P L D 1977 Supreme Court 164 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEEMA J.-Civil Appeals Nos. 48-R and 284 of 1969 are connected matters having a common background and involving identical questions of law. These are, therefore, disposed of together. The appellants in both the cases are transferees of big mansions having purchased them in unrestricted open auctions. The Bank of Bahawalpur Limited appellant in Civil Appeal No. 48 of 1969 purchased evacuee property No. S-64-R-16, known as the Royal Hotel, Anarkali, on 26-9-1961 for the highest bid of Rs. 10,50,000 while Mr. Zaheer-ul-Aman Khan, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 284 of 1969 purchased evacuee property No. S-64-R-106, Anarkali on 13-4-1962 for the highest bid of Rs. 6,75,

000. Full price was paid in both the cases and P. T. Os. were also issued in favour of the appellants, who in vain approached the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department for delivery of vacant possession of the respective big mansions purchased by them. The view taken by the Department was that the tenants who were already in -occupation of these mansions were entitled to the protection of section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, mentioned hereinafter as the Act, and contented itself with the delivery of constructive possession. Feeling aggrieved, the Bank of Bahawalpur filed Writ Petition No. 1167-R of 1963 while Mr. Zaheer-ul-Aman Khan filed Writ Petition No. 316-R of 1964 which ? ere both heard and disposed of together in terms of the Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 2-11-1965 to which my Lord the Chief Justice was a party. The reference to the Full Bench of five Judges was necessitated for the resolution of conflict of views between Hajl Abdul Karim v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (P L D 1961 Lab. 394) and Subedar Muhammad Afzal v. Syed Nafis Ahmad and others (P L D 1962 Lab. 45) on the one hand wherein the view taken was that occupants of big mansions were liable to be ejected under section 29 of the Act, as protection of section 30 . It was not available to them, and the Karachi Full Bench Case Dr. Cowas C. Vehta v. Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and others (P L D 1963 K ar. 938) on the other wherein a contrary view was taken. On reference, the conclusions reached by the newly constituted Full Bench of five Judges were ;firstly, that the possession or occupation of a person is authorised within the meaning of section 29 only when he is eligible for transfer and that an ineligible allottee or occupant is liable to ejectment ; secondly, that a person's possession or occupation of a big mansion would be authorised if he were otherwise eligible for the transfer of the portion In his possession or occupation, but for the declaration of the building se a big mansion; thirdly, that section 29 could not be invoked for the ejectment of a tenant of a big mansion ; and lastly, that the protection of section 30 would also be available to a tenant of a big mansion. Leave was granted vide this Court's order dated 28-3-1969 on the ground that the case involved a question A of statutory provision of general public importance. The matter is one of first impression. The conflict of views has arisen for the reason that the definition of "house" as contained in section 2(4) of the Act specifically excludes a big mansion so declared under para. 16 of the Schedule, whereas section 29 empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner to eject "any person in possession or occupation of any evacuee property", indeed an expression of utmost generality, presumably including a big mansion, the protective provision contained in section 30 is confined in particular to occupants of evacuee house, or shop or those declared by the Custodian as having tenancy rights prior to 14-8-1946 in an industrial concern, Cinema house or printing press which has been transferred to any oilier person under the Act. Thus prima facie there is a conflict between the vast powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 29 to eject occupants of evacuee properties of all kinds which would apparently include a big mansion on the one hand, and the specific exclusion of a big mansion from the definition of "house" under section 2(4) coupled with the particularization of the shops, houses and buildings to which protection under section 30 would extend with the conspicuous absence of a reference to a big mansion in this regard. Mr. S. M. Zafar learned counsel for the appellants took us through paragraph 24 of the High Court's judgment and disputed the correctness of two of the four answers returned by the Full Bench in sub-paragraph (1)(ii) and (2) which respectively ruled that a person's possession or occupation of big mansion would be authorised if he were otherwise, eligible for the transfer but. for the declaration of the building as a big mansion, and that the protection of section 30 of the Act would be equally available to an occupant of a big mansion. It was contended by him that where a dictionary of words was supplied by the Statute itself ordinarily the meanings given by it must be applied except where there were compelling reasons to depart from that meaning. Criticizing the view taken by the High Court that in the absence of any repugnancy protection under section 30 should also be extended to tenants of big mansions like those of all other properties. It was contended by him that the basic premise on which the argument proceeded was faulty, inasmuch as tenants of building sites remained equally unprotected and therefore, it was not correct to say that tenants of all evacuee properties stood protected under section

