P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

MUHAMMAD GUL, J.‑This judgment will dispose of the following five writ petitions, namely: (1) Writ Petition No. 580/65, Muhammad Akram son of Sardar Ahmad v. ‑(1) Capt. C. A. Saeed, D. C, and Election Tribunal, Gujrat and (2) Ahmad Din, son of Shah Muhammad. (2) Writ Petition No. 582/65, Muhammad Akram, son of Ahmad, Khan v. (1) Capt. C. A. Saeed, D. C. and Election Tribunal, Gujrat and (2) Ghulam Nabi, son of Sardar Khan. (3) Writ Petition No. 583/65, Ch. Sardar Khan v. (1) Capt. C. A. Saeed, D. C. and Election Tribunal, Gujrat and (2) Lal Khan, son of Fateh Ali. (4) Writ Petition No. 585/65, Ghulam Rabbani v. (1) Capt: C. A. Saeed, D. C. and Election Tribunal, Gujrat and (2) Feroze Din, son of Fazal Din. (5) Writ Petition No. 586/65, Ghulam Rasul v. (1) Capt. C. A. Saeed, D. C. and Election Tribunal, Gujrat and (2) Muhammad Nazir son of Faizullah Khan.

2. The petitioner in each case was elected to the Electoral College of Pakistan respectively from Electoral Units Nos. 121, 129, 130, 46 and .133‑Gujrat District during the last general election held in October‑November, 1964, defeating respondent No. 2 in each case. The latter filed election petition under section 58 of the Electoral College Act, 1964 to question the election of his successful riv4l. The main ground of attack common to all election petitions was that there had been impersonation by voters on a large scale to which the petitioner herein in each case was a privy and that this had materially effected the result of election. Certain other allegations peculiar to each particular case (which so far as necessary will be noticed in the sequel were also made.

3. Of the 140 odd election petitions pending with respondent No. 1, on 10‑3‑1965, he ordered notices to issue in (seven cases including) the above‑mentioned five cases for hearing on 19‑3‑1965. These cases were heard on 19‑3‑1965 and he not only held the election in each case to be void but also' declared respondent No. 2 in each case to be elected in place of the petitioner. The petitioner in each writ petition characterises the order passed by respondent No. 1 as "mala fide, illegal and oppressive and, therefore, a nullity", and further that he conducted the proceedings in the election petitions in violation of the provisions of section 60 of the Act and rule 36 of the Electoral College Rules, 1964. The respondents in each case traversed the allegations on the basis of which the validity of the impugned orders was questioned.

4. Mr. Manzur Qadir, the petitioner's learned counsel attacked the validity of the proceedings before the Election Tribunal and the impugned order in each case on the following imin grounds, namely‑ (i) that the conduct of proceedings by respondent No. 1 was throughout mala fide, which were, therefore, vitiated ab initio; (ii) that the requirements of section 60 of the Electoral College Act, 1964 and rule 36 ‑ of the Electoral College Rules, 1964 were violated and, therefore, the proceedings were vitiated; (iii) that the principles of natural justice were violated inasmuch as no proper opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his case ; and (iv) that at any rate, on the allegations made in the election petition, the only legal order possible in the case was to set aside the election as a whole and that there was no warrant for declaring respondent No. 2 as elected in place of the petitioner.

5. To show bias in respondent No. 1 and the mala fide character of proceedings by him as the Tribunal, the petition in each case sets out certain incidents concerning the conduct of respondent No. 1 in relation to his functions as the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat, alleged to have happened during the period preceding the last general election to the National Assembly in which Ch. Ghulam Rasul Tarar and Ch. Zahur Elahi were the two opposing candidates from the local Constituency. It is alleged that during this period respondent No. 1 functioned completely under the influence of the Muslim League Party and openly canvassad support for Ch. Ghulam Rasul who was nominee of that party; that he abused his official position as the Chief Executive of the District and threatened those who dare oppose the Muslim League candidate and support his rival Ch. Zahur Elahi. But as pointed out already these allegations are denied by respondent No. 1 in his counter‑affidavit. Thus the matter rests on two opposing affidavits sworn by the petitioner and respondent No. 2 and in the absence of any further material it is not possible to record a definite finding on the conduct of respondent No. 1 in the relevant behalf.

