P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑

This order will govern not only this writ petition but Writ Petitions No. 558 of 1959, No. 588 of 1959, No. 589 of 1959 and No. 618 of 1959 as well because an important question, namely, the validity of the appointment of Screening Committees which scrutinized the cases of Government employees and employees of municipal and other corporations, arises in all of them.

2. Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959 was presented through Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah, Advocate, by Mirza Muhammad Ali, who used to be the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, in the District of Gujranwala. He received a notice signed by Captain Mahabat Khan, Chairman of the Screening Committee appointed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, to consider the cases of employees of the Municipal Committees in Gujranwala District, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for unsatisfactory service. The petitioner offered an explanation which was not considered satisfactory and a letter was sent to him on the 23rd of September 1959, informing him that the Screening Committee being of the opinion that the petitioner had lost his efficiency had recommended to the appointing authority that he be removed from service. It was also said in this com munication that the petitioner could appeal to his appointing authority within a week of its receipt by him. A few days later, however, a communication was sent by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, to the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Kamoke to the effect that Mirza Muhammad Ali, Secretary, Municipal Committee should be directed to file his appeal to the Commis sioner, Lahore Division, not later than the 28th of September 1959, if he intended to appeal against the decision of the Screening Committee. The petitioner sent an appeal to the Commissioner, Lahore Division, through the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Kamoke, as well as an appeal to the Administrator, Municipal Committee himself. The latter officer did not deal with the appeal of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner had already preferred an appeal to the Commissioner under the order of the Deputy Commissioner. However, in his order the Administrator said that it would seem that the appeal lay to him and not to the Commissioner. The Commissioner dismissed the appeal and passed an order removing the petitioner from service. The material grounds raised by Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah the learned counsel for the petitioner were as under:‑-- (1) That the Screening Committee was not validly constituted and, therefore, its recommendation could not be considered by any authority to the prejudice of the petitioner. (2) That the appointing authority of the petitioner was not the Commissioner and, therefore, the order of the Commissioner, Lahore Division, was ultra vires. (3) That the order removing the petitioner was mala fide because Captain Mahabat Khan was interested against him.

3. Writ Petition No. 558 of 1959 was presented through Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah, Advocate, by Nazir Ahmad, who used to be the Octroi Muharrir of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, whose case too, like that of Mirza Muhammad Ali, was considered by the Screening Committee, Gujranwala, presided over by Captain Mahabat Khan, Additional District Magistrate, Gujran wala. On receiving intimation that the screening committee had found that he did not merit retention in service, Nazir Ahmad presented an appeal against the findings of the screening committee to Mr. M. I. Minhas, Magistrate 1st Class, Gujranwala, who was at that time the Administrator of Kamoke Municipal Committee, who dismissed the appeal, and passed an order removing him from service. The main points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner were as under:‑- (1) That the Screening Committee was not a validly con stituted body and, therefore, its recommendations could not be considered by any authority to the prejudice of the petitioner. (2) That the petitioner not having been granted a hearing to question the findings of the screening committee, the order of his dismissal was bad in law.

4. Writ Petition No. 558 of 1959 was presented through Malik Amjad Husain, Advocate, by Anwar Ali, who used to be an Octroi Clerk in the Municipal Committee, Gujranwala. Anwar Ali's case was considered by the Screening Committee presided over by Captain Mahabat Khan and the recommendations of the screening committee being against him he sent a written appeal to the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala, who later on removed him from service. The main grounds raised by the petitioner were:‑-- (1) That the Screening Committee, was not validly constituted. (2) That the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gujran wala, who had passed the order removing the petitioner from service was not the appointing authority and, therefore, the order was void.

5. Writ Petition No. 589 of 1959 was presented through Malik Amjad Hussain, Advocate, by Muhammad Hanif, who was an Octroi Clerk in the Municipal Committee, Gujranwala. The case of the petitioner was considered by the Screening Committee presided over by Captain Muhabbat Khan, A. D. M. Gujranwala, and the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala, having dismissed the appeal presented to him against the findings of the Screening Committee passed an order removing Muhammad Hanif from service. The main points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner were the same as those in Writ Petition No. 588 of 1959.

6. Writ Petition No. 618 of 1959 was presented through Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery, Advocate, by Muhammad Yusuf, who used to be a Clerk in the office of the Executive Engineer, Gujranwala Provincial Division. The case of Muhammad Yusuf was considered by the District Screening Committee appointed by the Governor of West Pakistan and it would appear from the order passed by the committee on the 7th of May 1959 that in the beginning they had not taken a view unfavourable to the petitioner but on further material being supplied to them by the officers under whom the petitioner was working the District Screening Committee, Gujranwala, formed an opinion adverse to him. The petitioner appealed against the finding of the screening committee to the Superintending Engineer, P. W. D. Building and Roads Department, Lahore Provincial Division, who dismissed it on the 25th of June 1959 and passed orders removing him from service. At the time when the District Screening Committee gave their findings against him, the petitioner had been transferred to Lahore from Gujranwala. The main points raised in this writ petition were :‑ (1) That the screening committee which dealt with the case of the petitioner was not validly constituted. (2) That as the petitioner was not within the jurisdiction of the District Screening Committee, Gujranwala, at the time that they gave a finding against him, the finding was ultra wires. (3) That the District Screening Committee, Gujranwala having originally formed an opinion favourable to the petitioner could not review their order. (4) That though the notice sent to the petitioner by the Screening Committee was to show cause against compulsory retirement, the order passed was one of removal from service. (5) That the opinion of the committee was based on in sufficient material and the order of removal was unjustified.

