P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

CHANGEZ, J.

This is a petition by Rana Muhammad Jamil under Article 170 of the Constitution of the ‑Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of suspension dated the 5th January 1956, and the inquiry proceedings which are being held against him, and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate him and to refrain from holding any inquiry or passing any order adverse to him. It is alleged by the petitioner that he was employed in the Provincial Transport Department on the 12th of December 1949 as an Assistant Traffic Manager arid on the 1st of Aril 1952 he was promoted as Traffic Manager,. On the 15th of August 1951, the Provincial Government constituted Punjab Road Transport Board to operate the transport is the Province which started functioning on the 15th of April 1932, and the petitioner continued in its service. On the 26th of May 1952, the Provincial Government' published the Punjab Road Transport Board Rules which came into force on that very date. The petitioner claims that in spite of this change he continued to be in the service of the Government and, therefore, was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Punjab Road Transport Board. He was, however, suspended on the 5th of January 1956 by the order of the General Manager of the Transport Board and thereafter he was served with two charge‑sheets by the Chairman, Road Transport Board, to which the petitioner sent suitable replies and requested for the supply of authenticated copies of the statements, documents and other references mentioned in the charge‑sheets. But instead he was served with a notice on the 4th of April 1956 by the General Manager to show cause why he should not be dis missed from service. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension arid the inquiry proceedings which are being held against him. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was still a Government employee as no notice was ever issued to the petitioner that his services had been terminated or that his services had been transferred to the Punjab Road Transport Board. He, therefore, maintained that the petitioner was not 'amenable to the jurisdiction of the Transport Board. The learned counsel for the respon dents pointed out that the posts of Assistant Traffic Manager and Traffic Manager were temporary posts under the Provincial Transport Department. Since the Transport Board was constituted, these posts were abolished, and as such the services of .the petitioner came to an end with the abolishment of the posts and he was no more an employee it the Provincial Transport Department. The Punjab Road Transport Board assumed charge of the opera tion of the Government Transport Services with effect from the 15th of April 1952, vide letter of the Government dated the Dated 7th of April 1952, which is annexure "A" attached to the written statement submitted by the respondents. The peti tioner had been originally promoted as Traffic Manager by the Governor on the 1st of April 1952 temporarily until such time as Mr. Zulfiqar Khan returned from England, who, however, returned in August 1952. In the meantime on the 24th of April 1952, the Board, vide annexure "B" to the written statement, had temporarily promoted the petitioner to the post of Traffic Manager and had posted him at Lyallpur. He began to draw his pay etc. from the Board. This by itself was a sufficient notice to the petitioner who fully knew the circumstances under which he was working. But if any further notice was needed, then in the year 1953, section 43‑A of the Motor Vehicles Act, IV of 1939, was amended by section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Amendment Act, XIX of 1953, clause (2) of which reads as follows :‑ "Any Road Transport Board established before the com mencement of this Act under subsection (1) of section 43‑A shall be deemed to have been established under that sub section as substituted by this Act, and all persons at any time employed for the purposes of any such Road Transport Board shall be deemed during the period of such employ ment to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the P. P. C., but shall not be deemed to be servants of any Government on the ground that they are employed by a Road Transport Board established by such Government". It is, therefore, quite clear that the employees of the Transport Board were not to be deemed to be servants of the Government. Under the circumstances, even if no notice in writing was given to the petitioner, then also in view of this provision of law, he shall be presumed to know that he was no more a Government servant but was an employee of the Transport Board. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that this contention of the petitioner is without any force. There is not the least doubt in my mind that the petitioner is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Punjab Road Transport Board. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the peti tioner that even if he was an employee of the Board, the Punjab Road Transport Board Rules, 1952, under which action was being taken against him were invalid inasmuch as they had not been laid before the Provincial Legislature, as required by subsection (33) of section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He argued that the condition prescribed under this subsection is mandatory, and its non‑compliance invalidates the rules. The object of this subsection, according to him, was to make delegated legislation subject to the effective control of the Legislature. By not placing these rules before the Legislature, the very object of the enactment was defeated. He, therefore, maintained that the rules Having become invalid, the order of suspension and the inquiry proceedings, which are being held against him, are illegal and without jurisdiction, In support of this contention reliance was placed on judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 72 of 1956, Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Chairman, Punjab Road Transport Board (P L D 1956 Lah. 1068), decided on the 9th of October 1956, in which it was held by Kayani and Sharif, JJ. that the Punjab Road Transport Board Rules having not been laid before the Legislature, as required by section 133, clause (3), of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, had become invalid from the time when they should have been first laid before the Legislature. The Provincial Legislature had met in December 1952 and it was conceded that the rules had not been laid before the Legislature. In fact, they have not been laid before the Legislature so far. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that section 133, sub‑clause (3), of the Motor Vehicles Act is merely directory and not mandatory in nature and that non-compliance with it does not invalidate the rules. He cited a number of authorities which I shall presently deal with. To appreciate the argument and its implication, it is necessary to quote section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act in extenso. It reads as follows :‑ "(1) Every power to make rules given by this Act is subject to the condition of the rules being made after previous publication. (2) All rules made under this Act shall be published in the Official Gazette, and shall, unless some later date is appointed, come into force on the date of such publication. (3) All rules made under this Act by the Central Govern ment or by any Provincial Government shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Central or Provincial Legislature, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications as the Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid". The plain reading of this section makes it clear that the rules made under the Act were to come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. As soon as they were published they became operative and were valid rules. Subsection (3), however, required that such rules had to be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Central or Provincial Legislature, as the case might have been, as soon as possible after they had been made and were subject to such modifications as the Legislature might have made during the session in which they should have been so laid. This section does not lay down any condition that the rules shall not come into force till they are laid before the Legislature, nor does it say that they will not become operative till they are' approved by the Legislature. It does not prescribe the legal effect of non‑compliance of subsection (3). The question, therefore, arises in the circumstances of the case as to what is the legal effect of non‑compliance of sub section (3) of section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act ? Is this subsection merely directory in nature or mandatory and does its non‑compliance invalidate the rules ? There cannot be any doubt that the object of placing the rules before the Legislature was to secure Legislative control over the rule making power of the Government. But if the intention of the Legislature was that the rules were to become ineffective in case they were not laid before the Legislature, then it is not comprehensible why the Legislature did not express its inten tion explicitly. It could have attached a condition that the rules will not become effective unless they were laid before the Legislature or were approved by it or at least that they would cease to be effective if this provision was not complied with. On the contrary, it appears that the Legislature intended that the rules were to become immediately effective as soon as they were published in the Official Gazette. Nothing can be read into the section which is not stated therein. We cannot attribute any intention to the Legislature when it expresses none. These rules had to be laid before the Legislature for not less than fourteen days as soon as practicable, .but no formal approval of the Legislature was required to make them valid. They were, however, subject to any modifications which the Legislature might have made during the session in' which they should have been laid. In subsection (3) of section 133, the word "shall" has been‑ used, but does the use of the word ~C "shall" make it mandatory ? In construing the word "shall" in subsection (1) of section 17 of the Government of India Act, 1935, my Lord the Chief Justice observed in Khalid Waheed and another v. The Crown (P L D 1956 Lah. 541.) as follows :

"The learned counsel very fairly conceded that he was unable to cite an authority in favour of the proposition that an order, which did not comply in its form with, the provi sions of subsection (1) of section 17 of the Constitution Act, would be invalid. He, however, pressed for the consi deration that a constitutional provision should not be allowed to be contravened with impunity, as otherwise the provision in question would be reduced to a nullity. I am conscious of the pre‑eminent position occupied by a consti tutional statute in the hierarchy of legal enactments. It seems to me, however, that the provision in question is directory rather than mandatory. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that non‑conformity with the provisions of sub section (1) of section. 17 would not invalidate the order if in fact it proceeded from the appropriate authority after a consideration of the relevant facts". This was a case in which the order of prosecution was challenged on the ground that it was not a valid order inasmuch as it was not expressed to be issued in the name of the Governor‑General as was required by sub section (1) of section 17 of the Government of India Act 1935, In J. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. Emperor (A I R 1947 F C 38), their Lordships of the Federal Court of India, while interpreting the word "shall" in section 41 of the Government of India Act where under it was provided that "all orders arid other pro ceedings of the Governor‑General‑in‑Council shall be expres sed to be made by the Governor‑General‑in‑Council and shall be signed by a Secretary to the Government of India", cons trued it as only directory and held that non‑compliance with this provision of law would not invalidate an order. In our Constitution there are a number of Articles in which the. word "shall" has been used with reference to the laying of Ordinances, Rules and Regulations before the Legislature. Article 63 reads :‑

