P L D 1980 S C 49 (PLP)

G. SAFDAR SHAH, J.-This order will govern both these petitions, as they arise out of the same judgment, dated 16-8-1976, of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, by which the writ petitions of the petitioners bearing Nos. 181/R/1967 and 512 of 1969 were dismissed. The dispute in this case relates to evacuee property, bearing No. S. E. 14-R.32, situate on Empress Read, Lahore. In November 1959, the Chief Settlement Commissioner is said to have ordered that the property was a big mansion and the same be disposed of accordingly. By his subsequent Memorandum, dated 15-4-1960, however, the Chief Settlement Commissioner directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, that upon the reconsideration of the matter the property was not to be treated as a big mansion, and so it should be disposed of under Settlement Scheme No. I, The grievance of the petitioners is that since they had not been informed of the said change in the status of the property, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner detailed a Settlement Inspector to visit the site and submit a report as to who were in occupation of the various portions of it. In pursuance of the said order, the Settlement Inspector seems to have visited the site, made inquiries from the various occupants and consequently submitted his report, dated 7-5-1960, suggesting therein the mode as to how the property should be transferred. Agreeing with the said report, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, vide his .order, dated 9-5-1960, transferred the various portions of the property in favour of claimants Ross Masood, Kanwar Khurshid Ali Khan, A. H. Anwari and Ahmadyar Khan, of which they were in possession, but rejected the forms submitted by Abdul Hamid Khan, Mst. Feroza Salim, Muhammad Ibrahim and Muhammad Akbar. The said order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was challenged before the Additional Settlement Commissioner in eight appeals filed by Kanwar Khurshid Ali Khan, Abdul Hamid Khan, Ahmadyar Khan, Mst. Feroza Salim, Akbtar Iqbal Puri (petitioner), Ross Masood, Abdul Razzak (respondent No. 5) and petitioner Muhammad Sharif Puri. All these appeals were heard together by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, who vide his order, dated 19-12-1960, transferred portion 'A' in favour of petitioner Akhtar Iqbal Puri, portion 'B' to Ross Masood, portion 'C' to Ahmadyar Khan, portion 'D' to Kanwar Khurshid Ali Khan, potion 'E' to Muhammad Sharif Puri, portions 'F' to Abdul Hamid Khan, portion 'G' to Mst. Feroza Salim, and portion 'H' to A. H. Anwari. This order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner was challenged in eleven separate revision petitions filed before the Settlement Commissioner, who vide his order dated 9-I1-1960, in so far as the petitioners are concerned, allowed the same against them with the result that they were held to be disentitled to the transfer of any portion of the main bunglow to which the claim of respondent Abdul Razzak, who was an associate of the claimant Ross Masood was upheld and the Deputy Settlement Commissioner directed to see if the whole bungalow could be transferred to him. Feeling aggrieved of the said order, the petitioners herein filed the above two separate writ petitions in the High Court, but the same were dismissed, vide the impugned judgment against which they have come up to this Court seeking leave to appeal. I would first take up the case of petitioner Muhammad Sharif Puri, as his claim to the transfer of the portion of the main bungalow in the High Court was different than the claim made by petitioner Akhtar Iqbal Puri. His claim in the High Court was that in the part of the bungalow marked 'E' which had been transferred to him by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, there existed an industrial concern, namely, an ice and cold storage factory which had been allotted to him by the Secretary, Rehabilitation Board and on the improvement of which factory he had spent Rs. 40,

000. He, therefore, made grievance of the fact that the learned Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to transfer to respondent Abdul Razzak, the said portion as part of the main bungalow, as the same had to be transferred to him as an industrial concern. Before dealing with the said contention, however, the learned Judge first took up the question of laches, in respect of the writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif Puri as his writ petition had been admitted to regular hearing subject to the raising of the said objection by the other side at the time of its final disposal. As a preliminary objection, therefore, it was contended on behalf of respondent Abdul Razzak that since the writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif Puri suffered from the delay of more than 2J years, the same should be dismissed on that ground alone without going into the merits of his case. In dealing with the said objection, the learned Judge noted that the only explanation offered by the petitioner was contained in the note, dated 22-5-1969, recorded at the end of the petition by his counsel which was to the following effect : "The petition was after completion mixed up with some papers in the newly acquired office at