7. The main question to be determined is whether or not the screening committees which dealt with the cases of the five petitioners were validly constituted. In this connection, the first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the first four writ petitions was that the screening committee which dealt with the case of the petitioners in these petitions was not con stituted by the authority directed by the Central Government to do so and was, therefore, not a properly constituted committee and at any rate, the committee was not validly constituted because the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, who constituted it, had acted on instructions which were not binding. In Writ Petition No. 618 of 1959 the point raised with regard to the constitution of the screening committee by Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery was that under the law a screening committee could have been appointed by the Central Government alone and as the one that dealt with the case of his client had not been so appointed but was appointed by the Provincial Government it had no valid existence and its findings could not be acted upon.

8. Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, I would mention the various provisions of law which were in force at the relevant time. On the 9th of March 1959 President's Order I of 1959 was issued whereby Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, had clauses 3, 4 and 5 added to its 6th Article. This amendment was to the effect that an autho rity not lower than the one that appointed him may suspend, com pulsorily retire (whether he has reached the age of retirement or not), reduce in rank, remove or dismiss a person in the service of Pakistan if he is found inefficient or guilty of subversive activities, corruption or misconduct and the President and the Governor of a Province were given the power to make rules in regard to these matters. On the 21st of January 1959, the President of Pakistan promulgated the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959). This Ordinance, as originally promulgated was, as was clear from its second section, applicable to persons in the Service of Pakistan within the meaning of Article 218 of the late Constitution‑which expression means the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which was enforced on the 23rd March 1956 but was abrogated on the imposition of Martial Law on the 7th of October 1958‑and to‑persons holding the office of Governor, Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, Auditor and Comptroller‑General, Attorney‑General and Advocate‑General, but a few months later an amendment, which is not necessary to be considered in the present case, was made in section 2, section 3 of this Ordinance, which empowered the setting up of the screening committees, was in the following terms:‑-- "If the Central Government sees fit to do so it may constitute or direct to be constituted one or more Committees, sole or corporate, to scrutinize the conduct of any person to whom this Ordinance applies and record a finding thereon and to make a recommendation as to punishment or other action." On the 23rd of July 1959 Ordinance XLI of 1959, called `Public Conduct (Public Statutory Corporation) (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, was promulgated by the President of Pakistan. Section 2 of this Ordinance was in the following terms :‑ "Nothing in any law, rule or instrument having the force of law shall prevent a person holding a whole time paid office or employment in a public statutory corporation whose conduct has been scrutinised by a committee constituted and empowered under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, from being‑ (a) suspended, reduced in rank, removed or dismissed for being corrupt or for misconduct or for inefficiency, or (b) retired for any cause mentioned in the preceding sub clause, or for having the reputation of being corrupt, on such pension (if any), as may be admissible to him, proportionate or otherwise, by an order of the authority which appointed him, made not later than the thirtieth day of September 1959."

9. I will first of all deal with Writ Petition No. 618 of 1959, the relevant facts of which have been detailed in paragraph 6 of this Order. The contention of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery, the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the committee which dealt with the case of his client was not constituted by an authority competent to constitute it and, therefore, its findings and the results that followed from those findings being of no validity, the order of removal of his client from service was void and inoperative and being declared as such an appropriate writ should issue. The contention was that only the Central Government was competent to set up a screening committee under section 3 of Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959) and as the screening committee which dealt with the case of his client was not set up by the Central Government but by the Governor of the Province of West Pakistan it was not a validly constituted body. This argument is based on a misreading of section 3 of Ordi nance III of 1959. That section conferred on the Central Govern ment the power to set up committees‑which came to be known as screening committees‑as well as the power to direct the setting up of those committees. Notification No. 1/3/59‑SR, dated the 24th of January 1959, issued from the Establishment Division of the President Secretariat, said that the Provincial Government of West Pakistan was directed to constitute screening committees for all officers and staff employed under it other than officers above the rank of Divisional Commissioner, officers belonging to the civil service of Pakistan, police service of Pakistan and general administrative reserve and permanent listed post‑holders who will be screened by the committee constituted by the Central Govern ment. The notification added that the instructions issued by the President Secretariat (Establishment Division) on or after the 8th of January 1959 in regard to screening shall be deemed to have been issued under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance 1959 and the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959. It, is clear that instructions already issued referred to in the notification were the instructions issued under clauses 3 to 5 of Article 6 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. Soon after the issue of the above notification the Governor of West Pakistan set up various committees of which the one which dealt with the case of the client of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery was one. This com mittee was constituted by the Governor by virtue of directions given to him by the Central Government by means of the noti fication dated the 24th of January 1959, and as section 3 of Ordinance III of 1959 authorized the Central Government to constitute screening committees, as well as to direct the constituting of the screening committees, the argument of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffary to the effect that only the Central Government could set up screening committees is without substance and cannot but be rejected.

