P L D 2019 Lahore 486 (PLP)

AMIN-UD-DIN KHAN, J.

Through this single judgment I intend to decide the above captioned appeal as well as F.A.O. Nos.92/2017, 93/2017, 95/2017, 96/2017, 124/2017 and 160732/2018, as common question of law and facts are almost same involved in all the appeals and the decision of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (hereinafter will be mentioned as "PEMRA") dated 03.03.2017 has been challenged in each appeal, though independent decision in each case but similar.

2. This is an appeal under section 30-A of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 against the decision of PEMRA dated 03.03.2017.

3. The brief facts are that on 23.02.2017 the appellant as well as 28 other T.V Channels and Pakistan Television Corporation aired news that a bomb blast was heard in Z-Block of D.H.A. Further news was aired that the second explosion in Gulberg Lahore is heard. Thereafter when the Government Authorities confirmed that there was no second explosion, breaking news was aired by all the Channels that news about the second explosion is incorrect. A show-cause notice was issued on the same day by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority to every Channel, except PTV on the ground that PTV does not come within the domain of PEMRA, that fake and fabricated news about blast in Gulberg has been aired. The show-cause notice was issued by the General Manager of PEMRA. The reply was filed by each of the appellants.

4. A Personal Hearing Committee was constituted by the Chairman PEMRA consisting upon Director General (Operations), Director General (Legal), Director General (Licensing-Broadcasting) and Consultant Legal. In the show-cause notice dated 23.02.2017, 7 days' time was granted for submission of reply i.e. till 02.03.2017, 4:00 p.m., whereas through a notice dated 24.02.2017 the appellants were directed to appear before the Committee on 2nd March, 2017 at 03:10 p.m. in Conference Room, 5th Floor, PEMRA Headquarters, Islamabad. With personal hearing notice there was a schedule mentioning specific time for each TV Channel, which is reproduced as under: PERSONAL HEARING SCHEDULE Date: 2nd March, 2017 Venue: 5th Floor, Conference Room, PEMRA Headquarters Islamabad Sr. No. Channel Time of Hearing 1 ARY NEWS 11:00 a.m. 2 Khyber News 11:10 a.m. 3 Channel 92 11:20 a.m. 4 Dunya TV 11:30 a.m. 5 Samaa TV 11:40 a.m. 6 Metro One 11.50 a.m.