30. It was submitted that a closer analysis of the provision made it abundantly clear that while occupants of building sites, big mansions and hotels were totally denied the protection, it was available in an unqualified manner in the case of houses and shops and in a qualified manner in the case of industrial concerns, cinema houses and printing press having been confined only to those declared as such before 20-12-1958. It was submitted that with the disappearance of the premise, the judgment would be no longer maintainable. It was contended that not only was there a clear repugnancy in the statutory provisions but the context also pointed to the contrary. In support of his interpretation for the exclusion of big mansion and hotels from the protection of section 30, reliance was placed on Indian Immigration Trust Board of Natal v. Govlndasamy (AIR 1920 P C 114), I. L. M. Cadlja Umma and another v. S. Don Manis Appu (A I R 1939 P C 6-3), Hariprasad Shivshanker Shukla and another v. A. D. Divelkar and others (AIR1957SC121) and of Hindras Interpretation of Statutes, 1961 Edn., p.

28. Another argument addressed in this regard was that a hotel and a big mansion were treated at par for purposes of section 30 and it only stood to reason that the Chief Settlement Commissioner would declare only such building a: a hotel which in fact was meant to be a hotel and yet by allowing the tenants to continue he would simply defeat the very object of the declaration. It was submitted that the wisdom behind the provision contained in para. 16 of the Schedule authorising the Chief Settlement Commissioner to declare a building as a hotel or a big mansion was not far to seek. In the former case premises used as a hotel before independence but occupied and used as residential premises by refugee families for want of a better accommodation in the hectic days of the partition, could be legitimately declared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and restored to its appropriate use in public interest. Likewise, declaration of a building as a big mansion which could otherwise, fetch handsome amount to the public exchequer was aimed at the prevention of its usurpation by a single allottee, occupant or claimants with nominal claims. It was next argued that sections 29 and 30 of which the former dealt with ejectment and the latter with protection of occupants, had to be read together and construed on the principle of harmonious interpretation. Even otherwise, it was submitted that a big mansion constituted a distinctly different category from other premises in regard to eligibility for transfer to which nobody could lay a claim as it could only be transferred in an unrestricted open auction and therefore, its exclusion from the protection of section 30 was only too reasonable to presume. Lastly, it was submitted that the High Court had erred in holding that once P. T. O. was issued, ejectment under section 29 could not be ordered. It was submitted that this view ignored para. 20 of Schedule 3 as the property went out of the compensation pool only on the issuance of P. T. D. as held in Mst. Aziz Fatima and others v. Abdul Hameed Farooqui and others (1976SCMR95). In Chief Administrative Officer, Ministry of Defence, Rawa pindi v. Habibullah butt and others (PLD196OSC78) a contrary view was taken under the unamended section 29 where nobody could be ejected. The existing provision of section 29 was substituted by the amending Ordinance I of 1959 which came into force on 5-1-1959 and was kept intact by Ordinance XLIII of 1959 which came into force on 28-9-1959. According to Mr. S. M. War, the Lahore judgment in Maji Abdul Karim v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (P L D 1961 Lab. 394) gave the correct decision on the point. On the other hand in defence of the Full bench judgment, it was contended by Mr. Maqbool Elahi counsel for the respondent Department, that section 30 came into play only after the transfer of the evacuee property whereas the application of section 29 covered the pre-transfer stage, The argument wag that the schedule of which para. 16 referred to big mansion was prepared under section 10 and was, therefore, referable only to transfer of evacuee properties. Reliance was placed on Haji Fateh Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others (P L D 1963 S C 311). It was argued that a unique feature of section 30 was that contrary to the complete bar of civil Courts jurisdiction in Rehabilitation and Settlement matters it expressly conferred jurisdiction on civil Courts to deal with post-transfer disputes between the transferees and the occupants under the ordinary Rent laws in order to avoid complications of duality of proceedings. It was submitted that under section 29, no action could be taken against a person if his "possession" fell within the definition of the word as contained in section 2(6) of the Act. It was next submitted that the mere issuance of P. T. O. did not take away the rights of the occupants and the delivery of possession also included notional or constructive possession and not necessarily actual physical possession. E. A. Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf (P L D 1914 S C 536) and Rahim Bakhsh v. Ch. Ahmad Bakhsh and others (P L D 1964 S C 189) were pressed into service in this regard. Lastly, it was submitted that fundamental principle of interpretation was to keep in view the object behind the provision and the intention of the law-giver which should be the determining consideration. Reliance was placed on Mian Rafi-ud-Din and 6 others v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 2 others (P L D 1971 S C 252). Before proceeding to examine the points raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be advantageous to reproduce the statutory provisions which call for interpretation, namely, section 2(4) defining "house", section 2(6) defining "possession", sections 29 and 30 and para. 16 of the Schedule, which are as follows : "2(4) 'House'.-`House' means evacuee residential premises of any value in urban area, or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises, notwithstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or outhouse is in the possession of a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential premises, but does not include any residential building situated within the premises declared under paragraph 6 of the Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel: (Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consist of more than one residential unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of said building or premises shall be deemed to be a house Provided further that where the area of the gardens and grounds attached or appurtenant to a house exceeds three times the plinth area of the house including outhouses and garages, if any, the area so in excess, or such part thereof as the Chief Settlement Commissioner may determine, shall not be treated as part of the house). 2(6) 'Possession'.-`Possession' means possession obtained in pursuance of an order passed on or before the 20th day of December 1958, by Rehabilitation Authority or any other officer authorised or permitted by the Central or Provincial Governments Provided that if a question arises whether an officer was so authorised or permitted the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in that behalf shall be final Provided further that the Central Government may, by order in writing direct that a class or classes of such persons as have not obtained possession as aforesaid shall subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, be deemed to be in possession for the purposes of this Act. (29) Ejectment.-(1) The Chief Settlement Commissioner may eject of cause to be ejected any person in possession or occupation of any evacuee property or any property acquired under section 3 whose? possession or occupation is not authorised by any of the provisions of this Act, or who contravenes or may have contravened any of the terms and conditions under which the property is hold by him or who, when called upon, has failed to pay public dues, or has wilfully caused damage to any such property allotted to or occupied by him, and for the purpose of such ejectment use or cause to be used such force as may be considered necessary. (2) The Chief Settlement Commissioner may delegate the powers under Subsection (1) to any Settlement Commissioner or Additional or Deputy Settlement Commissioner. (30) Protection of certain occupants.-(1) Where any person is in possession of any evacuee house, or shop, or has been declared on or before the 20th of December 1958, by a Custodian to have tenancy rights from a date prior to the 14th day of August 1947, in any industrial concern. Cinema house or printing press which is transferred to any other person under the provisions of this Act, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law such person shall without prejudice to any other right which he may have in that house, shop, industrial concern, cinema house or printing press, be deemed to be a tenant of the transferee on the same terms and conditions as to payment of rent or otherwise on which he held it immediately before transfer Provided that : (a) it shall be lawful for the transferee to charge a rent on the basis of the latest assessment carried out by the Municipality or local authority, as the case may be for other properties in the locality generally ; and (b) it shall not be . . . . . by registered post (acknowledgment due). (2) Where the transferee does not give notice within one month . . . . . by the tenant. (3) Nothing in proviso (b) to subsection (1) shall apply to a tenant (i) who has not within 3 months from the date of . . . . the transfer ; or (ii) who after the transfer, has sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the house or shop . . . . . case may be. (4) On the expiry of the period mentioned in proviso (b) to subsection (1) or on the contravention of . . . . . to such relationship." Paragraph 16 of the Schedule to the Act.