10. The next contention of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery the learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 618 of 1959 was that because, as was evident from the letter sent by the screen ing committee to Muhammad Yusuf on the 7th of May 1959, it was clear that in the beginning the views of the screening com mittee were not adverse to him and they subsequently changed this opinion their later opinion could not have been acted upon by the appointing authority. It is true that in the beginning the screening committee appears to have been of the opinion that no disciplinary action against Muhammad Yusuf was called for, but more material was supplied to the committee by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer, whereupon Muhammad Yusuf was served with a notice dated the 7th of May 1959, in which it was made clear that the additional material supplied by his officers had made the screening committee change the tentative C opinion formed earlier. The argument of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery was that what the screening committee did was to review their previous order, but this contention is based on a misappre hension of facts. The screening committee had not given a verdict in favour of Muhammad Yusuf and what they did cannot be held to be a review. At any rate as far as I can see there is no provision in the relevant law which might debar a screening com mittee set up under the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959) from re‑opening a case which has already closed. It should not be forgotten that the screening committee s was not the final authority in the matter and that operative orders could be passed only by an authority not lower than the one who had appointed the person concerned to service. The fact, there fore, that a screening committee which had only to express an opinion about a person whose case they had dealt with and to make a recommendation as to punishment or other action changed their opinion to the detriment of the public servant would no make any material difference. Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery further contended that as Muhammad Yusuf had been transferred from Gujranwala before the screening committee appointed for persons serving in Gujranwala sent their recommendations to the Superin tending Engineer, Lahore Provincial Division, and the committee lost their jurisdiction over Muhammad Yusuf as soon as he left Gujranwala, the recommendations of the committee could not be acted upon. This argument, to support which the learned counsel referred to no provision of law or rules, is in my opinion without force. The mere fact that Muhammad Yusuf happened to get transferred from Gujranwala before the District Screening Com mittee, Gujranwala, conveyed to him the opinion they had formed about him could not deprive the committee of the jurisdiction which they had to consider the case of Muhammad Yusuf. The final order, as I have already indicated, was to be passed by the departmental head of Muhammad Yusuf who had to be either an officer of the same status as the one who had appointed Muhammad Yusuf to the post of which he was to be deprived or an officer higher in rank than the one who had appointed Muhammad Yusuf. It was not denied that Muhammad Yusuf was within the jurisdiction of the Superintending Engineer, Lahore Provincial Division, who passed the order removing Muhammad Yusuf from service and I am of the opinion that the fact that was after the transfer of Muhammad Yusuf to Lahore that the Superintending Engineer accepted the views of the District Screen ing Committee, Gujranwala, which started considering the case of Muhammad Yusuf when he was posted at Gujranwala cannot invalidate his order.

11. The next contention of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery was that the order of the Superintending Engineer removing Muhammad Yusuf from service was invalid because the notice which was sent by the screening committee to Muhammad Yusuf on the 7th of May 1959 called upon him to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired from service and did not indicate that an order of removal from service was contemplated. The conten tion that the screening committee had only hinted at compulsory retirement is not strictly correct because paragraph 2 of the letter of the screening committee after intimating that they had come to the conclusion that Muhammad Yusuf was inefficient and not fit for retention in Government service added that Muhammad Yusuf should .how cause why his case should not be recommend ed for compulsory retirement. It is true that section 3 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959) authorized the screening committee to make recommendations as to punishment or other action, but it was not said that the recom mendation was to be accepted by the authority to which it was made. A recommendation remains a recommendation which the person to whom it is made may or may not accept even though the person recommending may be a very highly placed person and if a recommendation is not acted upon no one can complain. If the law were‑which it is not‑that a screening committee could recommend compulsory retirement if they were of the opinion that the person whose conduct they had scrutinised was guilty of curtain misdeeds and could recommend removal from service on same grounds other than those for which they could recommend compulsory retirement the matter would have been different but as the relevant provisions of law do not specify different acts or omissions for attracting different punishments that can be imposed the fact that the screening committee recommended one punishment and the appointing authority imposed a severer punishment does not invalidate the order of the appointing authority. Section 4 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959) says that on receipt of the finding and the recommendations of the screening committee the appoint ing authority shall pass order according to law and does not say that the order shall be in accord with the recommendation and as the law allowed the removal of the petitioner for reasons on the basis of which the screening committee had recommended compul sory retirement the order of removal passed by the Superintending; Engineer cannot, on any reasonable grounds, be considered to be invalid.

12. The last attack of Mr. Ghulam Abbas Jaffery on the order passed against his client was that it was not merited by the material on the record and the recommendations of the screening, committee were not justified. Whether or not the order was merited is a question which no Court can examine because of section 10 of Ordinance III of 1959 and if the order was not justified on the material on the record, the remedy of Muhammad Yusuf is by an appeal or representation to the executive authorities and not by a petition for issue of writ.

