2004 PLP 1856 (YLR)

(6) The District Government shall notify the result of the approval of the motion. (7) The Union Nazim shall have the right to appear before the Union Council and address it in his defence. (8) No motion for recall of Union Nazim shall be moved during the first six months of assumption of office of Union Nazim nor shall such motion be repeated before the expiry of one year from the rejection of previous motion: Provided that no motion for recall of Union Nazim shall be moved before 31st December, 2002. "

5. As against functions; duties and rights of a Union Nazim, Naib Union Nazim is only to deputize his Nazim, as noted above and is given aright to preside g over the meetings of the Union Council, in, absence of the Union Nazim. Naib Union Nazim, has not been ascribed any specific function or responsibility, as compared to Union Nazim. He can resign from his office, by tendering it, in writing, addressed to Zila Nazim under section 91 of the Ordinance. There is no provision of his external "Recall" but he can be removed through an internal recall, in the manner provided by section 92 of the Ordinance and it reads, as under:‑‑ "Section 92: Recall of Naib Union Nazim:‑‑‑ (1) If in the opinion of a member of Union Council, there is a reason to believe that the Naib Union Nazim is acting against the public policy or the interest of the people or for any other reason, he may, seconded by another member of the Council, move a motion in the Union Council for recall of Naib Union Nazim. (2) On receipt of notice referred to in subsection (1), the Union Nazim shall summon a session of Union Council within three days, if the Union Council is not already in session. (3) Where the Union Council is already in session, the motion referred to in subsection (1) shall be taken up for deliberations immediately on its receipt in the Union Council. (4) If the motion referred to in subsection (1) is approved by a majority of the votes of its total membership through a secret ballot, the Naib Union Nazim shall cease to hold office on approval of the motion by the Union Council. (5) Where the motion fails in the Union Council, the proposer and seconder of such motion shall lose their seats as members of the Union Council. (6) The District Government shall notify the result of the approval of the motion by the Union Council. (7) The Naib Union Nazim shall have the right to appear before the Union Council and address it in his defence. (8) No motion for recall of Naib Union Nazim shall be moved during the first year of assumption of office of Naib Union Nazim nor shall such motion be repeated before the expiry of one year from the rejection of previous motion."

6. Consequences of the "Recall" motions above noted, have been given in section 163 of the Ordinance, which says:‑‑ "Section 163: Ineligibility for re election.‑‑‑Where a member or a Nazim or a Naib Nazim has been removed or recalled he shall not be eligible for re‑election to any office of Local Government for a period of four years."

7. In the cases before us, internal "Recalls" in the cases of Union Nazims have been moved under section 85 and as against Naib Union Nazims, under section 92 of the Ordinance. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner's invariably submitted arguments on alike lines, challenging these motions against them and urged that these provisions of the Ordinance, militate against the will of the voter, inasmuch as, these authorize the members of Union Council to recall Union Nazim/Naib Union Nazim who have been elected by direct vote of the electors of his constituency. According to them. this indirect impeachment, is against the concept of political justice, reflected in the scheme of the Constitution of this country whereunder indirect recall is prescribed only for such offices to which appointments are made indirectly, only with a view to preserve sanctity and respect for the people and their fundamental right of franchise. In this behalf a reference to recall of the Prime Minister (an office of indirect election) has been made which in case of success, does not deprive the Prime Minister of his basic membership. It has also been contended that a body like a Union Council which comprises of only 21 members elected by the same electoral college, as that of Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazim, cannot claim any superior political right and mandate, over and above them, to defeat mandate of a large number of voters. Learned counsel for the petitioners also stressed that the provisions of internal recall, above referred, are directly in conflict with Article 17(2) of the Constitution, as it not only provides his recall from an elected office but also deprives him of his right to participate in any election/re‑election of any office of the Local Government for a period of four years and at the same time, people of his constituency are deprived from electing him, as their representative. The provisions of "Recall" have been graded as "Penal" in nature and being against public policy, are said to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and un‑Constitutional as those are violative of its' Article 4, reference' in this behalf was made to the case of Jamat‑e‑Islami. Pakistan v. Federation PLD 2000 SC