33. The Mall Mansion, Lahore. Despite hectic search everywhere it was not forthcoming. It is only two days back that my previous neighbour and landlord while adjusting his own office came across this petition and was good enough to make it available to the counsel. The previous clerk had to be removed from service on this score. The Settlement record is also lying in this Honourable Court in the connected W. P." The learned Judge, however, felt dissatisfied with the said explanation and inter alia, observed that "If the explanation offered had been true, then the reaction or conduct of the counsel as well as of his client should have been different. The counsel could not remain silent for such a long time after accepting the brief. He could easily redraft a fresh petition and file the same after a week or so. It may also be observed that this petition was already late as the impugned order was passed on 9-11-1966 and the connected Writ Petition No. 181/R of 1967 was filed by the son of Muhammad Sharif Puri on 22-2-1967. It may further be noted that the counsel in both these writ petitions is the same. Further, no certified copies of the annexures etc. are attached with the present writ petition. Only uncertified copies of the annexures have been filed. These annexures have been attested by the counsel only. Only one document, namely, grounds of appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Annexure 'B') is a certified copy. Thus, there could be no difficulty for the learned counsel to redraft and file a fresh petition if the original writ petition was not traceable. The non-judicial stamp of Rs. 100 could also be purchased afresh. No responsible counsel could remain inactive for such a long time and wait till the old draft was traced out. Further, I find that even the name of the clerk who is said- to be responsible for mixing up the papers, has not been disclosed. Similarly the name and particulars of the previous neighbour and landlord of the counsel are not given. The conduct of the petitioner is also not satisfactory in this regard. Like an ordinary client he should have enquired from his counsel whether his writ petition had been filed and if so, with what result. Silence on his part for such a long time casts serious doubt about the bona fides of the claim of the petitioner that the drafted writ petition was really mixed up or misplaced in the office of the counsel". The learned Judge, therefore, held that "Since this writ petition was admitted subject to the objection of limitation and laches to be raised at the time of final disposal, the same is, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this ground alone". Mian Fazle-Mahmood, the learned counsel for the petitioner, took serious exception to the said finding recorded by the learned Judge on the grounds, amongst others, (1) that delay per se has never been a ground to dismiss a writ petition ; (2) that the order of the Settlement Commissioner, which was impugned before the High Court, had already been suspended by an order passed on 22-2-1967 in the connected writ petition filed by Akhtar Iqbal Puri, and so no conceivable prejudige had been caused to the contesting respondents; and (3) that the writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif Puri had been admitted to regular hearing on 28-5-1967 and so the question of laches ought not to have been gone into by the learned Judge in the year 1976, when the petition was finally disposed of, notwithstanding the fact that the same had been admitted subject to the raising of the said objection by the other side. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on a number of judgments. But since the, contention urged by him can be disposed of on a short ground, there is no need to refer to the said judgments. The admitted position is that the .writ petition filed by Muhammad Sharif Puri was admitted by the High Court to regular hearing vide its order, dated 28-5-1969 subject to the raising of the said objection by the other side at the time of final disposal. It is, therefore, evident that if the petitioner had any grievance against the said order, he should have challenged the same through a petition in this Court within the prescribed period of limitation in which behalf, however, he took no steps, and consequently the contention now urged on his behalf has to be repelled, To put it differently, the petitioner had evidently acquiesced in the said order which to all intents and purposes was a final order in so far as concerned the admission of his writ petition to regular hearing, anc consequently now he cannot be permitted to challenge the same after the lapse of ten years. Having recorded the said conclusion, with which I respectfully agree, the learned Judge should have avoided to go into the merits of the case. But in view of the finding recorded by him in para. 14 of the judgment to the effect "It may be observed that it is one of those cases where a clever local family has tried to grab the maximum evacuee property under one pretext or the other ", he was evidently unhappy about the conduct of the petitioner, and so entered upon the merits of the case as well to demonstrate that he had no case whatever. Of this exercise conducted by the learned Judge, the learned counsel for the petitioner took full advantage with the result that in his rather protracted arguments, spread over a period of four days, and supplemented by his written arguments, he assailed the finding recorded against him to the effect that no portion of the property in dispute was ever an industrial concern, inter alia, on the grounds : (1) that the learned Judge had failed to take into consideration the allotment order dated 5-9-1952 passed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner by which a portion of the main bungalow was allotted to the petitioner as a cold storage ; (2) that the Additional Settlement Commissioner, after inspecting the site, also noted that in a part of the main bungalow, there existed the said cold storage and consequently vide his order, dated 19-12-1960, transferred the same to the petitioner as an industrial concern ; (3) that even the Settlement Commissioner in his order, dated 