Commission Ordinance. Where the relevant facts are not in dispute, as in the present case, the Court merely has to apply the law to such facts and render its decision. There is no need, in such case, to call for evidence and to embark out a regular trial."

61. Had the Legislature required a decree to be passed in terms of a foreign arbitral award before the initiation of enforcement proceedings, it would have unequivocally provided for this in the 2011 Act. The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 ("the 1937 Act") was enacted to enforce the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards commonly known as the Geneva Convention, 1927. The 1937 Act has been repealed by the 2011 Act. Section 6(1) of the 1937 Act provided that where the Court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable under the said Act, the Court shall order the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, whereas Section 6(2) of the said Act provided that upon the judgment so pronounced, a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie fron such decree except insofar as the decree is in excess of or not in accordance with the award. Since unlike Section 6(2) of the 1937 Act, there is no provision in the 2011 Act which requires this Court to issue a decree while recognizing a foreign arbitral award, we find no force in the contention made on behalf of NHA that unless a decree is issued in terms of the award dated 30.06.2019, the same cannot be enforced.

62. As long as a Court s edict is formally expressed in precise and deliberate language so as to facilitate its execution, it matters not whether it is enunciated through an order, judgment or a decree. An order of the High Court for the recognition of a foreign arbitral award is as good as a judgment in terms of such award. And once this is done, orders for the enforcement of such award would ensue. The long and short of it is that since the provisions of the 2011 Act do not require a decree to be issued in terms of the award but only for recognition to be accorded to the award, the enforcement of the award recognized by the Court cannot be pre-conditioned on a decree." I cannot find myself, in any manner, to disagree with the finding of the Court regarding the interpretation of Clause (a) of subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 2011. As a procedure is required to be followed the same has been clarified to be the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but clearly that statute should not be followed as the gospel when recognizing or enforcing foreign arbitral awards and clearly the requirement of the issuance of a decree is not mandated.

13. But what about the procedure on the basis of which a Court would assume jurisdiction to maintain an application for recognition and enforcement of an award before it? The provisions of Clause (a) of Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 2011 provide guidance that a Court is to follow the procedure, nearly as may be, as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and which must mean that the procedure is to be considered in the context of the "recognition and enforcement" of a foreign arbitral award and where the procedure is not found to be so applicable it can safely be ignored. Secondly, when objections to a Foreign Arbitral Award have to be considered, Section 7 of the Act, 2011 limits such objections to those contained in Article V of the Schedule to the Act, 2011. However, in the context of Section 7 read with Article V of the Schedule to the Act, 2011 it is noted that none of the objections listed in that Article relate to an issue regarding the jurisdiction of a Court to entertain the lis and which therefore, to my mind, must find itself regulated by Clause (a) of subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Act, 2011 and the principles of justice equity and good conscience; the Court obliged to first confirm that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application and thereafter consider objections under Section 7 read with Article V of the Schedule to the Act, 2011 to the Award. In this context, the provisions of Sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should therefore be considered, not strictly, but to see whether any provisions therein relate to the "recognition and enforcement" of a foreign arbitral award and would permit or prohibit the application from being maintained. In addition, under the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, it is open to this Court to consider the doctrine of Forum non conveniens7 when adjudicating such an issue and even on the assumption that the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with another court, to consider whether the other forum is a more proper forum to exercise jurisdiction over this lis. Keeping in mind the facts of this application it is apparent that: (i) neither of the applicants reside in Pakistan; (ii) the lis, being the provisions of information, that is being sought by the applicant, is in respect of information of an entity not located in Pakistan; and (iii) the information i.e., the books and registers of the entity that are sought to be provided to the applicant are not located in Pakistan. On the basis of these admitted facts facts, I can see no basis for making a case that either a part of the cause of action accrued in Pakistan so as to attract subsection (c) of Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or that the entity as against whom the Awards has to be enforced is within the jurisdiction of this Court so that the performance of the Award can be compelled by this Court and which would make this Court a forum conveniens. The entire cause of action accrued to the Applicant in the Cayman Islands and the entity as against whom the Award is being enforced being also located there, I am clear that the Award should be enforced in that jurisdiction and which as clarified by Mr. Farjad Ali Khan, has in fact been done in by the Court of the Cayman Islands, Financial Services Division in Cause No. FSD NO. 394 of 2022 (MRHCJ). I am therefore of the opinion that as no part of the cause of action accrued in Pakistan this Court does not have jurisdiction under the provisions of subsection (c) of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and as all the parties to the lis are in fact resident in the Cayman Islands and as all the information required is also located in the Cayman Islands, this application cannot be maintained before this Court as it clearly a Forum non conveniens.8 (ii) Lifting the Corporate Veil

