P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(a) West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of 1960) Ss. 3 & 5 [as amended by West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Ordinance (XLVII of 1962)], read with Constitution of Pakistan (1962) (as amended), Arts. 98 (2) (b) & 6, Fundamental Right No. 2 (4) ‑ Detention of person under West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 Detenu can invoke jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 98 (2) (b), Constitution of Pakistan (1962) immediately on his detention and pray for writ of habeas corpus‑Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.

491. The right of a person to a petition for habeas corpus is a high prerogative right and is a constitutional remedy for all matters of illegal confinement. This is one of the most fundamental rights known to the Constitution. There being no limitation placed on the exercise of this right, it cannot be imported on the actual or assumed restriction which may be imposed by any subordinate legislation. Article 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962) says that it is an inalienable right‑ of every citizen to enjoy the protection of law and in particular no action detrimental to life or, liberty can be taken except in accordance with law. If the arrest of a person cannot be justified iii law, there is no reason why that person should not be able to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court immediately for the restoration of his liberty which is his basic right. In all cases where a person is detained and he alleges that his detention is un-constitutional and in violation of the safeguards provided in the Constitution, or that it, does not fall within the statutory requirements of the law under which the detention is ordered, he can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of Pakistan (1962) and ask to be released forthwith. An order of detention under section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 for a period of two months only, does not require to be referred to the Advisory Board and so it cannot be argued that a detenu is not entitled to pray for a writ of habeas corpus before his case is referred to the Advisory Board. (b) West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance (XXXI of 1960), S. 3 (1)‑Sufficiency or otherwise of grounds of detention‑Not justiciable‑Court, however, competent to examine whether grounds forming basis of detention could be such as could satisfy detaining authority for passing order of detention Whether grounds fall within ambit of Ordinance‑To be decided with reference to facts and circumstances of each case‑Person delivering speeches, during electioneering campaign, criticizing police force, powers of President and nepotism in administration Detention, in circumstances of case under S. 3, held, without lawful authority. The question whether the detaining authority was satisfied on sufficient or insufficient grounds in issuing the order of detention is not justiciable. The word "satisfaction" however, is undoubtedly a condition precedent to the exercise of powers under section 3, West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. It is, therefore, open to the Court to look into the grounds supplied to the detenu in order to determine whether the detention is proper or improper. It can examine the grounds‑to ascertain whether they are definite and precise. Although the Court cannot question the sufficiency or otherwise .of the cause which is the basis of the satisfaction of the competent authority, yet the Court is well within the exercise of its judicial authority to satisfy itself that on the grounds which are the basis of the detention, the detaining authority could be satisfied as to the correctness of the order passed by it. If the grounds are not relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, namely, maintenance of the public order, etc. there could be no basis for the satisfaction of the competent authority and the Court in that case can hold that the condition precedent for the passing of the order is non existent. The power to legislate under the Constitution for preventive detention is for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order, etc. According to the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, which had to conform to these requirements, the acts which justify the order of detention are the acts which are prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. There are, therefore, limitations on the power of the Government in the exercise of its powers under section

3. It can pass the order if it was necessary for the purposes of the objects mentioned in this section. Hence any activity which threatens the maintenance of public order attracts the operation of section 3 (1). The Court, therefore, is bound to satisfy itself that the detaining authority has not exceeded the limitations specified in this section. If the Government goes beyond them and passes the orders of detention on grounds not provided in the subsection. the order would be one beyond the scope of their powers. The, grounds, therefore, must be grounds which lead to the inference that the person concerned is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the objects mentioned in section

3. If the grounds are not within the ambit of the Ordinance, the order cannot be justified. It is a ways with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case that it can be held whether the grounds fall within the ambit of the Ordinance and are relevant to the purposes of the preventive detention. Dale's case (1881) 6 Q B D 376; Arthur Terminiello v. City of Chicago (1948) 337 U S I; American Communication v. Douds, (1951) 340 U S 260 and Dirk De Jonge v. State of Orgegon (299) U S 353‑356 ref. Sh. Ghias Muhammad Deputy Attorney General for the Central Government: JUDGMENT SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.‑

This is a petition under Article 98 (2) (b) of the Constitution and section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, for release of the petitioner from detention made in pursuance of an order by the Provincial Government under section 3 (1) of the West Pakistan Public Maintenance Order (Ordinance XXXI) 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance).

