P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMED, J.‑This judgment will dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 558, 598, 599 and 612 of 1962, which raise certain common questions of law.

2. On the 13th of April 1962, the Martial Law Adminis trator of Zone `B' issued Martial Law Order No. 118 directing the removal of buffaloes, cows and other cattle from the area of the City of Lahore Corporation with a view to removing obstruction in traffic and improving sanitation. The Commis sioner of Lahore Division was authorised to implement the Order. On the 16th of April 1962, the Commissioner, Lahore Division, accordingly issued an order, giving time limits for the removal of cattle from various areas of the City of Lahore. In pursuance of the Commissioner's order, notices were served by the Corporation authorities on cattle owners. By means of Writ Petition No. 558 of 1962, which has been presented by one Muhammad Siddique, describing himself as President of the Cattle Owners' Association of Lahore, it is prayed that the order of the Commissioner may be declared "as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect." As a consequential relief, it is prayed that the respondents be, directed to refrain from enforcing the Commissioner's order.

3. On the 15th of February 1962, the Martial Law Administrator Zone `B' issued Martial Law Order No. 111, directing the acquisition of certain lands for constructing a timber market and authorising the Lahore Improvement Trust to allot sites in this new market to the timber merchants and do all other things necessary for the establishment of the said market. The order further contemplated that all timber and bamboo shops shall be moved from Ravi Road, Rattan Chand Road and other places within the City of Lahore Corporation to the said timber market as and when ordered by the Commissioner, Lahore Division. This latter officer issued an order on the 6th of June 1962, directing the proprietors of bamboo shops on Rattan Chand Road to shift their business to the new timber market. By an earlier order issued in March 1962, he had ordered timber merchants on the Ravi Road and other places in the City of Lahore to move their business to the new timber market. These orders are challenged by an individual bamboo merchant, Muhammad Afzal, in Writ Petition No. 598 of 1962, by eleven bamboo merchants collectively in Writ Petition No. 599 of 1962 and by the Timber Merchants' Association in Writ Petition No. 612 of 1962.

4. A common ground taken in all these petitions is that the orders issued by the Commissioner have no legal sanction behind them for the following reasons: ‑ (a) That under Article 225 of the Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, 1962, all Martial Law Regulations, except those specified therein, stand repealed with effect as from the commencing day, with the result that Martial Law ;Orders Nos. 111 and 118, under which the Commissioner has purported to act, have disappeared from the 8th of June 1962, (b) That Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962, called the West Pakistan Martial Law Orders (Continuance in Force) Ordinance, 1962, which seeks to perpetuate the provisions of the Martial Law Orders just referred to, is void inasmuch as (i) it is repugnant to Article 225 of the Constitution which clearly lays down that all Martial Law Regulation are repealed, (ii) it is not existing law within the meaning of Article 225 (1) of the Constitution, and, therefore, it is not continued in force after the commencing day, (iii) as it is not "existing Law", the Ordinance would be valid only if it was promulgated in conformity with the pro cedure laid down in Article 79 of the Constitution which admittedly is not the case, (iv) it offends against the 5th and 6th principles of law making as embodied in Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution, namely, freedom of movement and right to acquire property as well as freedom to follow any vocation, and (v) it is mala fide. There is no doubt that Article 225 of the Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, which came into force on the 8th of June 1962, provides in its clause (3) that "all Martial Law Regulations, except those specified in the table to this clause, are repealed with effect as from the commencing day . . . . . . . " Before the coming into force of the Constitution, the President also promulgated Order No. 29 of 1962 on the 7th of June 1962 entitled the "Martial Law Orders (Repeal) Order, 1962." Paragraph 2 of this Order may be reproduced here with advantage: "

2. Repeal.‑All Martial Law Orders made or issued by any Martial Law Authority shall stand repealed immediately before the commencing day as defined in Article 242 of the Constitu tion‑of the Republic of Pakistan. Explanation I. `Martial Law Authority' means the Chief Martial Law Administrator and includes a Zonal Martial Law Administrator. Explanation II.‑In this Article, `Martial Law Order' does not include any order made or issued under any of the Regula tions specified in the Table to clause (3) of Article 225 of the said Constitution."