9-11-1966 recorded the same conclusion, but none the less erroneously transferred the main bungalow to respondent Abdul Razzak ; (4) that the Settlement Commissioner had deprived the petitioner of the said industrial concern on the erroneous ground that he had failed to file his L. H. Form in that behalf ; (5) that the Settlement Commissioner had similarly fallen in error to hold that the petitioner had failed to file any application for the transfer of the said industrial concern, as in that behalf an acknowledgment receipt from the Settlement Department was before him but he disbelieved the same wholly. arbitrarily ; (6) that the Settlement Commissioner had also erred to hold that the petitioner had never filed an appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, but in order to enable himself to become an aggrieved person he subsequently managed to sneak in his memorandum of appeal on the record of the case ; (7) that the learned Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to hold that the so-called cold storage machinery lying in a portion of the main bungalow was a `mere junk', as in that behalf there existed on the record of the case *the allotment order, dated 5-9-1952, passed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, as well as the order dated 19-12-1960 passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner in both of which the existence of the said industrial concern had been acknowledged ; (8) that the learned Settlement Commissioner had misconstrued the judgment, dated 26-1-1957 of the Custodian to hold that there was no mention in it of any industrial concern, whereas in the said judgment the contention of the petitioner had been noted that he had purchased from the Rehabilitation Authorities a cold storage plant for Rs. 10,000 and on which plant he had spent Rs. 40,000 for making it serviceable ; (9) that the Settlement Commissioner could not have properly rejected the claim of the petitioner as to the transfer to him of the industrial concern, even if he was found to have failed to make any application in that behalf firstly, because he could have made the said application even during the revisional proceedings ; and secondly, because the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Additional Settlement Commissioner had been treated by the latter as an application to which no exception could be taken on any technical ground ; and (10) that the Settlement Commissioner had failed to take notice of the fact that the petitioner could have sought the transfer of the industrial concern under Settlement Scheme No. VIII, enforced in the year 1966, as also under Settlement Scheme No. IX, framed under the Displaced Persons Evacuee Law Repeal Act, 1974, therefore, to have deprived him of a chance to secure the transfer of the same under these schemes, the Settlement Commissioner had evidently conducted himself capriciously and in an arbitrary manner. Now most of these contentions had been urged in the High Court and rejected. The further view taken by the High Court was that since the petitioner had failed to challenge the order, dated 15-4-1960 passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, directing that the property in dispute was not to be treated as a big mansion and so disposed of under Settlement Scheme No. 1, the petitioner could not possibly be heard to contend that the same had to be transferred to him as an industrial concern. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not only vigorously pressed in service all the said and many other contentions urged by him against the judgment of the Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court, but has also assailed the said order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the ground that the same had been passed on the back of the petitioner and consequently he had no knowledge of it to have challenged the same through appropriate proceedings. It is my considered view, however, that by raising all the said and many other contentions the learned counsel seems to have, speaking proverbially `lost the wood in the tree', but on my part I feel no desire to be driven into a similar helpless, bewildering and unproductive situation. The concurrent finding recorded by the Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court is that since the petitioner had failed to make any application for the transfer to him of a portion of the main bungalow as an industrial concern, he had no locus standi to question the right of respondent -Abdul Razzak to whom the bungalow in question bad been transferred under Settlement Scheme No. I. This in my view is the basic question, therefore, if upon the analysis of the material on record, I feel satisfied about the said concurrent finding recorded against the petitioner then evidently to go into the said various contentions urged on his behalf would be a sheer waste of public time and consequently to undertake any such futile exercise must be avoided., Now it is true that the learned Settlement Commissioner had dealt with the case of the petitioner as if there always existed in a portion of the main bungalow an industrial concern. But in that behalf he relied on the judgment of the the Custodian, Muhammad Sharif Purl v. Rehabilitation Authority (P L D 1957 Cust. 12) A perusal of the judgment would, however, show that the petitioner had gone to the Custodian in revision, under section 13-A, Rehabilitation Ordinance XIX of 1948, challenging therein the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner by which he was sought to be evicted from the main bungalow in dispute, which had previously been allotted to him for residential purposes. During the course of the arguments, however, the petitioner, in order to strengthen