2. Mr. Farid Ahmad petitioner is an Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan practicing at Dacca. He is a Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan and is the General Secretary of the Pakistan Nizam‑i‑Islam Party. The following facts, some of which appear in Mr. Farid Ahmad's petition, are not in dispute: that he was arrested at 1‑45 a. m., on the 13th of September 1964, in Lahore; the arrest was made under sub sections (1) and (7) section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. He was given the order of detention at the time of his arrest. It was mentioned in the order that the Governor of West Pakistan was satisfied that it was necessary to pass the said order with a view to preven ting Maulvi Farid Ahmad from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. He filed a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution on the 14th of September 1964, asking the Court to determine that he was being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner. It was alleged that he had never acted in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. He complained that no grounds or reasons of his detention were communicated or disclosed to him and that he could not be arrested in view of the fact that he was on his way to Rawalpindi to preside over a meeting of the Committee of Privileges to the National Assembly which was due to meet on the 15th of September 1964. He challenged the Ordinance as an unconsti tutional piece of legislation. He further alleged that the order was mala fides inasmuch as it had been made to deter him in his democratic activities and was, in fact, made at the instance of the Government of, East Pakistan in which Province he had his sphere of political activities.

3. The Government‑respondent in their written statement maintained that the action had rightly been taken under section 3 of Ordinance of 1960, after the Governor had been satisfied that it was necessary to do so in view of the petitioner's activities which were prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of public order. They admitted that the grounds of detention were not served on the petitioner at the time of his arrest and averred that it was not necessary to do so. They had, however, supplied the grounds of detention to the petitioner on the 18th of September 1964, and placed a copy of the same on the record. It was also stated that the Government had taken the action on the basis of the speeches which the petitioner had delivered on the 13th of August 1964, at Mansehra and Abbotabad and on the 14th of August 1964, at Lahore. The copies of the speeches were also placed on the record.

4. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the Government that the petition .was premature and incompetent inasmuch as it had been filed before the case of the petitioner had been referred to the Advisory Board to report on the sufficiency of cause for his detention beyond two months. The objection, in our opinion, is without substance. In the very context of the objection, the Advisory Board is to "report on the sufficiency of cause for his detention beyond two months". The detention in the instant case being only for two months, there is no scope for the Advisory Board to determine the "sufficiency of cause for his detention." The objection otherwise is untenable. The Board is constituted and is functioning under subsection (5) of the Ordinance. The relevant provisions are produced: "(5) (b) No person shall be detained for a period longer than two months without the authority of the Board ; * * * * * "(5) (c) (i) Where it is desired to detain any such person for a period longer than two months, Government shall refer his case to the Board. * * * * * * * "(vi) If the Board authorises detention of the person concerned for a period longer than two months, Government may detain him for such period as it may think fit." The case of the petitioner is that he was detained without a warrant of law and an action detrimental to his liberty and freedom of speech has been taken in violation of the fundamental rights. It is true that under the Ordinance if the detention is to be for a period more than two months, it is necessary to put the case of the petitioner before the Advisory Board. Under the said law even if the detention is to be for more than two months, it is not provided to refer the case of the detenue to the Board immediately after his arrest. It can be done even on the last day of the second month. There is another way of looking at the case. An order of detention only being for a period of two months, the reference to the Advisory Board is not necessary. The preliminary objection seems to have been raised on the assumption that the petitioner may be detained beyond the period of two months. Supposing it is not done the result will be that the case of the petitioner will not be, reviewed by the Board, and if the preliminary objection, is accepted the petitioner will have to suffer detention of two months without any remedy although the detention may be altogether without any lawful basis. The objection is by all means far‑fetched. It is the right of a citizen to enjoy the liberty and Article 2 of our Constitution says that it is an inalienable right of every citizen to enjoy the protection of law and in particular no action detrimental to the life or liberty can be taken except in accordance with law. It is again specifically provided in the fundamental rights that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law. If the arrest of a person cannot be justified in law, there is no reason why that person should not be able to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court immediately for the restoration of his liberty which is his basic right. In all cases where a person is detained and he alleges that his detention is unconstitutional and in violation of the safeguards provided in the Constitution, or that it does not fall within the statutory requirements of the law under which the detention is ordered, he can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 98 and ask to be released forthwith. It has to be observed that the right of the petition for habeas corpus is a high‑prerogative right and is a Constitutional remedy for all matters of illegal confinement. This is one of the most fundamental rights known to the Constitution. There being no limitation placed on the exercise of this right, it cannot be imported on the actual or assumed restriction which may be imposed by an subordinate legislation. Both on facts of this case and in the very nature of petition, which has been made, we find no force in the preliminary objection.

