2026 PLP 990 (CLC)

ARBAB MUHAMMAD TAHIR, J.

The titled petition was earlier decided by this Court vide judgment, dated 10.09.2025, which was assailed by the respondent Department before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.867/2025. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 10.11.2025 remanded the matter to this Court by framing the following question.- "Whether the impugned order dated 16.01.2025, passed by Petitioner No.1, is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature, or administrative, or issued in exercise of executive authority? If it is held to be administrative or executive in nature whether, in the absence of an express power to revisit the earlier order under Rules framed under Motor Vehicle Ordinance, 1965, the authority could nevertheless invoke Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to set aside the earlier order?"

2. The petitioner, through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 impugns order dated 16.01.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner / Director General Excise and Taxation, Islamabad, whereby the review application filed by the Excise and Taxation Officer, Islamabad against order, dated 09.12.2024, was allowed.

3. The Relevant facts are that initially the petitioner approached the office of Motor Registration Authority, Islamabad Capital Territory for transfer of ownership of vehicle bearing registration No.VI-80, Chassis No. ZRE141-4508515, Engine No.Q009513, Toyota Corolla-Gli, Model 2012 Color Silver (hereinafter "Vehicle"). The Vehicle was presented for physical inspection for transfer of under Rule 47(3) of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicle Rules, 1969. During the process of physical inspection, official of the Motor Registration Authority found the same suspicious, hence the same was impounded and sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Islamabad for Chemical Examination of its chassis number. The Laboratory report confirmed the chassis number plat to be cut and weld. The vehicle was confiscated vide order, dated 12.06.2024, passed by the Excise and Taxation Officer of Motor Registration Authority, against which an appeal under rule 8(1) of the Islamabad Capital Territory (Seizure and Disposal of Motor Vehicles) 'Rules, 2014 (hereinafter "Rules of 2014") was preferred by the petitioner before the Director Excise and Taxation. The said appeal was dismissed vide order, dated 24.07.2024. The petitioner then filed revision petition under rule 8(2) before the Director General, Excise and Taxation. The revision petition filed by the petitioner was allowed vide order, dated 09.12.2024. Feeling aggrieved by order, dated 09.12.2024, the Excise and Taxation Officer filed review petition before the Director General, which was allowed vide order, dated 16.01.2025 whereby the revisional order, dated 09.12.2024 passed by the same forum was recalled, hence this petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Director General Excise and Taxation was not vested with any authority under the Rules of 2014 to review or recall his own order passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Rule 8(2). It is contended that the power of review is not an inherent power and can only be exercised where it is expressly conferred by statute. In the absence of any provision in the Rules of 2014 conferring such power, the Director General could not have entertained or allowed the review petition filed by the Excise and Taxation Officer. According to the learned counsel, a power not vested in an authority under the law cannot be assumed or exercised. Learned counsel further submits that the order dated 09.12.2024, passed by the Director General in revision, satisfies all the essential attributes of a quasi-judicial order, inasmuch as it was passed after examining the record and determining the controversy between the parties. It is argued that the statutory scheme of the Rules of 2014 itself provides a hierarchy of remedies, including appeal and revision, which indicates that the authorities functioning under the said Rules are exercising quasi-judicial powers. According to the learned counsel, had the authorities been exercising purely administrative powers, there would have been no necessity for the legislature to provide a revisional forum. It is further contended that a quasi-judicial order determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, and once such determination is made, the principle of finality of adjudication becomes applicable. Learned counsel submits that the doctrine akin to res judicata is attracted to quasi-judicial orders as well, preventing the same authority from reopening or reconsidering its own decision in the absence of a statutory power of review. Consequently, after passing the revisional order dated 09.12.2024, the Director General became functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to recall the same. Learned counsel also argues that reliance placed by the respondents upon Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter "Act of 1897") is misconceived, as the said provision is applicable only to administrative or executive orders and does not extend to orders passed in exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, the impugned order dated 16.01.2025, whereby the earlier revisional order dated 09.12.2024 was recalled on a review petition filed by the Excise and Taxation Officer, is without lawful authority and liable to be set aside.

