P L D 1966 Supreme Court 802 (PLP)

S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑This order will dispose of Criminal Appeals Nos. 5‑D and 6‑D of 1966 and Civil Appeal No. 52‑D of 1966. They are inter‑connected and arise out of the same facts. The circumstances that have necessitated these appeals may be briefly summarized. Dr. A. N. M. Mahmood, who is the first respondent to the Civil Appeal, is working as a temporary Reader and Head of the Department of Economics in the University of Dacca. He was drawing a salary of Rs. 975 p.m. together with a Headship allowance of Rs. 125 p.m. His substantive appointment was that of a Lecturer in the Department. Dr. K. T. Hossain, the second respondent, to this civil appeal, was also a permanent Lecturer in the same Department, though junior to Dr. Mahmood. He was on deputation to the Provincial Planning Department but his lien had been retained on his substantive post in the parent Department. Dr. Mahmood had been appointed temporary Reader in 1963. At that time Dr. Hossain had competed with him for the post but he was not selected. Some of the permanent Professors and Readers in the. Economics Department of the University, had gone away on deputation and the University were therefore anxious to appoint some qualified persons to fill up the gaps in the teaching strength. It seems that Dr. Hossain had received an offer of a permanent Readership in the Rajsbahi University at a salary of Rs. I,050,p.m. The Vice‑Chancellor of the Dacca University, Dr. M. O. Ghani, who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 5‑D of 1966, contacted this respondent and offered him the post of a temporary Reader in the Dacca University, at a salary of Rs. 1,050 p. m. He accepted the offer and by a resolution of the Syndicate of the University, dated the 16th October 1965, he was appointed a temporary Reader, in the Economics Department of the University, at a salary of Rs. 1,050 p.m. He actually assumed charge of this post on the 1st of November 1965. After the Syndicate resolution, the case was referred to the Selection Committee of the University for regularization of the appointment. The Syndicate had also decided that the post need not be advertised. Dr. Mahmood felt aggrieved by this appointment of his junior at a higher salary than his own and represented against it to the Vice‑Chancellor. He failed to obtain redress. On the 6th of November 1965, he instituted a suit in the Munsif's Court at Dacca for a declaration that the Syndicate's resolution of the 16th October 1965, was unlawful and for an injunction, restraining the University and its authorities from acting on this resolution, on the allegation that his status in the Department would be prejudicially affected by the appointment of Dr. Hossain at a higher salary. The validity of the appointment was challenged on the ground of its being made in contravention of the provisions of the Dacca University Ordinance, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the University Ordinance) and the relevant Statute. Along with the plaint an application for a temporary injunction to be issued against the University authorities was also submitted to the Munsif's Court by the plaintiff and the Munsif ordered the issue of a notice to show cause against the grant of the temporary injunction. On the 22nd of November 1965, the plaintiff preferred another application in the Munsif's Court praying that a temporary injunction be issued restraining the defendants from holding a meeting of the Selection Committee and Dr. Hossain from appearing before it. The learned Munsif heard the two petitions together. The plea was taken on behalf of the defendants who included the Dacca University, its Vice‑Chancellor and the Syndicate that the suit itself was barred under sections 55 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act and under section 55 of the University Ordinance and therefore no, prima facie, case existed for an injunction. The locus standi of the plaintiff to ask for such an injunction was also challenged. As Dr. Hossain had already begun functioning as a temporary Reader in the University, the learned Munsif rejected the prayer that Dr. Hossain be injuncted from working as a temporary Reader at the pay offered. He observed that the appointment of Dr. Hossain as Reader, by the Syndicate, without nomination by the Committee of Selection, was prima facie, irregular and the offer of a higher initial pay to him was also objectionable for the same reason. It appeared to him, prima facie, that the appointment in question was illegal, as being in violation of section 13 of the University Ordinance. He emphasized the fact that the plaintiff was undoubtedly senior to Dr. Hossain, in the Department. As the Vice‑Chancellor bad assured Dr. Hossain that he would arrange for his permanent appointment as Reader in the Dacca University, at the first opportunity, it was found by the Munsif that this threatened the existing status of the plaintiff. He, therefore, granted an injunction order which reads as follows:‑ "It is accordingly ordered that the prayer for injunction as made on 22‑11‑65 be allowed on contest