6. The Provincial Governor promulgated Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 on the 25th of May 1962. Sections 1 and 2 of this Ordinance, which are directly relevant in the present context, read as follows: ‑ "1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the West Pakistan Martial Law Orders (Continuance in Force) Ordinance, 1962. (2) It shall come into force on the expiry of Martial Law Orders Nos. 111, 112, 118, 119 and 121 issued by the Martial Law Administrator Zone `B' (hereinafter referred to as the said Martial Law Orders)." "

2. The said Martial Law Orders shall, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, be continued and be deemed to have been enacted in this Ordinance."

7. By section 3 of the Ordinance certain amendments were made in the Martial Law Orders continued by the Ordinance, making independent provision for penalties incurred for the disobedience of directions issued under the Martial Law Orders in question. It is, however, not necessary to reproduce these amendments here.

8. Now, the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the various petitioners is that the combined effect of clause (3) of Article 225 of the Constitution and the President's Order No. 29 of 1962 was that the Martial Law Orders in question stood repealed immediately before the commencing day and the repeal was followed by the commencing day, without any vacuum or interregnum .for the enforcement of Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962. In other words, when the commencing day dawned, neither the Martial Law Orders Nos. 111 and 118 nor the Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 were existing law within the meaning of clause (1) of Article

225. If that was so, the argument proceeds, then any Ordinance made by the Governor shall have to conform to the provisions of Article 79 of the Constitution if it is to be regarded as valid law, as it would be an Ordinance made after the commencement of the Constitution.

9. Article 79 lays down that "if, at a time when the Assembly of a Province stands dissolved or is not in session, the Governor of the Province is satisfied that circumstances exist which render immediate legislation necessary, he may, subject to this Article, make and promulgate such Ordinances as the circum stances appear to him to require, and any such Ordinance shall, subject to this Article, have the same force of law as an Act of the Provincial Legislature." Clause (2) of this Article contemplates that "an Ordinance made and promulgated under this Article shall, as soon as is practicable, be laid before the Assembly of the Province," The effect of clauses (3) to (6) of this Article is that any Ordinance promulgated by the Governor shall remain in force for a period of one hundred and eighty days if the Provincial Assembly does not meet within that period, or for a period ending forty‑two days after the first meeting of the Assembly following the promulgation of the Ordinance. In the present case, Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 has not been placed before the first meeting of the Provincial Assembly which has just ended on the 7th of July 1962.

10. This argument is, of course, advanced subject to the objection that even the President's Order No. 29 of 1962 is with out legal force inasmuch as Martial Law Orders and Regulations could be repealed only by the Chief Martial Law Administrator and not by the President.

11. As regards the attack on the validity of the President's Order No. 29 of 1962, suffice it to say that on the day it was promulgated, the ‑same person was functioning as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator and it was, therefore, immaterial whether he described himself as President or as Chief Martial Law Administrator when ordering the repeal of Martial Law Orders and Regulations. Further, it was the President of Pakistan who had imposed Martial Law in the country and appointed the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The President would, there fore, appear to be competent, for this reason as well, to lift Martial Law and to repeal Martial Law Orders and Regulations. In Piao Gul v. The State (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 307), their Lordships were pleased to observe that misdescription in the designation of the officer deciding a case was of no effect on the legality of trial, on the principle that a false description does not vitiate. For all these reasons, it appears to us that the validity of the President's Order No. 29 of 1962 cannot be questioned. '

