P L D 2005 Supreme Court 252 (PLP)

Ph.4591567 and 5910587.

5. Initially the case was registered under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, and subsequently, Section 365‑A P.P.C was also added. Miss Nadia Ayub, appellant, was arrested on 5‑7‑1998 whereas Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah, along with Miss Afia (abductee), were arrested on 12-7‑1998 from Lahore by a Sub‑Inspector of Police Station, Naulakha, Lahore and were subsequently, handed over to S.H.O. P.S. Kohsar, Islamabad. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses in all at the trial and gist of their evidence is as under.

6. Muhammad Asghar, ASI (P.W.1) recorded F.I.R (Exh. PA/1) on the basis of written complaint (Ex.PA) made by Muhammad Yousaf Abdullah, (P. W.7) father of abductee at Police Station, Kohsar, Islamabad. Muhammad Amir, H.C. (P.W.2) and Muhammad Anwar (P.W.8) are marginal witness of the memo. of recovery of photographs of Miss Afia with Faraz, her affidavit and Nikahnama which were produced by the accused before Zubair Ahmed, Inspector (P.W.3) of P.S. Kohsar, Islamabad. Raja Muhammad Afzal, S.‑I., (P.W.4), P.S. Naulakha, Lahore, while on patrol duty along with Sharjeel Zia, A.S.‑I. (P.W.5) having found Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdulah along with Miss Afia, standing outside City Hotel, Lahore, inquired from them about their identity and on their personal search, having recovered one .32 bore unlicensed pistol with live cartridges from each of the two appellants arrested them under section 13 of West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965. The Sub Inspector also produced Miss Afia before a Magistrate at Lahore on the same day who recorded her statement under section 164, Cr.P.C., wherein she stated that she was forcibly brought from Islamabad. Ambar Mughal (P.W.6) a fellow student of Miss Afia, of Federal Government College for Girls, F‑6/2, Islamabad, deposed that on 8‑6‑1998 she and Miss Afia along with their other girl friends, while standing in the College compound, were discussing the paper when a girl repeatedly called Miss Afia at the gate of the College and Miss Afia after handing over pencil and scale to her went to attend the said girl but before her return, she went inside the examination hall and later came to know that Miss Afia was missing from college. Nisar Ahmed, H.C. (P.W.9) was marginal witness of the recovery memo. of Pajero Jeep taken into possession by Munir Ahmed, S.‑I. from Police Station Shad Bagh, Lahore. Miss Afia (P.W.10) the victim girl while narrating the story of her abduction from her college on 8‑6‑1998 stated that she was appearing in F.Sc. examination and on the day of her abduction (i.e. 8‑6‑1998), at 2 p.m., she had to appear in Urdu Paper in the College and that shortly before start of paper, when she was standing with Ambar Mughal and other students in the College compound inside the College gate, she was called by Miss Nadia at the gate on a false pretext and when she went to inquire from Nadia Ayub about the purpose of her calling, she forcibly pushed her in a car which was standing outside the gate and in which Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah were present. She stated that she was taken to Rawal Town in the said car by the appellants from where, on the same day she was taken to Lahore by Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah, in a Pajero Jeep, by motor way, and at Lahore they with the help of 3/4 other persons, forcibly obtained her signatures and thumb impression on blank papers/printed forms and then she was taken to Faisalabad, Multan and Quetta. Miss Afia further stated that during this period the appellant in her presence, have been demanding ransom from her father on telephone for her return and later she was recovered from their custody by a Sub‑Inspector of Police Station Naulakha, Lahore and was produced before a Magistrate at Lahore on the same day. Tariq Zaman, Magistrate, (P.W.11) recorded the statement of victim girl under section.164, Cr.P.C to the following effect:‑‑

7. Liaqat‑Hayat, Inspector (P.W.12) and Munir Ahmed (P.W.13) conducted investigation of the case and challan was finally submitted by Zubair Ahmed (Inspector). The appellants in their statement under section 342, Cr.P.C denied the charge and pleaded as under: "Faraz Ayub:‑‑ "Miss Afia Yousaf came to me of her own accord and voluntarily entered into Nikah with me. No ransom was demanded by us. (Reply to Question 12)." Miss Nadia Ayub:‑‑ "Being real sister of Faraz Ayub, co‑accused I have been falsely implicated in this case. P.Ws. deposed falsely because of influence of the complainant. (Reply to Question No. 8). "Haris Abdullah:‑- "Being friend of Faraz Ayub, co‑accused, I have been falsely implicated in this case. P.Ws. deposed falsely because of influence of the complainant". (Reply to Question No. 11).

8. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that Miss Afia was sui juris and she having developed understanding for marriage with Faraz Ayub eloped with him and willingly performed Nikah with him at Lahore and that the letters written by her to Faraz Ayub and their photographs together at different places, would be a strong evidence to negate the allegation of abduction and demand of ransom. Learned counsel added that the alleged abduetee in her statement, has not been able to explain her conduct of not raising alarm and informing any person at any place that she was abducted, despite ample opportunity of doing so during the period she in the company of the appellants travelled place to, place through the public transport. Learned counsel having analyzed the deposition of the victim girl, contended that it would be evident from the conduct of alleged abductee and the circumstances of the case that she was a consenting party to the transaction and the essential ingredients of section 11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 were missing to constitute an offence. Learned counsel next argued that subsequent addition of section 365‑A, P.P.C was mala fide to attract the jurisdiction of Special Court established under Anti‑Terrorism Act, 1997, and that acquittal of the appellants from the said charge by the Federal Shariat Court, in appeal, being based on sound reasoning, would not call for interference.

9. Mr. M. Bilal, learned counsel for the complainant on the other hand, has contended that acquittal of appellants from the charge under section 365‑A, P.P.C, was in disregard to the direct evidence of complainant regarding demand of ransom by the appellants from him for return of his daughter and that of victim girl who stated that Faraz and Haris, in her presence, demanded ransom from her father on telephone, for her release from their custody. The learned counsel submitted that the evidence of the most natural witnesses of the occurrence, was excluded from consideration by the Federal Shariat Court to the extent of charge under section 365‑A, P.P.C and that without any cogent and convincing reason, acquitted them from the said charge. The learned counsel next contended that in addition to the evidence of Abdullah Yousaf (complainant) and Miss Afia (adbuckee) the evidence of Miss Ambar Mughal, a fellow student of Miss Afia and Muhammad Afzal, S.‑I., Police Station Naulakha, Lahore, would be of much significance to establish the charge of abduction and ransom against the appellants. The learned counsel has pointed out that for an ‑offence of abduction, sentence of life, imprisonment is provided under section 11 of Offence of Zian (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, but in the present case, the Federal Shariat Court incorrectly reduced the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to Nadia Ayub by the trial Court to a term of rigorous imprisonment for 10 years which is not a legal sentence under the law.

10. The Federal Shariat Court placing reliance on the judgment of Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in Hasham Khan v. State (PLD 1991 SC 567), taking a lenient view, reduced the sentence of Miss Nadia Ayub from life imprisonment awarded to her by the trial Court to a term of 10 years rigorous imprisonment. We find that Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court while interpreting section 11 of the offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 in the above referred case, had observed that probably the legislature intended to insert in section 11 ibid, the words "may be extended to life" instead of "shall be the imprisonment for life" and while raising the presumption of such intention of law makers, substituted the words "may be extended to life imprisonment" for the words "shall be life imprisonment" in the judgment and reduced the sentence of the convict in the said case from life imprisonment to a term of R.I. for 10 years. The learned counsel contended that by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the law laid down by this Court would be binding on all the Courts including the Federal Shariat Court, and consequently, the awarding of the sentence for a term lesser than life imprisonment under section 11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 would be deemed to be the legal sentence. The learned counsel however, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded to Miss Nadia under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979, was not sustainable.

