1998 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

MUNAWAR AHMAD MIRZA, J.

This appeal is directed against judgment dated 14th May, 1995 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal in Appeal No.27 of 1993.

2. Material facts lie within narrow compass. Respondent a police constable of Mianwali District on deputation with Irrigation Department was apprehended from passenger Bus No.MI-5286 near Railway Crossing, M.M. Road, while carrying 1600 Grams of Charas. Excise Inspector recovered said 1600 Grams of Charas from the physical possession of respondent Mahmood Ikram on 28th August, 1987 and lodged F.I.R No.88 with Police Station Kundian, District Mianwali under Articles 3/4 of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 (IV of 1979).

3. After completion of investigation, the respondent was sent up for trial before Magistrate 1st Class, Mianwali. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the trial Court to undergo simple imprisonment for one year vide judgment dated 13th June, 1988. Considering candid admission of guilt, the trial Court granted the respondent facility of probation subject to furnishing surety and personal bond for maintaining peace and keeping good conduct.

4. The respondent on 7th April, 1988 was, however, served with notice for showing cause disciplinary action including dismissal from service be not taken against him regarding grave misconduct of transporting 'Charas'. Respondent was provided hearing and after considering the material the competent authority vide order dated 5th August, 1990, dismissed him from service.

5. Respondent towards 18th August, 1990 filed departmental appeal against his dismissal from service, which was eventually dismissed on 17th November, 1.990 after providing him fair opportunity of hearing. He then sent another representation to Inspector-General of Police, Punjab on 16th December, 1990, which also, met the same fate and was rejected on 16th December, 1992.

6. Thus feeling aggrieved respondent had preferred an Appeal No.27 before Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, on 16th January, 1993. The Superintendent of Police (respondent No.3 in said service appeal) filed detailed comments. The claim of respondent set forth in the appeal was vehemently repudiated. It may be seen that the Tribunal partly accepted the appeal; and imposing major penalty of reduction in pay by a stage directed his reinstatement vide judgment dated 14th May, 1995. Operative portion whereof is reproduced below: "

10. I have hear: the parties and feel that the charge that the appellant was found to have been in possession of 1600 grams Charas by itself requires careful consideration. The appellant had in his appeal contended that he was a victim of conspiracy by certain Police Officers. The trial Court placed the appellant on probation by taking a lenient view as clearly, indicated in the Court order. Rule 10 of the Police E & D Rules provides reduction in rank as a penalty as an alternative to such severe penalties as those of dismissal or removal from service. I am, therefore, of the view that the appellant should be re-instated in service with a lesser penalty being imposed on him so that he makes a conscious effect to show good conduct in future and the purpose with which the learned Court had placed him on probation, keeping in view his young age is not defeated.

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, I set aside the impugned order, re-instate the appellant in service and impose upon him the major penalty of reduction in pay by a stage. The period between his dismissal from service and resumption of duty should be treated as leave subject to title".

7. Department had challenged above decision through petition for leave to Appeal No. 1244-L of 1995. This Court, however, granted leave on 26th February, 1996, to consider effect of probation allowed to respondent after his conviction qua misconduct attributed to him.

8. Learned Additional Advocate-General criticising validity of the impugned judgment argued that respondent was undisputedly involved in an offence covering moral turpitude; establishing recovery of Charas weighing 1600 grams from his possession which fact was also admitted by him before trial Court while pleading guilty. He maintained that detailed departmental inquiry was not required because grave misconduct committed by respondent was further supplemented by sentence awarded to him by Court of competent jurisdiction. It was emphatically urged that Service Tribunal had acted arbitrarily in converting penalty of respondent's dismissal from service to reduction in rank. According to learned State counsel impugned Judgment even otherwise suffered from material defects because no justification was given or reasons assigned regarding aforesaid modification in the penalty.

9. Mr. Seerat Hussain Naqvi, ASC, controverted the above stand and with great vehemence argued that irrespective of admitted feature of the case or conviction recorded by the trial Court; un-denyingly respondent was granted probation, therefore, under section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance 1960 Ordinance No V of 1960) the said imprisonment cannot constitute any disqualification or disability.