12. It seems to us that the effect of President's Order No. 29 of 1962 teas to repeal all Martial Law Orders immediately before the commencing day, and simultaneously with that repeal 'Governor's Ordinance XXI of 1962 came into force, i.e., immediately before the commencing day. Mr. Ghias Muhammad strenuously contended that the use of the phrase "immediately before the commencing day" in President's Order No. 29 of 1962 showed that the repeal was at once followed by the commencing day, without any possibility of the Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 creeping into the field between the repeal and the commencing day. This argument of the learned counsel overlooks the fact that Ordinance No. :XXI of 1962 came into force simultaneously with the repeal whereas the commencing day was to follow the repeal of the Martial Law Orders. While interpreting the word "immediately", we have to give it a reasonable meaning. Once that is done, the repeal of the Martial Law Orders would be accompanied by the coming into force of the Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 for the Teason that the Ordinance was to take effect on the expiry of the Martial Law Orders. Both these events, namely, the repeal of the Martial Law Orders and the coming into force of Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 would, therefore, take place imme diately before the commencing day. On this view of the matter, the Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 must be deemed to be an existing law within the meaning of clause (1) of Article 223 of the Constitution. That being so, the Commissioner's orders, giving various directions to the petitioners before us, would clearly be covered by the provisions of Ordinance No. XXI of 1962.

13. Once the Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 is deemed to be an existing law, it would be conceded that the provisions of Article 79 of the Constitution would not apply to it, for the reason that it is not an Ordinance made under the present Constitution. Article 79 of the Constitution has not been given a retrospective effect, and would clearly apply to Ordinances made or promulgated by the Governor after the commencing day. We do not, therefore, see any necessity for this Ordinance being placed before the Provincial Assembly as required by Article 79.

14. The validity of the Ordinance was, however, further challenged on the ground that it was repugnant to the express provisions of clause (3) of Article 225 of the Constitution inas much as it sought to continue in force Martial Law Orders which have been repealed by the Constitution itself. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Ghias Muhammad that the preamble and the title of the Ordinance are not happily worded as they do give the impression of running counter to the provisions of clause (3) of Article 225 of the Constitution. Once Martial Law Orders and Regulations are repealed by the President's Order No. 29 of 1962 and Article 225 of the Constitution, a Provincial Governor does not appear to have any authority to continue the same. But the defect is, however, one of form only, as section 2 of the Ordinance makes it clear that the Martial Law Orders enumerated in section 1 "are to be deemed to have been enacted in the Ordinance." In other words, the Ordinance is a fresh law re‑enacting the provisions of the Martial Law Orders in question. The Constitution or the President's Order No. 29 of 1962 do not contain any prohibition against the re‑enactment of any Martial Law Regulation or Order in the form of an Ordinance or of an Act of the Legis lature concerned.

15. The next ground on which the validity of the Governor's Ordinance is challenged is that it offends against the 5th and 6th principles of law‑making as enumerated in the 1962 Constitution. The 5th principle is to the effect that no law should impose any restriction on the freedom of a citizen to move throughout Pakistan or to reside or settle in any part of Pakistan or freedom of a citizen to acquire, hold or dispose of property in any part of Pakistan. It is, however, provided that this principle may be departed from where it is necessary so to do in the public interest. The 6th principle is to the effect that no law should impose any restriction on the freedom of a citizen to engage in any profession, trade, business, occupation or employment, or otherwise to follow the vocation of his choice. It is again provided that this principle may be departed from in certain circumstances. It is contended that by imposing restrictions on keeping cattle in the City of Lahore Corporation, or on carrying on the business of selling bamboos and timber in certain localities, restrictions are being imposed on the freedom and right to acquire property and to follow any vocation that the citizens may choose. A reading of the Martial Law Orders in question does not support any such contention. No restrictions are imposed in these Martial Law Orders on the right to acquire and; hold property or to follow the vocation chosen by the petitioners. The restrictions are only intended to regulate, in the public interest, the manner in which, and the place at which, the particular businesses shall be carried on. These restrictions are permitted by the Constitution itself.

16. It is also to be noted that according to Article 6 of the Constitution, the responsibility of deciding whether a proposed law does or does not disregard or violate any principle of law making, is that of the Legislature concerned, and tile validity of a law is not to be called in question on the ground that the law disregards, violates or is otherwise not in accordance with the principles of law‑making. It would be seen, therefore, that even if we had come to the conclusion that the Ordinance did violate any of the principles of law‑making, we would have no power to declare the Ordinance void for that reason. However, as it is, we are not persuaded that any principles of law‑making have been violated by the Ordinance.