(1) The President shall, in respect‑ of every financial year, cause to be laid before the National Assembly a state ment of the estimated receipts and expenditures of the Federal Government for that year, in this part referred to as the Annual Financial Statement." Article 69 (2) runs as follows :‑ " An Ordinance promulgated under clause (1) shall be laid before the National Assembly, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the next meeting of the Assembly, or if a resolution disapproved it is passed by the Assembly, upon the passing of that resolution." Article 96 (1) reads as follows :‑ " The Governor shall, in respect of every financial year, cause to be laid before the Provincial Assembly a statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Provincial Government for. that year, in this part referred to as the Annual Financial Statement." Article 102 (2) provides :‑ " An Ordinance promulgated under clause (1) shall be laid before the Provincial Assembly and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the next meeting of the Assembly, or if a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Assembly, upon the passing of that resolution." Article 124 says :‑ "The reports of the Comptroller and Auditor‑General relating to the accounts of the Federation shall be submitted to the President; who shall cause them to be laid before the National Assembly, and his reports relating to the accounts of a Province shall be submitted to the Governor, who shall cause them to be laid before the Provincial Assembly." Article 190 (1) reads :‑ " It shall be the duty of the Federal Public Service Commission to present to the President annually a report on the work done by the Commission, and the President shall cause a copy of the report to be laid before the National Assembly; and it shall be the duty of each Provincial Public Commission to present to the Governor annually a report on the work done by the Commission and the Governor shall cause a copy of the report to be laid before the Provincial Assembly." Article 191 (6) provides :‑ " A Proclamation shall be laid before the National Assembly as soon as conditions make it practicable for the President to summon that Assembly, and if approved by the Assembly, shall remain in force until it is revoked, or if disapproved, shall cease to operate from the date of disapproval." Has the word " shall " in all these Articles been used in the sense that it is mandatory ? Does it mean that if the direction given in these Articles is not complied with the result in each case would be that what is required to be laid before the Legislature would become invalid ? After carefully consider ing the various aspects of this question, I am of the opinion 1p that this was never intended by the Legislature. Unfor tunately, there is no decision of this Court as regards the interpretation of these Articles whether they are mandatory or merely directory. Counsel for the respondents, however, cited Munna Lal Tewari v. Harold R. Scott and others (A I R 1955 Cal. 451), where a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, while interpreting Article 320, sub‑clause (5) of the Constitution of India, held that it was not mandatory but of a directory nature, Clause (5) of Article 320 reads as follows:‑- " All regulations made under the proviso to clause (3) by the President or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before each House of Parliament or the House or each House of the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as both Houses of Parliament or the House or both Houses of the Legislature of the State may make during the session in which they are so laid." Chakrawartti, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed as follows :‑- " It is well‑known that when an Act provides that rules framed under a section of it shall have to be laid before the Legislature, the provision is generally made in one or another of three forms. There is either a mere direction that any rules framed under a particular section shall have to be laid before the Legislature for a certain period, or there is a provision that the rules shall not come into effect till after they have been laid before Legislature and have lain there for a period or it may be said that the rules shall have to be laid before the Legislature and if the Legislature disapproves or amends or modifies them, they will have effect only as so amended or modified. * * * * * * * * * The provisions of clause (.5) of Article 320, are, however, entirely different. In the first place, all that the clause requires and enjoins is that the regulations shall be laid before the Legislature for a period of not less than fourteen days. It is not said that till the regulations have been so laid and till after they have lain for a particular period, they shall not come into force. Again, the clause provides that after the regulations have been placed before the Legislature they shall be subject to modification 'whether by way of repeal or amendment.' " Even apart from the meaning suggested by the word "repeal", it appears to me that in view of the limited character of the provision contained in clause (5), limited in the sense that it is confined to a direction for laying the regulation before the House, the clause can be construed only as a provision of a directory character." To the same effect is the ruling Dalmer Singh v. State of Pepsu (A I R 1955 Pepsu 97), where Chopra, J. while interpreting clause (5) of Article 320 of the Indian Constitution, held as follows :‑ " The language and purpose of its provisions make me think that the sub‑article is meant to be a directory one. The Regulations are only to be laid before the House for fourteen days as soon as practicable after they are made. They are not to be formally approved by the House, but they are to be subject to any modifications the House may choose to make during the session in which they are so laid. The use of the word "shall" is not very much material. Article 166 (1) also uses the