13. The other four writ petitions which were presented by employees of municipal committees may now be taken up. The arguments with regard to the main question, namely, the validity of the screening committee presided over by Captain Mahabat Khan were addressed by Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah, Advocate, who appeared for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959 and Writ Petition No. 558 of 1959 and his arguments on this point were adopted by Malik Amjad Hussain, Advocate who appeared for the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 588 of 1959 and Writ Petition No. 589 of 1959. The contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah was that the screening committee presided over by Captain Mahabat Khan, Additional District Magistrate, Gujranwala, which had been constituted by the Deputy Commissioner of that District had no legal status because the Deputy Commissioner was not competent to appoint the screening committee. The attack on the setting up of the screening committee by the Deputy Commis sioner, was on two grounds, the first being that the Provincial Government had been authorized to set up screening committees with regard to persons serving in the Public Statutory Corporations and it was for the Provincial Government to name the personnel of such committees and the Provincial Government could not further delegate the powers delegated to them and the second being that assuming that the powers to set up screening committees to look into the cases of the servants of Public Statutory Corpora tions could be delegated to some other authority by the Provincial Government, the delegation in the present case was to an officer to whom the delegation could not be made.

14. The cases of servants of Public Statutory Bodies were dealt with by screening committees under Ordinance XLI of 1959, the second section of which has been reproduced in paragraph 8 of this order. This section makes it clear that the provisions of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance 1959 (Ordinance III of 1959) were as far as possible to apply to the screening committees entrusted with the task of looking into cases of employees of the Public Statutory Corporations. Under section 3 of Ordinance III of 1959, which section has been reproduced in paragraph 6, the Central Government could set up screening committees or direct their setting up. Soon after the Public Conduct (Public Statutory Corporations) (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance XLI of 1959) was promulgated, instructions with regard to action under it were issued by the Ministry of Interior (Establishment Division). In his letter No. 1/15/59‑SR., dated the 25th of July 1959, Mr. J. D. Hardy, Secretary of the Establishment Division, told the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan that steps should be taken to constitute screening committees to deal with servants of the Public Statutory Corporations under the Provincial Governments. Mr. Hardy attached to his letter to the Chief Secretary a copy of his D. O, Letter No. 1/15/59‑SR, dated the 25th of July 1959, addressed to all Secretaries, Joint Secretaries in charge of Ministries' Divisions and Chairman, National Planning Commission and said that the instructions contained in that letter should be followed by the Provincial Government with regard to employees of statutory corporations. Paragraph 3 of the latter letter of Mr. Hardy was in the following terms:‑ "You are now requested kindly to proceed with the screening of officers and staff holding whole‑time paid offices in the public statutory corporations, if any, under your Ministry. The powers to appoint screening committees for the purpose should be delegated to the Heads of the Corporations concerned. The Establishment Division should, however, please be informed of the composition of the committees." Now, it is clear from the language used in paragraph 3 of the letter of Mr. Hardy, dated the 25th of July 1959, reproduced above, that the direction issued to the Provincial Government did not say that the committees to look into the cases of servants of the Public Statutory Corporations were to be set up by the Provin cial Government itself and in fact in the letter it is clearly said that the power to appoint those committees should be delegated to the Heads of the Corporations concerned. Section 3 of Ordi nance III of 1959 did not in any manner limit the power of the Central Government to direct the setting up of the screening committees and it can hardly be doubted that a screening committee should be deemed to be validly constituted if it was constituted by the Central Government or by some one directed by the Central Government to do that. The instructions issued to the Provincial Government in this case were to the effect that the Heads of the Corporations were to appoint screening committees and as the direction of the Central Government was to the effect that the power to appoint screening committees should be delegated by the Provincial Government to the Heads of the Corporations mention ed in Ordinance XLI of 1959, it is clear that the Provincial Govern ment did not commit a breach of law if it directed the Heads of Statutory Corporations to set up screening committees to look into the cases of servants of the Public Statutory Bodies. This was not a case of delegation of powers by a person to whom they had been delegated, as Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah wanted that it should be held to be, but a case of carrying out the directions given under section 3 of Ordinance III of 1959, and I am clear in my mind that the screening committee which dealt with the cases of the municipal employees in Gujranwala could not be said to be invalidly constituted on the ground that they were not constituted by the Provincial Government but by someone else under direc tions from that Government. The action of the Central Govern ment in directing the Provincial Government to direct someone else to constitute screening committees did not amount to a contravention of section 3 of Ordinance III of 1959 and was open to no reasonable objection.