7. Geo News 12:00 p.m.

8. Awaz TV 12:10 p.m. 9 Jaag TV 12:20 p.m. 10 Abb Takk 12.30 p.m. 11 Roze TV 12:40 p.m. 12 Dawn News 12:50 p.m.

13. Mehran TV 02:30 p.m. 14 Kohinoor 02:40 p.m. 15 7-News 02:50 p.m. 16 Lahore News 03:00 p.m.

17. Neo TV 03:10 p.m. 18 Capital TV 03:20 p.m. 19 Sach TV 03:30 p.m. 20 Sindh TV News 03:40 p.m. 21 Express News 03:50 p.m. 22 Channel-5 04:00 p.m. 23 Din News 04:10 p.m. 24 Waqt TV 04:20 p.m. 25 KTN News 04:30 p.m. 26 News One 04:40 p.m. 27 Channel 24 04:50 p.m. 28 Bol News 05:00 p.m. 29 K-21 05:10 p.m. All the appellants before this court, appeared before the Personal Hearing Committee and submitted their reply to show-cause notice and thir defence/stance respectively. Vide decision of the "Authority" dated 03.03.2017 following decision was passed:- "i. On account of airing of fake news of explosion in Gulberg, Lahore on 23.02.2017 a fine to the tune of Rs.1.0 million is imposed on NEW TV, payable within three weeks from the issuance of this decision. ii. Moreover, NEW TV shall air the following apology through a news anchor on 6th March, 2017 at 06:00 pm in the same manner and magnitude as the fake news was aired. Besides tickers/scroll pertaining to apology shall also be aired from 6:00 pm to 7:00 pm during the regular transmission of Channel. iii. NEW TV is further directed to activate In house Editorial Committee, underintimation to this Office, to ensure compliance of the Code of Conduct. The Channel, at all reasonable times, shall facilitate inspection of time-delay mechanism. iv. NEW TV is also warned that in case of non compliance to above decision in part thereof or as a whole and/or in case of repeated violation of the Code of Conduct the Authority shall proceed against the channel(s) for suspension and/or revocation of its license under Section 30 of PEMRA Ordinance 2002 as emended by PEMRA (Amendment) Act 2007 and other enabling provisions of PEMRA laws." Hence, the appeals.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants argues that news was aired in good faith to sensitize the people and save their lives from any untoward incident. States that the news was not aired to create any panic. Further that PTV aired the news and even at the spot of first explosion it was heard that the government officials were informing on telephone to their superiors that the second blast has been heard in Gulberg area. When the government confirmed that there is no second blast, this news was aired as breaking news. States that show-cause notice does not contain that under which provision of law same is issued and the impugned decision is by General Manager and it is not by the authority. Further PEMRA has not proved that intentionally the wrong news was aired; that in the reply it was mentioned that there is no mechanism of providing authenticated news to the Channels; that there is no provision of PEMRA Ordinance 2002 which empowers the Authority to constitute Personal Hearing Committee. The mechanism is provided through Council of Complaints as provided under subsection (4) of section 26 read with section 39 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 (XIII of 2002). The show-cause notice does not show that it is either by the Authority or it is by the General Manager as the General Manager has no authority to issue notice for personal hearing before the Personal Hearing Committee. Further that all the members of the Personal Hearing Committee are the employees of the PEMRA. No independent person is in the Personal Hearing Committee. Further no right of hearing was provided to them by the Authority and the decision impugned is without any reason and substance, rather on the basis of alleged conclusion of the Personal Hearing Committee. Argues that Personal Hearing Committee has no authority to conclude the matter and send it to the PEMRA and PEMRA imposed a fine of one million rupees on airing the alleged fake news and a weeks' time was granted for implementation of the order along with the condition mentioned in the order at Sr. Nos.2 and 3 and at Sr. No.4 it was warned that for non-compliance of the order within the stipulated period, under section 30 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 the Authority shall proceed for suspension/revocation of the license. Argues that under the law 30 days' time is provided for filing an appeal, grant of one week's time for implementation of order is in contradiction to the right of appeal provided under the statute. The order is non-speaking and there is no reasoning in the order and the same is in violation of section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. States that in accordance with Article 19 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the fundamental rights of the appellants have been violated. States that maximum fine has been imposed without considering the facts and circumstances of the cases. States that when already the matter was qualified by the appellants, there was no need for asking the appellants again to air the apology etc. Learned counsel for the appellants have also argued the matter with regard to the establishment of the PEMRA Authority while referring the provisions of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002, functions of the Authority/Chairman, delegation of powers under section 13 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002. Argue that powers of decision of the Authority cannot be delegated. Further that 1/3rd is a quorum of total members for decision of the Authority in accordance with subsection (2) of section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance. Refers subsection (5) of section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 that determination should have been in writing and identifying the decision of Chairman and each member separately. The decision provided to the appellants does not qualify the decision in the light of section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002. Therefore, it is nullity in the eye of law. Further refers sub-rule (i) of Rule 3 of the Electronic Media Code of Conduct 2015 (hereinafter will be mentioned as "Code of Conduct") to argue that if the news was false and there exists sufficient reasons to believe that same may be false beyond a reasonable doubt, then it was violation otherwise it was not the violation of Code of Conduct. Further refers sub-rule (iv) of Rule 21 of the Code of Conduct to argue that news was aired in good faith to protect the people's health and safety. At this stage refers Manawan incident occurred in the Police Training School Lahore that the people were not sensitized with the incident, therefore a big loss was occurred to the life of civilians in that incident. Argues that though there are powers of delegation under section 13 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 but power of decision cannot be delegated and further no hearing was provided by the Authority to the appellants, therefore, all the proceedings are in violation of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Further argues that under section 29 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 only a fine can be imposed and other punishments mentioned in the impugned order are also against the statute. State that intentionally the via provided under the Ordinance of Council of Complaints in accordance with Section 26 of the PEMRA Ordinance has not been adopted, the rights of the appellants have been prejudiced. Further there is no provision for constitution of Personal Hearing Committee. Further that in Council of Complaints as well as the Authority there are independent members, whereas in the Personal Hearing Committee all members are the employees of PEMRA. Further within five days of the decision second show-cause notice dated 08.03.2017 was issued for non-compliance of earlier order. The alleged decision of the PEMRA does not show that how many members participated in the meeting and what was the decision of the Chairman as well as each member which is further violation of the law. At the end learned counsel pray for acceptance of the appeals and setting aside the impugned decision.

