P L D 1964 (W (PLP)

"It is a specific instance to indicate how the undersigned is being harassed by the General Manager (Mr. Zulfiqar Khan) on fictitious and baseless allegations. He has made scores of such attempts during the last few years to bring harm to the under signed, and all these have to be redressed when records and hard facts were brought by me to the notice of the higher authorities. The above is one of such attempts and I am receiving similar unkind letters of explanation and hardship almost daily, which would make any human soul unhappy. To seek justice, I will be constrained to place all such hard facts before the Chairman, Board and the Government. I am being victimised." In a meeting of the Board held on the 16th of April 1963 in the office of the Chairman the petitioner and Mr. Zulfiqar Khan, the General Manager (Traffic) were also present and the question of the bus‑stand of the Board at Okara also came up for discussion. A day latter, on the 17th of April 1963, Mr. Zulfiqar Khan made a written report (Annexure R/3) to Mr. M. Sharif Khan, the Chair man of the West Pakistan Road Transport Board, Lahore, in which he bitterly complained about the objectionable behaviour of the petitioner towards him during the course of the meeting. According to him, Mr. Abdullah continued to behave in a most objectionable manner and on every argument advanced by him in connection with the different cases which came up for discussion he termed them as "deliberate and willful misstatement of facts" and as a test case he made a reference to the controversy over the shifting of Okara Bus Stand. It was alleged by respondent No. 4 that the petitioner was guilty of indiscipline, official mis conduct, deliberate and willful misstatements to malign the position of his immediate superiors in the presence of subordinates. In this report it was further alleged by respondent No. 4 that the petitioner was also guilty of disobeying the orders of the Chairman by deliberately avoiding to bring with him the Works Manager (Mr. C. A. B. Woodwork) in the meeting in spite of the clear instructions conveyed to him on behalf of the Chairman. Respon dent No. 4 requested the Chairman for taking disciplinary action against the petitioner. The Chairman forwarded this complaint to the petitioner for his reply which is dated the 11th of June 1963 (Annexure R/5) The petitioner has alleged in his reply that the report of the General Manager against him depicts a highly exaggerated picture of the occurrence which took place on the 16th of April 1963 in the meeting in the presence of the Chairman. According to the petitioner, during the course of the meeting he had to correct certain statements which were contrary to the facts and that about the bus‑stand at Okara the General Manager accused him on incorrect facts, and that he was not wrong in calling it a "willful mis‑statement" of facts. The petitioner has explained that lie did not address these remarks to the General Manager nor were they intended by him to apply to the latter but that these remarks by him had reference to the subordinate officials who had put up distorted and incorrect notings for orders of the General Manager without disclosing to him the true facts. As regards his failure to bring with him the Works Manager to the meeting on the 16th of April 1963, lie attributed it to a confu sion in the telephonic message conveyed to him by the District Manager (Traffic).

4. Thereafter the Chairman by his letter No. Estt/13/519 dated the 18th of June 1963, served a charge‑sheet (Annexure `B') on the petitioner. It is comprised of three charges of disobedience of the orders and insubordination against the petitioner and their gist inter alia is as under: "(a) Under the instructions of the Chairman the District Manager (Traffic) informed you on telephone on the 11th of April 1963 to come to Lahore on the 16th of April 1963 and bring your Works Manager with you but in spite of these clear orders you failed to bring your Works Manager with you when you saw the Chairman on the 16th of April 1963, thereby you dis obeyed the clear instructions issued to you by your superiors; (b) that in the meeting which took place in the office of the Chairman on the 16th of April 1963, you wrongly accused the General Manager, who is your immediate superior of "wilful misrepresenting facts" and one of the examples cited by him was the case of Okara Bus Stand; and "(c) when your explanation was called by the General Manager on the 13th of April 1963, on the report put up by the Inquiry and Estate Officer you submitted an insolent and insubordinate reply by alleging: 'it is a specific instance to indicate how the undersigned is being harassed by the General Manager (Mr. Zulfiqar Khan) on fictitious and baseless allegations. He had made scores of such attempts during the last few years to bring harm to the undersigned." The petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation to the charges within seven days and he was informed that the enquiry against him will be conducted by Mr. Akbar Khan, Member (Technical), Road Transport Corporation, on the 1st of July 1963, at the Transport House, Lahore. The petitioner put in his expla nation (Annexure `F) on the 30th of June 1963, and denied the charges against him. As regards charge (a), his defence was that there was some confusion in conveying the message of the Chair man to him and that did not disobey him. About charge (6) the petitioner admitted that during the course of the discussion about the Okara Bus Stand in reply to the allegations against him that he had exceeded his powers he said that it was a "wilful mis statement". He has, however, added that he never stated that it was a wilful mis‑statement on the part of the General Manager, that he had been accused of a serious charge by the General Manager on the grounds which did not exist as the land was still in the possession of the Corporation and the mis‑statement could have been on the part of Officers/Officials making the distorted noting put up to the General Manager. In reply to charge (c) the petitioner reaffirmed his contention that the General Manager was doing every thing possible to harass him on fictitious and baseless allegations.