10. We have carefully perused the record and considered above X., arguments in the light of relevant law.

11. It may be seen that criminal charge pertaining to recovery of Charas from the possession of respondent (Mahmood Ikram) and departmental proceedings regarding charges of misconduct drawn under Police Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1975 are quite independent and distinct. Admittedly respondent was convicted by the trial Court on his pleading guilty at the very inception and simultaneously granted probation vide order dated 13.6.1988. Two important primary questions arise for determination. Firstly, whether departmental proceedings for enquiring into misconduct of the delinquent official are affected by the pendency of criminal trial and its effect on ultimately holding him guilty or innocent by the trial Court and secondly, whether after conviction the grant of probation under section 11(2). Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960, completely obliterates the guilt automatically, protecting such offender from imposition of penalty contemplated by relevant Efficiency and Disciplinary Rules.

12. Now taking up the first point, it hardly needs elucidation that, Competent Authority with regard to act or omission of Government servant constituting misconduct, is not precluded from initiating proceedings under Efficiently and Disciplinary Rules irrespective of the pendency of criminal trial. Besides, its final decision as mere supporting evidentiary value, because both these proceedings have distinct methods and basis for arriving at final conclusion. This ours has authoritatively to case of Deputy Inspector-General Police v. Anis-ur-Rehman Khan (PLD 1985 SC 134) that judgment of conviction or acquittal against accused officer, who has violated law or rules is merely an assessment of the criminal action alleged to have been committed by him whereas departmental proceedings whereby action is sought; regulates his act or omission showing misconduct or malversation therefore, both types of proceedings are quite distinguishable and relate to comprehensive procedure specified under corresponding penal law or Efficiency and Disciplinary Rules. In the afore-quoted report two police officers were issued show-cause notices for committing acts of misconduct and malversation with Mst. Aisha, who was recovered from residential accommodation of Inspector Anis-ur-Rehman during raid conducted by superiors. F.I.R. No. 100(376) was registered against the police officers under sections 342, 354, 376 and 511, P.P.C. on 27th-June, 1980 at Police Station Mozang. When criminal case was pending the accused officers were served with show cause notice. It is quite evident that after recording proceedings under relevant rules they were dismissed from service on 2nd July, Both filed appeals before next higher authority. Meanwhile these accused officers approached Punjab Service Tribunal, where service appeals were accepted, directing their reinstatement with back benefits. It is pertinent to mention that for failure of proper proof both accused were acquitted of criminal charge. However, judgment of Punjab Service Tribunal was challenged before this Court, when setting aside the decision, their dismissal from service was upheld. The extracts from observations appearing at pages 139, 140, 143 and 144 of afore-quoted report have direct bearing on the pivotal question in hand, therefore same are reproduced below:

"As regards the scope of two proceedings it has to be noted that the criminal trial of the appellants was on a case registered under section 342/354/376/511, P.P.C. In more comprehensive terms it implied an attempt on the part of appellants to wrongfully confine a lady and attempt an assault or use criminal force with a view to outrage her modesty and to commit rape on her. These charges would fail if the lady concerned at the proper stage made a statement that she was a consenting party to all that happened. The charge against the appellants in the disciplinary inquiry was one of malversation and misconduct against one and of abusing her and escorting her to a residential portion of Anis-ur-Rehman the co- appellant against the other. The word malversation has the meaning "corrupt behaviour in position of trust; corrupt administration (of Public money etc.). Its root is in Latin 'male' meaning badly and versari meaning 'behave'. 'Corrupt' has the meaning 'rotten, depraved, wicked, influenced by bribery' (Concise Oxford Dictionary). 'Misconduct' has been defined in clause (iii) of rule --2 of Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 under with the appellants were proceeded against. It reads as follows:-- "