against the defendants. Defendants 2 and 3 (viz., the Vice‑Chancellor and the Registrar of the University) are restrained by order of ad interim injunction from giving effect to the order, dated 19‑11‑65, directing defendant 5 (Dr. Hossain) to appear before the Committee of Selection on 3‑12‑65 or any other date and defendant No. 5 is restrained from appearing before such Committee and defendants 1 to 4 are further restrained from taking any step affecting the status of the plaintiff till disposal of the suit." The defendants went up in appeal against this order to the District Judge. While admitting the appeal, the learned District Judge vacated, ex parte, a portion of the order in so far as it prohibited the Selection Committee from holding its contemplated meeting and to the extent that it restrained defendant No. 5 from appearing before that Committee. The rest of the prohibitory order, however, was allowed to stand. The plaintiff seems to have unsuccessfully represented to the District Judge against this modification. In consequence of this order, the Selection Committee of the University met and Dr. Hossain appeared before it, on the 15th of December 1965. In the meantime, Dr. Mahmood had lodged a revision petition in the High Court at Dacca against the order of the District Judge on the 13th of December 1965. The revision petition was admitted but his request for ad interim suspen sion of the District Judge's order, was turned down. The Selection Committee, therefore, duly met and approved of Dr. Hussain's appointment as a temporary Reader at Rs. 1,050 p. m. The Committee was presided over by the Vice‑Chancellor. A clause was added in the recommendation to the effect that whenever a permanent vacancy of a Reader occurred in the Department, Dr. Hossain may be appointed to it, without further reference to the Selection Committee. The Syndicate of the University held a meeting on the 18th December 1965 and under orders of the Vice‑Chancellor, the recommendation of the Selection Committee was placed before it, as an item of the supplementary Agenda. The Syndicate resolved to accept the recommendation made by the Selection Committee. Before the Resolution was passed, it seems, the Registrar of the University had drawn the attention of the Members of the Syndicate to that part of the injunction order, issued by the Munsif, which was still effective. Incidentally, reference was made in this resolution to the previous resolution of the Syndicate which was thereby re‑affirmed. The plaintiff, Dr. Mahmood then applied to the High Court of East Pakistan for committal of the Vice‑Chancellor, the Registrar and Members of the Syndicate, for contempt. This petition was eventually heard by a Special Bench of five Judges, presided over by the learned Chief Justice. The learned Judges found Dr. M. O. Ghani, Vice‑Chancellor, Mr. Nur‑ul‑Huda, Treasurer and the rest of the defendants, who were Members of the Syndicate, to be guilty of contempt of the Munsif's Court and imposed varying amounts of fines on them, in default of payment of which, they were required to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months each. The Registrar of the University was absolved from liability to punish ment on the ground that he was not a voting Member of the Syndicate but a mere officer of the University, who had discharged his duty properly, by bringing to the notice of the Members of the Syndicate, the existence of the injunction order. The two criminal appeals call in question this order of the High Court, one of them being, on behalf of Dr. M. O. Ghani and the other, on behalf of Mr. Nurul Huda and other Members of the, Syndicate. Special leave to appeal was granted to them; as the matter was one of first impression and several questions of law and fact were raised in the petitions for special leave to appeal. Instead of agitating the matter before the learned Munsif, the plaintiff, Dr. Mahmood, moved a petition before the High Court of East Pakistan at Dacca, under Article 98 of the Constitution, calling in question the resolution of the Syndicate, dated the 18th December 1965. A Division Bench of the High Court, presided over by the learned Chief Justice, by order, dated the 24th March 1966, declared the impugned resolution of the Syndicate, dated the 18th December 1965, to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Special leave to appeal from this order was also granted by this Court and the appeal was ordered to be heard along with Criminal Appeals Nos. 5‑D and 6‑D of 1966. We have heard Mr. Manzur Qadir, on behalf of all the appellants, except for the Dacca University which was represented before us by Mr. Ahmed Sobhan. Mr. Ghulam Hafiz argued the case on behalf of Dr. Mahmood, respondent. The learned Attorney‑General, at our special request, clarified certain legal issues. In the contempt matter, the High Court found that there was no total lack of jurisdiction in the Munsif, in respect of entertainment of the suit brought by Dr. Mahmood. On the allegations made in the plaint, the learned Judges held that the suit was entertainable and therefore, the injunction order, passed, was with