P L D 1961 Dacca 445 (PLP)

SATTAR, J.‑The petitioner, Chitta Ranjan Sutar, has obtained this Rule upon the Secretary, Judicial Department, Government of East Pakistan, the District Registrar, Bakerganj and the District Sub‑Registrar, Bakerganj, to show cause why the order of respondent No. 3 refusing to accept for registration a kobala dated the 12th September, 1964 executed by the petitioner should not be declared as having been made without lawful authority and as such of no legal effect and further why the respondents should not be directed to cancel the said order of refusal and register the kobala in question. The facts of this case are as follows :‑The petitioner who claims to be a citizen of Pakistan and this fact is not disputed executed a deed of sale on the 12th September, 1964 in respect of some land in the district of Bakerganj in favour of one Nagendra Nath Mandal, a resident of Pakistan, and presented the same on that very date for registration to the respondent No.

3. The document was returned with the endorsement :‑ "The document cannot be accepted for registration unless it is accompanied by permission from the specified authority as per provision of section 4 and subsection (3) of Ordinance No. 1 of 1964 as amended by Ordinance No. 6 of 1964." The petitioner has challenged the order of the respondent No. 3 mainly on the ground that the provisions of the East Pakistan Disturbed persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1964 (Ordinance No. 1 of 1964) hereinafter called the Ordinance, on the authority of which the said order was passed, are ultra vires. In order to appreciate the points canvassed in this case, it is necessary to trace the history of the law, some of the provisions of which are under challenge in this case. On the 12th February, 1964, the Government of East Pakistan promulgated the Ordinance, above‑referred to, with the object as stated in the preamble, "to provide for the speedy rehabilitation of persons affected by the civil disturbance in East Pakistan in January, 1964, and for the protection of the immovable property of the minority communities." This, Ordinance was to remain in fore‑‑ up to the 31st December, 1964. By section 4 of this Ordinance, it was provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in fore: no transfer of any immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community shall be deemed to be valid and legal unless it had been made with the prior permission of the Deputy Commissioner of the district concerned in accordance with the provisions contained in that section. Section 6 of the Ordinance provided that save as provided in sections 2 and 5, no action taken, no decision given and no order passed under this Act shall be called in question in any Civil or Criminal Court or Tribunal. On the 3rd April 1964 Ordinance No. VI of 1964 was promulgated by which the original section 4 was substituted by a new provision. The present Rule was obtained on the 21st of September 1964. Then, on the 3rd October, 1964, Ordinance No. X of 1964 was promulgated, and by this Ordinance, for section 4, some new provisions were substituted. Some amendments were made also in section 6 of the Ordinance furthermore a new section being section 6‑A was added. Then, on the 31st December, 1964, another Ordinance, being Ordinance No. XIII, was promulgated, thereby extending the life of the Ordinance up to the 30th June, 1965, and again on the 3rd March, 1965, Ordinance No. II of 1965 was promulgated by which some amendments were made to section 4 of the Ordinance. The position, therefore, is that at the time when this case was heard, the following provisions found place in the Ordinance in question, and it is with reference to these provisions that arguments were advanced by both Mr. Paul and the learned Advocate‑General "4. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no transfer of any immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community shall be deemed to be valid and legal unless it has been made with the prior permission of the competent authority as specified in subsection (2). (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the competent authority shall be, (a) in case where the applicant proposes to transfer his immovable property by sale or mortgage only for bona fide purposes of meeting an urgent and unavoidable expenditure , (i) the Sub‑Divisional Officer of the Sub‑Division in which the property is situated, if the property proposed to be transferred is agricultural land and the area thereof does not exceed one standard bigha or twenty five percent of the total area of all agricultural land held by the applicant, whichever is less, (ii) the Deputy Commissioner of the district in which the property is situated, if the property proposed to be transferred is agricultural land and the area thereof does not exceed one acre or twenty five percent of the total area of all agricultural land held by the applicant, whichever is less, or if the property proposed to be transferred is non‑agricultural land or any building or structure and the market value thereof does not exceed rupees five thousand, and (iii) in all other cases, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commis sioner, or such other authority as may be appointed in this behalf by the Provincial Government by notification in the official Gazette ; and (b) in other cases where the applicant proposes to transfer his immovable property in any manner for any other purpose, the Commissioner of Relief and Rehabilitation, or such other authority as may be appointed in this behalf by the Provincial Government by notification in the official Gazette ; (3) An application for permission for transfer shall be