17. It was finally contended in this connection that the Ordinance was mala ,fide, inasmuch as it was promulgated at a time when the new Constitution was on the anvil, and an appropriate course for the Governor would have been to ask the Provincial Assembly to enact a law on the subject, but instead of doing that, the authorities hurriedly brought in the present Ordinance with a view to coercing the petitioners into obedience. We regret to say that we are not at all impressed by this argument. The Provincial administration had taken certain steps to improve the sanitation and traffic arrangements in the City, and had undertaken to build a new timber market for the con venience of the public and improvement of the City, and it was bound to follow up these measures to their logical fulfillment. It was clear that with Martial Law coming to an end, legal sanction was necessary for the measures so undertaken. The Governor was, therefore, bound to take necessary steps in this behalf. The Proclamation of the 7th of October 1958 and the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, gave him the requisite authority to issue Ordinances on subjects falling within his jurisdiction. There is thus no question of any mala fides on the part of the Governor in promulgating Ordinance No. XXI of 1962.

18. We have thus reached the conclusion that Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 is a valid existing law and continues in force under Article 225 of the Constitution. It does not suffer from any infirmities of the kind alleged by the petitioners. The orders issued by the Commissioner are, therefore, clearly in pursuance of powers given to him by a valid law.

19. There are two other aspects of this matter upon which we might briefly touch before passing on to consider the various c separate contentions raised in each of the petitions. The first is this, Even if we had come to the conclusion that Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 was not an existing law and was governed by Article 79 of the Constitution, it would still be valid until the expiry of forty‑two days after the first meeting of the Assembly of the Province. As already stated, the first meeting ended on the 7th of July 1962. The Ordinance would, therefore, have continued in force until the 18th of August 1962 and until then the Commissioner could clearly act under it.

20. The second aspect of the matter is that even if Governor's Ordinance No. XXI of 1962 had not been enacted, the liability incurred by the petitioners under the orders of the Commissioner, which were admittedly passed during the currency of the parent legislation, namely, Martial Law Orders Nos. 11I and 118, would have remained unaffected in view of the provisions contained in Article 250 of the Constitution section 3 of the President's Order No. 29 of 1962 and section 23 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956.

21. On behalf of the Cattle Owners' Association (petitioners in Writ Petition No. 558 of 1962), Mr. Ghias Muhammad has raised the following further contentions: ‑ (I) That even if the Ordinance, under which the Commis sioner is purporting to act, be regarded as valid legislation, the Commissioner's order is bad for the following reasons: ‑ (a) clause (a) of Martial Law Order No. 118 provides that the Commissioner may notify such localities or areas within the limits of Lahore Municipal Corporation, as he may deem fit, as localities or areas within which it shall not be lawful to keep or possess without permit any cow or buffalo of any age, but the Commissioner has arbitrarily chosen to notify the entire municipal area as ' prohibited area, instead of selecting localities as he was required to do ; (b) the power conferred 'on the Commissioner is subject to the performance of a duty, namely, the provision of alternative accommodation outside the municipal area, but the order passed by him is silent on this point, and (c) the Commissioner has discriminated between the owners of cattle kept for private or commercial purposes inasmuch as he has made provision for the issue of a permit for keeping a cow or a buffalo for private purposes, but not for a commercial purpose, in the same locality. (2) That the Commissioner's order cannot be implemented because (a) the land owners, whose land was acquired by the Commissioner for providing alternative sites to the cattle owners, have refused to hand over possession, and (b) sufficient time, is required to develop alternative sites.

22. As regards the argument based on clause (a) of Martial Law Order No. 118, we do not find any warrant for the conten tion put forward by Mr. Ghias Muhammad that the Commissioner was bound to select individual localities and could not notify the whole of the municipal area as prohibited area for keeping cattle. The intention of the Martial Law Order was clearly to provide for measures to remove obstruction in traffic and to improve sanitation within the limits of the Lahore Municipal Corporation, and it was left to the discretion and judgment of the Commissioner, Lahore Division, to notify such localities or areas as he may deem fit, in which cattle shall not be kept without permit. If the Commissioner came to the conclusion that the entire municipal area was such as to require improvement in sanitation and removal of obstruction in traffic, there was nothing to prevent him from issuing a notification to that effect. The action taken by him in notifying the entire municipal area as prohibited area does not appear to us to be arbitrary, as it is in conformity with the object of the Martial Law Order No. 118.