jurisdiction. The opinion was expressed that at the most the injunction order was void-able and not ab initio void. The learned Judges, however, thought it fit to caution the District Judge, before whom the appeal from the injunction order was still pending, that he was free to take a different view. After referring to the provisions of section 55 of the University Ordinance, it was further. observed that, even if ultimately, it may be found that the injunction order was erroneous or illegal, the liability of the University authorities to obey it, would not be affected. Reliance was placed in this connection on Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 18, Second Edition, p. 126, Paragraph 186, Volume 8 of the Third Edition of the same publication, Paragraph 36 at p. 20, observations at p. 107 of the Third Edition of Oswald on Contempt, High on Injunctions (Fourth Edition) at p. 1426 and some English decisions. The gift of these quotations and decisions is, that if there was jurisdiction to make the order, the question, whether it was rightly made on the merits, will not be considered. The contention, raised on behalf of the present appellants that the Munsif's order was vague and indefinite and, therefore, admitted of more than one interpretation, was repelled by the learned Judges. They held that the order was easily understandable and that confirmation of the impugned first resolution of the Syndicate, further consideration of the same and any act towards fixing a higher salary for defendant No. 5, "were undoubtedly steps, affecting the status of the plaintiff, in relation to respondent No. 5". That part of the second resolution, which provided for the giving of the next substantive vacancy among Readers, to defendant No. 5, was found to be "flagrant and deliberate step towards affecting the status of the plaintiff. It was held that the University authorities were guilty of wilful disobedience of the Court below, as the decision of the Syndicate could not be described as' "inadvertent, accidental or unintentional". The action of the authorities, in the view of the learned Judges, constituted criminal contempt, such as could only be punished by the High Court. The argument, that the alternative remedy available to the plaintiff, under Order XXXIX, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, should have been resorted to by him, in the Munsif's Court, was negatived, on the ground that the present case was not one of simple disobedience of the Court's order, but was calculated to interfere with the due course of justice. In the circumstances, the learned Judges felt that the High Court's inherent power, of summarily punishing an offender for contempt, was available, notwithstanding that some other kind of remedy, under the civil law, was also open. They pointed out that the contempt under consideration was not punishable under the Pakistan Penal Code and consequently, there was no bar to the High Court taking up the matter. The learned Judges' attention was drawn to a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court, reported as Sultan Ali Nanghiana v. Nur Hussain (A I R 1949 Lab. 131), in which it had been ruled that if the order of injunction, whose disobedience is complained of, is one without jurisdiction, no question of contempt of Court could arise. The learned Judges distinguished that case from the instant one, on the ground that there the order was absolutely without jurisdiction and, therefore, void and not merely void-able. For the position adopted by them, the learned Judges drew strength from the decision of the Privy Council reported as Ali Mahomed Adamali v. Emperor (A 1 R 1945 P C 147). In the proceedings under Article 98 of the Constitution the High Court recorded the following findings:‑ (1) The impugned resolution of the Syndicate, dated the 18th of December 1965, in so far as it sought to re‑affirm the first resolution of the 16th October 1965, was obviously without lawful authority, because both the resolutions were bad in law. The reason given was that the Syndicate had acted beyond its power under section 22(f ) of the University Ordinance and had arrogated to itself the power of the Vice Chancellor under section 13(7) thereof. It was held that the University Syndicate could not make a temporary appointment without first obtaining the recommendation of the Selection Committee, there was no sitting of the Selection Committee, in accordance with Statute 13 and the appointment was mala fide on account of bad faith and also because it was made in breach of a prohibitory order passed' by the Munsif. (2) The fixing of a higher salary for Dr. Hossain was an arbitrary act and to say the least, an abuse of power. Mr. Manzur Qadir, on behalf of the appellants, has contended before us that the plaintiff's suit did not lie at all, for the relief claimed, because of the bar raised by section 55 of the University Ordinance and, consequently, the injunction order was wholly without jurisdiction. In the alternative, it was maintained that even if the impugned order of injunction was found to be with jurisdiction, the proper provision to be resorted to was