6. In response learned counsel for the respondents argues that admittedly a false news was aired during one hour on 23.02.2017 by 29 channels as well as Pakistan Television Corporation, as PTV does not come within the ambit of Authority, therefore, no notice was issued to PTV. Argues that the defence taken by the appellants that news was aired in the public interest is absolutely wrong as the Authority has to decide in accordance with Clause (e) of Section 20 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 that what is public interest. So far as airing of wrong news is concerned, refers a judgment of Islamabad High Court passed in F.A.O.No.59 of 2017 dated 25.06.2018 and states that factual controversy was resolved in the said judgment relating to the same incident and said judgment was challenged before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan through a Civil Petition No.3167 of 2018. The judgment of Islamabad High Court was confirmed by the Apex Court through judgment dated 06.11.2018 titled "Messrs Muntaha-e-Noor Sachal TV (Pvt) Ltd v. PEMRA and others". With regard to delegation of powers states that under section 13 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 the Authority has full powers to delegate its powers to a Chairman or a Member or any Member of the staff etc, therefore the delegation of powers to the Chairman and Personal Hearing Committee is valid. With regard to quorum refers the judgment of Sindh High Court reported as "Aurora Broadcasting Services (Pvt.) Ltd. and 13 others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and another (2019 YLR 574) to state that though there are 12 Members of the Authority in accordance with section 6 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002, out of said 12 Members 04 are ex-officio members, 01 full time member, 05 members shall be imminent citizens to ensure representation of the provinces but two members shall be appointed by the Federal Government on need basis. States that two members on need basis were not appointed, therefore the members at that time were 10 and a Chairman, thus, quorum for a meeting was four members including the Chairman and the impugned decision is rendered by the Authority when three members and a Chairman attended the meeting, therefore it was a valid meeting and the decision. Further that in the impugned order only fine has been imposed in accordance with Section 29 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 and for further proceedings qua revocation of license the matter can be routed through Council of Complaints only and that procedure was to be adopted if the first part of the order for imposition of fine is not complied with by the licensee/appellants. Pray for dismissal of the appeals.

7. So far as the factual position that news was aired by 29 channels including the appellants of second blast in Gulberg Lahore on 23.02.2017 between 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m., is concerned, the news was also aired by the PTV. There is nothing on record till date as admitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that which channel was pioneer in airing the news and whether it was PTV or any other private TV channel. On query learned counsel for the respondents states that this fact can be ascertained by the scrutiny of the record of airing news on the said date of each channel but states that this exercise has not been done so far, therefore it cannot be said that which channel was pioneer in airing this news. The fact pleaded by the appellants that the first blast admittedly was occurred in Z-Block of D.H.A and there some police officials were telephonically informing to any other superior authority that the second blast has been heard in Gulberg Lahore. This fact has also not been probed in the proceedings conducted in this matter, which is in issue through the appeals before this Court. At this stage, I am intentionally avoiding to give any observation upon the factual aspect of this case, as legal questions are very important which require determination by this Court. Therefore, I am going to take legal aspect at this stage.