23. Mr. Ghias Muhammad laid considerable stress on the omission of the Commissioner to mention in his order to the petitioners that they shall be given alternative accommodation. It appeared to the learned counsel that the provision of alternative accommodation was a condition precedent to the issuing of any directions to the petitioners to move their cattle out of the municipal area. We consider it unnecessary to examine this conten tion at any great length, for the very simple reason that in actual fact alternative accommodation has been provided by the authorities Mr. Mushtaq Hussain, the learned" Additional Advocate‑General, who appeared before us for the Commissioner Lahore Division, has made a statement to the effect that six alternative sites have been earmarked by the authorities and at several of these sites various facilities like water connections and shelters have been provided. He also stated that the Commis sioner was negotiating for acquiring the area known as the Bowali Camp for housing the cattle which have been shifted from the municipal area. In view of this statement made by the learned Additional Advocate‑General, we have no doubt that the Commissioner Lahore Division has provided alternative accom modation. The areas indicated in the statement appear to be adequate. Therefore, the omission of the Commissioner to mention in his order that alternative accommodation shall be provided, or has been provided, is of mere academic interest, and cannot be used as an argument to challenge the legality of the order.

24. The next contention put forward by Mr. Ghias Muhammad was that the Commissioner's order was discriminatory inasmuch as it had made provision for issuing permits for one buffalo or cow to be kept for a private purpose, but had dis allowed the same cattle to be kept for a commercial purpose. The learned counsel contended that the Commissioner's order was in the nature of subsidiary legislation and accordingly it should have been directed towards advancing the object of the parent legislation, and should not have involved discrimination between different types of cattle owners. The learned counsel cited some authorities to support this proposition, namely, D. K. Kannisa v. Devichund (A I R 1924 Mad. 46), Perumalla Venkayya v. Batchu Pullayya (A I R 1942 Mad. 466) and Joti Pershad v. Emperor (A I R 1921 Lah. 134). The principle laid down in these authorities is that the validity of a rule is to be determined not so much by ascertaining whether it confers rights or merely regulates procedure, but by determining whether the rule is in conformity with the powers conferred under the statute and whether it is consistent with the statutes, reasonable and not contrary to general principles. In the present case, we find that Martial Law Order No. 118 makes provision for the issuance of permits for keeping cattle in any locality or area which is notified as a prohibited area under clause (a) of the Order. By making a rule that such a permit shall be issued in favour of a buffalo or a cow kept for private purposes and not for a commercial purpose, the Commissioner has not, in any manner, violated the object under lying Martial Law Order No.

118. The distinction created by the Commissioner between an animal kept for a private purpose and one kept for a commercial purpose does not appeal to us to be unreasonable. We can take judicial notice of the fact that animals kept for private purposes are better kept and under conditions which are less insanitary than those which prevail in the case of animals kept for commercial purposes by professional milk sellers.

25. Finally, a point was made that the alternative sites will need considerable time to develop, and that the owners of land had in several cases refused to surrender possession to the authorities. Certain affidavits to this effect were placed on the file by Mr. Ghias Muhammad. The learned counsel also pointed out that on a previous occasion the Judges of this Court laid a visit to an alternative site proposed by the authorities, and rejected it as being unsuitable. Whatever may have been the facts on the previous occasion in the present case we are satisfied that adequate alternative accommodation is being provided by the authorities end we are not prepared to interfere, in the exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction, simply for the reason that the proper development of these alternative sites will take some time.