Order XXXIX, r. 2, of the Civil Procedure Code and no question of contempt was involved such as was punishable by the High Court, brevi manu. Thirdly, the learned counsel argued that the order of injunction in this case, as modified by the District Judge, was capable of being understood in more senses than one and the appellants had bona fide accepted one interpretation, without any intention to commit contempt of Court. He stressed the fact that ever the Munsif had allowed Dr. Hossain to continue functioning as temporary Reader in the Department at a salary of Rs. 1,050 p.m. during the pendency of the suit. It was also represented by learned counsel that the findings given by the High Court in the two proceedings had, in fact, disposed of the plaintiff's suit, pending in the Munsif's Court or at least its final disposal will be gravely prejudiced thereby. He suggested that instead of entertaining the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution, the learned Judges should have dismissed it and left the plaintiff to pursue his remedy, in respect of the second resolution of the Syndicate, by an amendment of his plaint in the Munsif's Court. He pointed out further that though the High Court had recorded no final opinion on the question whether the plaintiff's suit in the Civil Court was competent or not, yet they had held the injunction order to be with jurisdiction. He contended that the High Court could not have passed the final penal order in contempt proceedings when the question, whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction at all, was still sub judice. To clarify the position, it may be mentioned that the revision petition, filed by Dr. Mahmood in the High Court, was allowed by him to be dismissed for default of appearance, after the contempt matter had been taken up. It would, therefore, be clear that the question of the propriety or validity of the impugned injunction order, is pending decision by the District Judge in appeal. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the learned District Judge would find it extremely difficult to divest his mind of the effect of the High Court's findings in contempt proceedings and in the proceedings under Article 98, despite the warning conveyed by the High Court judgment, to the B contrary. This aspect of the case, we regret to say, does not appear to have received the attention that it deserved, in the High Court. The impugned injunction order was passed under Order XXXIX, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Munsif. Sub‑rule (3) of rule 2 of this Order reads as follows: "(3) In case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the Court granting an injunction, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach, to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison, for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release." Sub‑rule (4) of this rule provides that "no attachment under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached, may be sold and out of the proceeds, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks, fit and shall pay the balance, if any, to the party entitled thereto". It will be noticed that sub‑rules (3) and (4) of rule 2 of Order XXXIX, provide an adequate remedy against disobedience of an injunction order issued under sub‑rules (1) and (2). With respect, we are unable to share the opinion of the learned Judges of the High Court that the alleged disobedience of the injunction order C in the instant case was one, which could be dealt with properly, only under the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court. The machinery provided by rule 2 of Order XXXIX, of the Civil Procedure Code was quite effective to deal with a situation of the kind that arose in the circumstances of this case. As was pointed out by this Court in Bahawal alias Bhaloo v. The State (P L D 1962 S C 476), merely failure to obey any process of the Court, when other methods of enforcing the process are available, does not amount to contempt of Court to be punished summarily by the High Court, unless the person served with the process, has done something more to exhibit a disrespect for the process of the Court, as, for example used insolent or indecent expressions or violent or profans language, on being served with such a process or assaulted or ill‑treated the process‑server. No such exaggerating circumstances were established in the present case. In this connection, the observations of Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, in the case in re: Clements, Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger ((1876) 46 L J Ch. 375 at p. 385), were quoted with approval. The observations are reproduced below:‑ "It seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt, being practically arbitrary and unlimited, should be most jealously and carefully watched and exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of the Judges, to see whether there is no other mode which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness, and which can be brought to bear upon the subject, 1 say that a Judge should be most careful