his case, also contended that he had purchased from the Rehabilitation Authority a cold storage plant, installed in a portion of the main bungalow, for Rs. 10,000 and spent on it the further sum of Rs. 40,000 to make it serviceable. However, the learned Custodian rightly refrained from giving any finding in that behalf, and simply observed "these are matters which may be considered by the Rehabilitation Commissioner West Pakistan". It is, therefore, obvious to me that the learned Settlement Commissioner, having misconstrued the judgment of the Custodian, allowed himself erroneously to hold that on a portion of the main bungalow there existed an industrial concern, and consequently non-suited the petitioner on the ground that he had not filed any L. H. Form in that behalf. With this finding, as already pointed out. the learned counsel for petitioner has expressed a great deal of grievance, but I am afraid all the . arguments addressed by him in that behalf seem to me to be misconceived. In this respect the finding recorded by the High Court is that there existed no industrial concern in any portion of the main bungalow in dispute, and I respectfully agree with the said conclusion. The admitted position is that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had personally visited the site, and thereafter vide his memorandum, dated 15-4-1960 directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre I, Lahore, that the property in dispute should not be treated as `big mansion' and the same disposed of under Settlement Saheme No. I. From this the learned Judge of the High Court concluded that bad there been any industrial concern in existence, as alleged by the petitioner. the Chief Settlement Commissioner would have noted the same and consequently he could not have ordered the transfer of the property under Settlement Scheme No. I, as the scheme in question did not cover industrial concerns. The learned Judge further noted that "if the contention of Muhammad Sharif Puri petitioner or his son Akhtar Iqbal Puri petitioner be accepted that they were running some industrial concerns at the time, then proper course for them was to approach the Chief Settlement Commissioner either to withdraw that Memorandum or modify it to the extent but no such representation was ever made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf, not otherwise the said Memorandum was challenged before any competent authority. Thus, the conduct of both the petitioners in this behalf goes against them. It is surprising how Malik Ghulam Jilani, Additional Settlement Commissioner, could flout such clear-cut direction of his superior, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by transferring a portion of the property as industrial concern There is nothing on the record to show that Muhammad Sharif Puri had ever applied for the transfer of such industrial concerns in any manner. As indicated above, the Inspector in his report .dated 7-5-1960 did not recommend the transfer of either any residential unit or industrial concern in favour of Muhammad Sharif Puri and consequentl nothing was transferred in his favour by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The learned counsel for this petitioner has not been able to point out any form or even application on the file submitted by Muhammad Sharif Puri petitioner for the transfer of any industrial concern or even a residential unit. The whole of the settlement record is available before this Court ......... It may be observed that if his case was covered by sub-paragraph (3) o paragraph 15 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation an Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, it was necessary for him to apply for the transfer of the same. Further, if there had been such Ice and Cold Storage factory in existence, it should have been included in the list of such factories in the relevant register of the Department concerned and should have been disposed of as such. The existence of Ice and Cold Storage factory could not escape the notice of the relevant authorities, especially situated on a main road in a city like Lahore. It is not denied that there is a regular procedure for the disposal of such industrial concerns. If this alleged Cold Storage and Ice Factory had been in existence, it should have been included in the relevant record of the Department. The fact that the Department has never claimed the existence of this Cold Storage and Ice Factory clearly belies the claim of Muhammad Sharif Puri petitioner. In fact, under the garb of industrial concern, he wants to grab the residential portion of this property which he otherwise is clearly debarred under the law". . It would thus be seen that the said finding recorded by the learned Judge of the High Court is based on proper inferences drawn from the material on record, therefore, no exception could be taken to the said finding in the present proceedings. The learned counsel, however, argued that in the order dated 5-9-1952 passed by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, a part of the bungalow in dispute had been allotted to the petitioner as an industrial concern, but the said order had been disregarded by the High Court. It is true that in the impugned judgment no mention has been made of the said order. But the same would in no way advance the case of the petitioner. The judgment of the Custodian, which was delivered on 26-1-1957, i. e: to say after about five years subsequent to the said order would show that a major portion of the bungalow in dispute had been allotted to the petitioner for the residence of his own family, the family of his sister-in-law who had lost her husband in Amritsar during the disturbances as well as the residence of his