P (PLP)

This order will dispose of an application filed by the defendant in this enquiry, Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot, on the 7th July 1949, the date on which the first hearing in the case took place. The application calls in question the propriety of Mr. Manzoor Qadir, Barrister‑at‑law, appearing and acting as counsel for the Province in this case follows:‑ (a) that before and during the hearing of earlier enquiries against Khawaja Abdur Rahim and Raja Hasan Akhtar, Mr. Manzoor Qadir did certain things and caused certain things to be done, otherwise than as a counsel, which make him a most important witness in this case; (b) that he is aware of material facts which make his evidence necessary for just and proper decision of the case; (c) that in the two earlier cases as well as in this case, Mr. Manzoor Qadir acted as "the Principal Investigating Officer" and consequently is a necessary arid material witness in this case ; (d) that if Mr. Manzoor Qadir does not give evidence as a prosecution witness, the defendant will be obliged to call him as a defence witness ; and (e) that for these reasons, Mr. Manzoor Qadir cannot act as counsel in the case, consistently with his position as an Officer of the Court and a member of the bar, and he should, therefore, be directed to withdraw from the case. A copy of the application having been delivered to Mr. Manzoor Qadir, he has made a lengthy reply, containing a number of highly important admissions. It should be mentioned that a number of the charges in the present enquiry involve important questions of fact which were also the subject of charges brought against 'two Officers of the West Punjab Government, in enquiries under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, in both of which Mr. Manzoor, Qadir acted as counsel for the West Punjab Province. Mr. Manzoor Qadir admits that in the preliminary enquiry into the case against Khawaja Abdur Rahim, which was conducted by the Chief Secretary to the Provincial Government, he himself was present throughout while the witnesses were being questioned, he himself put questions to them both in the nature of examination‑in‑chief and in, the nature of cross‑examination. The enquiry against 'Raja Hasan Akhtar was preceded by a police investigation, and before the matter was placed before the Commission, Mr. Manzoor Qadir was associated with the investigation and at his suggestion some of the witnesses were re-summoned for further examination, and at such examination, Mr. Manzoor Qadir was present and himself put questions to these witnesses, in the nature of examination‑in‑chief as well as cross- examination. Further, at his suggestion, some witnesses whom the police had not examined were also summoned, and Mr. Manzoor Qadir ‑examined them. During this investigation, some answers given by the witnesses in the course of examina tion and cross‑examination by Mr. Manzoor Qadir were dic tated to the stenographer by Mr. Manzoor Qadir himself although he says that this was "subject to the approval of the witnesses and the investigation officer." Mr. Manzoor Qadir has admitted that in the investigation by the police into the charges now preferred against the defendant, he performed the same function in regard to recording of witnesses' statements and suggesting the names of witnesses to be examined as he had done in the previous two cases. His contention, however, is that his connection with the statements in question, which may be proved by the evidence of the Chief Secretary in the case of Khawaja Abdur Rahim and the Investigating Police Officers in the case of Raja Hasan Akhtar and the present case, was of the same kind as the connection of "the examiner‑in‑chief and the cross‑examiner; with the record of a Court, that evidence regarding his questioning and the answers he elicited can be given by other witnesses, for, which reason his personal evidence is not necessary, and therefore, he is not legally debarred from conducting the case as counsel. At the same time, he states his complete willingness to appear as a witness for the defence if cited, adding further that such appearance will cause no embarrassment to the Govern ment on whose behalf he appears. In justification of his association with the investigation, and his actions and the part he took therein, he urges that he was competent to do so and indeed that it was "the only proper course" for him adopt, adding that the witnesses were only called and examined by him for the purpose of "ascertaining or verifying relevant points as and when they arose", and that he owed a duty to the Court to place before it only such material as he himself considered reliable. Apart from this, he felt it his duty to see that the record of witnesses' statements in the investigation should be full and accurate. Mr. Manzoor Qadir's reply then proceeds .to consider certain contingencies which may arise in the course of enquiry, and draws the inference that in no case will there be any embarrassment on account of his having been associated with the previous examination of these witnesses. In conclusion, the application seeks permission to continue with the conduct of the case on behalf of the prosecution and adds that Mr. Manzoor Qadir was "specially appointed by' the Governor of the West Punjab to conduct the present enquiry. We have heard arguments from Mr. H. S. Suharawardy for the defendant and Mr. Manzoor Qadir himself at great length on the propriety of Mr. Manzoor Qadir continuing to conduct the