5. Conversely, learned State Counsel has argued that the impugned order passed by the Director General recalling the earlier revisional order is lawful and justified in the circumstances of the case. It is contended that the revisional order dated 09.12.2024 was not legally sustainable as it failed to properly appreciate the material available on record, particularly the forensic report confirming that the chassis number plate of the vehicle had been cut and welded, which rendered the vehicle liable to confiscation under the relevant law. Learned State Counsel further submits that the orders passed by the departmental authorities under the Rules of 2014 are essentially administrative in nature, and that the impugned order does not satisfy the essential characteristics of a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. According to the learned State Counsel, since the orders passed in such matters are administrative, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply and the authority which passed the order retains the power to reconsider or modify the same. It is further argued that under Section 21 Act of 1897, the authority having the power to issue an order also possesses the power to add to, amend, vary, or rescind such order, unless a contrary intention appears in the relevant statute. In view of this statutory principle, the Director General Excise and Taxation, being the authority competent to pass the revisional order, was also competent to recall or modify the same upon realizing that the earlier order was illegal or contrary to law. Learned State Counsel therefore contends that the impugned order dated 16.01.2025 was passed in lawful exercise of authority in order to correct an earlier erroneous decision and prevent the release of a vehicle whose chassis number had been tampered with, and thus the same does not call for interference by this Court.

6. Heard. Record perused.

7. Before examining the rival submissions of the parties, it would be appropriate to first delineate the legal distinction between judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative orders, and thereafter examine the scope and applicability of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as the resolution of the controversy in the present case essentially depends upon the nature of the order passed by the authority concerned.

8. A "judicial order" is one passed by a court or tribunal in the exercise of its judicial power for the purpose of determining a dispute between parties relating to their legal rights and obligations. The essential feature of a judicial order is the existence of a lis, that is to say, a contest between two or more parties requiring adjudication by a competent forum. Such an order is rendered after affording the parties an opportunity of hearing, considering the material/evidence placed before the judicial forum, and applying the relevant law to the facts of the case. The determination so made conclusively adjudicates upon the rights and liabilities of the parties and carries with it a degree of finality. Once a judicial order is pronounced, the authority passing the same becomes functus officio, meaning thereby that it cannot revisit, alter, or recall its own decision except where the governing statute expressly confers the power of review or recall. Judicial orders are binding upon the parties and are amenable to challenge only through the remedies specifically provided by law, such as appeal, revision or review. Furthermore, such determinations attract the doctrine of res judicata, which is founded upon the principle that a matter once finally adjudicated between the parties by a competent forum should not be permitted to be re-agitated in subsequent proceedings. The defining characteristics of a judicial order therefore lie in the existence of a dispute, adjudication after recording of evidence and hearing the parties, determination of rights, and the finality attaching to such determination.

9. A "quasi-judicial" order occupies an intermediate position between judicial and purely administrative decisions. The expression "quasi-judicial" literally signifies an act which is not strictly judicial but partakes of certain attributes of a judicial determination. Numerous statutory authorities are vested with powers which, though essentially administrative in character, require them to decide questions affecting the rights or interests of individuals. Where a statute entrusts an authority with the power to determine such questions and obliges it to act judicially, for instance by holding an inquiry, considering objections, hearing the affected parties, and arriving at a reasoned determination, the function performed by such authority assumes the character of a quasi-judicial funccion. In such circumstances, although the authority concerned may not be a court in the strict sense, it is nonetheless required to adhere to the principles of natural justice, including fairness, impartiality, and the right of hearing. The presence of a dispute between contesting parties before the authority is often indicative of a quasi-judicial function; however, even in the absence of a traditional lis, where the statute requires an authority to inquire into facts and render a decision which prejudicially affects the rights of a person, the decision assumes a quasi-judicial character. Thus, a quasi-judicial order may be described as a determination rendered through a judicial process, where the authority, though administrative in origin, is required by law to act judicially while arriving at its conclusion.