-Every building or premises, whether residential or commercial, declared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner or an officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf to be a big mansion or hotel, shall be disposed of by unrestricted public auction ; Provided that no building the monthly rent of which in 1946 was less then five hundred rupees shall be declared to be a big mansion or hotel." Having carefully considered the contentions raised by Mr. S. M. Zafar in the light of concurrent findings handed down in the two Full Bench judgments of Karachi and Lahore, I am clearly of the view that the judgments must be upheld and the view taken by them should prevail. Although normally an expression if defined in a Statute has to be given the same meanings wherever it occurs therein, yet there is ample authority for the principle of interpretation that a definition of a term in a Statute is merely declaratory in nature and should not be unnecessarily inflicted where it does not fit in with the subject and context and might lead to anomalies and absurd results. Further strength is lent to this justifiable invocation of the above principle by the express qualification or exception with which section 2 was prefaced, namely, "unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context". From this, it is abundantly clear that the definition of "house" or of "possession" like any other definitions contained in section 2 would apply only where it is in consonance and fits in with the subject and the context and not otherwise. The repugnancy is only too obvious and incapable of resolution on any other reasonable hypothesis. Paragraph 16 of the Schedule conferred a discretionary power on the Chief Settlement Commissioner to declare any building as a big mansion or hotel, the only pre-condition however, being that its monthly rent in the year 1946 should not have been less than Rs.

500. The requirement was merely qualificatory in nature and not obligatory. The only consequence flowing from such a declaration was the change in the mode of transfer which was confined to public auction coupled with the indivisibility of the premises so that it had to be wholly disposed of as one unit. There appears to be no logic behind the artificial discrimination between the occupants of an ordinary house and those of a big mansion or a hotel and therefore, the only reasonable interpretation to be placed on section 30 is to interpret the word "house" used therein in its ordinary sense and not in the technical sense envisaged by section 2(4). I am, therefore, of the view that the High Court had rightly come to this conclusion on the basis of Indian Immigration Trust Board of Natal v. Govindasamy (AIR1920PC114) and Pratap Singh v. Gulzarl Lal and others (AIR1942Al1.65) from which relevant observations were quoted besides ire reproduction of a relevant quotation from Crales on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, 1952, page 200, wherein it was consistently held that strict application of the definition of a term need not apply under all circumstances and that it should be treated merely as declaratory. The first mentioned case which is the basic authority on the point was equally relied upon by Mr. S. M. Zafar, learned counsel for the appellants. It supports him to the extent of the application of the normal rule of construing an expression in accordance with the meanings assigned to it by the interpretation clause in the Statute but it also envisaged an exception to the rule as clearly reflected in the following observation : "Now, when the interpretation clause in a statute says that such and such an expression shall include so and so, a Court in construing a statute is bound to give effect to the direction unless it can be shown that the context of the particular passage where the expression is used shows clearly that the meaning is not in this place to be given effect to, or unless there can be alleged some general reasons of weight why the interpretation clause is to be denied its application." This view finds further support from the use of the omnibus protective expression "any evacuee house" in section 30 which clearly reflects the intention of the law-giver, namely, that in this context the word "house" has not been used in its technical sense. As rightly held by the Full Bench on the basis of The Queen v. Rowlands and others ((1882) 8 Q B D 530) and Duck v. Bates ((1884) 12 Q B D 79)' the word "any" is an expression of utmost generality removing all limitations or qualifications. There seems to be no earthly reason as to why the occupants of a big mansion on the mere prospect of its fetching a better price should be denied the statutory protection ordinarily available to the occupant of a house transferred to another in derogation to if not? frustration of the principal object of rehabilitation of the refugees. Even otherwise, if better price were the sole criterion there is no reason why, industrial concern, cinema houses or printing presses with still better prospect of fetching higher prices in public auction should not have also been excluded. Reliance was rightly placed by