prosecution in this case. Mr. Suharawardy has made full use of the important admissions contained in Mr. Manzoor Qadir's written statement. He has shown us copies of the statements of a number of the witnesses who were "examined and cross‑examined" by Mr. Manzoor Qadir in the course of the enquiry, and has declared that in each case, the questioning by Mr. Manzoor Qadir was directed to elicit from the witnesses something which would go against the present defendant. In the case of some witnesses, the questioning was close and severe, and in Mr. Suharawardy's view amounted to "badgering". Among the statements cited as instances are those made by Nasir Ali, Head Vernacular Clerk, in the office of the Deputy Commissioner. Montgomery, Sardar Ghulani Hassan Leghari, Muhammad Shah and Sheikh Muhammad Hussain. Mr. Suharawardy tried to show that in the course of cross‑examining Nasir Ali, Mr. Manzoor Qadir suggested to him that on a number of points he had not been telling the truth, and at the close of the statement the following question was put to him, viz:‑ After you had replied to some of my questions in the beginning, I explained to you that I had reasons to suppose that they were not quite accurate, and that you should stick to accuracy in your own interest. The answers you have given above in reply to further questions‑Are they the truth, or because you thought that they would satisfy me? A.: They are the truth to the best of my knowledge and recollection". With regard to Sardar Ghulam Hassan Lehtari, it is suggested that he was persistently pressed to say something against the defendant, although he was totally un willing to do so. Muhammad Shah was questioned regarding the Badi Estate (which is the subject of charge No. 7) and it is contended that the lengthy cross‑examination by Mr. Manzoor Qadir was designed to‑ trap him by tricky questions, so as to elicit what the prosecution needed. Similarly, an attempt was made to show that Muhammad Hussain, Tehsildar, was cross‑examined in a similar way with regard to the auction of crops on the Bedi Estate. Finally, it was said that Mr. Manzoor Qadir threatened a person named Mahbub Ali who was examined in the course of the investigation with imprisonment in the Lahore Fort if he did not depose as required, and that Mahbub Ali then broke down and complied with the demands of his questioners. This allegation has been denied by Mr. Manzoor Qadir, and he has also stated that Mahbub Ali is not a witness in this case. On this foundation, the argument is based that the defence would attempt to establish as a material part of their case, that individual witnesses were subjected to "badgering", akin to third‑degree methods in the course of the investigation, and that this was practiced to an extent which vitiates the enquiry at least in respect of certain charges ; this attempt will necessarily involve examination and cross‑examination of witnesses who were concerned in the questioning of persons during the investigation, and Mr. Manzoor Qadir is admittedly one of the most important of these persons. It is consequently undesirable that he should be counsel for the prosecution in the case. The closeness of his contact with the development of the case in the course of investigation gives him personal knowledge of as well as a personal interest in establishing, the case, and these factors cannot fail to detract from his usefulness and standing in the enquiry as "an officer of the Court". 1n any case, .a person who is likely to be an impor tant witness in an enquiry should not undertake the duties of counsel in such enquiry. In support of this proposition, Mr. Suharawardy cited a number of authorities before us. R. Ghadially v. Emperor (A. I. R. 1925 Sind 99) is a case in which two learned Judicial Commissioners of Sind laid down that gentlemen of the Bar should not appear in cases where it is possible they may have to give evidence or in which their personal interests are concerned. And this of course is a wise and sound rule because the fact that Counsel or a Pleader has to give evidence must frequently lead to unpleasant scenes and a gentleman whose own personal interest is at stake would find it hard to act with that fairness to all the parties in the Court and to the Court itself which the tradition of the English Bar requires". That was a defamation case in which the counsel for the prosecution was know to be a personal enemy of the accused, and further, he was also President of the Shikarpur Munici pality and it was apparently very largely his conduct as such President" which was in question in the case. The latter fact is important as it affords a parallel to the position of Mr. Manzoor Qadir in relation to the allegation of "badgering". In Sita Ram v. Ram Lal. (A. I. R. 1930 Lahore 361) a learned judge of this Court has. noted that it was improper for a certain counsel to have, conducted a case on behalf of one of the parties When he intended all long to appear as a witness on behalf of that party, and further that "it would be improper for this Court to sanction any such procedure". In the present case, although Mr. Manzoor Qadir may not himself Have the intention of appearing as a witness, it has been made sufficiently clear from the very outset, that, on certain points of importance, the defendant intends to examine him as a witness. An important case containing valuable observations on the point is D. Weston v. Peary Mohan Dass (I. L. R. 40 Cal. 898, F. B.) There the matter under consideration was the conduct of