10. In contrast, an "administrative order" is one passed by an authority in the exercise of executive or administrative power for the purpose of regulating public affairs or managing governmental functions. Such orders are generally concerned with the implementation of governmental policy, the regulation of administrative matters, or the supervision of public services, and are not primarily directed towards the adjudication of disputes between parties. An administrative order is typically issued in the course of administrative functioning without the requirement of a formal adjudicatory process, and it does not necessarily involve a conclusive determination of legal rights and liabilities. A significant feature of administrative orders is the absence of the element of finality which characterizes judicial determinations. The authority issuing such an order does not ordinarily become functus officio and may reconsider, modify, or withdraw the order in the exercise of its continuing administrative jurisdiction. Moreover, administrative orders do not attract the doctrine of res judicata, since they are not the result of a judicial determination of a dispute rather constitute measures taken in the course of administration and regulation of public affairs.

11. Having outlined the distinction between the above categories of orders, it is equally necessary to examine the scope of Section 21 of the Act of 1897, which has been relied upon by the respondents to justify the recall of the earlier order. Section 21 embodies a well-recognized rule of statutory construction and provides that where any enactment confers upon an authority the power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws, such power shall include the power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like conditions, to add to, amend, vary or rescind such notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. The principle underlying the provision is that the authority which is competent to issue an order in the first instance ordinarily retains the incidental power to modify or withdraw the same, unless a contrary intention appears from the statute conferring such power.

12. However, the application of Section 21 is not without limitation. The expression "orders" occurring in Section 21 must be construed in the context in which it appears, namely alongside notifications, rules and bye-laws, all of which are instruments of a legislative or executive character. Consequently, the orders contemplated by the provision are generally understood to be executive, administrative or legislative orders issued in the exercise of statutory power. The rationale behind this interpretation is that administrative or executive powers are often continuing in nature, and the authority exercising such powers must retain the flexibility to modify or rescind its decisions in order to effectively regulate public administration.

13. The position, however, is materially different where the order in question is judicial or quasi-judicial in character. When a statutory authority exercises adjudicatory power and determines the rights of parties after hearing them, the resulting decision acquires the character of a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. In such circumstances, the authority rendering the decision becomes functus officio upon pronouncing the order, and the matter cannot thereafter be reopened except in the manner provided by the statute, such as through a power of review, appeal or revision expressly conferred by law. The provisions of Section 21 of the Act of 1897 cannot be invoked to confer upon an authority the power to withdraw or recall a judicial or quasi-judicial order, as allowing such a course would undermine the principle of finality of adjudication, which is a cornerstone of the administration of justice. Thus, the expression "order" used in Section 21 of the Act of 1897 refers to executive or legislative orders having regulatory character, and not to adjudicatory determinations affecting the rights of parties.

14. In view of the foregoing principles, the applicability of Section 21 of the Act of 1897 in a given case necessarily depends upon the nature of the order sought to be varied or rescinded. If the order is administrative or executive in character, the authority issuing it may ordinarily exercise the power of modification or recall under Section 21, subject to the conditions prescribed by the statute. Conversely, where the order is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature and determines the rights and liabilities of the parties after an adjudicatory process, the authority becomes functus officio upon pronouncing the order, and such an order cannot be recalled or modified by invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act in the absence of an express statutory provision conferring a power of review. The determination of the present controversy must therefore turn upon the characterization of the order passed by the authority under the relevant statutory framework.