submitted, in such forte as may be prescribed to the Sub‑Divisional Officer in cases falling under sub‑clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (2) and to the Deputy Commissioner in all other cases. (4) On receipt of an application under subsection (3), the Sub‑Divisional Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, shall cause an enquiry to be made to ascertain‑ (i) whether the proposed transfer has been agreed upon due to coercion, threat, intimidation undue influence, misrepre sentation, inadequate consideration, or fraud and whether the purpose of the transfer, as stated in the application, is incorrect, or (ii) whether it is a bona fide transaction and the purpose of the transfer, as stated in the application is genuine ; and shall refuse permission in cases falling under clause (i) and, subject of cases under subsection (5), may grant permission in cases falling under clause (ii). (5) All applications falling under clause (ii) of subsection (4) in respect of cases under sub‑clause (iii) of clause (a) of subsection (2) or clause (b) of that subsection shall be forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner after the enquiry, with a report, to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner or the other authority concerned. (6) No instrument for transfer of immovable property of a person who is a member of a minority community shall be admitted for registration unless it is accompanied by the permission of the competent authority. (7) No transfer under clause (a) of subsection (2) shall be permitted more than once in a year. (8) A person aggrieved by an order refusing permission under subsection (4) or (5) may, within sixty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal from that order to‑ (a) the Deputy Commissioner, if the order is made by the Sub‑Divisional Officer ; (b) the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner or the other authority mentioned in sub‑clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub section (2) or clause (b) of that subsection, if the order is made by the Deputy Commissioner; or (c) the Board of Revenue, if the order is made by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner or the other authority ; and no further appeal shall lie. Explanation.‑In this section, the word "Transfer" shall include sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage, lease, sub‑lease or any other manner of transfer or any agreement, for such transfer or change of management through a power of attorney or otherwise, but shall not include a mortgage to Government or to the Agricultural Development Bank or to the Agricultural Development Corporation or to a Co‑operative Society or to such other organisation as may be notified by the Provincial Government in this behalf in the official Gazette, for obtaining loans for agricultural purpose." "6. (1) Save as provided in sections 3 and 5, no action taken, no decision made and no order passed under this Ordinance shall be called in question by any suit or proceedings in any Court or tribunal. (2) No Court shall entertain any suit for the specific perform ance of any contract relating to the transfer of immovable property belonging to a member of the minority community or for declaration of title or enforcement of mortgage security, in relation to such property, except with the prior permission, granted after such inquiry as is considered necessary by the Board of Revenue and no such suit pending on the date of commencement of this Ordinance shall be proceeded with except with such permission. (3) No immovable property belonging to a member of minority community shall be sold in execution of any decree of a civil Court or of any certificate signed under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, except with the prior permission of the Board of Revenue." "6A. A transfer of immovable property in contravention of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be null And void and the property so transferred shall stand forfeited to the Provincial Government." We are informed that the life of this Ordinance has since been extended up to the 31st of December, 1965. The only point canvassed in this case is that the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance are violative of the 13th/15th Fundamental Rights of the Constitution and as such they are void. The respondents have filed two affidavits in opposition and both of them have been affirmed by Mr. Md. Abdul Ahad, Section Officer, Law (Judicial) Department, Government of East Pakistan. In the first affidavit in opposition it has been stated that it came to the Notice of Government during the last Civil disturbances in January, 1964 that a number of members of the minority communities had left the province due to, or for fear of, disturbances, some of them having left without making any arrangement for the care and management of their properties, some of which were occupied by unauthorised persons, and that some unscrupulous persons of the Province had been trying to grab the properties of the members of the minority communities almost gratis. This temporary legislation, therefore aimed at protecting the properties of the minority Communities by facilitating return of such of them as were forcibly occupied by miscreants during the disturbances to their owners living in Pakistan and restoring the rest to the rightful owners or their heirs who might have left the properties but of panic) when they were traced out or when they returned from the foreign countries wherein they might have taken shelter. It has then been stated that at the time of the disturbances in January, 1964 members of the minority communi ties were reported to be leaving their