a certain Mr. K. B. butt in accepting a retainer in a case which apparently arose out of the detention on a criminal charge of Mr. K. B. Dutt's son. The suit was brought against the persons responsible for the detention, to recover damages for false imprisonment, etc. As the discussion at pages 933 to 935 of the recorded judgment will show, Mr. Dutt had closed personal knowledge of a great many factors which were directly relevant to the subject‑matter of the suit. Among the objections raised to his appearing as counsel were the following viz:‑‑ (1) that he had a personal interest and had in fact engineered the case ; (2) that he was a proper and material and indeed necessary witness to facts in the case; and (3) that both witnesses and counsel would be embarrassed by his appearance, the more particularly so as serious charges, , such as bribery, were personally made against him. It was also established, as appears from page 934 of the published Report that Mr. K. B. Dutt had been concerned in the preparation of the statements of witnesses sent to Government against the police, presumably, these statements were relevant to the allegation of malicious imprisonment, etc., and this points a similarity to the situation of Mr. Manzoor Qadir in the present case for he has admittedly been personally concerned in the preparation of the statements of witnesses who are to depose regarding the charges against the defendant, with this difference that out of the record of these statements the defendant has declared his intention of attempting to establish that Mr. Manzoor Qadir subjected the witnesses to "badgering". On the facts in the Calcutta case, the learned judges of the Full Bench came to the conclusion that since Mr. Dutt must have known that he was an important witness in the case, it was not proper of him to have accepted a retainer in the action. They pointed out that in the course of the trial Mr. Dutt "actually cross‑examined a witness who made charges of personal corruption against himself, a most unseemly spectacle". On the contentions raised in the present case, it is not unlikely that Mr. Manzoor Qadir may be required, as part of his duty, to undertake the cross‑examination of witnesses who may allege that the "badgered" them, that would indeed be a most "unseemly spectacle", and if, on the other hand, Mr. Manzoor Qadir continued as the principal counsel in the case, and did not cross‑examine such witnesses, the Court would be embarrassed materially through being deprived of the proper services of the counsel for the prosecution, in the investigation of the truth or otherwise of matters arising during the enquiry. The learned judges of the Calcutta High Court have referred in their judgment to certain observations made in an unreported case decided by that court in 1908 by Sir Francis Maclean, C. J. It was remarked in the unreported case with regard to the unprofessional and objectionable character of counsel cross‑examining a witness as to facts within his personal knowledge, that such a practice might create an effect upon the minds of the jury which would prove injurious to the administration of justice. The learned Chief justice then posed a case as under:‑ "Suppose for a moment that a leading Advocate were in cross‑examination to put to the witness in the box a question of this sort. Why did you not tell me so and so, and so and so? The possible effect upon the mind of the jury might be that they might regard the suggestion of counsel as being pitted against the state ment of the witness, an entirely fallacious view, with the result that, in consequence, they might disbelieve the latter ". Now that is a contingency which might very easily arise on the present enquiry, for having himself, as he no doubt supposes, thoroughly cross‑examined witnesses for the prosecution in the investigation, if one of these witnesses at the enquiry should state facts going beyond what he said in the investigation, there would be a strong temptation to Mr. Manzoor Qadir to put just the question which the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court posed in the precedent case, viz., " Why did you not make this disclosure to me when I cross‑examined you in the investiga tion?" in several very important respects, guidance with respect to certain contingencies likely to arise in the present case, may be taken directly from the case of Mr. K. B. Dutt in I. L. R. 40 Cal.

898. This case was followed in a case of the Patna High Court published as Chandreshwar v. Bisheshwar (A. I. R. 1927 Patna 61), the learned Judges of the Division Bench have observed at page 79 that " it is desirable that a Vakil should not appear in a case if he knows or has reason to believe that he will be an important witness in the case ". In the submission of learned counsel for the defendant, that is the precise situation of Mr. Manzoor Qadir at the threshold of the present enquiry, and he suggests that Mr. Manzoor Qadir should, therefore, retire from the proceedings. On the general question of the propriety of persons who have been concerned with an investigation, subse quently acting as counsel in the case, Mr. Suharawardy has invited our attention to subsection (4) of section 495, Criminal Procedure Code, which runs as follows:‑ "An officer of police shall not be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken any part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted. " He contends that there is a principle to be derived from this statutory provision which is applicable