15. The second part of the attack of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah on the constituting of the screening committees in the present cases was that the Central Government having directed‑as is evident from the letter of Mr. Hardy dated the 25th of July 1959 to the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan to which reference has been made in the last paragraph‑that the Heads of the Corporations were to be authorized to set up screening committees with regard‑to Statutory Corporations, the Provincial Government could authorise only the Heads of the Corporations to constitute screening committees and could not authorise persons other than the Heads of the Corporations to exercise the power. He contended that a Deputy Commissioner could not be deemed to be the Head of a Municipal Committee and as the screening committee presided over by Captain Mahabat Khan, Additional District Magistrate, Gujranwala, was appointed by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, the constituting of the committee was invalid and its actions a nullity. Before dealing with this conten tion, I will briefly mention the instructions issued by the Provincial Government in this behalf. On the receipt of the letter of Mr. Hardy, dated the 25th of July 1959, the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, issued Circular Letter No. S.O.‑XII‑2‑19/59, dated the 1st of August 1959, to all Secre taries to Government, all Heads of Attached Departments, all Commissioners of Divisions, all Deputy Commissioners in West Pakistan, all District and Sessions Judges in West Pakistan, the Registrar, High Court of West Pakistan and Mr. M. W. Abbasi, Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore wherein he said that the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959, had been further amended by the promulgation of Public Conduct (Scrutiny) (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance X L of 1959) to provide for the screening of all officers and staff holding whole time paid office in Public Statutory Corporations and the work of screening should be taken in hand at a very early date. The second paragraph of this letter reads as follows:‑-- "You are now requested kindly to proceed with the screening of officers and staff holding whole‑time paid offices in the public statutory corporations, if any, under your Department. The powers to appoint screening committees for the purpose should be delegated to the Heads of the Corporations concerned. This Department should, however, please be informed of the composition of the committees." On the 11th of August 1959 by means of his Circular Letter No. S. O. XII‑2‑19/59, dated the 11th of August 1959, addressed to all those to whom his Circular Letter No. S. O. XII‑2‑19/59, dated the 1st of August 1959, had been sent, the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, indicated that instructions which had been issued by the Government for screening of Government servants should be observed mutatis mutandis for screening employees of the Public Statutory Corporations. On the 17th of August 1959, the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan issued his letter No. S. O. XII‑1‑154/58, which was in the following terms:‑-- "In this Department's Circular No. S. O. XII‑2‑19‑59, dated the 1st August 1959, it was stated that the powers to appoint screen ing committees to screen the officers and staff of Public Statutory Corporations should be delegated to the Heads of the Corpo rations concerned. This was done under the directions of the Central Government given under Article 3 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Ordinance, 1959. It has now been decided that so far as smaller corporations‑‑such as town committees, notified are a committees, market committees, etc.‑are concerned, the power to appoint screening committees should be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner of the district concerned. He may appoint one or more screening committees from the officers on the district staff to screen the staffs of such corpo rations in his district and to intimate the composition of the committees to this Department. "

2. So far as public statutory corporations, other than those mentioned in para. 1 above are concerned, the heads of such institutions should be formally empowered by the administrative department concerned to appoint screening committees to screen the officers and staff of these institutions. This may be done immediately. The administrative departments should intimate the composition of the Committees to this Department. "

3. The appellate authorities for the staff of such corpo rations will be the same as under their normal service rules. "

4. Immediate action should please be taken to ensure that all the screening operations in the Public Statutory Corporations under the Provincial Government is finalised before the 30th September 1959 without fail." Acting on the instructions contained in paragraph 2 of this letter the Secretary to Government of West Pakistan Health, Welfare and Local‑Government Department issued Memorandum No. CL/VII‑99/59, dated the 29th of August 1959. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum was in the following terms :‑ "The Deputy Commissioner should appoint screening committees in respect of Municipal Committees of the status lower than Class I, Town Committees, Notified Area Committees and Market Committees. For this purpose more than one screening committees may be appointed if considered necessary with a view to finalising action in the minimum of time." It was on the basis of the letter sent by the Secretary to Govern ment of West Pakistan, Health, Welfare and Local‑Government Department that the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, consti tuted the screening committee, whose composition is under con sideration.

16. The argument of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah was that the letter of Mr. Hardy dated the 25th of July 1959 having said that the power to appoint screening committees to look into the cases of servants of Public Statutory Corporations should be delegated to Heads of the Corporations and the letter of the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, issued on the basis of that letter of Mr. Hardy, being to the same effect, the Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Health, Welfare and Local Government Department could not instruct the Deputy Commis sioner to appoint screening committees with regard to the employees of Municipal Committees because according to Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah a Deputy Commissioner could not be deemed to be a Head of a municipal committee under the Punjab Municipal Act. That the instruction issued by the Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Health, Welfare and Local Government Department with regard to the appointment of screening committees was in accord with the instructions issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan on the basis of the letter of Mr. Hardy is clear from the fact that in his letter No. S. O. XII‑2‑110/59, dated the 31st of August 1959, which the Chief Secretary sent to all Secretaries to Government of West Pakistan, all Commissioners of Divisions, all Deputy Com missioners in West Pakistan, all Heads of Attached Departments and the Registrar, High Court of West Pakistan, on the subject of screening of officers and staff of Public Statutory Corporations, it was said that in case of smaller corporations it may not be desirable to empower their heads to constitute the committees as they may not be of sufficient status or seniority. In such cases, added the letter, the Deputy Commissioner of the district con cerned should exercise the powers to appoint the screening committees and in case of doubt, the case should be referred immediately to the Administrative Department concerned which should take and communicate its decision promptly. Conse quently, the question that requires determination is whether or not the instructions of the Chief Secretary in this behalf were in accord with the instructions issued by the Central Government by means of Mr. Hardy's letter dated the 25th of July 1959.