8. The first legal question is that what should be the quorum for a valid Authority meeting and the decision. The second question is that whether the Chairman and each member is required to give independent reason or at least the decision should be signed by the Chairman and each member attending the meeting. The third question is that the hearing by the Authority was necessary or the hearing by the Personal Hearing Committee satisfies the right of hearing of the licensee/appellants. The fourth question is that whether for delegation of powers to the Chairman, proceedings were done under the valid delegation of powers in accordance with Section 13 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002.

9. The first question that what minimum quorum is required for a valid authority meeting for decision. Section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 is relevant, which is reproduced for ready reference as under:- "

8. Meetings of the Authority, etc.- (1) The Chairman or, in his absence, the member elected by the members for the purpose, shall preside at a meeting of the Authority. (2) One-third of the total members shall constitute a quorum for meetings of the Authority requiring a decision by the Authority. (3) The members shall have reasonable notice of the time and place of the meeting and the matters on which a decision by the Authority shall be taken in such meeting. (4) The decisions of the Authority shall be taken by the majority of its members present, and in case of a tie, the member presiding a meeting shall have a casting vote. (5) All orders, determinations and decisions of the Authority shall be taken in writing and shall identify the determination of the Chairman and each member separately." For members of the Authority Section 6 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 is relevant, which is reproduced as under: - "

6. Members of Authority:- (1) The Authority shall consist of a Chairman and twelve members to be appointed by the President of Pakistan. (2) The Chairman of the Authority shall be an eminent professional of known integrity and competence having substantial experience in media, business, management, finance, economics or law. (3) Out of twelve members one shall be appointed by the Federal Government on full time basis and five shall be eminent citizens chosen to ensure representation of all provinces with expertise in one or more of the following fields; media, law, human rights, and social service. Of the five members from the general public, two members shall be women. (4) Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Secretary, Interior Division, Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority and Chairman, Central Board of Revenue shall be the ex-officio members. (4-A) The remaining two members shall be appointed by the Federal Government on need basis on the recommendation of the Chairman. (5) The members shall receive such fee and expenses for each meeting as may be prescribed. (6) A member, other than an ex-officio member, shall be deemed to have vacated his office if he absents himself for three consecutive meetings of the Authority without the leave of the Authority." Learned counsel for the respondents/PEMRA admits that total strength of the Authority is twelve members and a Chairman but argues that subsection (4-A) of section 6 of the Ordinance, which was inserted later through amendment in the year 2007, two members are to be appointed on need basis on the recommendations of the Chairman, therefore, states that for the purpose of decision of the Authority quorum should be one-third of 10 members and a Chairman and states that a Chairman plus three members attended the meeting where the matter was decided, which is under challenge through these appeals, therefore, it is a valid decision and there is no defect in quorum of the meeting of Authority. Relies upon the "AURORA BROADCASTING SERVICES" case decided by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi referred supra.

10. I do not agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents/PEMRA nor I agree with the findings of learned Judge of High Court of Sindh at Karachi referred supra. Through the amendment in the year 2007 in subsection (1) of section 6 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002, the word "nine" was substituted by word "twelve" and subsection (4-A) of section 6 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002 was added but intentionally the legislature has not amended subsection (2) of section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002, which states that quorum will be one-third of the total members. Though learned counsel admits that number of total members is twelve and a Chairman, which comes to 13 in numbers. Admittedly if total members are twelve and the Chairman is 13th member, then one-third will be more than four members i.e. at least five members including Chairman. The argument that need basis members were not appointed does not minimize the quorum as clearly it has been mentioned as one-third of the total members. In this way, the members required for quorum of the Authority meeting was five, whereas in the instant case as per learned counsel for the respondents the members, who attended the meeting where the decision was made i.e. 126th meeting, were the Chairman PEMRA, Chairman FBR, Ms. Nargis Nasir Member (Punjab) and Ms. Shaheen Habibullah Member (KPK), therefore, a Chairman and three members attended the meeting of the Authority, which does not constitute a requisite quorum as provided under section 8 (2) of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002. I hold that at least five members including a Chairman or in case of absence of Chairman, a member elected by the members for the purpose, shall constitute a quorum. Therefore, 126th Authority meeting held on 3rd March, 2017 was defective for the purpose of decision of the point in issue, which is subject matter of this appeal on the ground of defect in quorum.