26. In view of what we have said above, we see no merit in Writ Petition No. 558 of 1962 which is dismissed with costs.

27. In Writ Petitions Nos. 598 and 599 of 1962, the following additional points have been urged by Mr. Ghias Muhammad on behalf of the bamboo merchants: ‑ (a) That Martial Law Order No. 111 does not make any provision for allotment of sites to bamboo merchants in the new market, and, therefore, bamboo shops cannot be shifted to, the timber market under this Order. (b) That the Commissioner's order is discriminatory inasmuch as he has directed the shifting of those bamboo shops only which are situated on Rattan Chand Road, thus leaving the other shops to enjoy better business in their existing locations.

28. The relevant paragraphs of Martial Law Order No. 111 are paragraphs 5 and 7 and they may be reproduced here: - "

5. The Lahore Improvement Trust shall forthwith lay out the area of the said Market, allot sites to the timber merchants and do all other things necessary for the establishment of the said market in this area." "

7. All timber and bamboo shops shall be moved from Ravi Road, Rattan Chand Rood and other places within the City of Lahore Corporation to the said Market as and when ordered by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore."

29. It will be seen that in paragraph 5, which deals with the allotment of sites in the new timber market, the Order mentions timber merchants only, whereas paragraph 7 contemplates the shifting of all timber and bamboo shops to the new market. It is the contention of Mr. Ghias Muhammad that paragraph 7 should be read as being subject to paragraph 5, with the result that as no sites can be allotted to bamboo merchants, the question of shifting them to the new market cannot arise. The learned counsel contended that it is not for Courts to supply an omission in the statute and we should not, therefore, interpret the provisions of this Martial Law Order as permitting allotment of sites to bamboo merchants as well. In support of this conten tion, he referred us to the following observations contained in paragraph 169 of Crawford's "Construction of Statutes," 1940 Edition: ‑ "

169. Casus omissus.‑Omissions in a statute cannot, as a general rule, be supplied by construction. Thus, if a particular case is omitted from the terms of a statue, even though such a case is within the obvious purpose of the statute and the omission appears to have been due to accident or inadvertence, the Court cannot include the omitted case by supplying the omission . . . . As is obvious, to permit the Court to supply the omissions in statutes, would generally constitute an encroach ment upon the field of the legislature."

30. Mr. Ghias Muhammad, however, overlooked the following further observations contained in the same paragraph, namely: ‑ "But, inasmuch as it is the intention of the Legislature which constitutes the law of any statute, and since the primary purpose of construction is to ascertain that intention, such intention should be given effect, even if it necessitates the supplying of omissions, provided, of course, that this effectu ates the legislative intention. Some decisions seem to indicate a trend in this direction, and allow words omitted by oversight to be supplied, if the statute is otherwise meaningless, or if an amendment without interpolation is ineffective . . . . . . It is proper for the Court to supply such omissions because they are in fact a part of the statute, having been intended to be included in the statute when drafted and enacted:"

31. In this connection, Mr. Mushtaq Hussain, the learned Additional Advocate‑General, contended that the intention of the legislator in this case is explicitly stated in paragraph 7 of the Order, namely, that all timber and bamboo shops have to be moved to the new market, and that the omission of bamboo merchants from paragraph 5, dealing with the allotment of sites, is of no consequence. He further stated that in actual fact the sites have been allotted to bamboo merchants also in the new timber market. Mr. Mushtaq Hussain relied on certain remarks made by Craies on page 105 in his book "A Treatise on Statute Law", 5th Edition, namely: ‑‑‑ "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out."

32. The learned Additional Advocate‑General also referred us to Cookson v. Lee ((1854) L J R Ch. D p. 473 (Vol. 32)). In that case, their Lordships were dealing with an Act of Parliament, which after reciting that certain lands in the neighbourhood of Leeds were in strict settlement, and that many persons were desirous of erecting buildings on the said lands, and that it would be advantageous to the parties interested in the lands if the same could be sold and the proceeds be invested in other real estate, to be settled to the like uses, vested the lands in certain trustees on trust to sell the same, either together or in parcels ; the purchase‑monies to be paid into the Bank of England. The Act contained no express power to expend any portion of the purchase‑monies in setting out lands or in making roads. It was held that, having regard to the objects of the Act, namely, the sale of the property as building land, such power ought to be implied, and that the trustees and their agents ought to be allowed all sums properly expended by them in making roads to the several allotments and in bringing the land into a fit state for the market.