15. Rules of 2014 have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, read with Justice Division's Notification No. F.17(2)/80-Pub., dated 31.12.1980, "issued in pursuance of Article 2 of the Islamabad Capital Territory (Administration) Ordinance, 1980. These Rules constitute the statutory framework regulating the seizure, confiscation and eventual disposal of motor vehicles within the Islamabad Capital Territory. Rule 2 of the Rules of 2014 provides the definitions of various expressions employed therein. In terms of Rule 2(a), the expression "Director General" means the Director General Excise and Taxation, ICT, while Rule 2(b). defines the term "Director" to mean the Director Excise and Taxation, ICT, Islamabad. These definitions identify the authorities entrusted with the exercise of powers under the Rules of 2014 and indicate the administrative hierarchy contemplated by the rule-making authority. Rule 3 of the Rules of 2014 prescribes the circumstances under which a motor vehicle may be taken into possession by the competent authority. The rule stipulates that any motor vehicle whose registration certificate has been. cancelled under Section 35 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, or which has been detained under Section 115 of the said Ordinance, or a vehicle the keeper of which fails to produce valid documents in support of his claim of ownership or lawful possession to the satisfaction of the Excise and Taxation Officer, may be taken into possession by such officer. The rule thus empowers the authority to take custody of vehicles in situations where the legality of their ownership or registration becomes doubtful.

16. The subsequent procedure relating to confiscation and disposal of such vehicles is laid down in Rule

7. The rule provides that where, pursuant to the proclamation made under Rule 6, no claim is received in respect of the vehicle, or where a claim is received but the claimant fails to establish his bona fide ownership, the Motor Registration Authority shall record an order for confiscation of the vehicle and confiscate the same in favour of the Government. After such confiscation, the vehicle may, subject to the provisions of Rule 8, be disposed of through sale in open auction to be conducted by an auction committee constituted by the Government.

17. The Rules of 2014 further provide a remedial mechanism through Rule 8, which confers the statutory remedies of appeal and revision. Under Rule 8(1), "any person" aggrieved by an order passed by the Motor Registration Authority may prefer an appeal before the Director Excise and Taxation within thirty days of the order appealed against, and the order passed by the Director is declared to be final, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2). Rule 8(2), however, confers revisional jurisdiction upon the Director General Excise and Taxation, empowering him either suo motu or on a revision petition filed by a claimant within sixty days of the order of the Director, to call for the record of the case and to pass such orders thereon as he may deem fit.

18. The rule-making authority has consciously devised a two-tier supervisory mechanism under the Rules of 2014, whereby the order of the Motor Registration Authority is first subject to scrutiny before the Director in appeal and thereafter open to examination by the Director General in revision. This hierarchy of remedies is indicative of the legislative intent to subject the original order to judicial scrutiny through designated forums rather than permitting its reconsideration by the same authority which passed it.

19. When the above statutory scheme is examined in the light of the legal principles distinguishing administrative and quasi-judicial functions, the nature of the order passed by the Motor Registration Authority becomes evident. The authority, before passing an order of confiscation, is required to examine the claim of the person asserting ownership of the vehicle, evaluate the material placed before it, and determine whether such person has succeeded in establishing bona fide ownership or lawful possession of the vehicle. The decision ultimately culminates either in the release of the vehicle or in its confiscation in favour of the State. Such determination directly affects the proprietary rights of the claimant in respect of the vehicle and therefore involves a clear adjudication of rights and liabilities.

20. An order of such nature cannot be regarded as a routine administrative direction issued in the course of regulatory supervision. Rather, it is the result of an adjudicatory process whereby the authority evaluates competing claims and arrives at a determination which entail civil consequences for the person concerned. The order, therefore, bears all the feature of determination. Such a structure is normally associated with a quasi-judicial adjudicatory decisions determining rights, because appellate and revisional jurisdictions are intended to examine the legality, propriety or correctness of decisions rendered by subordinate forums. The presence of these remedies is therefore a strong indication that the order passed by the Motor Registration Authority is not administrative in character but quasi-judicial in nature.

21. If the order were purely administrative, the position would have been materially different. Administrative authorities ordinarily retain continuing control over their decisions and may reconsider, modify or withdraw them in the course of administrative functioning without the necessity of invoking appellate or revisional forums. In such cases, the authority passing the original order would itself be competent to entertain subsequent representations and to re-adjudicate the matter without being constrained by the principle of res judicata. Administrative orders, by their very nature, do not ordinarily attain finality in the sense in which adjudicatory decisions do.