in the present proceedings as well which are of a quasi criminal nature, namely, that there are inherent reasons why a person who has been associated with the investigation of a criminal case should not later undertake the duty of prosecuting the case before a competent Tribunal. Mr. Suharawardy further pointed out that Mr. Manzoor Qadir had actually admitted having dictated to the stenographer in the course of the investigation a number of answers given by witnesses. whom he examined and cross‑examined. This meant that the wording of the answer as recorded embodied Mr. Manzoor Qadir's own impression of what was said by the witnesses, and contingencies could easily be imagined e.g., where a witness denied having answered in the sense appearing from the record, in which no one but Mr. Manzoor Qadir could be a proper witness to prove what was actually said in the answer. Finally, Mr. Suharawardy referred to a recent Bombay case reported as Emperor v. Dadu Rama (A I R. 1939 Bombay 150) where a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the question whether the Court has jurisdiction to forbid an Advocate to appear in a particular casa. The learned judges observed that conflicting principles were involved, namely, on the one hand the right of an accused person to be represented by an Advocate of his own choice, and on the other the duty of the Court to see that due administration of justice is not in any way embarrassed. The question had arisen in that case on account of the prosecution having served a summons on the Advocate in question to appear as a witness. The learned judges remarked that generally an Advocate who was called as a witness by, the "opposite side could safely be left to decide for himself whether he could continue to appear as counsel without either embarrassing the Court or, his client, but if the Court comes to the conclusion that by such appearance, the trial will be embarrassed, and expresses an opinion to that effect and if the Advocate refuses to withdraw, then the Court has inherent jurisdiction to require the Advocate to withdraw ". The learned Judges further, observed that before such action could be taken, it must be established that through the appearance of the counsel in question, material embarrassment would be caused to the trial. In that case, the Advocate in question put in a written statement denying all knowledge of the matter on which it was proposed to call him as a witness and the learned judges accepted this state ment and set aside an order which had been made by a Magistrate forbidding hint to Appear as counsel in the cases in question. Here, as appears clearly from Mr. Manzoor Qadir s written statement he had to admit that he was associated very closely with the prosecution, and it is submitted for the defendant that if Mr. Manzoor Qadir declines to withdraw from the proceedings, in spite of the expression of an opinion by the Court regarding the desirability of his doing so, this Court is competent to direct him to withdraw. Mr. Manzoor Qadir had made it clear that if this Court holds that his appearance as counsel for the prosecution is likely to embarrass the present enquiry, he will immediately withdraw from it. In fact, in his written statement, he has expressly sought permission of the Court to continue as counsel for the prosecution. He has pointed out that he has been specially appointed by the Governor to conduct the prosecution of the case, but admits that this appointment is not relatable to any statutory power, such as is given by section 4 of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. In fact, Mr. Manzoor Qadir admits that his express appointment in the present case was included in the formal order made by the Governor directing the enquiry on the basis of the precedents in the two earlier enquires under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1950. He concedes that' his position before the Court in all respects is the same as, and in no way superior to, the position of an advance of this Court conducting a" case before the Court. He has attempted, however, to show that there is nothing in any statute, not in the practice of the English Bar or the Bar of this Court, nor in anything he has done in the course of the investigation which is of such a nature as either legally to debar him from conducting the prosecution or even to render it undesirable that he should do so. He states that he examined the relevant section of Halsbury's Laws of England and has been unable to find anything to the effect that it is improper for a counsel to be in contact with the witnesses prior to the trial, or to examine them, or that such a counsel is in any way disqualified from conducting proceedings in Court later. As to his association with the enquiry, he contends that it was entirely bona fide and that he did nothing except what he thought was necessary for eliciting the full truth, and for recording in full the manner in which disclosures were made by each witness in the investigation. This was done, not with the‑object of gaining any advantage for the prosecution, but only that the Court may have a full statement to indicate the processes by which statements on material facts were obtained in the investigation. Not only was the interest of the Court borne in mind in following this procedure, but copies of the statements had been provided in excess of anything required by the law to the defendant as well, to use them in his defence as he through fit, and it was suggested that this