2. Definitions.--In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires:-- (i) . (ii) . (iii) 'misconduct' means conduct prejudicial to good order or discipline in the Police Force, or contrary to Government Servants (Conduct) Rules or unbecoming of a Police Officer and a gentleman, any commission or omission which violates any of the provisions of law and rules regulating the function and duty of a Police Officer to bring or attempt to bring political or other outside influence directly or indirectly to bear on the Government or any Government Officer in respect of any matter relating to the appointment, promotion, transfer, punishment, retirement or other conditions of service of a Police Officer; (iv) .. (v) .. These charges of malversation and misconduct have nothing directly to do with the criminal, charge or with the consent or the willingness of the victim. It is a charge relatable to the functionary and the service discipline within which he works. The Tribunal, it appears, with respect, was clearly in error in assuming that the two charges were co-extensive and inter-connected that the judicial trial was the proper alternative and once having been resorted to, the departmental inquiry should not have been held and the trial should have served as a substitute for departmental inquiry." "It appears to us that the Tribunal has laid down certain requirements for the competent Authority deciding to hold a departmental inquiry without the appointment of an Inquiry Officer. These cannot be sustained on the basis of law on the subject. The good record, the press reports and the quality of service rendered by an official is not the criteria for determining whether the inquiry shall be held after appointing an Inquiry Officer or by issuing a show-cause notice straightaway. It is the nature of the allegation, the time, occasion, the place and the presence or absence of superiors etc. Which may have a bearing on this question. No exhaustive or enumerative description of all the facts and circumstances can be provided. The competent Authority is the best judge of it. Its discretion cannot be controlled by any such standards as have been indicated by the Tribunal in its order. The scope and the law applicable to the criminal trial was different from that applicable to departmental inquiry. The charges in the two were not identical nor substantially the same. The competent Authority was not, therefore, duty bound under any provision or principles of law to await and follow the judicial verdict in the case."

13. Now we advert to second aspect whereby under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Ordinance') immunity from departmental disciplinary proceeding has been claimed. It may be seen that primary object of enacting law regarding probation was to provide reformatory measures and retrieve the amateur offenders who are neither involved for committing heinous offences nor those connected with moral turpitude; thereby making genuine attempt of restraining them from repetition of crime and ensuring their useful rehabilitation as honest, industrious and law abiding citizens within the purview of section 5(2) of 'The Ordinance: Thus, a Court trying the case has been empowered to exercise discretion in suitable cases so that 'First Offenders' may be saved from indignity of incarceration and becoming obdurant criminal by preventing their association with hardened guilty persons and thereby keep them from unhealthy influence of jail life. It is noticeable that section 11(2) of 'The Ordinance' clearly mentions about wiping away the stigma of conviction, which could create future impediments or hazards of such offender while making efforts to rehabilitate himself thus providing a shield from social sickness or his rejection in the society on the ground of past conviction.

14. Now looking to the facts of present case it may be seen, that under section 6 of the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, when departmental proceedings are drawn against the persons responsible for misconduct the Authority is competent to determine whether circumstances require detailed inquiry by appointing an Inquiry Officer or summary proceedings be held by providing personal hearing and summoning the accused officer in orderly room after apprising of the charge. Evidently in the present case required procedure was duly complied with, besides providing adequate opportunity of hearing to respondent at every stage. From the admitted facts we are obliged to examine whether disregarding of disability imposed by any law contemplated by section 11(2) of ' The Ordinance', would extend to respondent who is removed from service and awarded penalty by adopting prescribed procedure irrespective of his conviction. Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 reads "