111. On behalf of the petitioners, it has also been emphasized that these provisions of the Ordinance are based on lack of reasonable classification, resulting inequality and thus being in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution; deserve to he declared, as prayed. They further elaborated their arguments on the point of classification, by saying that those who are directly elected, like the petitioners in these cases, represent a direct choice of their constituency, as opposed to those who are choice of the elected body (i.e. Zila Nazim, Tehsil Nazim or Tehsil Naib Nazim etc.) The formers represent exercise of the fundamental right under Article 17(2) of the Constitution while the latter represent mandate of a small body though, elected by people. In their submissions, despite the well founded distinction between two classes of the elected representatives i.e. direct and indirect, the provincial legislature has failed to reasonably classify the distinction, as the provisions for internal recall of indirectly elected persons like those of Zila Nazim under section 24, Tehsil Nazim under section 63, etc. are quite similar in the form and substance, to those of the directly elected persons i.e. Union Nazim under section 85 and Naib Union Nazim under section 92 of the Ordinance. Referring to discrimination, they contended that the legislative scheme embodied in the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 does not even prescribe for members of a Union Council a "Recall" of another member of the Council. According to their submissions, both these elected office holders being elected through joint candidacy under section 154 of the Ordinance, cannot be treated differently, out of discrimination. As section 154 of the said Ordinance contemplates joint candidacy for election of a Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazim. The impugned provisions are claimed to be violative of Article 25 also for the reason that despite being elected by the same electoral college through joint candidacy, provisions of section 92 for internal recall of Naib Union Nazim have been prescribed differently, from those of section 85 contemplating internal recall of Union Nazim, without any reasonable classification whatsoever, some extra protection has been prescribed for the Union Nazim, inasmuch as, the motion for internal recall of Union Nazim, after approval of the Union Council, has to be caused by the election authority to be voted upon and approved by simple majority by the members of the village Councils, and Neighbourhood Councils before the Union Nazim shall cease to hold this office, however, no such restriction has been provided against recall of the Naib Union Nazim. It is also argued that "No Confidence" can only be shown by a body who had reposed confidence by electing the person sought to be removed and since members of Union Council do not elect their Nazim and Naib Nazim, they should not have been equipped with an authority to remove them. It is claimed that these provisions have no rational behind those and continuance of those would amount to perpetuate an unwarranted law which gets no support from any democratic system.

8. Learned Advocate‑General, Punjab rendered valuable assistance while representing the Punjab Government and its functionaries, arrayed as respondents in these petitions. He strenuously contested these petitions and opposing those, argued that an analysis of the provisions of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 shows that this law has created two classes of elected office‑bearers and has allocated them specified functions, duties, responsibilities and obligations to discharge and such classification being reasonable, is permissible under the Constitution. Reliance in this behalf was placed on the cases of I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary v. Azizullah Memon and 16 others PLD 1993 SC 341 and Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR

641. According to his submissions equality, as visualized by Article 25 of the Constitution, has to be done among, the same class of persons thus Union Councils and District Councils, including their respective members, belong to different classes, their treatment inter different classes or groups, cannot be termed as discriminatory. It has further been contended that Union Nazim has been given a different status who is termed as a head of the Union Administration; his functions have been specified; he is personally responsible for any loss to public by his decisions; he is to preside all the meetings of Union Council; he has a right to address its' meetings; he is, for these reasons, more protected and having a different classification, as compared to Naib Union Nazim, has to face both modes of recall, internal and external. As against it, Naib Union Nazim has no specified function, is not personally responsible like his Nazim, can only preside meetings of Union Council and deputize him, in absence of Union Nazim. Learned Advocate‑General further submits that Local Bodies Ordinance, itself created two classes of elected persons and then further divided these classes into further groups, he relied on section 148 of the Ordinance to urge that Union Council, including, Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazim is to be elected on the basis of adult franchise, on the basis of separate electorate whereas, subsection (2) of section 148 gives a different electoral college for the Zila/Tehsil Nazim, Naib Zila/Tehsil Nazims and all the other reserved seats of both the bodies of District Council and Tehsil Council thus the persons falling in unlike categories, have to be controlled in their respective specified methods. He further elaborated his submissions, by referring to previous Local Bodies Laws wherein classification of elected persons were made. A reference was made to section 11 of the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, whereby Union Councils had no Vice‑Chairman, like Naib Nazim, in the law under discussion. In this law, as well, there was a provision of vote of no confidence from the houses of District Councils, Tehsil Councils and Divisional Councils. A reference was also made to sections 10 and 11 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 whereby Chairman of a Municipal Committee used to be a nominee of the Provincial Government, as compared to Vice‑Chairman who was used be elected by the house. Similarly, he submitted that under Punjab Local Government Act, 1975, there were different classes of the elected office‑bearers in spite of the fact that under this enactment there was no Union Council. In Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, Union Council was again introduced by virtue of its section 58, creating special seats for peasants and workers, hereunder, Vice Chairman used to be elected by the members of Union, Council. Learned Advocate‑General adds that comparison of old local laws leads to the conclusion that those had never been consistent but in spite of it, superior Courts had been applying those laws, as those existed in their days. It was submitted that there is no inconsistency within the provisions of the Ordinance or of those, with the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and in comparison of those, no part of the Ordinance can be said to be discriminatory. His precise argument is that Courts have always favoured to save the laws, instead of spoiling those, without going into the wisdom of the Legislature. According to him law making is the function of the Legislature and Courts have consistently implemented it, as legislated, judgment on the point, by the Honouralbe Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Tariq Nawaz and another v. Government of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another 2000 SCMR 1956 was heavily relied. Finally it was urged that law relating to internal recall is not new and it is being applied in many countries like U.S.A. and Britain.