5. Although the petitioner had taken a number of grounds in his petition to challenge the order as without lawful authority, in the course of arguments before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner, confined himself to two grounds, namely:‑ (a) that the order of detention was void ab initio and not bona fide, as the grounds, on the basis of which the orders of detention have been made, do not attract the operation of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Ordinance, and (b) that the recital in the order of detention "that the Governor of West Pakistan in satisfied", is not correct and it never received the personal attention of the Governor. It was not contended that the order was not passed by the Governor but what was argued was that the Governor had not satisfied himself whether these grounds warranted action under section

3. In a nut shell, what has been strenuously canvassed at the Bar is that no order of detention under section 3 (1) of the Ordinance was warranted on the grounds alleged against the petitioner. We may here give the relevant portion of section 3 of the Ordinance which is necessary to appreciate these contentions and also those which are raised on behalf of the Government to which we will be presently referring. It reads as :‑ "

3. Power to arrest and detain suspected persons.‑(1) Government, if satisfied that with a view to preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, may, by an order in writing, direct the arrest and detention in such custody as may be prescribed under subsection (7), of such person for such period as may, subject to the other provisions of this section, be specified in the order, and Government, if satisfied that for the aforesaid reasons it is necessary so to do, say, subject to the other provisions of this section, extend from time to time the period of such detention."

6. The learned Advocate‑General took up the following position: that the grounds supplied to the detenu were relate-able to the purposes of section 3 (1) of the Ordinance and that it was not open to this Court to go behind the grounds communicated by the Government or to enquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts stated there. According to him this Court must accept the grounds or facts stated by the Government. It was contended that on the allegations made against the petitioner, the Govern ment was satisfied that it was necessary to take action against the petitioner and the question whether they were sufficient or insufficient grounds for the satisfaction of the Governor was not justiciable, the same being dependent on the subjective determination of the Government. It is not necessary for us to deal with the contention of the learned Advocate‑General that this Court cannot enquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts alleged against the detenue. In this case we will deal only with the facts as they have been brought on the record. The Government was not obliged to place the entire speeches on the record. They were not required to disclose all the evidence but only the reasons or conclusions which impelled them to take action against the petitioner with sufficient particulars or facts answer necessary in the circumstances of the case to enable the petitioner to make a repre sentation. They, however, m fairness to the petitioner have filed the speeches in the Court. The speeches constituted the materials in the form of information by which the Government was moved to take action. The petitioner was asked a specific question if he admitted the correctness of the contents of the speeches and his reply was that they were more or less correct. He or his counsel, however, did not pin‑point anything to which they could take exception. For the purposes of disposing of this petition, we would assume that the speeches produced in the Court correctly represent what the petitioner had said..