should‑be accepted as conclusive proof of the complete fairness of the practice and procedure followed by the investigators in the case. Mr. Manzoor Qadir examined a number of contingencies which might arise in relation to the statements recorded with his help or obtained by him through examination‑in‑chief and cross‑examination, and suggested that there were ways and means by which any questions which arose could be settled without requiring his evidence, while at the same time he reiterated his willingness, and that of his client that he should, if called by the defence, give evidence himself 'as Witness. He argued that in, all the cases cited for the defendant, one essential element was that a counsel should be an important witness in the case in order that his appearance in it should be held undesirable. He suggested that his own evidence in the case could not be regarded as important. With reference to section 495, Criminal Procedure Code; Mr. Manzoor Qadir referred to sub section (1) of that section, which lays down that a Magistrate in charge of a case "may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than an officer of police below the rank to be prescribed by the Provincial Government in this behalf ", and proceeds to lay down that " no person, other than the Advocate General, Standing Counsel, Government Solicitor, Public Prosecutor, or other officer generally or specially empowered by the Provincial Government in this behalf, shall be entitled to do so without such permission ". Mr. Manzoor Qadir contended that he himself as a Special Prosecutor appointed for the present enquiry fell in the category of persons who were entitled to appear and conduct the prosecution without the permission of a Magistrate, assuming that the case was before a Magistrate's Court. On this basis, he proceeded to argue that the solitary exception provided by subsection (4). that an Officer of Police who had taken part in‑the investigation of the offence; was disqualified for conducting the prosecution, justified the inference that as to Advocate General, Standing Counsel and others; who were entitled as of right and without the Court's permission to conduct the prosecution, there was no. statutory bar imposed against the exercise of that right Merely by reason of any such person having taken any part in the investigation of the offence. The rule of interpretation which Mr. Manzoor Qadir seeks by this argument to apply, is the well known rule expressio unius est exclusio‑alterius, but on a careful examination of the section, it seems to be clear enough, that this rule has no application. . Subsection (4) of section 495, Criminal Procedure Code, imposes a drawback upon the power of a Magistrate trying a case, in relation to the appoint ment of a particular person to conduct such case, viz., an Officer of Police who has taken part in the investigation of the offence. This is an 'exception to, the power expressly given by sub section (1) to such Magistrate to permit: certain persons to conduct the prosecution. Any inference derivable from the expressio unius rule' must, therefore, be confined to the scope of a Magistrate's power, to appoint, a certain person to conduct a prosecution before him, and it is clear that such an implication will not extend to cases which are expressly placed' by the section outside the power conferred upon Magistrate, viz., the case of Advocate‑General and others who have an inherent right in themselves to appear before a Magistrate and conduct a prosecution. It is therefore, wholly wrong to suggest that any thing in section 495, Criminal Procedure Code, can sustain the conclusion that whereas‑ association with the investigation is a disqualification for an Officer of Police, in relation to the conduct of the prosecution, Advocates‑General or, Standing Counsel, etc., still retain their inherent right of prosecuting such a case despite any degree of association with the investigation. It is thoroughly well settled that, as a general rule, it is desirable that the same person should "not be both Advocate and witness, and further the person should act as an Advocate in a case if he has per s4aa1 knowledge of the facts has a personal interest in the case, and we are fully satisfied that, notwithstanding anything contained in section 495, Criminal Procedure Code (which admittedly is not applicable in terms to the present proceedings) or to any principle derivable therefrom, an Advocate‑General or Standing Counsel or any other officer specified in subsection (1) of section 495, Criminal Procedure Code, would be disentitled, equally with any other Advocate of this Court, from appearing before us as counsel in a case if he were himself an important, witness in that case, or had a personal interest therein. It is accordingly necessary for us to consider, on the basis of the facts brought to our notice, whether Mr. Manzoor Qadir's further association with this enquiry as a counsel is desirable or otherwise. We do not doubt, in the slightest degree that whatever Mr. Manzoor Qadir did in the course of the investigation was done in good faith, and according to his lights for the furtherance of justice. But we cannot overlook the fact that for accomplishing these purposes Mr. Manzoor Qadir has in certain cages cross‑examined witnesses in the course of the investigation, and admittedly some of this cross‑examination has been of a nature which may justly be described as " severe". The dividing line between severe cross‑examination and "badgering" is not