9. Mr. S.M. Masud, Advocate appearing on behalf of the private respondents in Writ Petition No.10613 of 2003 besides submissions of the learned Advocate‑General, argued that Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001 is not ultra vires of any of the Articles of the Constitution of 1973 as it is neither in violation of its' Article 8 nor is inconsistent to its' Article 25 which warrantees fundamental rights of the citizens of this country and through this legislation no infringement of such right, has occasioned. He also submitted that had there been any infringement of some fundamental right of citizens/electors, anyone of those must have come forward to maintain a petition but none, throughout the Punjab, has filed any petition. According to him, in absence of any petition by some voter, it cannot be presumed that such infringement has taken place. Besides these submissions, it was emphasized in support of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance that a right to "Recall" an elected representative, has no where in the world, been given to a voter who elected him, except in China which has a centrally controlled democracy and has no resemblance with the one prevalent in our country. He mentioned that in U.S.A. Mayor is elected by a direct vote but is removed by another body. In this behalf examples of voters of President of United States of America and that of Prime Minister of Britain, were also coded, who elect them by direct vote but have no power of "Recall". Under our own system Members of National and Provincial Assemblies are elected through direct vote (Adult franchise) but voters have no right to "Recall" their membership. It has also been contended that Punjab Local Government Ordinance by virtue of clause 270‑A of the Legal Frame Work Order, 2002, has Constitutional protection and this Court being itself a creation of the Constitution, would not strike down a Constitutionally protected law. Reference in this behalf, was made to the cases of Ch. Sadiq Ali v. Collector Gujranwala and another PLD 1964 Lahore 255; Mian Mushtaq Ahmad v. Deputy Commissioner Sargodha and 11 others 1982 SCMR 775; Pakistan Lawyers Forum (Regd.) Lahore through its President v. Federation of Pakistan through its Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another PLJ 2003 Lahore 1078 (D.B.); Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2003 Lahore 371; Messrs Fecto Cement Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2003 Lahore 531 and Watan Party through Punjab President Ladies Wing Tasneem Shaukat Khan v. Chief Executive/President of Pakistan and another PLD 2003 SC

74. Mr. S.M Masud, answering arguments of the petitioners regarding discriminatory nature of legislation, compared provisions of the Ordinance to show that this law has created reasonable classes which, in his submissions, are permissible and asserted that discrimination has to be shown within same class but there is no such discrimination within one category of the elected persons. He referred to the judgments in the cases of Shaikh Shamsul Huq v. Province of East Pakistan and another PLD 1959 Dacca 75; Golam Sarwar Molla v. Chairman and Members of Election Tribunal, East Pakistan, Dacca and others PLD 1965 Dacca 86 and Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC

457. He also attempted to justify internal recall, by arguing that an elected office holder can only continue with the confidence of his house and if he loses this confidence he must go. As a precedent case of Muhammad Yaseen v. James Masih and 8 others PLD 1982 Lahore 217 was relied. Entering into submissions over striking down legislative laws by the Courts, it was assertively pleaded that neither this Court can run behind wisdom of the Legislature to inquire as to why such law was made nor this Court will adopt the role of legislation, as it is the exclusive function of the body set up for this purpose, under the Constitution. Cases of The Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. (1) The Sargodha‑Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (2) The Regional Transport Authority, Lahore and (3) The Provincial Transport Authority, Lahore PLD 1958 SC 437; The State v. Zia‑ur‑Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49; Fauji Foundation and another v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; Sardar Ali Shah v. Assistant Commissioner. Mailsi, District Vehari and 3 others PLD 1985 Lahore 238 and Ajit Kumar Roy v. Surendra Nath Ghose AIR 1953 Calcutta 733 were banked in this behalf. Respondents also heavily relied on the principles of interpretation of laws whereunder Courts apply laws, as those stand, unless and until those are patently ultra vires of the Constitution. Cases of Muhammad Saleem and 3 others v. Federal Public Service Commission of Pakistan through Chairman, Islamabad and 2 others 2003 MLD 1133 and Ahmad Abdullah and 62 others v. Government of the Punjab and 3 others PLD 2003 Lahore 752 (D.B.) were made precedents.

10. Syed Mohsin Abbas, Advocate; appearing on behalf of contesting respondents in Writ Petitions Nos.9845, 12717 and 12719 of 2003 adopting arguments of the other respondents, added to those, that Court had always been reluctant to strike down the laws, as held in The Province of East Pakistan and 3 others v. Sirajul Haq Patwari and another PLD 1966 SC

854. He, while, supporting arguments regarding‑ reasonable classification among elected representa tives, referred to the case of I.A. Sharwam and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041 and said that the classification made in the law impugned, is not only reasonable but is also permissible under the Constitution. It is also his argument that in view of law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Hassan and others v. Fancy Foundation PLD 1975 SC 1. no unreasonableness can be attributed to the Legislature.

11. These Constitutional petitions assailing internal Recall motions, were being heard by the learned Single Judge in Chambers of this Court when, learned Advocate‑General (Punjab) being under notice as per Article 199(4) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 read with Order 27‑A, C.P.C. viewing nature of the controversy, moved C.M. No. 1231 of 2003 in Writ Petition No.7312 of 2003, requesting the Honourable Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench for hearing and decision of all the similar/connected petitions together, to avoid conflict of judgments. On this move, all the petitions involving identical controversy were requisitioned from the other Benches, as well and were ordered to be heard by a Special constituted Division Bench.

12. We have completed hearing of all the learned counsel for the parties on different dates and have anxiously considered their respective arguments. We have also scanned the entire relevant provisions of the Ordinance and the law/judgments applicable.

13. The foremost argument advanced in support of all the petitions coming before us for the decision is that the provisions of the Ordinance of 2001 relating to internal recall of the Union Nazims and the Naib Union Nazims are inconsistent to each other and being discriminatory and violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by Chapter II of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 are liable to be declared as ultra vires of the Constitution. Under Article 8 of the Constitution, any law which is inconsistent to the rights conferred by Chapter‑II, to the extent of such in consistency is void and the State having been prohibited to make any law which takes away or abridges the rights so conferred, thus such law, in contravention of Article 8 remains void. This Court in view of the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution is equipped with jurisdiction to declare any law, as void which is in contravention of Article 8 of the Constitution. In order to determine controversy involved in these petitions, we will have to evaluate the intents and purposes of this legislation (PLG 2001) and to see its objects, keeping in view that the Legislature has the exclusive domain to legislate laws but obviously subject to Article 8(2) of the Constitution. The background for bringing of the Ordinance, 2001 was the feeling of the Government to give political power to the general public, by bringing down to their hands the administrative and financial authority to uproot the corruption, so that individuals of this country, sitting away from "Aiwan‑i -Iqtidar' may participate in development and built up of their own State. It had another been the aimed object, which flows from its preamble that a new simplified system of self‑running Local Governments by participation of neglected citizens to ensure welfare of the common man, with transparency of expenditure over development projects, curtailing wide range interference and fly over of funds from the upper level. In order to curb corruption and to achieve the aimed purpose, the Ordinance created different groups of elected persons, with their specified roles, rights and duties. Now Article 25 of the Constitution mandates that all citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to its equal protection without any discrimination. The discrimination visualized by this Article has to be within the same class of people and a person falling in one class cannot urge discrimination, basing treatment meted out to an other class, created by law. Classification on the basis of rationales, is permissible under the Constitution and principle underlying the guarantee by Article 25 is not that the same rules of law should be applied to all the persons living within this country, or that the same remedies should be available to them irrespective of difference of circumstances around them. It only conveys that persons positioned alike be treated equally in privileges conferred and, liabilities imposed. Article 25 prohibits discrimination within same class of persons but allows reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation, if tests of reasonable classification and distinction among the two sets of people are fulfilled on the basis of intelligent deferential which distinguishes them from those who are grouped together as against from those who are left out from their group and this) differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute) under scrutiny. The Honourable Supreme Court while graciously dealing with a similar situation arising out of a dispute regarding pensionary benefits of retired civil servant and the retired Judges wherein treatment meted to civil servants was claimed to be discriminatory between those classes of pensioners, deduced certain principles of law in paragraph 26 of the alighted judgment, in the case of I.A. Sherwani and others v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041 and this paragraph reads as under:‑‑ "