houses, some going to other places in this Province and some going to India. It was also reported that in some cases they were being forced to dispose of their properties at nominal prices by unscrupulous persons. The Ordinance was, therefore, promulgated to protect their immovable properties and to restore possession of immovable properties to them on their return by a summary procedure in cases of unauthorised occupation. This case came up for hearing by this Bench First on the 16th March, 1965. After hearing learned Advocates for the parties on the 17th March, the case was adjourned to 7th April, 1965 and it was pointed out to the learned Advocate General who appeared for the respondents that if be so wanted he could file another affidavit stating such other facts and circumstances as he thought necessary in justification of the restrictive clauses contained in the Ordinance. It is after this that the supplementary affidavit. in‑opposition was filed. The further statements made therein are contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 and we feel that we should better quote the same in extenso: "

3. That with reference to paragraph 8 of the petition and the affidavit‑in‑opposition it is further stated that after the Civil disturbance in East Pakistan in January, 1964, some members of the minority communities began to leave this country without making any arrangement for the management and protection of their properties and some unscrupulous persons taking advantage of the leaving of the members of the minority communities from this country, by coercion, threat, intimidation undue influence, misrepresentation or fraud, got hold of the latters' properties, either with fake or genuine documents with a nominal consideration, so to say, almost gratis and that the said members of the minority communities being paniky could not think of themselves and their pro perties properly and in the right way and thus became a victim of the said unscrupulous person and in the aforesaid manner they were going to lose their hearth and home. Thereafter, after sometimes, when a large number of persons, after regaining their proper senses, began to come back to this country, they found various difficulties to get back their pro perties and as such it became a problem on the part of the Government to rehabilitate them smoothly. That in some cases it was found that false declaratory suits were brought in the Courts of law in respect of the immovable properties of the minority communities. To that end of view it was necessary on the part of the Government for the speedy rehabilitation of the persons affected by the said civil disturbance and for the protection of the immovable properties of the minority communities to make immediate temporary legislation. That' by the East Pakistan Disturbed persons (Rehabilitation) Ordinance,1964 no absolute restriction has been put with regard to the transfer of the immovable property belonging to the members of the minority communities. That due to some improvement of the situation in the country the provisions of the said Ordinance have been slackened by amendments and in course of time when the normal condition will prevail amongst the members of the minority communities, the same will be totally deleted. That by the said Ordinance the Government are not taking away the 13th Fundamental Right but are imposing some restrictions which are reasonable in the peculiar circumstances prevalent in the country. That by the said Ordinance the Government do not mean to take away the right of the minority communities for an indefinite period. That in the proper cases necessary permissions are granted to dispose of immovable properties belonging to the members of the minority communities. That by no stretch of imagination it can be said that by the said Ordinance a section of people have been deprived of their inherent right. That the said Ordinance has been promulgated for the benefit of the minority communities so that they cannot be deprived of their properties by some fraudulent means. That the said Ordinance is only a check to a fraud". "

4. That it was also brought to the notice of the Govern ment that after the said Civil disturbance some unscrupulous persons were creating false and fake documents by adopting fraudulent means and were grabbing the properties of the minority communities practically on gratis and all these incidents were being published in the daily newspapers and the deponent craves leave to refer to those newspapers which will be placed before the Court at the time of hearing, that by the creation of the aforesaid documents it was difficult to come back to this country on the part of the members of the minority communities, who have already left this country for fear of or due to the said disturbance and the members of the minority communities were still on the flow of leaving this country without making any arrangement or protection of their pro perties and some unscrupulous persons did not at all hesitate to occupy the properties of the minority communities by any means whatsoever. That the said peculiar circumstances of the country compelled the Government to bring a temporary legislative measure for the protection of the properties of the minority communities and to rehabilitate them." As we have already noticed, the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance have been challenged on the ground that they go counter to the provisions of Fundamental Right No. 13 as the restrictions cannot be considered to be reasonable in the context of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the Pro vincial Government. They have also been challenged as dis criminatory and as such violative of Right No.