word "shall" while requiring the executive orders to be expressed in the name of the Governor. But in the latter case it has been held in Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay (AIR 1952 S C 181), that an omission to comply with its provisions does not render the executive action a nullity." Clause (5) of Article 320 of the Indian Constitution is almost similarly worded as subsection (A I R 1956 Andhra 29) of section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act IV of 1939. The latter provision of law directly came up for decision before the Andhra High Court in Krishan v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor (3), where Subba Rao, C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, after exhaustively dealing with the case‑law on the subject and relevant authorities and text books, came to the conclusion that subsection (3) of section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act was merely directory and not mandatory. He observed as follows :‑‑ " But, after considering the question carefully, we are inclined to adopt the view that, in the case of a statute directing rules to be laid before the Parliament or the Legislature without any condition attached, the rule is only directory. Though the statute says that the rules shall be laid before the Parliament as the provision in the statute is conceived in public interests, the dereliction of the duty by the Minister or other officer concerned in not following the procedure should not be made to affect the members of the public governed by the rules. It may be asked and legitimately too that when the Parliament to keep its control over delegated legislation directs that the rule shall be laid before the Parliament and if that rule is construed as directory, the object itself would be defeated. But the Parliament or the Legislature, as the case may be, if they intended to make that rule mandatory, they would have clearly mentioned the legal consequences of its non‑compliance as they have done in other cases. Bearing in view the aforesaid principles, we shall proceed to consider the scope of section 133 of the Act. Sub section (1) prescribes that there should be previous publication of the rules. Subsection (2) says that all the rules made under this Act shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall, unless some later date is appointed, come into force on the date of such publication. It is clear from this provision that the rules come into force immediately they are published, unless the Act provides for a different date. Subsection (3) then says that the rules shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Legislature as soon as possible after they are made and shall be subject to such modification as Parliament or such Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. This rule, therefore, is trot made either a condition precedent or a condition subsequent to the coming into force of the rules. It does not provide for any affirmative resolution. The rule continues to be in force till it is modified by the Parliament. If subsection (3) is only directory, in view of the opinion expressed by us, it is clear from a fair reading of the words used in the section that the rules made under the section came into effect immediately they were published and the` continued to be in force because it is not suggested that they were modified by the Legislature. We, therefore, hold that. the rule in question is valid." This question, though not precise in form, was also con sidered by the judges of the Queen's Bench in Baily v. Williamson ((1873) 28 L T R N S 28). In that case the question arose if the rules made under the Hyde Park Regulation Act which had not been laid before the Parliament as required by section 9 of that Act were in force on the date when the offence was committed. Section 9 of that Act required:‑-- "Any rule made in pursuance of the first schedule to this Act shall be forthwith laid before both Houses of Parlia ment, if Parliament be sitting, if not, then within three weeks after the beginning of the then next ensuing session of Parliament and if any such rules shall be disapproved of by either House of Parliament within one month after the same shall have been so laid before Parliament, such rules, or such parts thereof as shall be disapproved of, shall not be enforced." It was held that where a rule is to be laid before the Parliament only to enable it to express its disapproval, the rule comes into effect immediately and may cease to be operative from the date the Parliament expresses its disapproval. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay and others (AIR1952 SC 181), S. R. Dass, J., while interpreting clause (1) of Article 166 of the Indian Constitution which requires that the executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor, observed as follow :‑

"It is well‑settled that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done." The principles to be followed in determining whether a particular statutory provision is directory or mandatory have been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normandin (AIR 1917 PC 142). The judgment was delivered by Sir Arther Channell who observed as follows :‑-- " The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statutes must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th Edition, page 596 and following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the Acts done." Although there is only one authority which has a direct bearing on the point involved in this case, but the principle on which other cases cited above have been decided would seem to apply equally to the present case. The general principles for determining this question are set out in section 3 of Chapter XII of Maxwell on Interpreta tion of Statutes, 9th Edition. It is laid down at page 374 :‑ "It may, perhaps, be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of dis obedience, but the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and, when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an intention is not to be attributed to the Legislature." And then again on the same page it is stated :‑ "But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative". Then at page 379 it is laid down :