17. Doctor Nasim Hassan Shah contended that the Municipal Committees in Gujranwala, having been superseded shortly after the promulgation of Martial Law and their place having been taken by Administrators appointed under section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, the Administrators of the com mittees were the Heads of those Corporations and not the Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, the powers to constitute the screening committee could have been conferred on the Adminis trators, appointed under section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act and not on the Deputy Commissioner. If the argument off Doctor Nasim Hassan Shah were accepted, the result would be that a municipal committee could be deemed to be its own Head because on account of section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act an Administrator is to have the powers of the municipal committee which has been superseded‑a result which is so absurd that it cannot be accepted as correct. All the municipal committees in h the district of Gujranwala including that at the Headquarters were second class municipalities. The provisions of sections 231, 232 and 233 of the Punjab Municipal Act make it clear that a Deputy Commissioner has a good deal of control over the working of a municipal committee of the second class and if a person considers him to be the Head of that municipality, his belief cannot be considered to be unjustified. The question in this case is what the expression "Head of the Corporation" used in the directions of the Central Government contained in the letter issued by Mr. Hardy on the 25th of July 1959, the material part of which has been reproduced in paragraph 15 was intended to mean. This is clearly a question of fact and as it may be safely presumed‑as is clear from the letters issued by the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan from time to time in this behalf‑that the instructions issued by the Chief Secretary to Government of West Pakistan conformed to those issued by the Central Government and because, as I have indicated, a Deputy Commissioner is, for a vast majority of reasons, the Head of municipal committees in the district of which he is the administrative head and as there is nothing to show that the Central Government at any time indicated that they did not intend that Deputy Commissioners should appoint screening committees, to look into cases of servants of public statutory Corporations the contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah that a person on whom the Central Government did not intend that the Provincial Government should confer the power to constitute screening committees had been given that power by the Provincial Government is clearly without substance.

18. With regard to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959, Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah contended that the order of removal from service was not passed by the person competent to pass it and, therefore, even if the composition of the screening committees was not defective, the order of removal from service 1 was bad in law and an appropriate writ should issue so that his client may be treated to be still in service. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied on section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act which reads as follows:‑-- "(1) Every committee shall, from time to time, at a special meeting, appoint, subject to the approval of the Provincial Government in the case of a municipality of the first class and of the Commissioner in the case of a municipality of the second class, one of its members, or any other person, to be its Secretary, and may, at a like meeting, suspend, remove, dismiss, or otherwise punish any person so appointed; (2) The committee may and shall when so required by the Provincial Government, appoint at a special meeting, a person or persons approved by the Provincial Government to be its Medical Officer of Health or Engineer, and may assign to him or them such remuneration as it may think fit, and may, at a special meeting remove or dismiss any person so appointed: Provided that a Medical Officer of Health towards whose emoluments a contribution is made by the Provincial Govern ment shall not be appointed or dismissed without the previous sanction of the Provincial Government. (3) When a member of the committee is appointed secretary, he shall receive no remuneration in respect of his services. When any other person is appointed secretary, the committee may, with the previous sanction of the Commissioner assign to him such remuneration as it may think fit." The argument was that as the only thing that the Commissioner could do in regard to the appointment of the Secretary of a Municipal Committee of the second class was to approve or not to approve the appointment made by the Municipal Committee, the appointing authority was the Municipal Committee and not the Commissioner. He tried to lend support to his argument by pointing out that section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act authorized the committee to pass an order of dismissal, removal or suspension of a Secretary and he wanted it to be inferred that the appointing authority was the committee and not the Commis sioner. While adverting to this question the learned counsel had in view the provisions of law relating to Government servants who cannot be dismissed by authorities lower than those that appointed them but servants of Municipal Committees cannot be deemed to be Government servants and rules applicable to Government servants are hardly a safe guide for interpreting provisions of law applicable to servants of the Municipal Committees. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Punjab Municipal Act was brought on the statute book in 1911 while the protection to Government servants against dismissal from service by authorities lower than those who had appointed them was given to them for the first time in 1919 by section 96‑B of the Government of India Act and it is obvious that the Legislature which passed the Punjab Municipal Act could not have had the rule now applicable to Government servants in view. The mere fact that the Municipal Committee could dismiss its Secretary does not lead to the conclusion that the Legislature intended that in spite of the fact that they were providing that the approval of the Commissioner was necessary for the appointment of a Secretary of a Municipal Committee of the second class, the appointment was to be deemed to have been made by the committee. As section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act is worded neither the Commissioner nor the Municipal Committee can, acting singly, make the appointment of a Secretary, and the contention that the committee alone was the appointing authority overlooks the fact that the appointment by the committee could not be acted upon till the Commissioner had approved of it. If the contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah that the committee was the appointing authority were accepted, the order of removal from service of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959 will have been passed by an authority higher than the one which made the appointment, because in the face of a number of provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act wherein extensive powers of supervision over Municipal Committees of the second class have been given to a Commissioner their subordi nation to him can hardly be doubted, and would not ordinarily be open to any objections. Doctor Nasim Hassan Shah, however, relied on the language of section 2 of Ordinance XLI of 1959 wherein it was said that the order of suspension, compulsory retirement, removal of persons in the employ of Public Statutory Corporations from service or dismissal was to be passed by the authority which had made the appointment and contended that even if a Municipal Committee could be considered to be an authority lower than the Commissioner, his order will not be in accord with section 2 of Ordinance XLI of 1959. Even if it be held that in spite of the fact that in regard to all servants of Govern ment an authority higher than the one that made the appointment can pass the order of removal, dismissal or reduction in rank as was the position under the President's Order I of 1959 also, the order of removal or dismissal from service of servants of Public Statutory Corporations could not be passed by an authority higher than the one which made the appointment, the result which Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah wanted to follow could not follow. I have indicated that on the language of section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act neither the Municipal Committee nor the Commis sioner acting singly can be deemed to be the appointing authority and it follows that the appointment is to be deemed to have been made by the committee and the Commissioner acting together. The fact that the Punjab Municipal Act authorized the committee to pass an order of dismissal would be irrelevant in the present case because section 2 of the Ordinance XLI of 1959 which has been reproduced in paragraph 8 of this order says in clear terms that the orders mentioned in that section could be passed against servants of Public Statutory Corporations by the authority which appointed them. One has, therefore, to determine who the appointing authority was and if the order of removal from service was passed by the appointing authority the fact that it could not have been passed by that authority under section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act would not invalidate the order. If the Commis sioner and the Municipal Committee acting jointly were to be deemed the appointing authority in case of the Secretary of that committee‑and on the language of section 38 of the Punjab Municipal Act no other inference is possible‑it was the Commissioner and the Municipal Committee acting jointly that could pass the order of the removal of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959. As mentioned already the Municipal Committee had been superseded and its powers were vested in, and till the relevant time continued to be vested in, Mr. M. I. Minhas, Magistrate of the first class Gujranwala. It follows that the order of dismissal could be considered valid if it was passed by the Administrator and the Commissioner jointly. I have mentioned in paragraph 2 that Mirza Muhammad Ali the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959 sent an appeal to the Administrator of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, and one to the Commissioner, Lahore Division through the Administrator, Municipal Committee, Kamoke. On the petition of appeal addressed to the Commissioner, Mr. Minhas wrote that during the period that he had been in charge as the Administrator of Municipal Committee, Kamoke, the work of Mirza Muhammad Ali had been satisfactory and sent the petition of appeal to the Commissioner. The Commissioner passed an order that Mirza Muhammad Ali is removed from service. This order came down to Mr. M. I. Minhas, Administrator of the Municipal Committee, Kamoke, who conveyed it to Mirza Muhammad Ali. If the Administrator intended to differ from the Commissioner, he could have withheld the communication of the order of the Commissioner to Mirza Muhammad Ali and could have referred the case again to the Commissioner which he did not choose to do. In these circumstances, even if the Commissioner, could pass the impugned order only if the Adminis trator of the Municipal Committee agreed with him, the order was not invalid because at no stage did the Administrator indicate that he was not in agreement with that order and in fact by his conduct showed that the order had his concurrence.

