P L D 1955 Sind 384 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD BAKHSH, J.‑This is an application under section 491 Criminal P. C. praying that the detenu Qassim alias Qassu son of Ali Bhatti be brought up before the Court and set at liberty. It is necessary to state the facts leading up to this petition. The Chief Commissioner, Karachi passed an externment order on 22nd December, 1954 against the petitioner directing that he shall not remain in any place of Karachi Administration for a period of one year. It is necessary to reproduce this order. Whereas I, A. T. Naqvi, Chief Commissioner, Karachi, am satisfied in respect of Qasoo alias Kassim Dara alias Kassim Udhar Qasim Ali alias Kasoo Udhara alias Qassim Ali Bhatti son of Ali resident of Bhit Island, Karachi that he has acted and was acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance of public order and supplies and services essential to the community. Whereas, with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance of public order. It is necessary to make the following order :‑ Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by clause (c) of subsection 1 of section 3 of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952, (XXXV of 1952), I hereby direct that the said Qasoo alias Kassim Dhara alias Kassim Udhar alias Qasim Ali alias Kasoo Udhara alias Kassim Ali Bhati son of Ali, shall not remain in any place of Karachi Administration for a period of one year after 24 hours of the service of this order." The petitioner filed in this Court Writ Petition No. 62 of 1954 on 28th December, 1954 challenging the above order of the Chief Commissioner. This Court granted an interim stay of the externment order. On 21st April, 1955 the above writ petition was dismissed owing to the judgment of Federal Court in the case of Moulvi Tamizuddzn Khan (P L D 1955 F C 240s) whereby it was decided that S. 223‑A of the Constitution Act, under which the petition was filed, not having received the assent of the Governor‑General, was not good law. With the dismissal of this writ petition the stay order granted by this Court had also to go off with the result that the petitioner went out of Karachi. On 26th May, 1955 the election for the post of the Mayor of Karachi was fixed. The petitioner is a member of the Karachi Municipal Corporation. The Chief Commissioner was approached and he suspended the order of externment against the petitioner on 25th May 1955 in order to enable the petitioner to come, to Karachi and vote during the election. The petitioner accordingly came to Karachi on 25th May, 1955, he cast his vote on 26th May, 1955 and after doing that he again went out of Karachi. It is necessary, to mention here that on 18th April, 1955 the petitioner had filed an application under section 491 Criminal P. C. against the externment order because by that time the judgment of the Federal Court in Tamizuddin Khan's case was known. This application under section 491 Criminal P. C. was under objections. Ultimately it came up for consideration on 8th June 1955 when my learned brother acting as the Vacation judge passed the following order :‑ "Admit. Notice. I would suspend the operation of the externment order pending the disposal of the main appli?cation." Accordingly on 9th June, 1955 the applicant came over to Karachi. Up to this date all the orders were passed by the Chief Commissioner of Karachi. On 18th June, 1955, however the Central Government passed orders whereby the petitioner was arrested and detained under the same Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. It is necessary to reproduce this order: "Whereas the Central Government is satisfied that with a view to preventing Qassim Dhara alias Qassim Udhara alias Kassim Ali alias Kassu Udhara alias Qasim Ali Bhatti? son of Ali Cutchi from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the com?munity, it is necessary to detain him. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952 (XXX'J of 1952) it is hereby ordered that the said Qasim Dhara shall be detained in Karachi for a period of one year." Election by the Municipal Corporation of a member of the Constituent Assembly, of Pakistan had been fixed for 21st June, 1955. On.20th June 1955 the petitioner filed the present petition under section 491 Criminal P. C. challenging the order of detention passed by the Central Government. A prayer for bail was made on the ground that the petitioner had to cast his vote at the election for Constituent Assembly and our learned brother Inamullah, J. who was dealing with the matter at that time asked the learned Public Prosecutor to take instructions from the Government and to inform the Court whether the Government proposed to give any facility to the applicant for recording his vote. The learned Public Pro?secutor stated that he had taken instructions and they were that the Government did not propose to do so unless directed by the Court. Our learned brother came to the conclusion that the question of directing the Government in an application for bail did not arise and he therefore rejected the bail application. The petitioner accordingly continued to be detained in the Central Jail. In his affidavit the petitioner has alleged that he is a member of the Karachi Race Club and also of the Karachi Municipal Corporation. In the year of 1953 there had been a keen contest for the Presidentship of the Race Club between Mr. Yousuf Haroon and Major‑General Iskandar Mirza at present Hon'ble Minister for Interior, Government of Pakistan. The detenu strongly supported the candidature of Mr. Yousuf Haroon and he not only cast his own vote in his favour but also canvassed and secured support of other members of the Club for Mr. Haroon who ultimately succeeded in the election. The