11. Effects of discharge and probation.

(1) A conviction of an offence, for which an order is made under section 4 or section 5 for discharging the offender after the due admonition or conditionally or placing him on probation, shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings in which the order is made and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under the provisions of this Ordinance: Provided that where an offender, being not less than eighteen years of age at the time of his conviction of an offence for which an order discharging him conditionally or placing him, on probation is made, is subsequently sentenced under this Ordinance for that offence, the provisions of this subsection shall cease to apply to the conviction. (2) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this section, the conviction of an offender who is discharged after due admonition or conditionally, or who is placed on probation, shall in any event be disregarded for the purposes of any law which imposes any disqualification or disability.". Bare perusal, discloses that disqualification or disability mentioned therein is not directly relatable to conviction for an offence wherein offender has been granted probation but contemplates any disqualification or disability specifically provided. or something attached to such law which should be ignored while applying above referred provisions of the Ordinance. Therefore, for all practical purposes the facility of probation does not altogether obliterate the conviction, but eliminates its impact by lifting, away disqualification attached to any other law. Apparent by section 11 (2) of "The Ordinance" pre-supposes that disqualification should not merely result from conviction awarded to offender released on probation but must also be provided by some law other than afore-referred enactment. We have already noticed that guilt or innocence resulting from criminal trial is irrelevant for proceeding initiated against Government servant under Efficiency and Disciplinary Rules. Similarly it was not essential that material brought forth during investigation coupled with other record may constitute misconduct entailing punishment under service laws. It therefore, pre supposes that for applying provision of section 11(2) of the Ordinance the qualification or disqualification must not be merely flowing out of or consequential from conviction but must be through independent law prescribing such disability or disqualification.

17. At this stage it would be proper to mention that Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was promulgated on 16th May, 1958 in the Republic o1 India. Its section 12 broadly speaking, has similar effect and reads as under:- "

12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction.