26. From the above cited cases the following principles of law are deducible:‑‑‑ (i) that equal protection of law, does not envisage that every citizen is to be treated alike in all circumstances, but it contemplates that persons similarly situated or similarly placed are to be treated alike; (ii) that reasonable classification is permissible but it must be founded on reasonable distinction or reasonable basis; (iii) that different laws can validly be enacted for different sexes, persons in different age groups, persons having different financial standings, and persons accused of heinous crimes; (iv) that no standard of universal application to test reasonableness of a classification can be laid down as what may be reasonable classification in a particular set of circumstances, may be unreasonable in the other set of circumstances; (v) that a law applying to one person or one class of persons; may be Constitutionally valid if there is sufficient basis or reason for it, but a classification which is arbitrary and is not founded on any rational basis is no classification as to warrant its exclusion from the mischief of Article 25; (vi) that equal protection of law means that all persons equally placed be treated alike‑ both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed; (vii) that in order to make a classification reasonable, it should be based:‑‑ (a) on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those who have been left out; (b) that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by such classification. The Honourable Supreme Court re‑affirmed the above produced principles of law in their another erstwhile judgment in the case of Government of Balochistan through Additional Secretary v. Aziz Ullah Mamen and 16 others PLD 1993 SC 341 while dealing with a matter wherein, vires of Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968 had been claimed to be in conflict with different provisions of the Constitution. The above‑referred principles were re‑capitulated/re‑emphasized in paragraph No.5 of the judgment at page

358. Similar principles and test regarding discrimination, above referred, were once again laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR 641, in paragraph No.59 of the judgment at page 811; it shows that consistent view of the Honourable Supreme Court is that equal protection of law does not mean that every citizen is to be treated alike in all circumstances but it contemplates that persons in similar situation or placed in similar places, are to be treated in the same manner and reasonable classification is permissible, based on reasonable distinction/basis. In this background, different laws can validly be enacted for different sexes, persons in different groups H and persons having different status or financial standing etc.

14. On the basis of the touchstone given by the Honourable Supreme Court, analysis of different provisions of the Ordinance 2001 reveals that primarily this Ordinance created two classes of elected persons which were further divided into different groups, conferring/allocating those groups, different responsibilities, different obligations, different liabilities, different rights, different ways/means of treatment and different modes of their holding of office and different mechanism for their removal from the office. The Ordinance has created two classes of elected persons, one coming to their office through a direct vote of the elector of their respective constituencies and the others coming to their office through an in‑direct vote. For this purpose members of the Union Council including Union Nazims and Union Naib Nazims are one class of elected office holders and the members of the District Councils/Tehsil Councils are other class and this classification has rational behind it, as noted above. Members of the Union Councils come to the office through an election based on adult franchise, with separate electorate under section 148 (1) of‑r the Ordinance, whereas, the electoral college for the election of the other group is given by section 148(2) of the Ordinance. Earlier group coming to the office by virtue of election in the manner given in section 148(1) has further been divided into different groups i.e. Union Nazims and Naib Union Nazims, giving a‑ different status to the Union Nazim who is the Head of Union Administration (under section 75 of the Ordinance), his functions have been specified (under section 80 of the Ordinance), he is personally responsible for any loss to the public by his decision (under section 81 of the Ordinance), he is to preside all the meetings of his Union Council, (under section 89(4) of the Ordinance). He has a right to address its meetings (under section 90 of the Ordinance), but as compared to this group of the office holders the other group of Naib Union Nazims, they have no specified functions to perform, they have no personal responsibility/liability like the Union Nazims and they can only preside meetings of their respective Union Council and can deputize them, in absence of their Union Nazims. Since, the responsibilities, obligations, rights, duties, and status of the office holder of both these groups are different and the group of Nazims for this reason, enjoys more protection under section 85(4) of the Ordinance which is not available to the Union Naib Nazim, thus, this further grouping/classification, also has rational behind it and is justified in view of the framework given by the Ordinance. Likewise their treatment and method of removal have been differently provided by the Ordinance, which is not discriminatory because as discussed above discrimination has to be within one group/classification.