22. The existence of this hierarchical framework therefore constructively implies that the original authority, after passing its order, cannot revisit or modify the same at its own instance. To hold otherwise would render the appellate and revisional remedies largely redundant and would defeat the very purpose of creating a the appellate and revisional forums. The legislative intent underlying Rule 8 of the Rules of 2014 is thus that once an original order is passed by the Motor Registration Authority, the same cannot be recalled, modified or re-adjudicated by the very forum which passed it; rather, it must be assailed before the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be.

23. In other words, upon passing the original order, the Motor Registration Authority effectively becomes functus officio, and the legality or propriety of that order thereafter falls within the domain of the higher forums created by the Rules. This interpretation not only accords with the scheme of the statute but also preserves the integrity of the adjudicatory process envisaged by the rule-making authority.

24. In view of the foregoing discussion, the order passed under the Rules of 2014 entails adjudication upon the rights and liabilities of the parties and therefore bears the character of a quasi-judicial order. Once such jurisdiction is exercised and a decision is rendered, the authority becomes functus officio, subject only to the statutory remedies of appeal or revision provided under the Rules of 2014. Consequently, the power under Section 21 of the Act of 1897, which is primarily applicable to administrative or executive orders, cannot be invoked to recall or modify such quasi-judicial determination in the absence of an express statutory provision.

25. In the present case, the, proceedings have been carried out under the Rules of 2014. Initially, the registration certificate of the vehicle was cancelled under Section 35 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, following which the vehicle was detained under Section 115 of the said Ordinance and taken into possession by the competent officer under the Rules of 2014 through order dated 02.05.2024. Thereafter, the vehicle was ordered to be confiscated under Rule 7 of the Rules of 2014 vide order dated 12.06.2024. Being aggrieved, the petitioner availed the statutory remedy of appeal under Rule 8(1), which was entertained and adjudicated upon by the Director Excise and Taxation, but the same was dismissed vide order dated 24.07.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner preferred a revision petition under Rule 8(2) before the Director General Excise and Taxation, which was duly entertained and allowed through order dated 09.12.2024.

26. The Rules of 2014 do not confer upon the Director General any authority to review or recall his own order passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Rule 8(2). Indeed, the Rules do not contain any provision empowering either the Director or the Director General to exercise review jurisdiction in respect of their own decisions. By entertaining the review petition and recalling the revisional order, the Director General effectively assumed a jurisdiction not vested in him by law and, in doing so, attempted to sit in appeal over his own order rendered under Rule 8(2). Such an exercise of authority lacks legal sanction.

27. It is further noteworthy that the recall of the revisional order was not based upon any allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of material facts on the part of the petitioner while obtaining the order dated 09.12.2024, nor was it premised upon any subsequent change in circumstances or in the governing law. The impugned recall appears to be the result of nothing more than a change of opinion on the part of the Director General, which, in law, cannot constitute a valid ground for recalling an order passed in the exercise of statutory revisional jurisdiction. In the absence of an express legislative provision conferring power of review, such an order could not have been recalled by the same authority.

28. Article 175(2) of the Constitution stipulates that no court shall exercise jurisdiction except such as is conferred upon it by the Constitution or by law. It is a well-settled legal principle that the conferment of jurisdiction is exclusively a legislative function and cannot be assumed or created by the consent or acquiescence of the parties. In the case of Federal Government Employees Housing Authority through Director General, Islamabad v. Ednan Syed and others (PLD 2025 SC 11), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is constitutionally impermissible for courts to expand or enlarge their jurisdictional domain beyond what is expressly provided by the Constitution or the law.

29. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 16.01.2025 passed by the Director General Excise and Taxation is legally not sustainable and is liable to be set aside.

30. For what has been discussed above, the instant petition is allowed. Consequently, order, dated 16.01.2025, is hereby set-aside. Parties are left to bear their own costs. UN/39/Isl Petition allowed.