petitioner therefore alleges that the original order of externment was passed against him by the Chief Commissioner, Karachi on 22nd December, 1954 under the directions of the Ministry of Interior on account of this motive. The order of detention which is being challenged in this petition is also alleged to be illegal and invalid on the ground that the powers under the Security of Pakistan Act, 1952 had already been delegated to the Chief Commissioner of Karachi and therefore the Central Government could not pass the order of detention especially during the pendency of the externment order issued by the Chief Commissioner of Karachi. The order is also attacked on the ground that there is no connection whatsoever between "smuggling" and "prejudice to the maintenance of supplies and service essential to the community." The detention order was also attacked on some other grounds but they have not been pressed at the time of arguments. The order of detention, is also alleged to be mala‑fide because the detenu was known to be a strong supporter of Mr. Yousuf Haroon for election to the Consti?tuent Assembly and his detention was therefore ordered to prevent the detenu from casting his vote. We have heard the arguments of the learned Advocate for the petitioner in great detail and, we have also heard the learned Public Prosecutor fully in the matter. In all three important points are involved in this case, namely,‑ (1) Whether the order of detention is mala‑fide as alleged by the petitioner ; (2) Whether after the delegation of powers to the Chief Commissioner of Karachi the Central Government could still exercise their powers under the Security of Pakistan Act, and (3) Whether the order of detention in question on the facts alleged by the Crown is in accordance with the letter of law. We will deal with these points separately Point No. 1.‑We must immediately repel all suggestions that the orders of externment or detention were passed in this case on account of any motive either by the Chief Commis?sioner of Karachi or by the Central Government. It is impossible to think that on account of a trifling matter the Central Government would go to the extent of directing the Chief Commissioner of Karachi to pass externment order in the manner alleged against an innocent person Besides the petitioner was not the solitary voter for the Race Club elections. There must be so many other voters and not a single instance has been pointed out to us at the Bar that any other voter was similarily arrested. If there had been any such instance surely it would have been pointed out to us. Apart from this there was a secret voting at the election and we are not even in a position to say definitely and with certainty that the petitioner did cast his vote in favour of Mr. Haroon. The petitioner has a record of his own as disclosed in the counter affidavit filed by Mr. Abdul Samad Khan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C. I. D., Karachi to which we shall refer hereafter when we come to deal with point No. 3 it was apparently on the basis of those facts that action was taken against the petitioner under the Security of Pakistan Act 1952 directing his externment from Karachi for a period of one year. It is also impossible to think that the Central Government passed the order of detention deliberately with a view to circumvent the order passed by this Court on 8th June 1955 suspending the operation of the externment order pending the disposal of the petition under section 491 Criminal P. C. challenging the externment order. The order of detention was apparently passed in view of the facts stated in the counter affidavit referred to above though as the learned Public Prosecutor for the Crown himself admits that various dates of the passing of these orders have conspired to arm the petitioner with a plausible argument in his favour on the question of mala‑fides. The order was suspended on 8th June, 1955 and the detention order was passed on 18th June, 1955, i.e., only ten days later. The Ankara incident referred to in the counter affidavit occurred on 20th May, 1955. The learned advocate for the petitioner therefore gets an opportunity for arguing that if the Central Government considered the petitioner to be responsible for the Ankara incident‑ they could have directed his detention before the eighth of June. We have however given the matter our most anxious consideration and we have come to the definite conclusion that the order of detention was not inspired by any motive whatsoever. The argument of mala‑fides would appear to get some strength from the fact that the Govern?ment did not even agree to .let the petitioner be escorted to the Karachi Municipal Corporation to cast his vote on 21st June, 1955. Even our learned brother Inamullah, J. while reject?ing the bail application was constrained to observe that :‑ "I do not think that there is much force in this contention though I may record my disapproval of the attitude taken by the Central Government in not meeting this allegation of the applicant by allowing him to record his vote which in no way would have interferred with the order passed by the Central Government under the Security of Pakistan‑Act. The applicant may have been taken under police custody to the Municipcial Corporation and may have been allowed to record his vote." We however think that this attitude of the Government shows that the Government took a very serious view of the Ankara incident and they were in no mood to grant any further indulgence to the petitioner whom they considered to be a very undesirable person. For these reasons we have no doubt that the petitioner has not proved any mala‑fides what?soever as alleged by him. Point No. 2.