"On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims to the Legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and Government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them." In this connection a passage from Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 287 may be quoted with advantage :‑ "Statutory rules should not take effect unless they have been made and published as directed by the statute which authorises them, but it may be a question whether the direction to lay the rules before Parliament is mandatory or merely directory. Is laying a condition precedent to their operation or may it he neglected without prejudice to the effect of the rules ? Each case must depend on its own circumstances or the wording of the statute under which the rules are made". After discussing certain rulings it was stated at page 288 :‑ "It would seem therefore that the better opinion is that directions for laying are only directory in spite of the fact that an Indemnity Act, 1944, was considered necessary to absolve the forgetfulness of a Minister who had neglected to lay regulations ("as soon as may be") specified in the Schedule to the Fire Services (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1941". Dr. C. K. Allen, in his book "Law and Orders", 1945 Edition, has dealt with this question at some length at pages 109 to 113 and has quoted with approval the general principles of interpretation stated by Maxwell which have been referred to above. It will thus be seen that there is preponderance of authority in favour of the view that statutory provisions which require the laying of the rules or regulations made under the Act, before the Legislature without attaching any condition of invalidating them if they are not so laid are directory in nature and not mandatory. As against this view, a Division Bench of this Court has decided in the case cited in the earlier part of the judgment that the Punjab Road Transport Rules, 1952, having not been laid before the Legislature as required by section 133 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, had become invalid from the time when they should have been first laid before the Legislature. The Division Bench dissented from the view expressed in Krishan v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Chittoor, on the ground that the learned Judge in that case had not paid sufficient attention to "the real aim and object of the enactment", which was to make delegated legislation subject to the Parliamentary control. Setting out the vast powers given by rules to the Board, the learned judges observed :‑ "While on the one hand the Legislature made it con venient for the Board to operate the rules from the date of their publication, it safeguarded its own superlative powers by providing that, 'as soon as possible', the rules shall be placed before it for scrutiny. This only means that if ‑ the rules were published in January 1952, they should have been placed before the Legislature in the next session, and for at least fourteen days. The period of fourteen days is an additional insistence on the necessity of scrutiny. It is not a mere formality. The transport service is essentially a matter of public interest, and affects the common man, whose interests are safeguarded by his own representatives. Although the Government is supposed to be of the people, in the present political context we all know that it represents what is known as the official point of view, and we are aware that, standing in bold contract to it is the public point of view. Con sequently, the very object of the enactment is defeated if the rules are not subjected to legislative scrutiny. The normal rule should be that where a thing is required to be done in a certain way, it should be invalid if not done in that way. The danger of regarding imperative enactments as merely directory cannot be too strongly emphasised". The learned judges, after discussing the rule of inter pretation in such cases, as laid down by Maxwell and some other authorities, observed : "We are altogether in favour of Parliamentary control, and hold that since the Rules were not laid before the Legislature `as soon as possible'‑they have not been laid for three years, not even after this petition was instituted‑they have become invalid from the time when they should have been first laid". The main considerations which are the foundations of this decision are that the transport service is essentially a matter of public interest, and affects the common man, whose interests are safeguarded by his own representatives and that the official point of view stands in bold contrast to the public point of view and if the rules are not subjected to legislative scrutiny the very object of the enactment is defeated, namely, to make delegated legislation subject to parliamentary control. These are undoubtedly weighty considerations, but with the greatest respect, I feel it necessary to take note of some other equally vital factors that affect the situation. In subsection (3) of section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, there is nothing to suggest that the rules shall have no effect unless laid before the Legislature or that they will not come into force till they are approved by the Legislature. Subsection (2) makes it perfectly clear that the rules become part of the law on their publication in the Official Gazette. The object of laying the rules before the Legislature for a period of 11 days is only to bring it pointedly to the notice of the members of the Legislature to enable them to get them modified if they so desire. But the mere laying of the rules before the Legislature does not entitle the members of the Legislature to get them modified without adopting the procedure prescribed by the rules of business of the Legislative Assembly. What I mean is that the laying down of the rules before the Legislature is not tantamount to moving a motion or resolution for the consideration of the house. No discussion can be raised or amendment moved as soon as the rules are laid before the