7. As to the other contention of the learned Advocate General, it is well‑settled that the question whether the detaining authority was satisfied on sufficient or insufficient grounds in issuing the order of detention is not justiciable, For the purpose of preventive detention, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to la y-down objective rules of conduct, non‑compliance with which may lead to such detention. Section 3, therefore, does not provide any objectives which the Court can utilize to decide whether o: not the detaining authority was satisfied on sufficient grounds. The objection of preventive detention is to prevent the individual from acting in a particular way to restrain him from achieving a particular object. . The Legislature has specified the objection for which the preventive detention can be ordered. If the ground exists and the Government is satisfied, it may order the detention. The Court, in such circumstances, will not be competent to investigate as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds, because the satisfaction of the Government depends on its subjective determination. In the content of the responsi bilities of the Government, it was necessary to leave the Govern ment to exercise the power of preventive detention whenever the conduct of a person appeared to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or other objects enumerated in section

3. The basis of detention is an apprehension based on his past conduct or some information as to the action which he is likely to take in future, and, therefore, it is not possible to lay down any objective standards to come to this conclusion. To do so, may create difficulties in the way of executive authority to maintain law and order. If in each case they are to look for the evidence to satisfy the judicial standards, it may become difficult for them to take any decision which otherwise may be necessary to prevent an apprehended action on the part of the person. It may well happen that before they succeed in collecting the necessary evidence, or they may not succeed at all, the person concerned may succeed in his object. In these circumstances, it is reasonable and proper that the action of preventive detention should, after a person furnishes' the grounds relate-able to the purposes of detention, be left to the satisfaction of the executive authorities. The state of mind of a person, who makes an order, is pre eminently a fact within his own knowledge. But all the same it is open to the Court to see when an application is made challeng ing the existence of that satisfaction whether there was, in fact, any subjective satisfaction of the authority which made the order. If the grounds relate-able to the purpose of preventive detention do not exist, there can be no satisfaction at all, and the question of having come to a subjective or objective determination of the matter by the Government will not arise. The word "satisfaction" is undoubtedly a condition precedent to the exercise of powers under section

3. It is, therefore, open to the Court to look into the grounds supplied to the detenue in order to determine whether the detention is proper or improper. It can examine the grounds to ascertain whether they are definite and precise. Although the Court cannot question the sufficiency or otherwise of the cause which is the basis of the satisfaction of the competent authority, yet the Court is well within the exercise of its judicial authority to satisfy itself that on the grounds which are the basis of the detention, the' detaining authority could be satisfied as to the correctness of the order passed by it. If the grounds are not relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, namely, maintenance of the public order etc., there could be no basis for the satisfaction of the competent authority an the Court in that case can hold that the condition precedent for the passing of the order is non‑existent.

8. The power to legislate under the Constitution for preventive detention is for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order, etc. According to the Ordinance, which had to conform to these requirements, the acts which justify the order of detention are the acts which are prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. There are, therefore, limitations on the power of the Government in the exercise of its powers under section

3. It can pass the order if it was necessary for the purposes of the objects mentioned in this section. Hence any activity which threatens the maintenance of public order attracts the operation of section 3 (1). The Court, therefore, is bound to satisfy itself that the detaining authority has no exceeded the limitations specified in this section. If the Govern ment goes beyond them and passes the orders of detention on grounds not provided in the subsection, the order would be one beyond the scope of their powers. The grounds, therefore, must be grounds which, lead to the inference that the person concerned is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the objects mentioned in section