the H. C. in this regard on Meux v. Jacobs (1875 L R 7 H L 481). Lastly, it would be pertinent to observe that while in the entire scheme of the Rehabilitation and Settlement Laws meticulous care has been taken to confer exclusive jurisdiction on these authorities with an express and designed ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts, section 30 of the Act is the solitary exception to this general rule creating by operation of law a statutory tenancy on the transfer of the property and leaving the disputes between the transferee landlord and the tenant to be dealt with under the ordinary Rent Laws of the land. Therefore, for this reason as well as on the view taken by the Full Beach on the basis of Haji Abdul Karim v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (P L D 1961 Lah. 394) and Subedar Muhammad Afzal v. Syed Nafis Ahmad and others (P L D 1962 Lah. 45) it is abundantly clear F that the ejectment contemplated by section 29 is confined to a stage where P. T. O. has not yet beers issued. This view is also in accord with the principle of harmonious interpretation equally pressed into service by Mr. S. M. Zafar and offers a reasonable resolution of the seemingly conflicting language employed in sections 29 and 30 of the Act. In order to remove any possible misunderstanding in regard to the two above-mentioned authorities, it may be observed that the view taken therein on another point, namely, the ipso facto extinction of all kinds of tights of all persons in evacuee properties including tenancy rights with the issuance of an acquisitive notification under section 3 of the Act was not endorsed by the two Full Benches of Karachi and Lahore and for the contrary view reliance was placed on this Court's decision in Muhammad Khan v. Settlement Commissioner (P L. D 1962 S C 284). In consequence, I uphold the view taken by the High Court iii this Full Bench decision endorsing the view of the Karachi Full Bench and dismiss the appeals. Since the cases involve interpretation of statutory provisions of a complicated nature, there shall be no order as to costs. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.-The facts relevant to the determination of the appeals have been set out in details by my learned brother Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J., and need not be repeated to extenso. The appellants in both the cases are transferees of big mansions having purchased in unrestricted open auctions in the Sear 1961. The auctions were confirmed the same year and full price for the mansions have since been paid. Provisional Transfer Orders were issued in the year 1962. A dispute arose, however, when the auction purchasers asked the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department for delivery of vacant possession of the big mansions concerned. The said Department was of the view that the tenants, who were already in occupation of their mansions, were entitled to the protection given under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, hereinafter called the Act, and accordingly delivered only constructive possession of the properties. The auction-purchasers having been aggrieved by the delivery of only constructive possession approached the High Court on Constitution Petitions which were disposed of in terms of the Full Bench judgment of the then High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 2nd of November 1965. The said Full Bench had arrived at the following conclusions : "Firstly, that the possession or occupation of a person is authorised within the meaning of section 29 only when be is eligible for transfer and that an ineligible allottee or occupant is liable to ejectment ; Secondly, that a person's possession or occupation of a big mansion would be authorised if he were otherwise, eligible for the transfer of the portion in his possession or occupation, but for the declaration of the building as a big mansion thirdly, that section 29 could not be invoked for the ejectment of a tenant of a big mansion ; and lastly, that the protection of section 30 would also ,be available to a tenant of a big mansion." On a consideration of the provisions of section 2(4) read with paragraph 16 of the Schedule 2(6) and sections 29 and 30 of the Act, my learned brother Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J., agreed with the conclusions of the said Full Bench of the High Court. I regret my inability to agree to the said conclusions. On the facts stated the short question that arises for consideration is whether in the case of a big mansion section 30 of the Act affords any protection to a person in occupation of the mansion. Section 30 has already been quoted in extenso by my learned brother, and I need only draw attention to certain words contained in the section, namely, "in possession of any evacuee house". Possession has been defined in section 2(6) of the Act as follows : "Possession" means possession obtained in pursuance of an order passed on or before the 20th day of December 1958, by Rehabilitation Authority or any other officer authorised or permitted by the Central or Provincial Governments Provided that; "Provided further that the Central Government may, by order in writing direct that a class or classes of such persons as have not obtained possession as aforesaid shall subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, be deemed to be in possession for the purpose of this Act." The second proviso was introduced by Ordinance No. LIII of 1959 on the 28th of September 1959, and acting in pursuance thereof, the Central Government issued the following Notification dated the 13th of October 1959, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, on the 29th of October 1959 ; Karachi, the 13th October 1959. No. F. 1127)/59-SI.