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who after his release under section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence." This provisions of law has been pressed for interpretation on various occasions and was exhaustively dealt in case AIR 1975 SC 2216 wherein decision of (i) Kerala High Court in Civil Appeal No. 1664 of 1974 and (ii) Rajasthan High Court in Civil Appeal No.891-892 of 1974 were challenged. In Kerala case offender was apprehended on 12th August, 1972 at Olavakkot Railway Station for disorderly drunkness and indecent behaviour. Sub Magistrate, Palghat finding guilty, instead of sentencing released him on probation. Disciplinary proceedings were drawn and he was dismissed from service in view of misconduct. High Court quashed the proceedings because trial Court has not imposed any sentence and rule 14(1) under which removal had been ordered was found inapplicable. Out of other two appeals arising from Rajasthan High Court, as regards Civil Appeal No.891 of 1975 accused Narsingh was convicted for having possession of stolen copper but appellate Court (Additional Sessions Judge, Jodhpur) maintaining conviction had set aside the sentence granting him probation. Departmental authority removed him from service on 26-2-1971 wit out holding departmental proceedings. On challenge High Court quashed the decision similarly in the second case; Appeal No.892 of 1975 Railway fireman at Jodhpur was convicted under section 420 Indian Penal Code but trial Magistrate instead of sentencing him directed his re ease on probation. Consequent upon said conviction offender Abdul Hamid was removed from service, which was quashed when challenged through Constitutional petition. Analysing the farts and identical legal points the Supreme Court of India has observed with approval law laid by various Courts with regard to application of section 12 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, by making special reference to service law:-- (AIR 1975 SC 2222 to 2254-paras 12 to 15, 17, 18 and 20) "(12) It was suggested that section 12 of the Act completely obliterates the effect of any conviction and wipes out the disqualification attached to a conviction of an offence under such law. This argument, in our opinion, is based on a gross misreading of the provisions of section 12 of the Act. The words 'attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law' refer to two contingencies (i) that there must be a disqualification resulting from a conviction; and (ii) that such disqualification must be provided by same law other than the Probation of Offenders Act. The Penal Code does not contain any such disqualification. Therefore, it cannot be said that section 12 of the Act contemplates an automatic disqualification attaching to a conviction and obliteration of the criminal misconduct of the accused. It is also manifest that disqualification is essentially different in its connotation from the word 'misconduct', Disqualification cannot bean automatic consequence of misconduct, unless the statute so requires. Proof of misconduct may or may not lead to disqualification, because this matter rests on the facts and circumstances of a particular case or the language in which the particular statute is covered. In the instant case neither Article 311(2) proviso (a) nor Rule 14(i) of the Rules of 1968 contain any express provision that the moment a person is found guilty of a misconduct on a criminal charge he will have to be automatically dismissed from service. Article 311(2) proviso (a) is an enabling provision, which merely dispenses with the various stages of the departmental inquiry and the show-cause notice. Rule 14 despite incorporating the principle of proviso (a) to Article 311(2) enjoins on the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case before passing any order. Thus, in our opinion, it is a fallacy to presume that the conviction of a delinquent employee simpliciter without any thing more will result in his automatic dismissal or removal from service. (13) It was, however, suggested that Rule 14(i) of the Rules of 1968 is the provision, which contains the disqualification by dispensing with the departmental inquiries contemplated under Rules 9 to 13 of the said Rules. This cannot be the position, because as we have already said Rule 14(i) only incorporates the principle of proviso (a) of Article 311(2). If section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act completely wipe out the disqualification contained in Article 311(2) proviso (a) then it would have become ultra vires, as it would have come into direct conflict with, the provisions of the proviso (a) to Article 311 (2). In our opinion, however, section 12 of the Act refers to only such disqualifications as are expressly mentioned in other statutes regarding holding of offices or standing for elections and so on. This matter was considered by a number of High Courts and there is a consensus of judicial opinion on this point that section 12 of the Act is not an automatic disqualification attached to the conviction itself. (14) In R. Kumaraswami Aiyar v. The Commissioner, Municipal Council, Tiruvannamalai, 1957 Cri.LJ 255 at p.256 (Mad) Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., as he then was, observed as follows:-- "If for instance the petitioner is dismissed from service because he has been found guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude it cannot be said that he is suffering from a disqualification attaching to a conviction. What section 12-A has in view is an automatic disqualification flowing from a conviction and not an obliteration of the misconduct of the accused. In my judgment the possibility of disciplinary proceedings being taken against a person found guilty is not a disqualification attaching to the conviction within the meaning of section 12-A of the Probation of Offenders Act." The same view was endorsed by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Om Prakash v. The Director Postal Services (Posts and Telegraphs Deptt.) Punjab Circle, Ambala, AIR 1973 Punj 1 at p.4 = (1973 Lab IC 74 at pp.77 & 78) (FB) where it was observed: "What section 12 removes is a disqualification attaching to a conviction. In my opinion, neither liability to be departmentally punished for misconduct is a disqualification, nor it attaches to the conviction. 'Disqualification' in its ordinary dictionary meaning connotes something that disqualifies or incapacitates. To disqualify a person from a particular purpose means to deprive that person of the qualities or conditions necessary to make him fit for that purpose. " It was further observed by the High Court: "The other reason why, section 12 of the Act does not help the petitioner is that the departmental proceedings are not attached to the conviction of the offence. Departmental proceedings are not taken because the man has been convicted. The proceedings are directed against the original misconduct of the Government servant No part of section 12 is intended to exonerate a Government servant of his liability to departmental punishment for misconduct. This provision does not afford immunity against disciplinary proceedings for the original misconduct. What forms basis of the punishment is the misconduct and not the conviction." (15) A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Director of Postal Services v. Daya Nand, 1972 Serv LR 325 at p.341 = (1972 Lab IC 736 at p.747) held the same view and observed thus: "Firstly, the ordinary meaning of 'qualification' is the possession of some merit or quality which makes the possessors eligible to apply for or to get some benefit. The word 'disqualification' used in section 12 has the opposite meaning. It imposes a disability on the person to whom the disqualification is attached in applying for or getting such benefit. The disqualification contemplated by section 12 is something attached to the conviction, namely, something which is a consequence or the result thereof. Instances of such disqualification may be found in a statute, statutory rule or in administrative practice. Under section 108 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, a person is disqualified to be a Member of Parliament or State Legislature if he is convicted of certain offences. It would also be an administrative consideration in entertaining applications for jobs or for grant of licences to disfavour an applicant who is a convict. Such a disqualification is removed by section