11. Raja Abdul Rehman, learned A.A.‑G., on the other hand, has submitted that the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in an earlier case Muhammad Sharif v. State (PLD 1985 SC 319), held that the Court could propose the change in law but could not change the law and decline to reduce the sentence of convict for a term less than life imprisonment provided under section 11 of the. Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The learned A.A.‑G. however, has not been able to convince us that acquittal of appellants from the charge under section 365‑A P.P.C was suffering from any legal or factual infirmity calling for interference of this Court.

12. The laws are enacted through the process of legislation by the Parliament and the function of the Courts is to apply and interpret the laws in the spirit in which same are enacted. This is not the function of the Courts to add or omit any word from a provision of law or to re write or re‑enact any law or change its language, through the method of interpretation of laws. The Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 203‑F read with Article 203‑D of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, can declare a law repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and direct the Government for enactment of law in accordance with the Injunctions of Islam but while interpreting a provision of law, it is not supposed to change the words of an existing provision of law without declaring it repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. Article 203‑D, ibid, provides as under:‑ "203D. (1) The Court may, either of its own motion or on the petition of a citizen of Pakistan or the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, examine and decide the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet, hereinafter referred to as the Injunctions of Islam. (IA) Where the Court takes up the examination of any law or provision of law under clause (1) and such law or provision of law appears to it to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, the Court shall cause to be given to the Federal Government in the case of a law with respect to a matter in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List, or to the Provincial Government in the case of a law with respect to a matter not enumerated in the either of those Lists, a notice specifying the particular provisions that appear to it to be so repugnant, and afford to such Government adequate opportunity to have its point of view placed before the Court. (2) If the Court decides that any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, it shall set out in its decision:‑ (a) the reasons for its holding that opinion; and (b) the extent to which such law or provision is so repugnant; and specify the day on which the decision shall take effect: Provided that no such decision shall be deemed to take effect before the expiration of the period within which an appeal therefrom may be preferred to the Supreme Court or, where an appeal has been so preferred, before the disposal of such appeal. (3) If any law or provision of law is held by the Court to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam,‑ (a) the President in the case of law with respect to a matter in the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List, or the Governor in the case of a law with respect to a matter not enumerated in either of those Lists, shall take steps to amend the law so as to bring such law or provision into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam; and (b) such law or provision shall, to the extent to which it is held to be so repugnant, cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of the Court takes effect." There is no cavil to the legal position that the judgment of the Supreme Court on a question of law, is binding on all Courts and authorities in the country by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution but the change in the provision of section 11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 in the manner in which it was made by the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court would not be in conformity to the provisions of Article 203‑D of the Constitution and consequently, would not be considered a law declared for the purpose of Article 189 of the Constitution. We find that on the same subject the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, in Muhammad Sharif v. State, supra, observed as under:‑ "We may, however, observe that at present worded section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, (VII of 1979) does not admit of any possibility of award of the sentence of imprisonment which might be less than the imprisonment for life. The words used are "whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent shall be punished with imprisonment for life and with ." does not admit of any other interpretation." In another case Ishtiaq Ahmed v. State (PLD 1984 SC 380) (Shariat Bench) it was held as under: "The question of sentence regarding Ilyas might have been examined in another context namely the gravity of the acts and the proportionate severity of the sentence which could be awarded to each of them; but section 11 as it stands on the statute book, has not made any distinction between the ordinary and a graver offence of abduction or for that matter kidnapping. The minimum sentence of life imprisonment having been prescribed by statute, it is for the law‑makers to make appropriate amendment in this behalf. Many cases have come to the notice of this Court where serious possibility of reduction of sentence could have been examined if the law could have permitted so. But on account of the rigidity of the provision contained in section 11, it is not possible for the Court to reduce the sentence of Ilyas. In this behalf some general remarks were also made by this Court in the case of Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal and others."