5. Mr. Akbar Khan respondent No. 3 after holding the enquiry submitted his report. As regards charge (a) he found that, while there appeared to be no reason to assume that Mr. N. D. Khan, District Manager (Traffic) did not correctly convey to the petitioner the orders of the Chairman but in view of the serious nature of the charge against the petitioner he gave him the benefit of doubt in the absence of any corroboration of the statement of the District Manager (Traffic). He, accordingly, dropped the charge of disobedience of the order against the petitioner. As regards the other two charges the learned Enquiry Officer has observed that the gist of Mr. Abdullah's statement before him was that his remarks "wilful mis‑statement etc." were not meant for the General Manager personally but were in general terms and had reference to the various notings by the subordinates upon which the General Manager had formed certain impressions and because of which the General Manager without full verification of the facts proceeded to ask for his explanation. The Enquiry Officer refused to accept the explanation of the petitioner that these remarks were not directed against the General Manager and in this connection he has also referred to the tenor and tone of para graph 4 of the memorandum dated the 14th of April 1963 from the petitioner to the General Manager. He has further relied on the note by the Chairman on the file which is to the effect that without knowing the facts. Mr. Abdullah proceeded to make direct allegations of wilful mis‑statement against his immediate superior, and he must admit that he has not seen such behavior in his 32 years of service. In these circumstances the learned Enquiry Officer found the petitioner to be guilty of insubordination.

6. On the report of the Enquiry Officer a Show‑cause Notice No. Estt/13/519/63 dated the 20th of July 1963 (Annexure 1) was sent by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner who submitted his explanation in reply to it. Eventually the papers were put up in a meeting of the Road Transport Corporation held on the 19th of August 1963 in which the petitioner was also personally heard in support of his defence. This meeting of the Corporation was attended by Mr. M. Sharif, the Chairman, Mr. Akbar Khan, Mem ber (Technical) and Mr. Mehdi Hassan, Member (Finance) and the petitioner was found guilty of the charge of insubordination against him. This order was conveyed to him by the Secretary of the Corporation on the 20th of August 1963 (copy Annexure `K'). According to this order at the hearing on the 19th of August, 1963, the petitioner admitted the charge against him and the Corpora tion took a very serious view of the conduct and behavior of the petitioner and decided to reduce his pay by 3 stages from Rs. 1,150 to Rs. 1,000 per month with effect from the 19th of August 1963. The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order to the Road Transport Corporation, which was treated as a representation by the Corporation who dismissed it on the 28th of December 1963. He then filed‑ two successive petitions for review of the impugned order, which were also dismissed by the Road Transport Corporation on the 11th of January 1964 and the 17th of March 1964. There after the petitioner filed an appeal to the Secretary to the Govern ment of West Pakistan, Transport Department, Lahore, but it remained without any response.

7. The petitioner has also imp leaded Khalifa Afzal Husain, respondent No. 5 to his writ petition and before entering upon a discussion of the various allegations by the petitioner it would be useful to give in brief some of the relevant facts pertaining to respondent No.