12. This meaning of disqualification does not include the reason by a hearing prior to punishment is dispersed with by proviso (a) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Secondly the object of section 12 is to remove a disqualification attached to conviction. It does not go beyond it." (16). (17) The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Akella Satyanarayana Murthy v. Zonal Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Madras, AIR 1969 Andh. Pra. 371 at p.373 = (1969 Lab IC 1241 at p. 1243) appears to have taken the same view where it was observed thus: We are of the view that what section 12 of the Central Act has in view is an automatic disqualification flowing from a conviction and not an obliteration of the misconduct of the official concerned. The disciplinary authority is not precluded from proceedings under Regulation 89(4)." (18) The Madhya Pradesh High Court also took the same view in Premkumar v. Union of India, 1971 Lab IC 823 at p.824 (Madh Pra) where it was observed:-- "We have heard the learned counsel at some length but we find ourselves unable to agree with the above contention. The relevant words of the section are 'shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law; The words can only be read so as to remove the disqualification which under some law may attach to a person on account of his conviction. For instance, if a person is convicted of an offence, he is disqualified from standing for election to the Central or State Legislatures. But if such a person is given benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, then by virtue of section 12 of that Act the disqualification for that purpose (standing for election) will stand removed." (19) ... ... ... ... ... (20) Even the Rajasthan High Court in its judgment concerning Civil Appeal No 891 of 1975 has endorsed the view taken by the Madras High Court and followed by the other High Courts. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the Madras High Court as referred to above and as endorsed by the Delhi. Rajasthan, Punjab Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh High Courts." (Underlining is ours)

18. In another case entitled Shankar Dass v. Union of India (1985 Supreme Court Cases (I&S) 444), conviction was recorded by the trial Court for an offence under section 409, I.P.C. causing criminal breach of trust, but finding him victim of adverse circumstances directed his release on probation. However, pursuant upon said conviction Government chose to dismiss him from service. Eventually said order was set aside allowing reinstatement with back benefits mainly because departmental authority had factually acted without holding inquiry as regards misconduct. However, question concerning disability or disqualification under the law was interpreted in para. 4 at pages 446 and 447 as under:-- "

4. Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act must be placed out of way first. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or 4 "shall not suffer disqualification" attaching to a conviction for an offence under such law. The order of dismissal from service consequent upon a conviction is not a 'disqualification' within the meaning of section

12. There are statutes, which provide that persons who are convicted for certain offences shall incur certain disqualifications. For example, Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, entitled ' Disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislatures' and Chapter IV entitled ' Disqualifications for Voting' contain provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being members of Legislatures or from voting at elections to Legislatures. That is the sense in which the word 'disqualification' is used in section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Therefore, it is not possible 'to accept the reasoning of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court."

19. On considering the principle of law discussed above, we, feel inclined to hold that, by virtue of section 11 (2) Probation-of offenders Ordinance, 1960, the offender gets an opportunity of rehabilitation in the society without stigma of conviction provided the offence is not repeated and terms of bond furnished by him for good conduct and peace are honoured till stipulated period; nevertheless, in case of Government servant without prejudice to benefit available under aforesaid enactment, the Departmental Authority is not precluded from initiating action for misconduct under relevant Efficiency and Discipline Rules.

20. Now reverting to controversy culminating in present case, obviously Punjab Service Tribunal has partially accepted the appeal without assigning reasons or examining effect of section 11 of 'The Ordinance'. Surprisingly, the Service Tribunal merely taking into consideration lenient view of trial Magistrate placing respondent on probation; the Service Tribunal has proceeded to award lesser penalty to respondent, which is clearly violative of law.

21. Additionally, Department in the present case, had independently drawn proceedings contemplated under Efficiency and Discipline Rules and by giving show-cause notice, entertaining the reply and providing hearing had passed final order. It may be seen that validity of said Departmental proceedings was neither analysed by the Tribunal nor effectively challenged before it. Even otherwise, we do, not notice any glaring impropriety or legal infirmity as regards Departmental proceedings independently drawn against the respondent.

22. In the result, we are inclined to hold that impugned judgment, for above reason, is patently erroneous, therefore, merits to be set aside. Accordingly appeal is allowed, however, parties may bear their respective costs throughout. . A.A./I-9/S Appeal accepted