14. It seems that understanding this context Mr. Farjad Ali Khan attempted to argue that as K-Electric, which is ultimately owned by IGCF, is located in Pakistan and therefore this Court should lift the veil of incorporation as between K-Electric and each of the parent companies and enforce the award as against K-Electric. I must admit that I found this argument completely untenable. The doctrine of lifting the corporate veil has been considered by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the decisions reported as The President v. Mr. Justice Shaukat Ali9 Printing Corporation of Pakistan v. Province of Sindh and others10 Union Council, Ali Wahan, Sukkur v. Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited11 Water and Power Development Authority through General Manager and Project Director, Ghazi Barotha Hyedro Power Project and Another v. Administrator, District Council Swabi and 5 others12 Karachi Development Authority v. Central Board of Revenue.13 Province of NWFP through Secretary Local Government and Rural Development Peshawar v. Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation14 Water and Power Development Authority v. Administrator, District Council, Swabi,15 Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir Khan Tareen,16 and National Accountability Bureau v. Murad Arshad,17 and by this Court in the decisions reported as Nagina Films Ltd. v. Usman Hussain18, Associated Cement (State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Government of Sindh19 Central Insurance Company Ltd. v. M. T. Tasman Spirit20 Messrs Sakhi Dattar Cotton Industries and Oil Mills through Authorized Partner,21 Pub Corporation v. Water and Power Development Authority through Managing Director22 State life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Fazal and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd.23 In the Matter of: International Complex Projects Limited and another24 Add Oil (Private) Limited and another v. State25, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan v. Natover Lease Refinance Limited,26 Mohammad Ahmad Ansari v. Interglobe Commerce Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.27 The grounds on which such an argument is premised is that the ownership structure has been put in place as a facade, sham or to perpetuate a fraud or that the subsidiary company is in reality an agent of the Parent Company, thereby holding the Parent Company liable for the actions of the Subsidiary Company. In the context of companies wholly owned by Government, the Court has been more willing to lift the veil applying what has come to be known as the Functions Test and make the Company subject to the Constitutional Jurisdiction of this Court28 or to hold that it is not amenable to taxations regimes. While mentioned has been made in the decision reported as Messrs Sakhi Datta Cotton Industries and Oil Mills through Authorized Partner29 that the veil can be lifted as between a subsidiary and it's parent company, the basis on which such interference can be made has not be dilated on in that decision. This issue has however been considered by the courts in the United Kingdom on the ground that the corporate veil can be lifted when it is considered that each of the companies are part of a "Single Economic Unit" and whereby while in respect of contractual and statutory obligations the Court has been reluctant to lift the corporate veil, the parent company is however usually held liable for the actions of the subsidiary in an action in tort and on which issue there has been a considerable amount of change that has occurred in the law in that country in terms of those obligations in the context of guaranteed human rights.30

15. In the present application there is no allegation that ownership structure was designed in some way to create a fa ade or a sham or to perpetuate a fraud. There is also no allegation that K-Electric was acting as an agent of any of the companies in the ownership structure. Even if one is to consider the "Single Economic Unit" argument, that too cannot be sustained as the ownership structure, clearly indicates that there is no one entity that is controlling all of the other entities in the structure, the ultimate ownership clearly being divided as between Al-Jomaih Holding Company, AsiaPak and Denham Investment and each working for their own independent benefit. Further, where the veil is lifted, liability on the obligation usually comes to vest on the Parent Company, while if the argument of Mr. Farjad Ali Khan is sustained then liability on the contractual and statutory obligation would inversely come to be on the Subsidiary Company which would be altogether unique. Additionally, K-Electric is neither a respondent nor was a party to the Arbitration proceedings before the LCIA and would clearly plead ignorance of these proceedings let alone on any contractual and statutory obligations of IGCF. Finally, one cannot help but comment on the fact that the ownership structure has, in principle, been in place for many years without objection from WCL and it cannot be that the purchase of the share, held by the Abraaj Group in IGCF, by AsiaPak should be considered as an event to necessitate the lifting of the veil. There therefore being no legal basis for lifting the veil, the contention raised by Mr. Farjad Ali Khan is accordingly rejected. The Application under Order is clearly not maintainable.

16. For the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that: (i) the entire cause of action in respect of the enforcement of the Award is in the Cayman Islands and outside the jurisdiction of this Court; and (ii) this Court is Forum non conveniens with regard to the Application under Order; The Court lacking jurisdiction the Application under order is returned to WCL. There will be no order as to costs. MH/W-5/Sindh Application returned. [1] 2007 SCMR 852 [2] 2008 CLC 852 [3] PLD 2008 Karachi 536 4 PLD 1968 Karachi 480 5 PLD 2016 Supreme Court 174 6 2023 CLD 140, See also Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. v. Acro Textile Mills Ltd. (PLD 2018 Lahore 597 and Orient Power Co. (Private) Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd. (PLD 2019 Lahore 607) 7 See Global Quality Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Hardee s Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169 and Raziq International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Panalpina Management Ltd. PLD 2014 Karachi 175 8 See Global Quality Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Hardee s Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169 and Raziq International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Panalpina Management Ltd. PLD 2014 Karachi 175 9 PLD 1971 Supreme Court 585 10 1990 PLD 176 11 1993 SCMR 468 12 2005 PTD 627 13 2005 PTD 2131 14 PLD 2005 Supreme Court 670 15 2005 SCMR 487 16 PLD 2018 Supreme Court 114 17 PLD 2019 Supreme Court 250 18 1987 CLC 2263 19 1992 MLD 1730 20 2004 CLD 695 21 2006 CLD 191 22 PLD 2009 Karachi 139 23 2010 CLC 1895 24 2017 CLD 1468 25 2018 CLD 15 26 2023 CLD 225 27 2023 CLD 570 28 See Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 Supreme Court 244, Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation through Director General Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Akram Alizai, Deputy Controller, PBC, Islamabad 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1655, Aitchison College, Lahore through Principal v. Muhammad Zaubair and another PLD 2002 Supreme Court 326; Ziaullah Khan Niazi v. Chairman, Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2004 SCMR 189, Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani PLD 2005 Supreme Court 806, Pakistan International Airline Corporation and others v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others PLD 2010 Supreme Court 676, Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1257 and Pakistan Olympic Association v. Nadeem Aftab Sindhu 2019 SCMR 221 29 2006 CLD 191 30 See Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources plc [2019] UKSC 20, VTB Capital plc v. Nutritek International Corp (2013) UKSC 5, Chandler v. Cape plc (2012) EWCA Civ 525 UKSC 20; Lubbe v. Cape Plc (2000) UKHL 41, Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman (1990) UKHL

2. Adams v. Cape Industries plc (1990) Ch 433, Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] UKHL 5 and DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852