15. It cannot be, and has not also been disputed that prior permission of the nature provided for in sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance amounts to a restriction on the Fundamental Right regarding acquisition and disposal of property guaranteed by the Constitution. The first question that falls to be determined, therefore, is: Whether the restrictions in question are justified by the circumstances disclosed in the affidavit‑in‑opposition ; or, in other words, whether, in the light of those circumstances, it can be said that the restrictions are reasonable. Fundamental Right No. 13 is couched in these terms: "Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to acquire, bold and dispose of property," We have already noted the object with which the Ordinance was promulgated. In this connection, reference may usefully be made to sections 2 and 5 of the Ordinance which provide. "2. (1) Any Magistrate or other officer, specially empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government by general or special order may, after such local enquiry and with such police or other help as he may consider necessary, evict summary any person who may have occupied or taken possession in any manner whatsoever of any house, hut, structure or land which any other person has had to leave or has left on account of, or in apprehension of, the civil disturbance in January, 1964. (2) The Magistrate or other officer referred to in subsection (1) shall, as early as possible, restore possession of such house, hut, structure or land to the person who is proved to his satisfaction to have been in possession thereof and has left it in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1). (3) When a person, who was in possession of any house, hut, structure or land before the Civil disturbances of January 1964 and has left it in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1) is not available for the restoration of such property under sub section (2), or for there occupation of such property, although lying vacant, the Magistrate or the other officers referred to in subsection (1) may order the property to be put under the management of the Evacuee Property Management Committee constituted under section 3 of the East Bengal Evacuees (Administration of Immovable Property) Act, 1951, or under the management of such other authority is may be specified by the Provincial Government in accordance with the rules made in this behalf." "5. (1) If, on an enquiry under section 2, any Magistrate or other officer specially empowered under that section is satisfied that any person is in possession of any house, hut, structure or land under an instrument registered under the Registration Act, 1908 within a period from the 1st January, 1964, to the date of commencement of this Ordinance, obtained under coercion, threat, intimidation, undue influence, misrepresentation or fraud, he shall refer, or the transferor may apply, to the District Judge within thirty days of the completion of the enquiry, for cancellation of the instrument. (2) The District Judge shall, after notice to the transferee and hearing the parties, pass an order within a month of the receipt of reference or application canceling the instrument and ordering restoration of possession to the person who is proved to his satisfaction to have been in possession thereof before the Civil disturbance of January, 1964 Provided that the District Judge may extend the time for good and valid reason to be recorded in writing. (3) When the person found to be in possession of any such property before the civil disturbances of January, 1964, is not traceable, the District Judge may order the property to be put under the management of the Evacuee Property Management Committee under section 3 of the East Bengal Evacuees (Administration of Immovable Property) Act, 1951 or under the management of such other authority as may be specified by the Provincial Government in accordance with rules made in this behalf." If the above provisions to which no exception has been taken at the time of hearing of this case, are examined, it will be seen that sufficient powers have been given to certain, authorities to deal with cases of illegal occupation or possession of properties of members of the Minority Communities taking advantage of the disturbed conditions that prevailed during January, 1964. Any document that was taken under these circumstances under coercion, threat, intimidation, undue influence or misrepresenta tion or fraud can be cancelled by the District Judge under section 5 on a report received from a Magistrate holding an enquiry under section

2. In order to determine the reasonableness of any restriction imposed by law on a Fundamental Right, the questions that are to be considered are whether the object of the legislation justifies the provisions and whether the object in the light of the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of the legislation or thereafter during the period during which the law was to remain in force could be attained only in the manner provided for in the legisla tion. If the restrictive provision has no relation to the object of the legislation or it goes in excess of the object or the prevail ing circumstances do not warrant the restriction, then it cannot be said to be reasonable and the jurisdiction or this Court to strike down such a legislation cannot be questioned. If any restriction is imposed on the property right of certain persons by a law enacted in public interest and it is found that such restriction is necessary to attain the object of the law, the restriction is undoubtedly reasonable. If, however, the restriction is found to be unnecessary to achieve the object of the law, then the restric tion is unreasonable. It is now settled by authorities, the correctness of which cannot be disputed, that reasonableness of any restrictive clause in any law has to be determined with reference to the prevailing circumstances at the time when the restriction is imposed and with the object with which it is done. It is in this context that the learned Advocate‑General has pointed out that, in determining the