5. Khalifa Afzal Husain was working under the West Pakistan Road Transport Board as Deputy General Manager when the Board decided that he should not be retained in service after attaining the age of 55 years on the 17th of July 1962 and should retire compulsorily and his post be retrenched for the future. After his compulsory retirement respondent No. 5 was re‑employ ed temporarily by the Board as District Manager, Government Transport Service, Hyderabad, for a period of one year with effect from the 17th of September 1962. On the representation of res pondent No. 5 the Road Transport Corporation in its meeting held on the 18th of November 1963 decided to treat the order of the compulsory retirement of respondent No. 5 as invalid and declared him as having continued in the service from the 18th of July 1962 onwards. On the 23rd of November 1963, the Corpo ration allowed respondent No. 5 to proceed on deputation to work with the Karachi Road Transport Corporation where he continued to serve until the 12th of March 1964 when the Karachi Road Transport Corporation while acknowledging the meritorious services of respondent No. 5 decided to send him back for their internal reasons. On the return of respondent No. 5, the Corpo ration at first on the 1st of April 1964 decided to post him as Officer or. Special Duty in the Headquarters. However, in a subsequent meeting, the Corporation realised that it was not possible for the District Manager, Hyderabad to supervise the working of its transport services at Sukkur and for administrative reasons it decided to bifurcate Sukkur Service from Hyderabad Service. The Corporation further decided in its meeting held on the 6th of April 1964 that in the public interest it was necessary to upgrade the post of the Additional District Manager, Sukkur, to that of District Manager and to post the petitioner as District Manager, Sukkur, with the directions to give effect to the Scheme for the bifurcation. In the opinion of the Corporation the peti tioner being a senior officer with experience of nearly 14 years, would be helpful in arranging various administrative details requir ed of him for the bifurcation and in running the services of Cor poration. In super-session of its earlier order dated the 1st of April 1964 the Corporation decided to post respondent No. 5 as District Manager, Lyallpur, to relieve the petitioner.

8. It is in the background of these facts that this writ peti tion was filed by Mian Muhammad Abdullah in this Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan chal lenging the validity of the order dated the 20th of August 1963 passed by respondent No. 1 causing reduction in his pay by three stages and the subsequent orders passed by the Corporation on the 28th of December 1963, 11th January 1964 and 17th March 1964 dismissing his appeal and the two successive review petitions. The petitioner has also challenged the validity of the order passed by respondent No. 1 on the 6th of April 1964 by which he was deprived of the senior post to which he was entitled and was post ed to hold the charge of a junior post ai Sukkur thereby causing his reduction. He has also attacked the validity of the order of the posting of respondent No. 5 as District Manager, Lyallpur, in his place.

9. According to the allegations of the petitioner he has an unblemished and distinguished career of service under the respon dent to his credit, he was posted as District Manager, Rawalpindi, from May 1957 to September 1962 and was responsible for these remarkable improvements shown in the affairs of that region under his control. He was then posted to Lyallpur in September 1962 with the sole object of bringing the Lyallpur service in proper condition and there again the petition worked round the clock with equally good results. It has been alleged by the petitioner that the services rendered by him to the Board won signal appre ciation at the hands of the authorities concerned. The case of the petitioner is that the Road Transport Corporation is a statutory authority constituted under the West Pakistan Ordinance XI of 1963 and is comprised of the Chairman and the two Members who can act as a corporate whole and that the Chairman alone had no authority or power to frame the charge‑sheet against the peti tioner. It has been further alleged that Mr. Akbar Khan being one of the Members of the Road Transport Corporation, which is his punishing authority, could not at the same time act as the Enquiry Officer against him and after having formed an opinion against him as a result of the enquiry he could not sit as one of the judges against him in the meeting of the Corporation held on the 19th of August 1963 in which the final punishment was award ed against the petitioner. The petitioner has further averred that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were based on extraneous material, in particular on the adverse remarks which were made on some office file by Mr. M. Sharif Khan, the Chairman, who was never examined as a witness in the case. It is also alleged that Mr. Sbarif Khan having once expressed a definite opinion adverse to the petitioner on the matter in enquiry, he was not legally competent to appoint Mr. Akbar. Khan, his own subordi nate as an Enquiry Officer in the case and that the enquiry in the circumstances ought to have been entrusted to some impartial and independent person. The petitioner has complained that on account of a number of reasons Mr. M. Sharif Khan, the Chair man, was inimically disposed towards him and the various orders passed by him against the petitioner were malicious and motivated. As regards the other reliefs claimed by the petitioner, he has alleged that Khalifa Afzal Husain was a ‑favourite of respondent No. 2 and the Chairman was out to bestow favours on the former. It is averred that although Khalifa Afzal Hussain was compul sorily retired on charges of corruption and bad record of service yet the Chairman manoeuvred the situation to achieve a double object; firstly to damage the petitioner by depriving him of the senior post of tile District Manager, Lyallpur, and causing his reduction by posting him to Sukkur against the office which was previously held by a Traffic Manager and secondly to favour respondent No. 5 at the cost of the petitioner. The petitioner contends that his transfer to Sukkur has resulted in his virtual reduction and was motivated by malice.

10. Respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 5 have filed their separate written statements in which they have controverted the allegations of the petitioner.

11. The objection of the petitioner against the validity of the charge‑sheet and the appointment of Mr. Akbar Khan as the; Enquiry Officer are not well founded and have no force in them. The charge‑sheet in the case was served on the petitioner with the prior approval of the Road Transport Corporation and the appointment of the Enquiry Officer was also made by the Corpo ration and not by the Chairman alone who had to sign the charge‑sheet on behalf of the Corporation as its executive head. Mr. Akbar Khan is a member of the Corporation and in that capacity he was in no way subordinate to the Chairman. There is no denying the fact that in the course of his report the Enquiry Officer has relied on the adverse remarks of Mr. M. Sharif Khan, the Chairman, contained in one of the office files and although 4 Mr. M. Sharif Khan, was not examined as a witness in the case yet as the report itself discloses, the petitioner when asked if he; wished to cross‑examine the Chairman in that connection did not avail of the opportunity afforded to him. There is thus no force in this objection of the petitioner as well. There was no bar in) law against the appointment of respondent No. 3 as an Enquiry Officer by the Corporation and no defect in the proceedings of the' Enquiry Officer have been brought to our notice.

12. There is, however, a serious objection against the impugned order passed by the Road Transport Corporation against the petitioner in its meeting held on the 19th August 1963. It is admitted on all hands that after show‑cause notice the case of the petitioner was put up for hearing in the meeting of the Corpo ration on the 19th of August 1963 in which the Chairman and the remaining two members attended. Mr. Akbar Khan, one of the) two members, in his capacity as the. Enquiry Officer had already) formed an opinion against the petitioner and it cannot be said that he sat in the meeting of the Corporation with an unbiased mind. By his report he had pre judged the issue against the petitioner before participating in the meeting. The petitioner was certainly placed in a position of great disadvantage in having to face the member who had already expressed his opinion against him in writing. Moreover in the awkward situation of the petitioner, he was bound to experience considerable reluctance and embarrassment on his part to face the Enquiry Officer and to criticize his conduct and the report. No doubt administrative tribunals are not required to follow the procedure commonly known to law Courts but nevertheless in quasi judicial matters they are bound to act in conformity with the principles of natural justice and in accordance with the cannons of fair play. It is one of the fundamental and well‑recognised principles of administration of justice and that justice should not only be done but it should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. If one of the members of a tribunal is biased or, which is the same thing, has pre judge the issue against a party, it is bound to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party that he is not likely to get a fair and impartial deal at the hands of tribunal. If one of the authority or any one of the authorities hearing a case has any pecuniary or otherwise substantial interest or is biased, the defect goes to the root of the constitution of the tribunal which becomes improperly constituted.

13. In Ghulam Rasul and others v. Crown (P L D 1951 F C 62) a legal Remem brancer to the Government advised the Crown to file, an appeal against an order of acquittal. Subsequently after he was appoint ed as a Judge of the High Court, the appeal was decided by a Bench of which he was a Member. In these circumstances it was held that the impropriety in the constitution of the Bench was not a mere irregularity but an illegality and that it was highly undesirable for a judicial officer whatever be his rank or position that he should act judicially in a case in which he had an occasion to investigate extra judicially and in which he had formed an opinion adversely to the party against whom he had directed a prosecution or institution of an appeal or review and that nothing should be allowed to happen in a case which may give rise to a reasonable apprehension to an accused person that he would not or did not have a fair trial. It was further remarked in that case that it is essential that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. It was also observed in that authority that although the counsel for the accused had agreed to the appeal being heard by the Division Bench as it had been composed but that does not affect the accused's right in pressing their objection as to the impropriety of the constitution of the Bench based as it was on the mandatory provisions of section 556 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the principles of natural justice.