33. It seems to us that in the present case the intention of the legislator who promulgated Martial Law Order No. 111, is clearly and explicitly contained in paragraph 7 of the Order, namely, that all timber and bamboo shops shall be moved from Ravi Road, Rattan Chand Road, and other places to the new timber market as and when ordered by the Commissioner, Lahore Division. The power to allot sites in the new timber market is only intended to serve the purpose outlined in paragraph

7. It is, therefore, a case of omission of a detail in paragraph 5, which does not, in any way, affect the validity or meaning of para graph

7. We are inclined to the view that this omission can be supplied by the Court, and we hold that paragraph 5 must be read so, as to include the power of allotment of sites to bamboo merchants also. We have already referred to the statement of the learned Additional Advocate‑General that this has in fact been done.

34. The next point made by Mr. Ghias Muhammad was that paragraph 7 contemplated that all timber and bamboo shops should be moved, whereas the Commissioner had only singled out those bamboo shops which were located on Rattan Chand Road, presumably for the reason that the Lahore Improvement Trust was intending to widen the road in question. It appeared to the learned counsel that the action taken by the Commissioner, was discriminatory and against the terms of paragraph 7.

35. A reference to paragraph 7, which has already been reproduced above, shows that the timber and bamboo shops are to be moved to the new market as and when ordered by the Commissioner. In other words, the law allows the Commissioner to spread the shifting of these shops to the new market over a period of time. The intention, no doubt, is that all the timber and bamboo shops have to be shifted, but the paragraph in question does. not contemplate a simultaneous shifting of all the shops. It appears to us, therefore, that the Commissioner does not act illegally when he requires the shop situated on the Rattan Chand Road to move first This is not a case of discrimination either, as there is no averment that the Commissioner does no intend to carry out the provisions of Martial Law Order in relation to bamboo shops situated in other parts of the municipal area.

36. As there is no substance in the additional contentions put forward by Mr. Ghias Muhammad on behalf of the timber merchants, we have no alternative but to dismiss Writ Petitions No. 598 and 599 of 1962 as well. The petitioners shall pay costs to the respondents.

37. We may now take up the separate contentions raised in Writ Petition No. 612 of 1962 by M/s. Shamim Hussain Qadri and Rafiq Qureshi Advocates, namely:‑ (a) That Martial Law Order No. 111 does not contain any preamble which could disclose the object of the Order, but, judging from the past actions and declarations of the authorities, the intention was to shift only those timber merchants who were squatters, and not those who were owners of their premises, as is the case with the petitioners. (b) That the Commissioner's action is arbitrary and discriminatory as several shops situated in areas other than Ravi Road have not been asked to move. (c) That the petitioners have been allotted sites which are not favourably situated and which are much less in area than those at present occupied by them on Ravi Road. (d) That, in any case, the Martial Law Order in question does not confer any power on the Commissioner to shift saw‑mills and godowns, which are not "shops".

38. In support of the first contention, our attention was drawn to a press report which appeared in the Urdu Daily "Zamindar" dated the 19th of January 1962 (Annexure "A" to the petition) to the effect that a deputation of the Timber Merchants' Association waited on the Commissioner, Lahore Division, who assured the deputation that only those shops would be shifted to whose proprietors notices has already been issued for the reason that they constituted encroachments on public roads. The Commissioner was, further reported as having stated that those timber merchants, whose shops were away from the road and did not cause any obstruction in the widening of roads, need not worry about being shifted. It was argued by Mr. Qadri that this press report clearly showed that it was never the intention to shift those timber merchants who were owners of the premises of their shops, and, therefore, the impugned order was clearly in contravention of the assurrances previously given by the Commissioner. The learned Additional Advocate‑General stated that, in the first place, the Commissioner did not give the assurances attributed to him, and, in the second place, whatever the assurance that may have been given by the Commissioner, the Martial Law Order under which action was being taken was not restricted in scope so as to apply only to those whom the other side called "squatters."