reasonableness of the restrictions in question we should take into account the fact that the Ordinance was promulgated immediately after the disturbances of January, 1964 which took place in East Pakistan in the wake of the disturbances in West Bengal and at a time when members of the minority communities were forced by circumstances to make some arrangement with regard to their properties. He has then pointed out that the law in question is a temporary one and was promulgated in an emergency. We have given our anxious consideration to these facts. It is true that the Ordinance was promulgated in public interest and some of its provisions, particularly those contained in sections 2 and 5, were designed to give relief to members of minority Communities who had under undue influence, coercion, threat, intimidation, or misrepresentation, or fraud, during the time the, disturbances continued, had either to dispose of their properties or made some other arrangement against their will. We, however, fail to see how, in order to gain the object of this Ordinance, the provisions of sections 4 and 6 are considered a necessary when perfect p: ace and tranquility prevail in the Province. It has not been stated in the Legislation or in the affidavits‑in‑opposition that this law was meant also to prevent large scale migration of members of the minority communities. Even assuming that to be one of the objects, it has not been made clear to us as to how the provisions of sections 4 and 6 were found necessary to be continued indefinitely and particularly when members of minority communities instead of leaving this country were returning on large numbers. This was the position when we heard the case and we have no material before us to hold that the position has in any way changed since then. Regard being had to these facts, we are unable to agree with the learned Advocate General that the circumstances, to which he drew our attention, point unmistakably to the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance. It will be seen that section 4(l) requires prior permission to be taken of the authorities mentioned in that section before any member of a minority community transfers any immovable property belonging to him. Section 4 (2) (a) provides that where an immovable property is proposed to be transferred by sale or mortgage the person so desiring to transfer must prove that he intends to transfer the said property for bona fide purposes of meeting an urgent and unavoidable expenditure. Section 4(4) (i) provides that on receipt of an application for permission the sub‑Divisional Officer or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, shall cause an enquiry to be made to ascertain whether, amongst other things, the purpose stated in the application is correct. It is then provided that if it is found that the purpose stated is not correct then permission shall be refused. Sub section (7) of section 4 provides that no transfer of any immovable property by sale or mortgage for bona fide purposes of meeting an urgent unavoidable expenditure shall be permitted more than once in a year. This section, in its explanation, has provided that transfer within the meaning of this section shall include sale, exchange, gift, will, mortgage, lease, sub‑lease or any other manner of transfers or agreement for such transfer or change of management through a power of Attorney or otherwise. By subsection (2) of section 6 Courts have been prohibited from entertaining any suit for the specific performance of any contract relating to the transfer of immovable property belonging to a member of the minority community or for declaration of title or enforcement of mortgage security in relation to such property without prior permission as provided for in section

4. Subsection (3) of that section provides that no immovable property belonging to a member of a minority community shall be sold in execution of any decree of a civil Court or of any certificate signed under the Public Demand; Recovery Act except with the prior permission of the Board of Revenue. Section 6‑A provides for forfeitute of the property in case of contravention of sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance. These provisions are drastic in nature and we are not satisfied that they were necessary to attain the object of the Ordinance. The circumstances, to which reference has been made, also do not show that in order to attain the object of the legislation, provisions, of sections 4 and 6 were necessary. The provisions of sections 2 and 5 are sufficient to achieve the purpose of the Ordinance. Learned Advocate General has however relied on certain observations of Hamoodur Rahman, J. in the case of Saiyyid Abul A'la Maudoodi v. The Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1964 S C 673). Those observations appear on page 788 of the report and are as follows: ‑ "It seems to me that from the very nature of things no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what matters are relevant or irrelevant for the purposes of determining the reasonablesness of an Act or restriction. Reasonableness is itself a relevant term. What is unreasonable in one given set of circumstances may well be reasonable in another different set of circumstances. In my view, it will neither be possible nor advisable to lay down any exact or precise enumeration of the matters which may be taken into consideration for testing the reasonableness of such a restriction, for, there can be no general standard of reasonableness applicable to all cases. It will certainly depend upon the nature of the right sought to be restricted, the nature and extent of the restrictions sought to be imposed, the nature of the circumstances in which the restric tion is to be imposed, the evil sought to be prevented or remedied, the necessity or urgency of the action proposed to be taken and the nature of the safeguards, if any, provided to prevent possibilities of abuse of power. All these and there may well be other considerations, such as the objectives of the legislation and the prevailing conditions at the time, in the light of which the reasonableness has to be