to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on the accusations of contempt should be adopted. I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that, necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men's rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found. Probably that will be discovered after consideration to be true measure of the exercise of the jurisdiction." It was added in the judgment of this Court that a committal for contempt should not be made, unless disobedience shown is of such a serious nature as to indicate that the alleged contemner is deliberately out to flout the order of the Court and to treat it with some degree of contumaciousness. Even if the University authorities in the instant case formed an erroneous judgment on the effect of the modified injunction order, there is no indication available that they deliberately wanted to defy the Court's order so as to bring their case within the pale of contumacious contempt. They have all the time been protesting that they bona fide acted upon what they thought was a plausible interpretation of the injunction order. They point out that they had not interfered with the salary of the plaintiff, nor with his status as Head of the Economics Department in the University of Dacca. Their interpretation of the order might have been erroneous but it is forcefully argued that their conduct was not contumaciously contemptuous. This was, in our opinion, a very material and relevant consideration in the case and the person in the best position to pronounce on this question and to determine whether there was disobedience of the injunction order on the part of the University authorities would have been the learned Munsif. The matter should have been left to be dealt with by him under Order XXXIX, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. The principle laid down by the majority decision in Sultan Ali Nanghiana's case by the High Court of Lahore appears to us to be one that could have been properly invoked, in the circumstances of this case. The plea had been definitely taken on behalf of the appellants in the Munsif's Court that the suit itself was barred by virtue of the provisions of section 55 of the University Ordinance and that the matter sought to be agitated in the plaint, furnished no ground for action against the University. That issue remains to be decided by the Munsif and as his decision would be subject to the normal incidents of appeal and revision, what the final decision may be, it is impossible to anticipate at this juncture. We would not like to say anything at this stage of the case, which might prejudice either party and we, consequently, refrain from examining the relevant provisions of the University Ordinance or the Statutes, which have a bearing on the question of the vires of the impugned resolutions of the University Syndicate. That question must be left to be decided in the first instance by the trial Judge. The distinction sought to be drawn by the learned Judges between the instant case and Sultan All Nanghiana's case, on the ground that in the latter case there was complete lack of jurisdiction on the part of the High Court to issue an injunction order, really begs the question which fairly requires determination in the present case also. Even in the Lahore case, the finding about the total lack of jurisdiction of the High Court, in the matter, was given after full arguments had been heard on the points of law and fact involved and the position is not different here. It appears to us that if the High Court was anxious to take up the matter in contempt, it could have either transferred the plaintiff's suit to itself for disposal or at least to have come to a considered finding, after hearing the parties at length, as to whether the Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or not. Without final disposal of that issue, anomalous results would follow if the conviction for contempt is allowed to stand. If, for instance, it is eventually found that the suit was wholly outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, then the injunction order would also have been one without any validity and its disobedience could not be visited with punishment in contempt proceedings by the High Court. The authorities and quotations from text‑books, on which the learned Judges of the High Court have relied, merely lay down that an order, passed erroneously on the merits or tainted with irregularities, but with jurisdiction, could be disobeyed by the contemner only at his peril. But if there is total lack of jurisdiction, then the person concerned cannot be found guilty of disobedience of the order of the Court or Tribunal concerned at all. It is so stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, Third Edition in paragraph 36 at p. 20. This paragraph talks of "Indictment for disobedience to justices" i.e., orders, passed by inferior Courts. The learned Judges have only quoted a part of this Paragraph to the effect that "if there was jurisdiction to make the order, the question whether it was rightly made on the merits will not be considered". That opinion is again incorporated in Paragraph 