11. As per sub-section (5) of section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002, the determinations and decisions of the Authority shall be taken in writing and shall identify the determination of the Chairman and each member but the decision of the Authority impugned through these appeals, which was issued by Muhammad Tahir, General Manager (Operations) does not show that in which meeting this decision was taken, who presided the meeting, whether the Chairman or any other members of Authority meeting attended the meeting. The record provided by the respondents/PEMRA shows that decision was taken in 126th meeting of the Authority held on 03.03.2017. The impugned decision shows that on the conclusion by the Personal Hearing Committee as noted in Para 2 of the impugned decision, the decision was taken by the Authority on considering the recommendations of Personal Hearing Committee. It is not clear that what was the decision of the Chairman or each of the members. Even the proceedings provided by the respondents show that Authority meeting was held in routine. The meeting of Authority was held and item No.3 was considered for recommendation of Personal Hearing Committee held on 02.03.2017. The caption of this Item No.3 is reproduced as under:- "Item No.3: Recommendations of Personal Hearings Held on 02.03.2017 in connection with Show Cause Notices dated 23.02.2017 issued to 29 Satellite TV Channels on Airing Fake News of Bomb Blast in Gulberg, Lahore on 23.02.2017." When questioned to the learned counsel for the respondents that whether the decision conveyed to each Channel is available in the record in shape of a decision of the Authority having signatures of Chairman and the members attended the meeting. The answer is in the negative. Learned counsel states that the signatures of Chairman and members attended the meeting are available only on Attendance Sheet. In accordance with normal procedure of the Authority meeting, the decisions are taken down by the Secretary to the meeting, which are noted minutes wise and in the subsequent meeting same are confirmed. In the instant case learned counsel states that in the next meeting i.e. 127th meeting held on 24.03.2017 the decisions of 126th meeting were confirmed. Neither the decision of the Authority issued to the appellants contains the signatures of Chairman or any member nor the said decision is available in the record of Authority containing the signatures of Chairman and the members who attended the meeting. I am afraid that even a decision of the quasi-judicial authority requires signatures of the Authority delivering that decision. In this case, admittedly the Photostat copy from the abstract of the Authority meeting shows that Nasir Ayub Secretary to the Authority signed the minutes of the meeting. Ordinarily in Authority meetings, the minutes of meeting are noted by the Secretary to the meeting and before next meeting the noted minutes and decisions are conveyed to the members for inviting their objections. If there is any defect in noting or anything is missing from the proceedings of the meeting and if any member has any objection, same is conveyed within the stipulated period to the Secretary. So in the next meeting the original draft of the minutes of the meeting is prepared by the Secretary and if there is any objection by a member, same is placed for confirmation in the next meeting. Same procedure is adopted in the University meeting of syndicate and in the meeting of Administration Committee of this Court. It is possible that any member who attends a meeting may not be in attendance in the next meeting. Meaning thereby that till 24.03.2017 minutes of the 126th meeting and decisions were not approved by the Authority. Even the record produced by the respondents/PEMRA of minutes of 126th authority meeting shows that same were recorded on 8th of March 2017 by the Secretary to the meeting but the decision is of 3rd of March, 2017 which was issued to the appellants. In this view of the matter, on the basis of defects that quorum was not complete, the authority meeting is defective and the same was not able to take a decision. Therefore, the decision is nullity in the eye of law. Further the alleged decision of the Authority does not contain the signatures of Chairman and each member. Even it does not show that who attended the meeting to take the decision and further even in the record of Authority the signatures of Chairman and three members attending the meeting are not available except on the attendance sheet which was for noting of attendance of the meeting held on 03.03.2017. The alleged decision does not contain the reasons and even the defence put by the appellants is not mentioned in the decision. It seems that the recommendation or conclusion of the Personal Hearing Committee is taken as a decision of the Authority. By noting of facts it is evident that in show cause notice for filing of reply time was granted till 02.03.2017, whereas in the notice of personal hearing the time for hearing was fixed for 29 channels and as per schedule of personal hearing provided by the respondents the time was started from 11:00 a.m. till 05:10 p.m. and only 10 minutes time was given to each TV network. Furthermore, in the impugned decision three weeks' time was granted for payment of fine, whereas the second show cause notice was issued on 08.03.2017 for non-compliance of the order dated 03.03.2017. It seems that an extra ordinary hasty proceedings were conducted. In this view of the matter, the alleged decision is not a decision in the light of subsection (5) of section 8 of the PEMRA Ordinance 2002. Further neither the decision conveyed to the appellants nor the record of decision available with the Authority contains the signatures of the Chairman as well as the members. Therefore, it is nullity in the eye of law and it cannot be said the decision of the Authority.