15. Though, for the reasons given above, different modes of internal recall of Union Nazims and Union Naib Nazims who are two different groups, are not discriminatory yet in view of Article 8 of the Constitution, inconsistency and discrimination has to be looked into qua the fundamental rights warranted by Part II of the Constitution. In all these petitions, no fundamental right has been pointed out to have been invaded by promulgation of the Ordinance and it is not shown how this legislation is opposed to any fundamental right. It may, could have been urged by a voter that since he elected his representative, he has a right to recall him but none of them has filed any petition before us to assert that his right if any, has been snatched by the provisions of section 85 or section 92 of the Ordinance. Reference of the learned counsel for the respondent in Writ Petition No.10613 of 2003, (Mr. S.M. Masud Advocate), to the manner of election and recall of the representatives, prevalent in different countries like U.S.A., Great Britain and even in this country, is not misplaced. In United States of America, the President is elected by a direct vote but is removed/impeached by two third majority of the two houses, that is, the Congress and the Senate. Likewise in Great Britain leader of the party winning in general elections becomes. Prime Minister, but he is removed/impeached by the two third majority of the two houses i.e. the House of Commons and the House of Lords. All around the world right of recall of an elected representative has been given to a different group of persons, in place of the elector. This fact cannot be denied that the right of recall is not given to a voter any K where in the world except China or other few countries where, different kind of centrally controlled democracy is being practised. In this manner it could not be said that no confidence could only be moved by a group of persons who had reposed confidence.

16. Provisions of the Ordinance, under scrutiny, were promulgated for whole of the Province of Punjab, other than the areas notified as Cantonments under the Cantonments Act, 1924, in relation to the matters covered under the said Act and not against any class or set of groups. Above all, it is not for the first time that provisions of "internal recall" have been introduced through the Ordinance. In Basic Democracies Order, 1959 a Union Council was formed by its section 11 and its Chairman was to be elected, out of its members. Under Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of No‑confidence against Chairman) Rules, 1963 motion of no‑confidence, after discussion, was to be put to the house for voting which it: carried by 2/3rd majority of the total number of the members of the Basic Democracy, was to be considered as passed and such declaration, made by the Presiding Authority was final., Likewise, Chairmen and Vice‑Chairmen of the Municipal Committees under the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 were elected under its sections 10 and

11. Chairman was to be nominated by the Government and was to continue during its pleasure. Whereas, Vice‑Chairman was to be elected from the elected members and could be removed from his office under section 11(3) of this Ordinance, through a vote of no‑confidence passed by 2/3rd majority of the members of the Committee Similarly, Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1975 envisaged elections of the Chairmen and Vice‑Chairmen of the Local Councils through its section 21 and besides giving manner of their removal by the Government under section 31 and also envisaged a method of their removal through vote of no‑confidence, by section 33 and if such vote is passed by 2/3rd, majority of the total number of the Local Council, he was to cease to hold the office. The most recent enactment which remained in force for a period of more than two decades, that is the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, it gave alike offices of Chairman by, virtue of its section 12 and except in the cases of a Village Council, a Union Council, a Muhallah Council and a Ward Council, a Vice Chairman. They were liable to removal in terms of its section 29 and besides it; there was a provision of vote of no‑confidence, given by section 30, under which, if such a move is carried by 2/3rd, Chairman of‑the Vice‑Chairman had to vacate the office. All these previous provisions relating to vote of no‑confidence motions which‑can be termed as internal recalls, show that these provisions were made part of different statues and the Courts had been implementing these, as those stood.