‑It may be noted here that along with the petitioner some other relations of his were also externed and then detained under the same provision of law and their appli?cations have also been heard by us and we are deciding them today. Mr. Brohi appears for one of those persons, viz., Abdullah Bhatti, Mr. Nusrat appears for Haji Siddiq Bhatti, and Mr. Alvi appear for Haji Umer and Haji Muhammad Bhatti. This and the next point have been argued by the learn?ed advocate Mr. Brohi in the matter of Abdullah Bhatti. As these points are involved in all the petitions we have got to dispose them of here. Mr. Brohi relied on the ruling in Locker's case (1948 A E R Vol. I, at p. 85), where it was held that the Minister, when delegating his powers, had for the time being divested himself of those powers ; in other words so long the delegation lasts the abdication is there but the delegation can be revoked at any time and the power would then‑ revert to the delegator. Mr. Brohi has also referred to the Ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Sibnath .Banerji and others (A I R 1945 (P C) 156) where their Lordships were pleased to observe as follows :‑ "Their Lordships would also add, on this contention, that subsection (5) of section 2 provides a means of delegation in the strict sense of the word, namely, a transfer of the power or duty to the officer or authority defined in the subsection, with a corresponding divestiture of the Governor of any responsibility in the matter . . .? Mr. Brohi has then referred to the ruling in the case of Swami Hariharan and another (A I R 1948 All. 435) which says that there is no rule of law or of natural justice which requires that before an authority which has the power to delegate can delegate its function to another, it must divest itself completely of the power so delegated, In this contention it is necessary to reproduce section 18 of the Security of Pakistan Act which gives the power of dele?gation to the Central Government :?-- "The Central Government may, by order, direct that any power which by or under any of the provisions of this Act is conferred on the Central Government shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercised in respect of Karachi by the Administrator of Karachi or by such officer subordi?nate to him and not ‑below the rank of District Magistrate as he may, by order, direct." In accordance with this section the Central Government passed the order of delegation on 26th May, 1952 which reads a s follows :?-- "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 18 of the Security of Pakistan Act 1952 (XXXV of 1952) read with Article 5 of the Pakistan (Establishment of the Federal Capital) (Amendment) Order, 1952, (G. G. O. 4 of 7952), the Central Government is pleased to empower the Chief Commissioner, Karachi to exercise within the limits of the Capital of the Federation the powers specified in sections 3, 11 and 12 of the said Act." The sum and substance of the arguments by the learned advocate for the petitioner therefore is that so long the delegation lasts there is an abdication or renunciation by the delegator but this is not necessary in every case. The delegator can by express words reserve his right to exercise the power simultaneously with the delegatee. Since in this case no such power was reserved by the Central Government for themselves they could not exercise the power of detention simultaneously with the Chief Commissioner to whom they had delegated their power under section 3 and who had actually exercised his power. We think however that this view is not correct. The ruling in Locker's case is distinguishable in the case of Huth v. Clarke (25 Q B D 391) where it was held that :?-- "Delegation, as the word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself . . . . it is never used by legal writers so far as I am aware as implying that the delegating person parts with his powers in such a manner as to denude himself of his rights." We have also another important English ruling on this point. It is reported in the case of Gordon Dadds & Co. v. Morris and others (A E R 1945 : Vol. 2, p. 616) where it was held that the delegation did not amount to any denudation of any powers of the delegator. In this case, the case of Huth v. Clarke (25 Q B D 391) was considered. In the case of Daya Shanker v. Emperor (A I R 1948 All. 321) the Privy Council case reported in 1945 P C 156 was referred to and considered. This case was decided by the same learned Judge who had decided the case reported in the same column at page 435 to which the learned Advocate Mr. Brohi had referred and which we have discussed above. The learned judge explaining the ruling of the Privy Council proceeded to observe as follows :‑ "But this observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council does not mean that by delegating his power to a Subordinate Officer, the Governor would be divesting himself of the powers to pass orders." The learned Public Prosecutor has also referred us to the case reported in A I R 1954 Saurashtra page 62 where it was held that after the Rajpurmukh had delegated his power of sanction to the Subordinate Officers his power of sanction was not exhausted. We therefore have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the delegation of powers does not amount to renunciation or abdication of powers on the part of the delegator. It is inherent in every delegation that the delegator can at any time revoke the delegation and the power reverts to him. A Therefore by delegation the powers are transferred to a person to do things which he could not otherwise do in absence of delegation but that would not mean that the delegator is therefore shorn of all his powers. We think therefore that the objection regarding the order of detention on this ground must fail. Point No. 3.