13. The observation made in Hasham Khan v. State, supra, was based on the assumption that law makers intended to insert the words "may extend to life" instead of "shall be life imprisonment" and, the inadvertent omission could be supplied in the law. We find that the Shariat Appellate‑Bench of the Supreme Court in the above judgment neither declared the sentence of life imprisonment provided under section 11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam nor recommended the Government to amend the said section in the light of its observations and the Government, also has not taken any step for the amendment in the above provision, therefore, even if legislature had such an intention, the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court without examining the vires of the above provision of law in the light of Injunctions of Islam, could not competently change the words of the existing provision. We, therefore, approve the earlier view taken by Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in Muhammad Sharif v. State (PLD 1985 SC 319) and Ishtiaq Ahmed v. State (PLD 1984 SC 380) and hold that the Courts cannot pass a sentence of lesser imprisonment than the life imprisonment under section 11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 in departure to the statutory provisions. The Federal Shariat Court arid Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in exercise of the powers under Article 203‑D, can examine the vires of a law or a provision of law on the touchstone of Injunctions of Islam and can also declare a law or a provision of law, repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and direct the Government for necessary amendment by a certain date. The amendment so proposed if is not made by the date fixed by the Court, it becomes the law of the country but the Federal Shariat Court or Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court, in exercise of this power, cannot substitute the words of a provision with the consideration that legislature intended to legislate the law in that manner, without declaring such provision repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam wholly or partially. The Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in the above case, changed the words of Section 11 ibid, as under:‑‑ "

11. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage etc.‑‑‑Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her wilt, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced to seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to life and with whipping not exceeding thirty stripes, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever by means of criminal intimidation as defined in the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or, knowing that it‑is likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall also be punishable as aforesaid." (Underlined words are ours, in place of the words "for life" presently appearing in section 11). We may observe that Shariat Appellate Bench in its criminal jurisdiction, was trot supposed to award a sentence as Tazir punishment which is not provided under the law. The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands and should not read into section of an Act words which are not used by the legislature. The Court has only to interpret the law and read the intention of legislation from the language used by the legislature. There is a strong presumption that Parliament does not make mistakes and if ambiguity is found in legislation, it must be corrected by legislature and is not the function of the Court to repair it. It was held by Mr. Jusice Walsh in the case of Attorney‑General v. Bihari re‑Australian Factors Ltd. (1966), 67 SR N.S.W.) 150; "It is not function to repair the blunders that are to be found in the legislation. They must be corrected by the legislature." The Courts have no power to treat an Act of Parliament as being altered in such a way to agree with the Judge's idea of what is right or reasonable. In nutshell unless the words "may be extended to life" are substituted for the words "shall be imprisonment for life" in section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979, in accordance with the requirement of provisions of Article 203‑D of the Constitution or by the legislature, in exercise of its legislative powers, the Courts cannot, on the basis of an observation of Shariat Appellate Bench, award imprisonment for a term lesser than imprisonment for life provided in law. The Government may examine the above provisions of law and make necessary amendment, as proposed.