12. The next question is whether hearing by the PEMRA Authority was necessary. Admittedly there is no provision of Personal Hearing Committee in the PEMRA Ordinance 2002. Learned counsel for the respondents/PEMRA refers minutes of 101st Authority meeting held on 16.01.2015. Para 21 of the decision whereof is reproduced as under:- "

21. The Authority unanimously reaffirmed its powers earlier delegated to the Chairman PEMRA for issuance of Show Cause Notices which inherently contains the power to constitute Personal Hearing Committees in order to carry out the functions of the Authority envisaged under PEMRA Laws." It means that power to issue show cause notice is given to the Chairman and also Chairman is authorize to constitute a Personal Hearing Committee. The Statute does not contain any provision for constitution of Personal Hearing Committee. If it is constituted, that cannot be equated. I am clear in my mind that the proceedings of the instant matter which is under challenge before this Court in the appeals are quasi-judicial in nature and in quasi-judicial proceedings the hearing by the Authority is necessary. I take benefit of law declared by the High Court as well as the august Supreme Court of Pakistan and in this regard I would like to reproduce the abstracts from the judgments for benefit and ready reference qua personal hearing and quasi-judicial proceedings, as under:- "Osman Abdul Karim Bawaney v. The Collector of Customs, Chittagong and others" (PLD 1962 DACCA 162) "We think that the correct proposition of law is that whenever a duty is cast upon any Tribunal to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function, it becomes incumbent upon such Tribunal or body to act in accordance with well recognized principles of natural justice which also postulates that, if a penalty is imposed upon a person or his rights are invaded upon, he should be given a fair hearing." "Karachi City Cricket Association, Karachi v. Mujeebur Rahman, Chairman, Adhoc Committee, Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore and 2 others" (PLD 2003 Karachi 721) "It is well-settled law that the principle of natural justice is to be read as part of every statute unless the same is specifically excluded. This principle is applicable to judicial as well as to all quasi-judicial proceedings." "Abdul Wahid and 4 others v. City District Government through District Coordination Officer, Lahore and 3 others" (2014 PLC (C.S) 820) "Further the principle of audi alteram partem is not only applicable to the judicial proceedings rather the same is to be strictly followed in the quasi-judicial proceedings. "(1) The University of Dacca through its Vice chancellor and (2) The Registrar, University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed" (PLD 1965 Supreme Court 90) "This Court has already had occasion to point out that at least three cases, namely, in thee cases of the Chief Commissioner, Karachi v. Mrs. Dina Sohirab Katrak (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 45), Faridsons Limited v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1961 SC 537) and Abdur Rahman v. Collector and Deputy Commissioner, Bahatwalnagar and others (PLD 1964 SC 461) that in all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative, the principles of natural justice have to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequences affecting "the person or property or other right of the parties concerned." This rule applies even though there may be no positive words in the statute or legal document; whereby the power is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases this requirement is to be implied into it as the minimum requirement of fairness." "From a careful review of the decisions cited before us it appears that wherever any person or body of persons is empowered to take decisions after ex post facto investigation into facts which would result in consequences affecting the person, property or other right of another person, then in the absence of any express words in the entactment giving such power excluding the application of the principles of natural justice, the Courts of law are inclined generally to imply that the power so given is coupled with the duty to act in accordance with such principles of natural justice as may be applicable in the facts and circumstances of a given case." "Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A. C. and another" (1994 SCMR 2232" "From the above stated cases, it is evident that there is judicial consensus that the Maxim audi alteram partem is applicable to judicial as well as to non-judicial proceedings. The above Maxim will be read into as a part of every statute if the right of hearing has not been expressly provided therein." "Dr. Zahid Javed v. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhary and others" (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 637)" "Now the next question would be whether the powers conferred under Section 11-A of the Act are administrative powers and/or quasi judicial powers to be exercised by the Chancellor. The word "Quasi" is defined 'as if', as though, as it were, in a manner, in a certain sense or degree, seeming, seemingly, analogous to and it may mean resemblance. The quasi judicial power is a duty conferred by words or by implication on an officer to look into facts and to act on them in the exercise of discretion, and it lies in the judgment and discretion of an officer other than a judicial officer. A "quasi judicial power" is one imposed on an officer or an authority involving the exercise of discretion, judicial in its nature, in connection with, and as incidental to, the administration of matters assigned or entrusted to such officer or authority. A "quasi judicial act" is usually not one of a judicial tribunal, but of a public authority or officer, which is presumably the product or result of investigation, consideration, and human judgment, based on evidentiary facts of some sort in a matter within the discretionary power of such authority or officer. A quasi judicial power is not necessarily judicial, but one in the discharge of which there is an element of judgment and discretion; more specifically, a power conferred or imposed on an officer or an authority involving the exercise of discretion, and as incidental to the administration of matters assigned or entrusted to such officer or authority." Admittedly no hearing was provided by the Authority to the appellants except through the Personal Hearing Committee, which is declared that the same is not equal to hear by the Authority, hearing by the Authority was necessary before the decision as fine of rupees one million to each appellant has been imposed.