17. To our mind, language and intention of the Legislature is clear from the construction of the Ordinance who in its wisdom, enacted the Ordinance under review, for the specified purposes. This Court, probably is not required to run behind the wisdom of the Legislature or to M challenge/discard it. In this country we are functioning as Courts of law and are under obligation to give effect to the laws, as legislated and as those stand. In a case relating to local bodies elections, under the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, (Punjab Ordinance No.VI), through Notification 15‑81993, issued under section 26(a) of the Ordinance by the Governor of the Punjab, were to be held in January, 1994. This Notification was impugned before this Court by making writ petitions which were allowed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers of this Court vide judgment dated 30‑1‑1994 but in spite of it, local councils were not restored within the time given by the judgment and ultimately the matter went before an Honourable I.C.A. Bench, where instead of restoring the local councils, the Punjab Government was allowed more two months time to hold the local council elections. The Government, in the meanwhile, was empowered through an Ordinance No.VI of 1994 to curtail term of the local councils which was curtailed and a Notification was issued fixing a date for these elections. The I.C.A. was dismissed on 9‑4‑1994 and the matter went up before the Honourable Supreme Court through Constitutional Petitions Nos.36 to 39 of 1996, in the case of Mazhar Zulfqar Ali Baboo and others v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 1997 SC 11 pending which the Punjab Local Government Act, 1996 was passed and assented by the Governor on 10‑7‑1996, re‑structuring the continuance of Local Government Institutions. In spite of mala fides being involved in this legislation, the Honourable Supreme Court gave effect to the law as legislated and was enforced as it was enacted.

18. Under general democratic principles, any elected representative losing confidence of a body of members to whom he leads or where he works, has no right to remain in N that office and on this principle an internal recall emanating out of the house of Union Council, has logic and sense behind it. In the case of Mian Mushtaq Ahmad v. Deputy Commissioner Sargodha and 11 others 1982 SCMR 775 where no confidence motion was carried by 10 members out of 11, attending the meeting and expressing no confidence in the Chairman of the Town Committee, the Honourable Supreme Court refused to interfere on any reason including, as to whether such motion was permissible before the expiry of the 6 months, the time provided by section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. A similar view was expressed by this Court in the case of Muhammad Yaseen v. James Masih and 8 others PLD 1982 Lahore 217.

19. The petitioners before us having accepted the provisions of Ordinance opted to contest the election thereunder who after winning the election, entered into their respective offices, performed their duties, whereafter, they cannot be permitted to turn back and to say that provisions of the Ordinance which were accepted by them are ultra vires of the Constitution, especially when, they were proceeded against under punitive provisions like sections 85 and 92 of the Ordinance. They are certainly estopped now to challenge any of the provisions of the Ordinance by saying that O those are contrary to the Constitution or are opposed to their fundamental rights, if any. Some of these petitioners have pointed out certain procedural irregularities/ illegalities which require determination after inquiry and recording of evidence and this Court while discharging Constitutional jurisdiction is not supposed, under law to embark upon such exercise. All these grievances revolving around non‑issuance of proper notice of the meetings, presiding over of the meetings by unauthorized persons, holding of meeting in illegal manner or at un notified places and that the motions (recall moves) were not signed by the required number of members, canvass factual disputes which do not fall within the competence of this Court in view of the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Younus Khan and 12 others v. Government of N.‑W.F.P. through Secretary, Forest and Agriculture, Peshawar and others 1993 SCMR 618.

20. For what has been discussed above, we are of the considered view of the legislation in form of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, especially its provisions of sections 85 and 92 are neither in conflict or inconsistent with the rights given by part 11 of the Constitution nor are discriminatory and thus the same are intra vires of the Constitution and have non conflict with its Article,