60 at p. 28 of the same Volume of Halsbury's Laws. But as has been observed above, the question, whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction exists at all in this matter or not, remains to be finally decided. Before the disposal of that question, it would be highly inapt to resort to proceedings in contempt for punishing the alleged disobedience of the order issued. In Abdul Hayee Khan v. The State (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 169), this Court had occasion to deal with an alleged contemptuous act, committed by a Presiding Officer of a Subordinate Court. A Magistrate in that case had been held guilty of contempt of the High Court, in granting bail to an. accused person, contrary to an order passed by the High Court. It was pointed out that nothing in the nature of bad faith or bias, on the part of the Magistrate, could be deduced from anything contained in the record. It was held that the Magistrate had adopted a particular interpretation of the High Court's order and could not be attributed the intention to violate it deliberately. His act in bailing out the accused was declared to be legal and his conviction for contempt was set aside. In the Corpus Juris Secundum, in section 14 at p. 19 of Volume 17, the American Law is stated thus:‑ "Disobedience of, or resistance to, a void mandate, order, judgment, or decree, or one issued by a Court without jurisdiction of the subject‑matter and parties litigant, is not contempt, and where the Court has no jurisdiction to make the order, no waiver can cut off the rights of the party to attack its validity." It is added there that "on proceedings to punish for contempt, the propriety of the judgment is generally not open, but the judgment is not conclusive as to the Court's authority to render it." Reference is made therein apparently to another American case in which it seems to have been held that "it is no bar to the conclusiveness and sentence for contempt that the Court was investigating a matter over which it was finally ascertained to have no jurisdiction". This seems to go against the principle laid down earlier on the authority of another case. There is also in the same Volume, an observation at p. 16 in section 12 in these terms: "To justify adjudging one guilty of contempt for the alleged violation of an order, the order must be so clearly expressed that when applied to the act complained of, it will appear with reasonable certainty that it has been violated." Apparently, therefore, under the American Law, disobedience of an order which is capable of more than one interpretation, if one of the possible interpretations is adopted by the alleged contemner, would not be punishable as contempt. A Special Bench of the Lahore High Court in another case, reported as Homi Rustomji Pardivala v. Sub‑Inspector Baig and others (A I R 1944 Lah. 196), held that to justify action in contempt, the act complained of must be one intended or calculated to interfere with the due course of justice. An honest but mistaken arrest, though it might interfere with the due course of justice, could not amount to contempt. Contempt proceedings are in the nature of quasi‑criminal, if not criminal proceedings and the benefit of the doubt arising therein, must go to the accused persons. The learned Attorney‑General suggested that the principle laid down in Sultan Ali Nanghiana's case received indirect support from an English decision, reported as Hadkinson v. Hadkinson (2 A E R 567 at p 569). It is observed therein by Romer, L. J., that "it is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it, unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void". The inference drawn by the learned Attorney‑General is that if the Court is found to have no jurisdiction at all, then the disobedience of that Court's order, would not entail punishment in contempt. Of course, the mere opinion of the contemner that he thought the order was void, would not assist him. The learned Attorney‑General also invited our attention to Foot Note (q) to paragraph 50, at p. 28 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, Third Ed. which mentions that in Scott v. Scott ((1913) A C 417), H. L. Viscount Haldane, L. C., and Lord Halsbury had decided that the appellants were not guilty of contempt because the order which had been made and whose disobedience was in question, was invalid. The other law Lords apparently did not touch this point in their judgments. In an American case, reported as 31 Lawyers' Edition, 402 U. S. Supreme Court Reports, at p. 409, it was held that the "Circuit Court being without jurisdiction to entertain the bill is equity, for an injunction, all its proceedings in the exercise of its jurisdiction which it assumed, are null and void. The restraining order, in the nature of an injunction, it had no power to make. The adjudication that the defendants were guilty of contempt, in disregarding that order, was equally void; their detention by the marshal under that adjudication was without authority of law and they were entitled to be discharged." This majority opinion in that case appears to be in accord with the principle