13. In my view, decision of the authority should have been in a manner to note all the allegations and counter allegations with elaborate discussion of each of the points raised but in the impugned decision all the above things are missing. It even does not show that whether the appellants were heard or what was their defence. When fine of rupees one million has been imposed through the impugned decision of the authority, in my view, it is synonymous to a conviction or at least the rights of appellants are involved. I am of the view that the proceedings before the authority are quasi-judicial in nature while deciding the matter in issue, which are appealable before this Court. A full care and caution should have been adopted. Further I am of the considered view that the principle of natural justice i.e. audi alteram partem that no one should be condemned unheard is to be read as part of every statute unless is specifically excluded. This principle is applicable to judicial as well as to all the quasi-judicial proceedings especially after insertion of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. In these circumstances, question is whether hearing authority is necessary. I am of the considered view that personal hearing by the Authority was necessary in accordance with the Statute.

14. Under the law when there is a mechanism provided for Council of Complaints which procedure has absolutely not been adopted in the instant case, therefore, while allowing all the appeals I declare the impugned decision dated 03.03.2017 passed against the appellants as nullity in the eye of law, same is set-aside. If permissible under the law, the Authority if wants to take action will be at liberty to start fresh proceedings in accordance with law. At the time of admission of the appeals the appellants were directed to deposit 50% of impugned amount in cash and surety bond equivalent to the remaining 50% of the amount with the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. Hence, the liability of surety bond submitted by the appellants is discharged and further the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to return 50% amount already deposited with this Court by each of the appellants in accordance with law.

15. Before parting with this judgment I intend to note here that I am intentionally avoiding from dilating upon the factual aspect of the case, as noted earlier, so that it may not prejudice the case of any of the parties if any fresh proceedings are initiated. KMZ/F-14/L Order accordingly.