son, namely, Mr. Z. I. Puri who was then serving as a Member of Class-I Service of the North-Western Railways and had come to stay with him in the said house. However, when the Rehabilitation Commissioner, vide his order dated 11-7-1956, directed his ejectment from the house, the petitioner went to the Custodian in his revisional jurisdiction who allowed the same mainly on the ground that the bungalow in dispute had been allotted to him for his residence, and the contrary .finding recorded by the Rehabilitation Commissioner to the effect that the same had been allotted to his son Mr. Z. I. Puri was incorrect. To put it differently, the petitioner had contested his case before the Custodian mainly on the ground that the bungalow in dispute bad been allotted to him for residential purpose, although in that behalf he also contended to have purchased from the Rehabilitation Authority a cold storage plant installed in a portion- of the bungalow for Rs. 10,000, in which respect however, the learned Custodian rightly did not give any finding. In this ambivalent situation, therefore, notice may now be taken of the Office report, dated .4-7-1955, of the Rehabilitation Department (to which reference has been made at page 15 of the judgment of the Custodian), in which it was said "that the petitioner had, in fact, purchased the cold storage plant from the Director of Industries, that the machinery was "mere junk" and was purchased to get allotment of the building in which it was lying, that the building was allotted in a regular manner to the petitioner who had no house of his own, that the petitioner had offered to buy this house for Rs. 1,07,000 and had deposited Rs. 27,000 as part of the purchase price but the transfer was not sanctioned by the Custodian, that the allotment was in favour of the petitioner Mr. Sharif Puri though the name of his son Z. I. Puri was included in the allotment subsequently by order of the A. R. C.f that the ejectment proceedings were. started on the ground that Mr. Z. I. Puri had been transferred to Karachi but the petitioner had three other sons and their families living with him,. that the allotment was made to him as a local and he had been paying rent regularly." From this it should be obvious that the Rehabilitation Department, on whose order dated 5-9-1952 the petitioner relied, not only disagreed with the contention of the latter that a part of the bungalow in dispute had been transferred to him as an industrial concern, but further that he had purchased only the cold storage plant from the Director of Industries, which was `mere junk' lying in a portion of the building with a view to enabling himself to get the allotment of the building for his residential purposes. In this view of the matter, it is difficult to agree with the contention urged by the learned counsel that a portion of the bungalow had been transferred to the petitioner as an industrial. concern the more so when in the face of the said departmental report made against him, he failed to seek any remedy although he was fully posted with the contents of the same for they had been noted by the Custodian in his said judgment. In this view as well as for the detailed reasons furnished by the learned. Judge of the High Court, I feel wholly satisfied that no part of the bungalow in dispute had ever been allotted to the petitioner as an industrial concern and consequently the finding of the High Court to the same effect seems to be unexceptionable. The learned counsel, however, argued that the petitioner had indeed filed an application before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for the transfer of the portion of the bungalow in his possession as a converted industrial concern under paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. I, and so the same ought to have been transferred to him. The concurrent finding recorded against him by the Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court, however, is that he had failed to establish his stand in .that behalf, but the learned counsel argued that he had produced an acknowledgment receipt from the Department to show that his said application had been duly received by the competent officer. I am afraid, there is no force in this contention. The learned Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court have considered the effect of the said acknowledgment receipt and held-that the same was wholly insufficient to support the stand taken by the petitioner. Curiously, however, the petitioner chose not to summon from the Office of the concerned authority his said application either in the proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner or the High Court, and consequently it is not open to this Court to disagree with the said consurrent finding recorded against him to the effect that he had never made any such application before any of the Settlement Authorities. I have also not been able to agree with the contention urged by the learned counsel to the effect that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had construed the appeal filed before him by the petitioner as an application under paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No. I or that the Settlement Commissioner should have afforded him an opportunity to seek the transfer of the portion of the main bungalow under Settlement Scheme No. VIII or Settlement Scheme No. 1X framed under the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. There is no indication in the order of the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner to show that he was even conscious of the contention now urged by the learned counsel, much less to have treated the appeal of the petitioner as an application under paragraph 20 of Settlement Scheme No.

1. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show that any request was made to the learned Settlement Commissioner to allow the petitioner a chance to seek the transfer of the property under the Settlement Scheme No. VIII or Settlement Scheme No. IX, and consequently thel grievance now made in that behalf is evidently misconceived. The learned counsel also relied on Settlement Scheme No. II, framed under section 16(1) (b) and (c) of Act XXVIII of 1958. But this Scheme also does not help him. In accordance with the requirement of paragraph 2 of the Scheme, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, for the disposal of industrial concerns (which have been defined by the Scheme to include any factory registered under the Factories Act, 1934) was to prepare from time to time lists of evacuee industrial concerns, submit them to the Central Government for approval and when the same was finally approved, the Central Government had to issue a notification in the official Gazette acquiring all such concerns, in case they were situate within the Federal Capital or require the then Government of West Pakistan to acquire them if situate in the Province. The admitted position is that no such exercise was conducted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this case which again would go a long way to show that no part of the main bungalow in possession of the petitioner was ever considered to be an industrial concern. Furthermore, under paragraph 7 of the Scheme, the petitioner was required to make an application to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the transfer of the portion in his possession as an industrial concern, provided his case was covered by sub-pares. (2), (3) and (4) of para. 15 of the Schedule to the Settlement Act. But admittedly he made no such application, and quite rightly, as hi case could possibly fall only under sub-paragraph (4) of the said para. 1: which however, could not help him, as it runs as under : "(4) If any local or displaced person has invested in any Industrial concern or Cinema, house, not being an Industrial concern or Cinema house, transferred under sub-paragraph (2) or sub-paragraph (3), not less than 40 % of its prevailing market value, then that concern or cinema house shall, in case such local or displaced person applies in that behalf, be transferred to him on payment immediately of the prevailing market value minus the investment made." The expression "Investment made" appearing in the said sub-pare. has been defined in Explanation (a) appearing at the end of paragraph 15 to mean "an amount sanctioned by a Custodian or a competent Rehabilitation authority or the Chief Settlement Commissioner on an application made on or before the 20th day of December, 1958". The factual position, however, , is that the sum of Rs. 40,000 spent by the petitioner on the improvement of the alleged industrial concern in his possession has not been shown to have been made under the sanction of the Custodian or a competent Rehabilitation authority or the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and consequently he was not even entitled to make the said application before the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the transfer of the said property. The learned counsel, however, went on arguing that the Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to upset the finding recorded by the Additional Settlement Commissioner to the effect that the petition of the main bungalow in possession of the petitioner was indeed an industrial concern, as the said finding had been recorded by him after the spot inspection. Quite apart from the fact all the respondents, in the two writ petitions filed in the High Court, had vigorously denied the correctness of the said finding recorded by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, it is on record that long before he visited the site, the Chief Settlement Commissioner himself had inspected the property and in consequence of which inspection he directed vide his Memorandum dated 15-4-1960 that the property was not to be treated as `big mansion' and the same, therefore, disposed of under Settlement Scheme No. I. Of this eventuality, however, the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner had taken no notice, and consequently the High Court was wholly right to hold that he had exceeded his jurisdiction, as when, he passed the said order, the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, was in the field against which the petitioner had raised no objection whatever. I have also not been able to agree with the learned counsel that the said order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was passed on the back of the petitioner and so he had no knowledge to challenge the same through appropriate proceedings. It is on record that in the various portions of the property in dispute at least eight familes were residing, therefore, it is inconceivable that whereas all the said occupants were aware of the visit of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to the site, only the petitioner had remained unaware of the same or for that matter of the subsequent order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. For all these reasons, therefore, I am satisfied that the petitioner had no locus standi to seek the transfer of the portion of the main bungalow in his possession as an industrial concern, or even as `converted property', and so the concurrent finding recorded against him in that behalf by the Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court is wholly proper. I would, therefore, dismiss this petition. I would now take up the petition filed by Akhtar Iqbal Puri, the son of Muhammad Sharif Puri the other petitioner. The case set up by him in the written arguments, submitted by his learned counsel is somewhat different than what he had claimed before the Department, but even so let us proceed to examine his latest stand. His case is that although he had converted a portion of the main bungalow, the annexe on the back of it and the quarters, into an industrial concern somewhere before the year 1959, yet in the L. H. Form filed by him on 17-11-1959, he had confined his claim to the transfer of a portion of the bungalow as a house, as according to the then legal position the portion in his possession did not exceed Rs. 10,000 in value and so he was entitled to its transfer. However, owing to the change in law with effect from 3-5-1960, when by the Memorandum issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the