14. In Abdul Wassey v. Pakistan (P L D 1957 Kar.363) a civil servant was dis missed on the basis of a report by an Enquiry Officer who was biased. It was held that the proceedings were vitiated on the ground of bias in the officer conducting the enquiry and that the rules of natural justice demanded that the Enquiry Officer should be a person with an open mind and unbiased against the delin quent it was further observed in that case that the principles laid down in Ghulam Rasul and others v. Crown would equally apply to the administrative tribunals as well. Similarly in Muhammad Murtaza Kazi v. University of Sindh and others (P L D 1960 Kar. 500) it was held that as regards Qazi Ahmad Muhammad it is clear that he prosecuted the case on behalf of the employer and it is too much to imagine that while sitting as a member of the syndicate he would be able to divest himself of the role he had already played in prosecuting the case against the petitioner during the course of the enquiry.

15. On behalf of the respondents their learned counsel has argued that during the course of the meeting of the Road Transport Corporation, Mr. Akbar Khan, Member (Technical) did not take part in the deliberations of the Corporation and that he merely remained sitting there as a silent spectator and did nothing to prejudice or influence the other Members at the meeting. This may or may not be so. As discussed above, the mere presence of a Member who is disqualified from taking part in the proceedings of the tribunal renders it incompetent to function as such and it is immaterial what 'part that particular member played in the proceeding of the tribunal and how far it was able to influence its decision in a case. In Rex v. Meyer (1876 Q B D 173) a rule for certiorari was issued by the Court for the purposes of quashing the conviction on the ground that Mr. James Meyer was an interested Justice. On showing cause, Mr. Meyer made an affidavit that, though he sat on the Bench, he took no part until the other Justices had unanimously determined to convict the petitioner. It was held that Mr. Meyer had such an interest as might give him a real bias in the matter in dispute and consequently he ought not to have sat as a Justice and that it was immaterial what part he really took in the matter.

16. Eve, J., in his judgment in Law v. Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (1919 Ch. D 276) has observed as under: "A person who has a judicial duty to perform is disqualified from performing it if he has a bias which renders him otherwise than an impartial judge, or if he has so conducted himself in relation to the matters to be investigated as to lead a reasonable man to suspect that he may have a bias." In Rex v. London County Council ((1892) 1 Q B 190) the London County Council were determining applications for licences and acting judicially. Three members of a Committee which had refused a license, their refusal being in effect under appeal before the Main Committee, sat with the others, although they did not vote. Their presence there was held to vitiate the proceedings: (see per A. L. Smith, J., delivering the considered judgment of the Court remarked). "In our judgment, the London County Council are adjudicating as to whether a man is or is not to be deprived of his license; to use the words of Cotton, L. J. in Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education ((1889) 43 Ch. D 366, 379): Though not in the ordinary sense judges, they have to decide judicially as to whether or not the complaint made is well founded'. In our judgment, when so acting, they are not emancipated from the ordinary principles upon which justice is administered in this Kingdom, and which are, as it has been said, founded on its very essence; and again "In our judgment, if members of a body such as the London County Council, consist ing as it does of 139 persons and sitting in a building like that at Spring Gardens, desire to retain counsel on their behalf to press accusations against applicants for licenses, or others, before the council, they should either absent themselves altogether from the precincts of the building, or sit in such a position, with their counsel, that it may be known to all as to who the real accusers are, and that they do not leave the bench' if they remain in the position the three councilors did upon this occasion." Justice is not only to be done but it must appear that it was being done and the appearance as well as the reality of justice are of fundamental importance in the administration of justice."

17. In a case from India reported as K. v. Narayana Rao and another v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and another (A I R 1958 Andhra Pradesh 636) some employees of the State Road Transport Corporation were dismiss ed on the basis of the findings of a Committee of three members. One of these members was also a member of a previously consti tuted committee which had made the preliminary investigations against those employees and submitted their report against them. It was held in that case that the bias of the enquiry authority was fatal to its decision and that the position should not be different when only one of those constituting the tribunal be shown to have pre judged the issue.

18. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied on Rex v. Leicester Justices ((1927) 136 L T R 635), which is, however, distinguishable. In that case at the general annual licensing meeting the justices, as the licensing committee, objected to the renewal of the appli cant's old license on the ground of redundancy, and at the adjourned meeting they referred the question of renewal to the compensation authority under section 19 of the Licensing (Con solidation) Act, 1910, and they made to that authority a report suggesting that the renewal of the license should be refused. At the principal meeting of the compensation authority the justices who had sat as the licensing committee attended and with other justices adjudicated upon the question of renewal and refused it subject to the payment of compensation. An objection was raised that the justices had disqualified themselves from adjudicating upon the question. Repelling the contention of the petitioner Lord Hewart, C. J., observed that the objection of the Licensing Com mittee was merely a mode of informing the license‑holder that his case will be considered and that he must be prepared to deal with certain specific points. "The Justices . . . . . were not adju dicating upon any rights and they were not prosecutors. In truth, there was no prosecution." There was no previous adjudication by the Justices and, therefore, they did not incur any disqualifica tion from attending the meeting.

19. The learned counsel for the respondent has also pointed out that according to the rules of the Corporation the quorum for its meeting is the Chairman and two Members and in order to form the proper quorum Mr. Akbar Khan had to attend the meeting of the Corporation on the 19th of August 1963. We are not concerned with the circumstances under which Mr. Akbar Khan decided to participate in the meeting but we are sure that in this case he was disqualified from attending the meeting and to participate in its deliberations.

20. In view of the above discussion we hold that Mr. Akbari Khan, Member (Technical) was disqualified from attending the meeting of the Road Transport Corporation held on the 19th of August 1963 in which the case of the petitioner was considered and that the impugned order passed in that meeting reducing the pay of the petitioner by three stages was against law and without lawful authority. But this does not mean that the charge‑sheet and the report of the Enquiry Officer are also liable to be quashed and this will not in any way debar the Corporation if it so desires, from considering these charges and the report again in another properly convened meeting of the Road Transport Corporation after serving the petitioner with a fresh show‑cause notice.

21. It has been brought to our notice that after the institu tion of the writ petition the Road Transport Corporation has already appointed Mr. Chowro in the vacancy at Sukkur in the absence of the petitioner who is on‑ leave: This will necessitate a fresh order for the posting of the petitioner on his return to duty and the impugned order of his transfer to Sukkur stands pro tanto cancelled. In view of these circumstances we have for the present decided not to pass any order on this part of the case of the petitioner which shall stand over for the present till after the petitioner has reported for duty.

22. As regards the orders about the re‑instatement of Khalifa Afzal Husain and his posting as District Manager, Lyallpur by the Road Transport Corporation, the petitioner has no locus standi to object against them. This part of the case of the petitioner is, therefore, liable to be dismissed on this short ground alone.

23. In this view of the case taken by us, it is unnecessary for us at this stage to go into any of those allegations of malice and bias leveled by the petitioner against Mr. M. Sharif Khan, respondent No. 2, who is no longer the Chairman of the Road Transport Corporation. He has been succeeded by Mr. Baig. As this case may have to be considered again by the Corporation, we have knowingly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the charges against the petitioner.

24. For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following order in this petition: (1) The decision of the Road Transport Corporation in its meeting held on the 19th of August 1963 and the order dated the 20th of August 1963 conveyed to the petitioner reducing his present pay by three stages from Rs. 1,150 to Rs. 1,000/‑ per month with effect from the 1st of September 1963 are declared to be against law and without lawful authority. Likewise the orders dated the 28th of December 1963, 11th of January 1964 and the 17th of March 1964, passed by the Corporation on appeal and the successive representations by the petitioner are liable to be quashed and have no effect. To‑ this extent the writ petition is accepted; (2) the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the orders passed in the case of respondent No. 5 for his re‑instatement and appointment as District Manager, Lyallpur, and his writ petition to that extent shall stand dismissed; and (3) the case of the petitioner that the orders of his transfer to Sukkur has resulted in a reduction in his rank and was motivated by malice shall stand over for the present till after the petitioner has reported for duty and fresh orders for his posting are made by the Road Transport Corporation. Under the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs of the writ petition. A. H.