14. The crucial question requiring determination in the present case would relate to the nature of transaction whether it was a case of abduction or elopement. The defence plea was that Miss Afia of her own freewill and consent with the intention to enter into marriage contract eloped with Faraz Ayub and performed Nikah with him at Lahore whereas the prosecution case was that Miss Afia was abducted from College in a deceitful manner and was taken to Lahore for the purpose of marriage with Faraz Ayub and demand of ransom from her father. We having put the defence version in juxta position with the prosecution case, have examined the possibility of correctness of the defence version and found it without any substance. This is not denied that Miss Afia was a student of F.Sc. of F.G. Girls College, F.6 Islamabad and on the day of occurrence, she had to appear in examination in the college and shortly before the start of paper at 2 p.m. She disappeared from the College. The deposition of Miss Ambar Mughal (PW.6) a fellow student of Miss Afia, regarding the manner in which Miss Afia was taken out of the College, was not challenged and she also corroborated the statement of abductee so far as her disappearance from the College was concerned except that the girl, who called Miss Afia at the College gate, was Nadia Ayub and further she also did not identify Nadia Ayub in Court as the said girl. The statement of Miss Afia that first she was taken to Rawal Town from where Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah, took her to Lahore in a Pajero Jeep by motor way and at Lahore during the stay in a hotel, her signature and thumb impression were obtained on some papers and then she was taken by the appellants to Faisalabad, Multan, Quetta and was again brought back to Lahore, through public transport was not disputed. Miss Afia however, admitted in cross examination that the letters brought on record were in her hand but the same were written by her under the command and instructions of accused during the period she remained in their custody and that her photographs with Faraz Ayub were also prepared in a deceitful manner through camera tricks. She denied that she was willing and consenting party to the transaction and deposed that she was kept by accused in their custody under coercion and threat of life and that she due to the constant fear, had no other option except to remain silent and obey the accused, therefore, she did not raise alarm or protest against the accused while in their custody. The abductee was recovered from the custody of Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah, from outside a hotel at Lahore and on her disclosure that she was abducted from Islamabad a Sub‑Inspector of Police, produced her before a Magistrate at Lahore who recorded her statement under section 164, Cr.P.C., wherein she narrated the story of her abduction and subsequent events in detail. This statement of Miss Afia was recorded without the knowledge of the complainant and the concerned police at Islamabad and the police officials at Lahore, who produced her before the Magistrate were also not aware of the true facts in the background. She being an educated girl, made the statement before the Magistrate, without any outside pressure and influence and this first statement of abductee recorded immediately after her recovery from the custody of appellants would provide a strong corroboration to her subsequent statement and also the statement of complainant before the trial Court. This is correct that if the essential elements of the offence under section 11 of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 are missing, it would become difficult to prove the charge but mere fact that the abductee in the present case, a sui juris girl, did not resist to her abduction or raise alarm while in custody of accused, would not be, in the given facts, sufficient to inter that she was consenting party and it was a case of elopement. The circumstances leading to the occurrence in the present case and the subsequent events, such as performing of Nikah of Miss Afia with Faraz at Lahore and their visit to different cities and stay in the hotels together, the writing of the letters by her to Faraz and their photographs together, may apparently create an impression that the abductee, was a consenting party to the transaction and she willingly contracted marriage with Faraz Ayub and subsequently, at the instance of her parents, changed her mind but this false impression would be demolished by the fact that she in her statement before the Magistrate at Lahore when she had no contact with her parents or any of her relatives, clearly stated that she was abducted by the accused and kept her in forcible custody. She, in her statement before the Court has denied to have willingly signed and put thumb impression on the Nikahnama and her affidavit and stated that her photographs with Faraz were prepared through camera tricks and she was compelled to write letters in question to him. We may observe that this is not known that when these letters were written and how the photographs were prepared, therefore, the same could not possibly be an evidence of consent and consequently, it stood established beyond any doubt that it was a clear case of enticing away the abductee from the college and thereafter, under the threat of life, she was made to act as per desire of the appellants. In a case of abduction if ultimately it is proved that the alleged abductee with her free‑will and consent joined the accused, it would be elopement and the transaction may not constitute an offence under section 11 of Offence of Zian (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance 1979 but if in an apparent case of elopement ultimately, the element of enticement and inducement is proved through the evidence, the transaction would be abduction which may constitute an offence under section 11 of the ibid Ordinance wherein it is provided that "Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she maybe compelled, or knowing, it be likely that she will be compelled, to marry and person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or reduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment for life."

15. Miss Afia has consistently stated that she was forcibly taken to Lahore from Islamabad and was compelled to put her signatures on the Nikahnama and also on an affidavit of her consent. The defence version regarding the willingness of the abductee in the transaction of Nikah would also be negated by the fact that in the normal circumstances, there was at all no need of a separate affidavit of abductee and preparing such an affidavit by the accused of her consent to the Nikah, would evidently suggest that they being conscious of the fact that Miss Afia was not a consenting party to the Nikah and she put signatures on the Nikahname, under compelled circumstances due to their pressure, were apprehensive of their act and visualizing the consequence, also got an affidavit of her consent signed by her for their protection: Miss Afia subsequently filed a suit for jactitation of marriage on the ground that she was not a consenting party to the Nikah and the suit was decreed. In the light of the' circumstances narrated above, it stood established beyond any doubt that the victim girl was subjected to the inducement and seduction and the appellants kept her in her their custody by force and against her will but she purposely kept silent during the period she remained in their custody to avoid any unfortunate incident.