laid down in Sultan Ali Nanghiana's case. Oswald on Contempt, Second Edition, p. 96, also records the opinion that recourse ought not to be had to contempt proceedings in aid of a civil remedy where there is any other method of doing justice available. In Foot Note (o) in relation to Paragraph 3 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, Third Edition, at p. 4, it is stated as follows:‑ "Where a remedy by civil action is available and no interference with the course of justice is involved, the Court will refuse to commit, leaving the party to his ordinary legal remedy. Recourse ought not to be had to process of contempt, in aid of a civil remedy, where there is any other method of doing justice." It is plain that in the circumstances of the instant case, the position envisaged by the above authoritative pronouncements, exists and it would therefore appear that the High Court would have been well‑advised in restraining themselves from proceeding in contempt against the appellants, leaving the plaintiff‑respondent to his alternative remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure. Among other authorities, the High Court appear to have attached great weight to the decision in Ali Mahomed Adamali v. Emperor (A I R 1945 P C 147 ). In that case the alleged contemner was said to be in possession of waqf property, for which he failed to furnish accounts or other information called for by the Acting Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay. That Judge had referred the question whether the property was or was not waqf, to the Waqf Committee constituted under the relevant statute. Acting on the opinion thus rendered by the Waqf Committee, it was held that the property was, in fact, waqf and the provisions of the statute were attracted. The failure of the appellant to furnish the necessary information called for, resulted in his prosecution and conviction. He appealed to the High Court at Bombay. The learned Judges of the High Court held that the question of the nature of the property being waqf, could be enquired into by the Court itself and the order of his prosecution could not be sustained, as it was passed, not ‑on the Court's finding, but on the opinion of the Waqf Committee which had no jurisdiction in the matter. The learned Judges remanded the case, in consequence, to the Court of Small Causes to be dealt with afresh, but, at the same time, they took up, suo motu the matter of disobedience of the order in question and held the person concerned to be guilty of contempt. It seems to us, speaking with the utmost respect, that the without jurisdiction, it could not be visited with punishment in contempt. The Privy Council also appears to have omitted to note this aspect of the case. As a result of the above discussion, we have reached the conclusion that this was not a fit case in which the appellants should have been committed for contempt by the High Court. If there was any disobedience of the injunction order involved, that question should have been left to be taken up and decided by the trial Judge under the provisions of rule 2, Order XXXIX, Civil Procedure Code. The circumstances are far from revealing the commission of a criminal contempt such as could attract the summary jurisdiction of the High Court. With regard to the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution, it is clear that the plaintiff‑respondent could have asked for an amendment of his plaint in the Munsif's Court, in order to attack the vires of the resolution of the Syndicate, passed by them, on the 18th December 1965, if so advised. That furnished him with a fresh cause of action, if the action lay under the relevant law. We have deliberately avoided saying anything on the merits of the respective contentions of the parties or the question of jurisdiction raised on behalf of the appellants in this case, as these are matters which fall to be decided, in the first instance, by the learned Munsif. The alternative remedy by agitation of the same question in his own suit, being available to the plaintiff's P the learned Judges of the High Court should have declined to entertain the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution to call in question the second resolution of the Syndicate. This step would have obviated the necessity of recording the findings at the High Court level, such as could be deemed to have practically disposed of the suit, pending in the Munsif's Court. On this short ground, therefore, we consider that the order passed on the petition under Article 98 of the Constitution was not justifiable. Resort to the High Court's summary jurisdiction should not be permitted if it amounts to circumvention of the normal processes of law. In the result, we allow the three appeals and set aside the orders passed by the High Court. This would leave the plaintiff respondent, Dr. Mahmood, free to pursue such remedy as may be open to him in the suit which is still pending before the Munsif, after seeking amendment of his plaint. We would leave the parties to bear their own costs in Civil Appeal No. 52‑D of 1966, in the circumstances of this case. A. H. Appeals allowed