8. Recall motions approved by the concerned Union Councils under those provisions cannot be declared as prayed. These petitions have no merits in those and thus, are consequently dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Schedule of the cases decided vide judgment passed in Writ Petition No.7044 of 2003. List of Nazim's cases: (1) Writ Petition No.2508 of 2003 (2) Writ Petition No.2590 of 2003 (3) Writ Petition No.2625 of 2003. (4) Writ Petition No.2726 of 2003 (5) Writ Petition No.3429 of 2003 (6) Writ Petition No. 10886 of 2003 (7) Writ Petition No.11199 of 2003 (8) Writ Petition No.11203 of 2003 (9) Writ Petition No.11378 of 2003 (10) Writ Petition No. 14873 of 2003. List of Naib Nazim's cases. (1) Writ Petition No.7044 of 2003 (2) Writ Petition No. 18861 of 2002 (3) Writ Petition No. 1163 of 2003 (4) Writ Petition No. 1232 of 2003 (5) Writ Petition No. 1287 of 2003 (6) Writ Petition No. 1567 of 2003 (7) Writ Petition No. 1708 of 2003 (8) Writ Petition No. 1789 of 2003 (9) Writ Petition No. 1945 of 2003 (10) Writ Petition No. 2085 of 2003 (11) Writ Petition No. 2154 of 2003 (12) Writ Petition No.2356 of 2003 (13) Writ Petition No.2458 of 2003, Crl. Org. No.253 of 2003; (14) Writ Petition No.2468 of 2003 (15) Writ Petition No.2509 of 2003 (16) Writ Petition No.2591 of 2003 (17) Writ Petition No.2624 of 2003 (18) Writ Petition No.2723 of 2003 (19) Writ Petition No.2727 of 2003 (20) Writ Petition No.2766 of 2003 (21) Writ Petition No.3315 of 2003 (22) Writ Petition No.3316 of 2003 (23) Writ Petition No. 3421 of 2003 (24) Writ Petition No.3676 of 2003 (25) Writ Petition No.3951 of 2003 (26) Writ Petition No.4056 of 2003 (27) Writ Petition No.4134 of 2003 (28) Writ Petition No.7312 of 2003 (29) Writ Petition No.7421 of 2003 (30) Writ Petition No.7805 of 2003 (31) Writ Petition No.7982 of 2003 (32) Writ Petition No. 8094 of 2003 (33) Writ Petition No.9567 of 2003 (34) Writ Petition No. 9845 of 2003 (35) Writ Petition No.10400 of 2003 (36) Writ Petition No.8257 of 2003 (37) Writ Petition No.10448 of 2003 (38) Writ Petition No.10585 of 2003 (39) Writ Petition No. 10590 of 2003 (40) Writ Petition No. 10604 of 2003 (41) Writ Petition No. 10613 of 2003 (42) Writ Petition No. 10629 of 2003 (43) Writ Petition , No. 10671 of 2003 (44) Writ Petition No. 10814 of 2003 (45) Writ Petition No. 11111 of 2003 (46) Writ Petition No. 11191 of 2003 (47) Writ Petition No. 11194 of 2003 (48) Writ Petition No. 11268 of 2003 (49) Writ Petition No. 11241 of 2003 (50) Writ Petition No. 11291 of 2003 (51) Writ Petition No. 11337 of 2003 (52) Writ Petition No. 11338 of 2003 (53) Writ Petition No. 11340 of 2003 (54) Writ Petition No. 11349 of 2003 (55) Writ Petition No. 11360 of 2003 (56) Writ Petition No. 11361 of 2003 (57) Writ Petition No. 11362 of 2003 (58) Writ Petition No. 11381 of 2003 (59) Writ Petition No. 11396 of 2003 (60) Writ Petition No. 11427 of 2003 (61) Writ Petition No. 11865 of 2003 (62) Writ Petition No. 11491 of 2003 (63) Writ Petition No. 12000 of 2003 (64) Writ Petition No.12002.of 2003 (65) Writ Petition No. 12114 of 2003(66) Writ Petition . No. 12710 of 2003 (67)Writ Petition No. 12717 of 2003 (68) Writ Petition No. 12719 of 2003 (69) Writ Petition No. 13381 of 2003 (70) Writ Petition No. 13382 of 2003 (71) Writ Petition to 13628 of 2003 (72) Writ Petition No. 15425 of 2003 (73) Writ Petition No.11249 of 2003 (74) Writ Petition No. 1027 of 2004 and (75) Writ Petition No.20892 of 2002. (1) Writ Petition No.2498 of 2003 (2) Writ Petition No.10990 of 2003 and (3) Writ Petition No.20502 of 2001. M.H./M‑200/L Petitions dismissed.