-In exercise of the powers conferred by the second proviso to clause (6) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (XXVIII of 1958), the Central Government is pleased to direct that a claimant, a non-claimant displaced person or a local who has not obtained possession of a house or a shop in pursuance of an order passed by a competent authority on or before the twentieth day of December 1958, shall for the purpose of the aforesaid Act, be deemed to be in possession thereof, if he has been in undisputed occupation of the house or the shop since before the twenty-first day of December 1958, and no other person is otherwise entitled to the transfer of such house or shop in pursuance of a final order passed by a competent authority before that day: Provided that the rent and other public dues in respect of such house or shop have been paid by the occupant from the date of his occupation and, if he is a claimant, such amount is adjusted against his claim. Abbas Ali Khan, Deputy Secretary." It does not appear whether any occupant of the mansions concerned was in "possession" in pursuance of an order passed by the competent authority on or before the 20th day of December 1958, or was in "possession" within its extended definition as given in the aforesaid Notification dated the 13th of October 1959. Considering the "house" in its general sense as considered by the Full Belch of the High Court and agreed to by my learned brother Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J., I am of the opinion that upon the facts appearing on record none of the occupants has satisfied that he has been in "possession" of the mansion concerned within the meaning of the word "possession" as given in section 2(6) of the Act read with the said Notification of the Central Government dated the 13th of October 1959. The onus was entirely upon the occupant, who claimed protection under section 30 of the Act, to prove that he bad been in possession within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Act, and this onus none of the tenants/occupants of the mansions concerned has discharged. So far as section 29 of the Act is concerned I do not think it is applicable to a property which has already been permanently transferred to a person. Under paragraph 18 of the Settlement Scheme No. III, after the acceptance of the bid, and an payment of the full price the auction-purchaser was entitled to the possession of the property. Under paragraph 19 on payment of the purchase money in full the purchaser was entitled to the issue of a Permanent Transfer Deed. Thus in the facts and circumstance of the cases the auction-purchasers were entitled to the issue of Permanent Transfer Deeds and to possession of the properties. Under paragraph 20 of, the said Scheme where a property is transferred permanently, the transferee will acquire full proprietary rights in it. In the present case if the entire price has already been paid a Permanent Transfer Deed should have been issued to the purchaser, and if this be so section 29 is not attracted. If on the other hand no such Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued yet, the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, in my opinion, can eject or cause to be ejected the person/persons concerned. It appears, however, that under Memo. Nos. 709-PA-SC(P)/62, dated the 13th of October 1962, and 2580-PIL/67-1, P, dated the 26th of July 1967 the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner has prohibited the physical ejectment of unauthorised occupant from a "house". Vide Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958 by M. A. Latif, 1969 Edition, p.

561. Reverting to section 30 of the Act, if "any evacuee house" mentioned therein is to be confined strictly to "house" as defined in section 2(4) of the Act and not to a "big mansion", then the protection available under section 30 is not available to the occupant of a big mansion. On the other hand if "any evacuee house" mentioned in section 30 includes "a big mansion" then unless the person in occupation is in "possession" within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Act he is not entitled to the protection provided for under section 30 of the Act. In either case, therefore, the occupant is not entitled to the statutory protection given under section 30 of the Act,. My conclusion, therefore, is that the protection given under section 30 of the Act does not apply to a person who is not in possession of a big mansion in terms of section 2(6) of the Act. In accordance with the view I have taken I agree that both the appeals be dismissed without any order as to costs. DORAB PATEL, J.-I agree. S. A. H. ????????? Appeals dismissed.