‑This according to us is the most important point involved in the case. Section 3 (1) of the Security of Pakistan Act reads as follows :‑ "The Central‑Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence or the external affairs or the security of Pakistan, or any part thereof or to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, or for the maintenance of public order ; it is necessary so to do, may make an order . . . . The original order of externment as set out above shows that the petitioner was detained with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance of public order although in the preamble it was stated that the Chief Commissioner was satisfied that the petitioner had acted and was acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and the maintenance of public order and supplies and services essential to the community. Still when the operative part of the order came it was sought to detain the petitioner in the interest of public safety and maintenance of public order only. There was no reference to the maintenance of supplies or services essential to the community. We consi?der this to be a deplorable omission on the part of the office of the learned Chief Commissioner which was responsible for the draft and type of this order. This however is immaterial for the purposes of the present petition. We are concerned here with the order of detention passed by the Central Govern?ment. This order as set out above clearly shows that the petitioner was detained with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the Community. Here again we find the words "maintenance of services" were not relevant to the case of the petitioner and were therefore unnecessarily incorporated in the order. The order could have referred only to the "maintenance of supplies essential to the community" and that would have been a perfectly good order. Any way the position becomes crystal clear that the object of the Government in detaining the petitioner was to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community. We have to decide the present case from this point of view alone. In this connection the counter affidavit filed by Mr. Abdul Samad Khan in writ petition on 14th March, 1955 and also filed in the present petition on 21st June, 1955 are relevant. The pertinent portion from the affidavit filed in the writ petition are reproduced below :‑ "That our records further show that petitioner Qassu thereafter obtained employment as a 'Khalasi' with Messrs. Alcock Ashdown 8r. Co., Ltd. on Rs. 1‑8‑0 per day. But, finding life difficult and being brought up in an environment of smuggling carried on by his elders like Haji Muhammad Abdullah Bhatti and others, he seriously took to this profession of smuggling in which he was actively assisted by his younger brother Mamoo alias Muhammad. That as a result of this smuggling activities carried on over a number of years, the petitioner Qassu has amassed wealth and riches. He now owns several buildings, race horses, launches, boats country crafts, luxurious cars and is at present a member of the Karachi Municipal Corporation and also of the Council of the Karachi Provincial Muslim League. That in 1948‑49 petitioner Qassu was arrested by the Excise Police for smuggling charas through the port of Karachi and was convicted and sentenced to 4 months' R. I. That during the year 1952 petitioner Qassu was arrested and sent up for trial in the following criminal cases (a) Crime No. 53 of 1952, under sections 147/148/324 Pakistan P. C. of Napier Police Station, City Station, Karachi. (b) Crime No. 181 of 1952 under sections 307/148/149 Pakistan P. C. of City Police Station, Karachi. Proceedings under section 107 Criminal P. C. of Napier Police Station. (d) Proceedings under section 107 Criminal P. C. of City Section (Police Station). Besides these he was indirectly connected with a large number of other cases both under the. Penal Code and under the Sea Customs Act. That our records further show that petitioner Qasuu is closely associated with well‑known Arab Smugglers like Yousuf Marzook, Abdul Rahman Shaheen, Ahmed Shahban, who are now Externees from Karachi. Petitioner Qassu was himself externed from Karachi for his smuggling and criminal activities on 2 previous occasions : once in 1951 and again in 1952 but on both occasions the orders were later withdrawn. That in the year 1954 petitioner Qassu was found to have smuggled an engine affixed to his own launch named 'Zam Zam' registered in the name of Haroon Ali, a depen?dant and close relation of Qassu. This launch was confiscated by the Customs under the Sea Customs Act and a fine of Rs. 12,000 imposed on the petitioner in lieu of confiscation ..." That since partition the petitioners and members of their families have continuously been engaged in flooding the markets of this City with smuggled cloth, cameras, watches, bidi leaves, cigarettes, pens, medicines and other valuable articles. In short, there has been no commodity the import of which has been banned or restricted by Government, which these petitioners and the members of their family have not smuggled into the country thereby not only defeating the very purpose of such restrictions but also gravely affecting the economic stability of this State. That the petitioners by such illegal activities have caused a serious set back to the economic stability of Pakistan by inflicting heavy monetary losses upon the State by way of loss of Customs Duty, Income Tax, Sales Tax and Foreign Exchange. By their activities, the petitioners have also prejudicially affected the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community." In the affidavit filed now in the present petition the following incidents have been mentioned with great emphasis :‑ "That the detenu Kassim and his gang have been carrying on their smuggling activities inspite of having been externed from Karachi on the 21st of April, 1955. At about midnight of 20th/21st May, 1955 secret information was received that a launch belonging to the detenu Kassimali Udhara Bhatti had arrived with costly smuggled cargo in the neighbourhood of Clifton. An immediate raid was arranged and motor launch Ankara was seized with all its contents. This launch though licensed in the name of Usman Ali Bhatti actually belongs to Kassimali Udhara Bhatti. A vast quantity of smuggled goods and Pakistani Currency to the value of Rs. 19,900 was seized. A photograph of the detenu Kassimali Udhara Bhatti was prominently placed on board thereby leaving no doubt as to his interests in this particular launch arid the cargo thereon. That besides the Pakistani Currency mentioned above, the cargo carried on this launch included smuggled goods such as foreign cloth, wrist watch, umbrella. soap, worth more than Rs. 7,000 and also over 50,000 tolas of gold worth more than Rupees 51 lakhs. A quantity of 2700 guineas also formed part of this cargo. That some shots were fired from the raiding launch as it approached the Ankara. This was done in order to terrorize the crew of Ankara into quick surrender. On hearing these shots the entire quantity of gold carried by the Ankara was thrown into the sea and this was witnessed by the occupants of the raiding launch. That our enquiries have revealed that this quantity of smuggled gold was to be handed over to 4 Arab smugglers now in Karachi. As a result of the jettisoning of this entire quantity of gold there has been a stir among the Arab Smugglers of Karachi with a consequent rise in the price of the gold. That the present order of detention has been passed by the Central Government because the Central Government is satisfied that such an order is necessary in order to prevent the detenu from . . . . furthering his illegal proclivities. Moreover, the investigations that have been going on against the detenu and the members of his gang in regard to their smuggling activities cannot be successfully carried on if this detenu is at liberty." It is clear now beyond all questions that the case of the Crown against the petitioner is that he and his family members have been smuggling articles in Pakistan from outside and they have been flooding the local market with the articles which have been banned by the Government. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has challenged this order of detention on the ground that the activity of the petitioner as disclosed by the Crown in their affidavits does not come within the expression "prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community" and therefore the order of detention is bad. The learned Advocate has also attacked this order of detention on the ground that the detention of the petitioner and other Bhattis for a collateral purpose of carrying on the investigation regarding their smuggling activities is not warranted by the provisions of Security Act. We have heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor for the Crown on this point very thoroughly and we have come to the conclusion that the Crown has made out no case against the petitioner that he has been indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies in this country. Smuggling consists of two kinds one pertains to "smuggling in" and the other consists of "smuggling out", in other words, the illegal import and export. If the petitioner had been smuggling out or illegally exporting supplies from this country to some other country his act will certainly be considered as prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies in this country. We know of so many cases in which people used to smuggle grain out of this country to some other countries, whereby the supplies of this country were greatly diminished or reduced and that activity therefore will clearly come within the four corners of the expression mentioned in section 3 of the Security Act. But in this case there is no such allegation of "Smuggling out" against the petitioner. The only case against the petitioner is that he is smuggling goods from outside into this country and is flooding the local market with articles of various kinds especially those on which the ban has been imposed. We do not think this action on the part of the petitioner in any way prejudices the mainte?nance of supplies in this country ; on the contrary, it increases, though illegally, the supplies of articles in this country. The activity of the petitioner may be anti‑social, anti‑national or whatever one may call it, but it certainly cannot come within the letter of law as enunciated by section

3. We are to decide this case not on the moral plane but strictly on the legal one, and we must interpret the letter of law as it stands and we must give the ordinary meaning to the words appearing in section 3 of the Security Act under which the petitioner has been detained. It is open to the Government to move the Legislature of the country to pass a suitable law to meet cases of this kind. As the law stands at present action under section 3 against the petitioner is apparently unwarranted. In this connection Mr. Brohi has referred us to a very important Full Bench ruling of the Patna High Court in the case of Misrilal and others (A I R 1951 Pat. 134). In this case three persons had conspired to mix stone‑dust with flour and they were selling the same and making huge profits. Their Lordships have made very important observations in this case and they are re?produced below :‑ "It seems to me, however, that the plain duty of the Court is to consider the words in the Act as they stand and give to them their ordinary