19. Another aspect of the matter is that even if it be held that the proposal for disciplinary action should have emanated from the Administrator of the Municipal Committee and gone to the Commissioner, the case of Mirza Muhammad Ali will not become any better because the appeal to the Commissioner having been sent through the Administrator and he having expressed his opinion about the work of Mirza Muhammad Ali for the period that the Administrator was in charge of the affairs of the Municipal Committee the case has to be held to have gone to the Commissioner with the view of the Administrator thereon and just as the opinion of the Municipal Committee, or of an Administrator when the Committee is superseded, about the appointment of a person as its Secretary was of no effect if not approved of by the Commissioner the opinion of the Adminis trator‑if he did hold that opinion‑that Mirza Muhammad Ali should continue in service would remain ineffective till it was approved of by the Commissioner. But at any rate, even if the impugned order should have been passed by the Administrator, I would not have been in favour of the issue of a writ because jurisdiction to issue a writ being entirely discretionary I would not have been in favour of exercising it because the Commissioner being admittedly an authority higher than the Administrator of the Municipal Committee the petitioner would have had to prove that the fact that his case was dealt with by the Commissioner had worked to his prejudice which he has not done.

20. The next contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah with regard to Writ Petition No. 557 of 1959 was that Captain Mahabat Khan was biased against Mirza Muhammad Ali, and therefore, the order of removal from service was mala fide. The learned counsel relied on a press report of some remarks in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the appeal presented to that Court by Mr. Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan against a decision of a Bench of this Court which is reported in Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan v. Pakistan (P L D 1959 Lah. 879). These remarks were to the effect that if an order was mala fide and the statute had been used merely as a cloak to pass the order, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to grant relief would not be ousted by reason of section 10 of Ordinance III of 1959. It appears to me that it was not necessary for Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah to seek support from the decision of the Supreme Court on this point because Ordinance XLI of 1959 nowhere says that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in the matter would be barred nor does it say that section 10 of Ordinance III of 1959 was to apply to cases governed by it. The question for consideration, however, is whether the contention of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah that a writ should issue on the ground that the impugned order was mala fide can succeed. At the hearing Mr. M. B. Zaman, Assistant, Advocate‑General, West Pakistan, produced an affidavit of Captain Mahabat Khan in which the assertions in the petition against his were controverted on oath. This affidavit was in my view a com plete answer to the assertions of fact but, as I will presently show, the result could not have been in favour of Mirza Muhammad Alt. even if he had succeeded in establishing that Captain Mahabat Khan was, for some reason, unfavourably disposed towards him. Section 2 of Ordinance XLI of 1959 is to the effect that a screening committee appointed in the manner laid down in Ordinance III of 1959 could scrutinize the conduct of the employees of Public Statutory Corporations and the appointing authority could pass one of the orders mentioned in that section. The language of section 3 of Ordinance III of 1959, which has been reproduced in paragraph 8 makes it clear that a screening committee could make a recommendation as to the punishment or other action to be taken with regard to a person whose case had been scrutinized by it. What the committee could do was to make only a recommendation and not pass a final order. Even if it be assumed that Captain Mahabat Khan had ill‑feeling towards Mirza Muhammad Ali and further assumed that Captain Mahabat Khan prevailed upon his two colleagues on the screen in committee to agree with him in expressing an opinion against Mirza Muhammad Ali, I am still of the view that the argument that the impugned order was mala fide was unsustainable. The order was passed by the Commissioner, Lahore Division, to whom Mirza Muhammad Ali had addressed an appeal against the recommendations of the screening committee and as it was not asserted nor even hinted directly or obliquely that the Come missioner had any ill‑will against Mirza Muhammad Ali or that the Administrator of Kamoke Municipal Committee was for some reason ill‑disposed towards Mirza Muhammad Ali the argument that the order of dismissal was mala fide cannot be accepted.