said embargo was removed and consequently he became entitled to the transfer of all the said portion of the bungalow which he had converted into an industrial concern, he rushed to the Court of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. seeking the setting aside of the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, dated 9-5-1960 as he had failed to dispose of his L. H. Form filed before him on 17-11-1959. The Additional Settlement Commissioner, who was the only competent officer to consider his claim for the transfer of the portion in his possession as an industrial concern, first inspected the site, found to his satisfaction that the claim set up by him was valid and finally transferred to him all the portion of the main bungalow . which he had converted into an industrial concern vide his order dated 19-12-1960. His grievance, therefore, is that the said finding recorded by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, which was a finding of fact, could not be upset by the Settlement Commissioner--especially when he did not even visit the site in order to satisfy himself if his claim was actually tenable. By going through the record of the case, the various orders passed by the functionaries of the Department, as well as the judgment of the High Court, I find no force in the said contention. The learned counsel for the petitioner has no doubt raised a large number of contentions, relevant as well as irrelevant, but the very short and basic question in this case is whether the petitioner can be said to have been in possession of any portion of the bungalow in his own right, and further whether he had made any application before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner concerned for the transfer o the same as an - industrial concern or as 'converted property' in view of the Memorandum dated 3-5-1960 issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. In the appeal filed by him before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, the grievance of the petitioner was in respect of the annexe of the bungalow which by the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had been transferred to its occupant, named, A. H. Anwari. In point of fact, only Anwari had been made by him as respondent in his appeal, and yet the Additional Settlement Commissioner transferred to him the major porno of the main bungalow, open lawns, the annexe and the servant quarters a an industrial concern, not realizing that no part of the main bungalow ha ever remained in his possession in his own right. In this behalf the judgment of the Custodian, Muhammad Sharif Puri v. Rehabilitation Authority ha already been quoted to show that the bungalow in dispute had actually been allotted to Muhammad Sharif Puri for his residence as well as for the residence of his son named, Z. I. Puri. But the name of the petitioner doe not appear in the judgment nor indeed has he brought any other material on the record of the case to show that he was the occupant of the same i his own right or that his possession had ever been recognized by the authorities. In this view of the matter, no exception can be taken to th concurrent findings recorded against him by the learned Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court, that the petitioner had simply taken undue advantage of the possession of his father with a view to sustaining hip otherwise untenable claim in respect of the transfer of the major portion of the bungalow on the plea that he had installed therein an industrial concern or even as `converted property'. The record would show that the petitioner had throughout claimed the transfer of the annexe, on the back of the main bungalow, as an industrial concern, and in that behalf he succeeded before the Settlement Commissioner who however, in view of the conflicting stands taken by the petitioner to the effect that the industry installed by him was housed in the annexe or the quarters, directed the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to ascertain the actual location of the machinery and then demarcate to him the area depending on whether the machinery was housed in the annexe or the quarters. I am also inclined to agree with the contention urged by respondent Abdul Razzak that the petitioner had relied on the Memorandum of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 3-5-1960, for the first time in the High Court, and further that in his application, dated 6-5-1960, filed before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, he had made no claim to the transfer of the major portion of the bungalow as an industrial concern or as `converted property'. In this behalf reference may be made to the Memorandum of his appeal, dated 27-7-1960, filed by him before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, in which he had only claimed the transfer of the annexe which was transferred by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to its occupant, named, A. H. Anwari, it would therefore, follow that if in his said application dated 6-5-1960, he had actually claimed the transfer of the major portion of the bungalow as an industrial concern, then in the said appeal he could not have possibly confined his claim only to the annexe, especially when the appeal was filed by him after about two months and twenty days of the said application. There is also another hurdle in the way of the petitioner. After the bungalow was transferred to respondent Abdul Razzak by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, it was open to the petitioner to challenge the said order in appeal, under section 19 of Act XXVIII of 1958, but he chose not to do so, and instead contented himself by filing an appeal against the order, dated 9-5-1960, by which the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had transferred to A. H. Anwari the annexe on the back of the main bungalow. The grievance of respondent Abdul Razzak is, therefore, understandable that the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction to reopen the said past and closed transaction in his favour, and consequently transfer to the petitioner a major portion of the bungalow which had already been transferred to him by a competent authority. 1, therefore, feel satisfied that the concurrent finding recorded against the petitioner by the Settlement Commissioner, as well as the High Court is unexceptionable, this petition has no force in it, and I would dismiss the same. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, J.-I agree. S. A. H. Petition dismissed.