meaning. The words them? selves have to be' construed independently of what is stated in items 3 and 18 in the concurrent List of Sch. VII of the Constitution and what is contained in Rule 81, Defence of India Rules . . . . Do these facts stated in the grounds of detention come within the purview of section 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act is what I have to consider. There can be no question that the conduct of the detenus, stated in the grounds of detention was highly reprehensible particularly in these days of food shortage and economic difficulties which the State is facing. I have, however to consider the case of the detenus not on moral grounds but on legal grounds, and if their conduct comes within the meaning of the words in section 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act, then the detention must be held to be valid. On the other hand, if on a fair and reasonable reading‑ of the words in section 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act, the act of the detenus as stated in the grounds of detention cannot be included within the meaning of those words, then the detention must be held to be illegal; no matter how gross and anti‑social the act of the detenus may be. According to Webster's Dictionary, the word "maintain" has various meanings including "to support", "to sustain, to keep up; not to suffer to fail or decline." The word "maintain", and (sic) according to Webster it means "support and un keep of property, machinery, equipment etc." According to Webster, the word "supply" has amongst various meaning the meaning "to fill the needs of or to furnish with supplies, provisions, equipment or the like, as well as filling, a want, a need." The word "supplies" therefore carries with it, to my mind, the meaning to fill the needs of or to supply provisions to a community. The meaning of the words "the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community," therefore must be upkeep of the needs and the provisions essential to the community. These may be of various kinds impossible to define, but so long as they are essential to the community, their upkeep would be essential for the purpose of the Act. As I read these words, I think the true meaning to be given to them is to prevent any person from doing an act in any manner prejudicial to the upkeep of the needs, the provisions and the services essential to the community, that is to say, the flow of supplies and services essential to the community must be continued to be maintained in the interest of the community and any one who did any act to prejudice it was liable to be detained by the detaining authority under the Act. I do not think that the words "maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" could reasonably carry the meaning that any one who adulterated foodstuffs would be acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies or the continuity of supplies. It is true that adulterated foodstuff supplied to the community may be harmful to its health, but supplying such adulterated foodstuff would not be prejudicing the maintenance of supplies. The Act does not speak of profiteering, much less profiteering at the expense of the health of the community. I think it would be straining the language of section 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act to apply it to acts such as are stated in the grounds of detention served on the petitioners in these cases. I can quite conceive of the position where hoarding done on a large scale affects the flow, ‑continuity and the upkeep of supplies essential to the community, attracting the provisions of the Act.' I can also conceive of the position where by acts of sabotage production of supplies essential to the com?munity is disturbed and enough supplies are not manufactured or produced to meet the needs of the community coming within the purview of the Act. Conceivably where certain persons persuade the cultivators not to grow any food or that if they grow any food they should conceal their produce, the act may also come within the purview of the Act because if such instigation was success?ful, then the produce of the land would not be available for distribution to the community, and thus the upkeep, the continuity, the flow, or the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, would be affected. The facts alleged against the detenus in these cases, however do not disclose any such thing. They merely disclose that these individuals are guilty of a very grave anti‑social conduct and that by selling 'spurious foodstuff they are making a profit and also endangering the health of the community. Such conduct, in my opinion, is not covered by the words of the Act "maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community." With these observations of their Lordships we respectfully agree. The learned Public Prosecutor apparently found it difficult to maintain his case on this point, and he was therefore constrained to file a written argument' in this connection. His argument was that these people by their activities were disturbing the economic equlibrium of the State and were therefore not less dangerous than those who openly wage war against the State. We agree that the smuggling activities of the petitioners, if proved, result in loss to the Government of Income‑tax, Sales‑tax and Customs duty etc. etc., but we are afraid all this is not covered by the words "acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community." In view of these reasons, we consider the order of detention passed against the petitioner to be illegal and we accordingly allow the petition and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty. A. H.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petition allowed.