3. If the grounds are not within the ambit of the, Ordinance, the order cannot be justified. We will make reference, to the observations of Cotton, L. J., in Dale's case ((1881) 6 Q B D 376). "I quite agree with Brett, J., that when persons take upon themselves‑ to cause another to be imprisoned, they must strictly follow the powers under which they are assuming to act, and if they do not, the person imprisoned may be discharged, although the particulars in which they have failed to follow those powers may be matter of mere form. Here, however, the departure from the correct procedure is not in my opinion a mere matter of substance." The question, therefore, is whether the grounds alleged against the petitioner are of the nature which come within the expression of public safety and the maintenance of public order occurring in section 3 (1) of the Ordinance. Since it is not possible to specify and exhaust the acts which may be prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order, they have not been parti cularized in the Ordinance. It is always with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case that it can be held whether the grounds fall within the ambit of the Ordinance and a relevant to the purposes of the preventive detention. The action against the petitioner was taken on the basis of the speeches which he delivered on the 13th and 14th of August 1964, at Mansehra, Abbotabad and Lahore: Reliance is not placed on the entire subject of the speeches but only on certain grounds which were served upon the petitioner under clause (6) of section 3 of the Ordinance, whereby the authority making the order had to communicate to the detenu within fifteen days of detention the grounds on which the order was made. We do not feel the necessity to reproduce the grounds in extenso. The upshot of the grounds is that the petitioner in his speeches has criticised the police force as indulging in tyranny, he had said that a sum of Rs. 50,000.00 had been spent on a party of the President at Peshawar in disregard of the miseries of the masses and the sufferings of ‑the flood‑affected people of Hyderabad; he criticised the powers bf the President and objected to "his hands being strengthened" and exhorted the people by saying "we wish that his hands should be broken". Reference is also made to the portions of his speeches where he alleged that the Members of the National Assembly had been won over by corrupting them with permits, etc. that the administration was corrupt and that the present Government had no sympathy with the masses and was actually supported by the people who had earlier supported Ranjit Singh and Britishers. He also criticised the President for becoming a Field Marshal and used different epithets for him. There was another ground taken up against him that he had said: "In our childhood we used to read the spirit of Islam, which since Martial Law has become the alcohol of Islam. That means that after a few days when they commit fornication, they will call it Islamic fornication. A woman issues Fatwa for us in the Assembly. Instead of Imam Abu Hanifa, Begum G. A. Khan has become our Mufti. The Rooh‑e‑Islam has become Sharab‑e‑Islam."