16. The abduction is not essentially through the use of force rather it can also by other means such as inducement, enticement and persuasion to act in a certain manner. It is abduction to persuade a woman to enter into a vehicle, building or a room or any other place with intention to contact marriage with her, against her will which is an offence punishable under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. However, it is always a question of fact whether the transaction was abduction or elopement which would be determined on the basis of evidence in each case. In the present case, the victim girl repeatedly, in her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C before a Magistrate at Lahore, in her statement under section 161 Cr.P.C., before the police and in her statement before the trial Court, has stated that she was abducted by the appellants from Islamabad and was kept in forcible custody:

17. Miss Afia was admittedly recovered from the custody of appellants at Lahore after 33 days of her abduction and visualizing the circumstances to which she faced during this period, her silence of not resisting to her abduction and subsequent illegal custody, was understandable as the resistance on her part could put her in further trouble with serious consequence. We find that abductee acted very wisely and her silence could not be termed as an evidence of her consent. We have not been able to find out any convincing evidence to suggest that the abductee was a willing and consenting party to the transaction and learned counsel also has not shown us any material evidence which was kept out of consideration, in determining the question of guilt of appellants:

18. We, having assessed the evidence in the light of the statement of victim girl, hold that it was a case of deceitful abduction in which no presumption of, elopement could be raised on the basis of false claim of marriage and consequently, would take no exception to the concurrent findings of guild of appellants arrived at by the two Courts. The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to persuade us that it was a case of elopement and we having scanned the overwelming evidence produced by the prosecution in detail, have found that the transaction would fully satisfy the essential elements of abduction to constitute an offence under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 and the commission of offence by the appellants stood proved beyond any doubt.

19. However, we find the case against Miss Nadia Ayub was distinguishable. The complainant, on coming to know about he incident through Miss Ambar Mughal, approached Miss Nadia and her parents at their residence and negotiated with them for the return of his daughter but he neither in the F.I.R., nor in his supplementary statement, nominated Miss Nadia as an accused. Miss Ambar Mughal who initially informed the complainant that Miss Afia was called by a girl at the college gate, did not state that said girl was Nadia Ayub and thus except the statement of Miss Afia, there was not other evidence of her involvement in the matter. This is an admitted fact that, complainant at the first instance, approached Nadia Ayub and her mother for their cooperation in the matter of return of Miss Afia and remained in contact with them, therefore, the possibility that he having found them not cooperative also subsequently, arrayed Miss Nadia as an accused in the case, could not be ruled out. This is correct that Miss Nadia Ayub, being real sister of Faraz Ayub, must be aware of the whole situation but this fact alone, would not be sufficient to suggest her involvement in the transaction of abduction of Miss Afia as stated. Be that as it may, the case against her being not free from doubt, we while giving her benefit of doubt, acquit her from the charge under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979. The case of Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah, who having abducted Miss Afia from Islamabad, took her to Lahore by road in a vehicle and then kept her at different places under threat of life for a period of more than one month and during this period they forcibly obtained her signatures on the Nikahnama and on an affidavit showing her willingness for marriage with Faraz and they also made an attempt to exploit her parents, would be distinguishable and the charge against them under section 11 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 would be proved beyond any doubt.

20. For the reasons given above, we maintain the conviction and sentences awarded to the appellants namely, Faraz Ayub and Haris Abdullah by the trial Court which was upheld by the Federal Shariat Court and dismiss the appeal to their extent. However, the appeal, to the extent of Miss Nadia Ayub is allowed and her conviction and sentence is set aside. The appeal of the complainant against acquittal of appellants from the charge under section 365‑A, P.P.C, and for enhancement of sentence of Nadia Ayub is dismissed. The copies of this judgment shall be sent to the Registrar of Federal Shariat Court and Registrars of the High Courts for guidance. M.B.A./M‑196/S Order accordingly.