21. With regard to the case of his client Nazir Ahmad who put in Writ Petition No. 558 of 1959, Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah said, though perhaps half‑heartedly, that as his client had not been granted a hearing to question the findings of the screening committee, the order of his removal from service was bad in law. This argument which was also raised on behalf of Mr. Zafar‑ul‑Ahsan and rejected by the Supreme Court as well as by a Bench of this Court, has no substance. The opportunity that the law gave to a person whose case had been considered by a screening committee to represent his case was a right of appeal which was conferred by paragraph 6 of the Public Conduct (Scrutiny) Rules, 1959, made on the 21st of January 1959, under section 8 of Ordinance III of 1959. This opportunity was availed of by Nazir Ahmad the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 558 .of 1959 and the fact that the Administrator of Municipal Committee, Kamoke did not afford him an opportunity to make his representations orally, which it is not asserted that he had ex pressed the desire of doing, is of no consequence and cannot invalidate the order of the Administrator of the Municipal Committee, who was competent to pass the order removing Nazir Ahmad from service.

22. As mentioned already, Malik Amjad Hussain, Advocate, who appeared for the petitioners in Writ Petitions No. 588 of 1959, and No. 589 of 1959, adopted the arguments of Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah with regard to the main question, namely, the validity of the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, constituting the screening committee presided over by Captain Mahabat Khan. In addition, Malik Amjad Husain urged that the Administrator of Municipal Committee, Gujranwala was not the appointing authority of the petitioners in Writ Petitions 558 and 559 of 1959 and was, therefore, not competent to pass the order removing them from service. In this connection he relied on the provisions of the Punjab Executive Officer Act wherein it was provided that appointments of persons whose remuneration was Rs. 25 or under was to be mad,, by the Executive Officer. It was not denied by Malik Amjad Husain that at the time when his clients were removed from service their salary was much more than Rs. 25 and it would, therefore, appear that though they may have been taken in the service of the Municipal Committee, Gujranwala by the Executive Officer of that Committee because their salary was not over Rs. 23 at that time, the appointment to posts held by them at the relevant time must have been made, by the Municipal Committee of which they were servants. It is not without significance that the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 588 of 1959 and Writ Petition No 589 of 1959 did not produce the orders by which they were appointed to the posts they were holding at the time of their removal from service. The contention of Malik Amjad Husain was that if an appoint ment could be made by the Executive Officer to a post which carried a salary not exceeding Rs. 25 the fact that the person so appointed was promoted to some other post would not make appointment by the committee necessary, but this argument cannot be accepted. The Executive Officer could only make appoint ments of servants whose salary did not exceed Rs. 25 per month and it is obvious that he could not under the law be permitted to indirectly make appointments to posts the salary of which would exceed Rs. 25 per mensem.

23. All the three learned counsel who represented the petitioners contended that the material on which the orders of removal were based, did not justify those orders. Assuming that this is so, I am of the view that even if section 10 of Ordinance III of 1959 were not applicable to a case, a Civil Court could not hold that an order of dismissal, removal from service, or reduction in rank, compulsory retirement or suspension was not justified by the material on the basis of which it was passed. In matters of service, every servant is, unless the law or rules applicable to him provide otherwise, subject to the jurisdiction of the officers given power by law or rules to deal with his case and the only power that a Court has in the matter is to declare that an order was void and this can be done by a Court only if the order is passed by an authority not authorised by law to pass it, or the order is one which assuming the findings of fact given by the Administrative Authority to be correct could not under the law have been passed or the order is mala fide, that is, that it purported to have been passed under the cloak of a power which could not N have been exercised. Whether or not the material on which the order against a servant was passed with regard to matters connected with his service was sufficient to justify the order passed is a question into which Courts have no jurisdiction to enter. In such cases the Administrative Authority has to be treated as a Tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction and its orders cannot be reviewed by Courts on the score of errors on questions of fact however gross or inexplicable the error may appear to the Court to be, because every Tribunal has the jurisdiction to decide rightly as: well as wrongly a matter which it has jurisdiction to decide.

24. No other contention was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners and as those raised by them have no substance the petitions cannot but be, and are hereby, dismissed. It may be that some of these petitioners have a valid grievance against the action taken with regard to them and if that be so I have no doubt in my mind that the Executive authorities will, as they are competent to do, grant appropriate relief which Courts may be powerless to grant. In view of the fact that the petitioners did not probably know the contents of the instructions issued with regard to screening as they were almost invariably marked "Secret" and for that reason they did not know the correct position in law, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. S. A. HAQ, J.‑

I agree. A.H. Petitions dismissed.