Legislature. This can only be done in conformity with the rules of procedure of the Legislative Assembly and not otherwise Subsection (1) of section 133 provides that the rules could have been made after previous publication. This as of course a condition precedent. It is not alleged that they were not previously published. This is the first notice to the public including the members of the Legislature that the rules are going to be framed. Then with the publication of the rules, so framed, in the Official Gazette, the public as well as the members of the Legislature get a second notice that the rules have come into operation Subsection (3) of section 133, of course, provides for a third notice to the members of the Legislature alone. But if the third notice is inadvertently not given, can the public and the, mem bers of the Legislature, after receiving the first two notices, complain that they have been deprived of their right to get the rules modified ? Without the rules having been laid before the Legislature, the members could have moved in the matter to get them modified, if they had so desired, by bringing a motion or a resolution before the House. To say that by not laying the rules before the Legislature the members have been deprived of all parliamentary control over the delegated legislation, in my humble opinion, would be going a little too far. The rules have now been in force for the past four years and it appears that during all this period no attempt has ever been made by any member of the Legislature to get these rules modified in any manner. They can even now exercise their right to get them modified. The considerations of convenience and justice have an important bearing in deciding the question under con sideration. The learned judges have referred to the vast powers given by these rules to the Board. In exercise of the powers given by these rules thousands of persons must have been employed by the Board subject to the terms and conditions provided by these rules. On account of the omission to lay the rules before the Legislature, if they are to be invalidated, it would certainly involve general inconvenience or injustice to thousands of innocent persons. Similarly in other spheres of the activities of the Board it is likely that it would result in great loss to third parties. After carefully considering all the aspects of the question, I have reached the conclusion that subsection (3) oft section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act is merely directory, and, therefore, the Punjab Road Transport Board Rules, 1952 although they were not laid before the Legislature as required by subsection (3), are perfectly legal and valid. I wish to point out that this does not mean that the authorities concerned can disregard the provisions of law with impunity, but if on account of an oversight or for get fullness the rules are not laid before the Legislature, then the directions being directory only, it would not entail the consequences of invalidation of the rules. But if they are deliberately withheld or they are not laid before the. Legislature mala fide, or with some ulterior motive, then I am sure the Legislature can certainly correct the wrong by repealing such rules and punishing the officers concerned for dereliction of duty. The learned counsel for the petitioner then argued that rule 13 (5) empowers only the Board to suspend the petitioner as his monthly salary exceeds Rs. 150, but he was suspended by the General Manager. Rule 18 (a) empowers the Board to frame regulations for determining the qualifications required for the recruitment of officers and servants of the Board and prescribing terms and conditions of their employment. In exercise of this power the Board has framed regulations which are known as the Punjab Road Transport Board Service Rules, and vide Schedule 'B' of these rules, the power is given to the General Manager to suspend officers of the cadre to which the petitioner belongs. The show‑cause notice asking the petitioner why he should not be dismissed from service was given to the petitioner in accordance with the resolution of the Board to that effect, vide Annexure "L" attached to the written statement. It is, therefore, clear that the proceedings which are being taken against the petitioner are valid and legal. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not press any other point before us. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no force in this petition which is; accordingly dismissed. As a complicated question of law was involved in this case, there will be no order as to costs. S. A. RAHMAN, C. J.‑

I concur in the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother in this case and agree generally with the reasoning by which it is supported. The question whether a particular provision in an enactment, though ostensibly in the imperative form, is really mandatory or directory, is a question of some nicety and no hard and fast rule can be laid down for the exact construction to be l placed on such a provision in all cases. In each case, the scope and object of the Act and of the particular provision would be relevant to the real intention of the Legislature) in this respect. Generally speaking, when the provision charges some public authority with a duty and no express or clearly implied indication is given by the Legislature that the failure to conform to the letter of the law would entail the drastic consequences of invalidation and further such invalidation would result in unmerited injustice or serious general inconvenience to members of the public or other persons to be specially affected, the public or those persons having no effective control over the actions of the authority concerned, the provision is construed as carrying a directory rather than a mandatory connotation. That no effort has so far been made by the Administrative Department concerned to place the Rules before the Legislature is a lapse that is, to say the least, extremely regrettable and I can only hope that the omission will be made good, with tender of due apologies to the Legislature, at the earliest opportunity. A. H. Petition dismissed.