easy to demarcate, and therefore we cannot fail to take notice of the contention raised by the defendant that this cross‑examination is in fact " badgering", in the sense of " worrying or persecuting persistently (one who cannot escape)", "pestering" and "harassing". Whether the cross‑examination of a particular witness falls in one category or the other is a matter which can only be determined when all the facts are before the Court, and it is possible to see whether a particular question or series of questions could be said to raise naturally and to be necessary merely for eliciting the truth, or must be described as falling in the category of importuning or harassing of the witness, such as was calculated to create an effect of domination on his mind. If it were possible to de cide this matter at the outset of the enquiry in relation to each witness, there would arise also the possibility of determining that Mr. Manzoor Qadir could, without embarrassment either to his client or to the Court, continue as counsel for the prosecution. But as matters stand, this question will fall to be decided separately in relation to each witness concerning whom the contention is made that he was "badgered" in the investigation and on each occasion, it will be necessary to enquire into the state of Mr. Manzoor Qadir's mind and his intentions in relation to the questioning for which he was responsible, and immediately the question. will arise whether Mr. Manzoor Qadir can be a proper advocate for his client when he will be in the position at the same time, of being required to justify his own actions, and will have a personal interest in avoiding the conclusion that he took an active part in worrying or harassing or annoying witnesses during the investigation. Under section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, the credit of a‑witness may be impeached on the ground that it was obtained by"' corrupt inducement", and it is open to the defendant to contend that the application of third‑degree methods by persistent questioning in the investigation constitutes a form of unfair evil, the avoidance of, which was a " corrupt inducement " to the witness to say what was required of him; it will be open to the defendant also to attempt to establish this by evidence, and it is clear that an important witness for this purpose will be Mr. Manzoor Qadir. We have already indicated, in the discussion of the case of Mr. K. B. Dutt as printed in I. L. R. 40 Cal. 898, the possibility of certain contingencies arising in which Mr. Manzoor Qadir's association as a counsel with the enquiry may be unseemly. We consider that there is force in the contention that the closeness of his contact with the development of the case in the course of the investigation will greatly reduce his usefulness to us as an officer of the Court. As the enquiry is of a quasi criminal nature, it is open to the defendant to criticize everything done in the course of the investigation in his effort to meet the charges against him; in an ordinary criminal case, much that takes place during the investigation is the subject of statutory secrecy on the ground of privilege and otherwise, and although it is possible to contend that these obstructions need not hamper the present enquiry (on which we express no opinion), it is nevertheless certain that in respect ‑of a great many things which occurred during the investigation, we shall be required to rely upon statements made at the Bar by the learned counsel representing the prosecution. It seems to us that by virtue of Mr. Manzoor Qadir's close association with the investigation, his own actions have necessarily come within the field of legitimate criticism by the defendant, and that we may consequently not be able to accept from him, with the same confidence as we would show in ordinary circumstances, statements made at the Bar in regard to matters relevant to the case. We are also impressed by the consideration, in view of the express intention of the defendant to impeach the credit of certain important pro secution witnesses with reference to the severe cross‑examination to which they were admittedly subjected in the investigation, that as some suggestion of stigma attaching to Mr. Manzoor Qadir will necessarily arise, it may well be, assuming he is subject .to ordinary human frailty, that the fear of such a stigma might weaken his resolution to extract from an unwilling witness (and several of the witnesses whose statements in the investigation have been shown to us would appear to fall in that category) by all legitimate means, the truth which is in their possession. And finally, there is undeniable force in the argument raised for the defendant that since Mr. Manzoor Qadir is personally responsible for the wording of a number of the answers given by witnesses in the course of the investigation, his evidence is quite indispensable for the purpose of proving those answers, should the question of their accuracy arise for determination in the case. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the continued association of Mr. Manzoor Qadir with this enquiry as counsel for the prosecution is calculated to embarrass the trial and to deny to the Court the degree of assistance which it is entitled to expect from prosecution counsel, by reason of Manzoor Qadir's close association with the investigation, and we accordingly record our opinion that it is desirable in all the circumstances that he should withdraw from the prosecution. K.M.A. Petition accepted.