considered. This much however, appears from decided cases that the Courts both in this country and in other foreign jurisdictions have treated a restriction as unreasonable if the restriction is for an indefinite or an unlimited period or disproportionate to the mischief sought to be prevented or if the law imposing the restriction has not provided any safeguard at all against arbitrary exercise of power. I am not prepared to go to the extent saying that if a law merely confers an unfettered discretion, then the law must necessarily be bad. It is not difficult to conceive of situations where power must be vested in some authority to take immediate action to prevent acts fraught with imminent danger, even though such prevention encroaches upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution of the country. But here again the reasonableness of it would be dependent upon the circumstances which necessitate the taking of such drastic action, the duration for which it is to be taken, and the safeguards provided against abuse of power. If the circumstances do not demand such action or the action is disproportionate to the mischief to be prevented, and can be exercised without any check, then the restriction will certainly be unreasonable". It. is true that there cannot be any absolute standard for determin ing reasonableness of a restriction. It has to be judged with reference to the prevailing circumstances when a particular evil is sought to be remedied. We have already pointed out that we have taken into account the facts and circumstances stated in the two affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent and we have found ourselves unable to accept the argument of the learned Advocate‑General that those facts and circumstances justified the imposition of the impugned restrictions and their continuance even after complete normalcy returned of this Province. In taking the view that we have already expressed, we have not been unmindful of the fact that under this Ordinance an appeal has been provided against an order of refusal to permit transfer by a minority community of his property. The argument on behalf of the petitioner has proceeded on the basis that the restrictions imposed by sections 4 and 6 affect members of minority communities only. Is that so ? The 13th Fundamental Right not only provides for freedom in regard to property by way of disposition but has also guaranteed freedom in respect of acquisition and holding of properties. It is therefore incorrect to say that by this Ordinance only members of minority communities have been affected. A person has a free choice provided the owner of a particular property agrees to acquire that property. This free choice, in our view, has also been affected by the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of the Ordinance irrespective of the fact whether the intending purchaser is a member of a minority community or a member of the majority community. Section 6A has no existence independent of sections 4 and

6. The other provisions of the Act however are not affected by our conclusions regarding sections 4 and

6. The provisions of the Ordinance contained in sections 4 and 6 have also been attacked as violative of Fundamental Right No. 15 which is worded thus: "All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law." This Fundamental Right does not prevent the Legislature to provide by law reasonable classification for attaining the object of the law. We have been unable to accept the argument advanced by Mr. Paul in the absolute form in which ‑he has done in regard to this Fundamental Rights. His contention has been that, since this law only affects members of minority communities, it is discriminatory in nature and is therefore violative of the equality clause provided by the Constitution. In our view, in determining whether the 15th Fundamental Right is encroached upon by a law in relation to property right the provision of that right cannot be considered in isolation and without reference to the provisions of the 13th Fundamental Right. When a law is made in regard to property right of a particular community, the validity of such a law has to be determined reading, the said two Fundamental Rights, namely, the 13th and the 15th together. If a law relating to property is found not to be violative of the Fundamental Right No. 13, it cannot be said that that law is liable to be struck down because it imposes certain restrictions on a particular community. In this case, the law under challenge relates to property right and if we could hold that the law is reasonable or it has imposed reasonable restrictions within the meaning of the 13th Funda mental Right, we are firmly of the view that this law could not have been struck down because it affected only members of a particular community. In such circumstances, the law could be said to have made reasonable classification and would have fallen within the exception to the 15th Fundamental Rights. As however we have found that the provisions of sections 4 and 6 cannot be said to have imposed reasonable restrictions within the meaning of the 13th Fundamental Right, those provisions are liable to be declared void, and in that sense they are also discriminatory so far as the 15th Fundamental Right is concerned. As section 6‑A cannot exist independently of sections 4 and 6 that also falls. Regard being had to our findings above, this Rule is made absolute and it is declared that the order passed by the respon dent No. 3 refusing to accept for registration the petitioner's kobala dated the 12th September, 1964 has been made without lawful authority and is as such of no legal effect. The respon dents are directed to cancel the said order of refusal and register the kobala if otherwise in order in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. In view of the facts of this case there will be no order as to costs. Mr. Abdur Rab II on behalf of the respondents prays for a certificate under Article 58 of the Constitution. We certify that this case involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. SIKANDAR ALI, J.‑‑I agree. ABDULLA, J,‑I agree. S. Q. Rule made absolute.