9. Since the entire material of speeches which ha furnished the grounds for detention of the petitioner has bee placed on the record, we have to consider them as a whole an not dwell upon isolated passages here and there. We would, therefore, have a look at the speeches as a whole. There was a good deal of argument addresses before us by the learned Advocate‑General that these speeches aimed at creating commotion and unrest in the country. We have to take into consideration what effect the speeches were likely to produce on the mind of the public for whom they were intended. We are to focus our attention on what can be regarded to be their central theme or purpose. We have also to take into account the places and circum stances in which the speeches were made, because the background in which the speeches are made can furnish great assistance enabling the Court to consider the purpose and effect of these speeches in their true perspective. The central theme that run through the entire speeches is that the petitioner was anxious to win the electorate on his side by criticising the policies of those who were in the opposite camp. He concluded the speech at Mansehra by making an appeal to the audience that in the coming elections of the Basic democracies, they should exercise their votes fairly, without any consideration of sectional or party feelings. There is a similar appeal in his speeches at Abbotabad and in Lahore. Doubtless, the language of the speeches is not healthy. The petitioner has indulged in rhetoric to impress his audience. He has unhesitatingly used adjectives and referred to similes which are far from being proper. He is an Advocate of the Supreme Court. He is a Member of the National Assembly and is also General Secretary of the Nizam Islam Party. One could expect from a person of his stature to have used in the criticism of his opponents language with some decorum and propriety. The fact, however, remains that there is nothing in any of the speeches which may warrant an inference that he was instigating any commotion or disorder. The speeches, in our opinion, do not incite or encourage to commit acts of violence. It does not seem to be the intention of the petitioner to have disturbed the public tranquillity or communal harmony. His utterances cannot be considered to be inimical to public walfare or to incite people to disturb public peace. He has indeed criticised the Government and its policies, but the criticism of the administration cannot always be interpreted to mean that it was intended to undermine respect for the Government with a view to bringing about disorder. The right to utter a reasonable criticism is a privilege and a source of strength to a community. On "Freedom of speech" lies the foundation of all democracy. Speeches, undoubtedly, had been made at a time when it had already been announced about the coming elections. The petitioner is opposed to the party in power. Being a Member of the Opposition, it is his effort that in the coming elections they should come in power. It is but natural that the object of every political candidate is to criticise the opposite‑party. There is no gain‑saying the fact that in a system of the Government where the Constitution provides for the functioning of the political parties, the Opposition is a necessary outcome and they are always in an endeavour to succeed by criticising the opposite‑party. The political parties have programmes of their own which they put forth to the electorate to succeed, which success in its wake may enable them to form the Government. In the very nature of the political parties, it is necessary that they should have freedom to put their view‑points before the people. In doing so, they criticise the Government in power to persuade the people to vote for the members of their party It was obviously with a view to achieving this purpose that the petitioner also made speeches here and there to promote a feeling among the people that they should not vote for any of the members of the Muslim League which is the party in power. The petitioner had a right peacefully to impart his view to others. It is plain that he wished only to introduce them in his propaganda of election in favour of the Opposition against the Party in Power. The aim and object of the speeches was, therefore, not to cause any disorder which might endanger public safety, but it was only in the process of an electioneering campaign. Speeches of this character at the present moment and against the background of the coming elections could neither incite nor they had the tendency to incite any person from among the people, who are likely to hear speeches of this nature, to commit acts of violence. It is essential and necessary for the working of all democratic systems that the citizens should be well aware of the principles of every political ideology and political system. Awakening the public or making them politically conscious is different from making them violent. The political party has the right to place its own view before the people and there can be no interference with their activities unless they trans gress the limits mentioned in different laws for the maintenance of the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order. If, however, any person makes any speech or indulges in any activity which shows a tendency to achieve his object having a recourse to violence, the Government can always step in to take action against him by preventive detention. The Government can always take this step when the circumstances warrant, whether the speech is made for the purposes of election or general otherwise. The Constitution has provided the freedom of speech, but it has to be enjoyed with due regard to public welfare or morality. An individual's liberty is sacred but cannot override the public welfare. In Arthur Terminiello v. City of Chicago ((1948) 337 U S 1), it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the constitutional right to freedom of speech is protected unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that arises far above public inconvenience,' annoyance or unrest. Again in American Communication v. Douds ((1951) 340 U S 260), it was held: "Freedom of speech, Press or Assembly are dependent upon the power of Constitutional Government to survive. If it is to survive, it must have the power to protect itself against unlawful conduct and under some circumstances against the incitements to commit unlawful acts." Hence no person in the guise of the election to the legislative bodies can indulge in activities which may incite people to unlawful acts or violence against a Constitutional Government. We may also make reference to Dirk De Jonge v. State of Orgegon (299 U S (353‑356)) it was held by Chief Justice Hughes:‑ "These rights (reference was to right of free speech, free press and free association) may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime. The people through their Legislatures may protect themselves against that abuse." It will thus be clear that the fundamental rights granted to the citizens in the Constitution can be curtailed in the larger public interest. The petitioner being a citizen of Pakistan had a "right of freedom of speech' and expression subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law being in the interest of security of Pakistan, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defama tion or an incitement to an offence". In this context a reference may be made to another observation of Hughes Chief Justice in De Jonge v. State of Orgegon, "the rights themselves must not be curtailed. The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that the Government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of the Constitutional Government." The freedom of speech is guaranteed, if it does not transcend "the points of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects". As to the law imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech in the case of the petitioner, it was the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, which, as stated above, provides in section 3 for detention of a person with a view to preventing him from prejudicing public safety or maintenance of public order. On examination of the speeches made by the petitioner, we have not been able to find any direct or causal connection between them and the maintenance of public order. The past acts would furnish safe criteria of the likely future activities of the detenu. In the past conduct of the petitioner as depicted by the speeches, there is nothing to indicate that it was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It, t therefore, provides no clue for an assumption that he would so conduct himself in the future as to cause prejudice to public safety or public order. The grounds taken for detention are, therefore, clearly beyond the ambit of section

3. Detention based on the said grounds is without lawful authority. Satisfaction of the Government, referred to in the order of detention of the petitioner, is thus no satisfaction in the eye of law, the same being with reference to the matters which are not relate-able to the purposes of preventive detention.

10. The result is that we have come to the conclusion on an examination of the grounds supplied to the petitioner and the speeches on which those grounds are based that the order of detention is not justified. We therefore, hold that the order of detention is bad and illegal and direct that the petitioner should be set at liberty immediately. K. B. A. Petition accepted.