39. We are inclined to agree with the learned Addi tional Advocate‑General. The question whether the Com missioner did give the assurances mentioned in the press report of the 19th January 1962, is a disputed question of fact, but even if we were to accept the press report as correct, the fact remains that the Martial Law Order No. 111 draws no distinction between timber merchants who own their premises and those who do not ; nor does the Order differentiate between those premises which are situated close to the road and those which are away from the road. Paragraph 7 of the Order clearly applies to all timber shops, irrespective of their location or ownership.

40. The second contention raised on behalf of the timber merchants, namely that the Commissioner's action is arbitrary and discriminatory for the reason that notices have not been issued to all timber merchants in the city, has no force for the reasons already outlined by us while dealing with a similar contention raised on behalf of the bamboo merchants, by Mr. Ghias Muhammad. Nothing more needs be said on this point.

41. The allegation that the petitioners, or at any rate some of them, are being given sites which are smaller in area than their present premises, or that the sites being allotted to them are not favourably situated in the new market, has no bearing on the legality of the action taken by the Commis sioner. It is not for us to determine the size of the allot ments, nor their location in the new market. We were, however, assured by the learned Additional Advocate‑General as well as by Sheikh Shaukat Ali, the learned counsel appearing for the Lahore Improvement Trust, that in the large majority of cases the size of the allotments was more or less equal to the areas at present occupied by the peti tioners, and that even the so‑called unfavourable sites had been provided with all the necessary facilities.

42. The last contention which needs to be noticed is that the Martial Law Order does not contain any provision for the shifting of saw‑mills and godowns but only of timber shops, but the Commissioner has directed that saw‑mills and timber godowns should also be shifted to the new market. It was stated that the premises of a timber merchant con sist of at least three distinct parts : (1) the office portion or the shop where the sales are conducted, (2) warehouse or godown where the timber is stored and (3) the saw‑mill where the timber is prepared or manufactured not only for the timber merchant himself but also for outside cus tomers. It was contended that only the first part, namely, the office or the shop portion, fell within the purview of Martial Law Order No. 111.

43. In this connection, we have to look at the purpose and the intent of the legislation in the first place. It seems clear to us that the object of Martial Law Order No. 111 h is to shift the entire timber business to the new market and not to split up the business, by shifting the so‑called shop portion to the new market and leaving the godowns, and saw‑mills in the old locations.

44. In the second place, we find that most of the so -called saw‑mills are really nothing more than a single saw -band fixed in the premises of the timber shop for the purpose of preparing the timber for sale, by ,cutting it to standard sizes. May be, that sawing is also done by these saw‑bands for outside customers, but we are satisfied that primarily the saw‑bands have been fitted by most of the timber merchants for preparing their own timber for sale.

45. In the third place, we are also of the view that the word "shop" is not to be confined in meaning to only that part of a business premises where the actual negotiations or transactions of sale take place. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a shop is defined as "a building in which goods and merchandise are sold at retail or where mechanics work and some time keep their products for sale". The shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines shop as "a house or building where goods are made or prepared for sale and sold", or "a building or room set apart for the sale of merchandise." Wharton's Law Dictionary describes a shop as "a place where things are kept for sale, usually in small quantities, to the actual consumers." It will be seen that the term "shop' connotes a place where merchandise is prepared and kept for sale and actually sold. Storing of small quantities of merchandise is a necessary incidence of any selling business and, therefore, the term "shop" must be interpreted to include reasonable storage accommodation.

46. As we have found that the saw‑mills, maintained by the petitioners, mostly consist of single saw‑bands fitted in their premises for cutting timber to standard sizes and that reasonable godown or storage facilities are incidental to the business of sale, we consider that the shifting of these saw‑mills and godowns comes within the purview of Martial Law Order No.

111. In coming to this conclusion, as already stated, we have also taken note of the purpose and the intention behind the Martial Law Order in question, namely shifting of the entire timber business to the new market.

47. For reasons given above, we find that Writ Petition No. 612 of 1962 also merits dismissal and we order accor dingly. The petitioners shall pay costs to the respondents in this petition as well. A. H. Petition dismissed.