6. Mr. Manzur Qadir also relied upon a number of other circumstances in the case to stress mala fide nature of the proceedings in each case. For instance it was pointed out, that out of about 140 election petitions pending with respondent No. 1 notices were issued for hearing on 19‑3‑1965 only in seven cases (including the five which have led to these proceedings) in all of which the contesting respondents were prominent supporters of Ch. Zahur Elahi. All these cases were heard and decided on 19‑3‑1965 in the space of one hour or so with the same result, namely, that in all the seven cases the contesting respondents were unseated and the petitioners were declared elected, although in some such cases, e.g., Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Akram the prayer was only for setting aside the election as a whole. Further that the findings recorded by respondent No. 1 are capricious and fanciful, unrelated to the facts placed before him. Lastly, in none of these cases election as a whole was set aside in which case fresh election should have been ordered. All those who were unseated were staunch supporters of Ch. Zahur Elahi and those who were declared elected by respondent No. 1 belonged to the rival political group. They were issued identity cards there and then, the plan purpose being to enable them to participate in elections to the National Assembly two days later, and to vote for Ch. Ghulam Rasul Tarar, the Muslim League candidate on 21‑3‑1965 and to demonstrate to all those who dare support Ch. Zabur Elahi that they would risk losing their own membership of the Electoral College. It was urged that these circumstances taken together could reasonably sustain an inference of mala fide nature of the proceedings in each case before respondent No. 1 as Tribunal.

7. We have given our anxious consideration to this part of the argument but in our opinion though some of the circumstances listed above, particularly the incredible haste with which proceedings were. concluded and the tenor of the order passed in each case, do create a doubt in one's mind as to the bona fide nature of the proceedings, but in our opinion, they are not sufficient to sustain a judicial finding of mala fides. For one thing, it is not possible to take judicial notice of the political affiliations of the persons concerned in proceedings before respondent No.

1. Thus the foundation upon which the whole argument rests is wanting: Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that some of the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner tend l$ to create doubt in one's mind as to the bona fides of the proceedings, nevertheless, the matter tests in suspicion only and it is not possible to record a finding on basis of suspicion however strong it might be.

8. Regarding the second 'ground of attack, Mr. Manzur Qadir relied upon the provisions of section 60 of the Electoral College Act, which reads: "60 (1) A Tribunal shall, upon receipt of an election petition give notice thereof to all the contesting candidates at the election to which the petition relates. (2) Subject to any rules made in this behalf, the Tribunal shall, after giving the contesting candidates an opportunity of being heard and taking such evidence as may be produced before it, make such orders as it may think fit. (3) The decision of the‑Tribunal on an election petition shall be final." Rule 36 of the Electoral College Rules, 1964, framed under section 86 of the Act, on which learned counsel also relied reads: "On the receipt of an election petition the Tribunal shall give at least a week's notice to all respondents named in the petition arid after holding a summary inquiry record its finding. Provided that

" A plain reading of the above provisions of the Act and the rule, makes it clear that the Tribunal is enjoined by law to give‑(i) notice to all contesting candidates; and (if) an opportunity of being ‑ heard and taking such evidence as may be produced, summary nature of the inquiry notwithstanding. These requirements are of fundamental character and give legislative effect to the well‑known principle of natural justice; that "nobody shall be condemned unheard." It is only when these statutory requirements are complied with, that the decision of the Tribunal becomes final. Conversely if no notice is given or hearing is refused to a party concerned then the Tribunal will be functioning against the express provisions of the statute and there will be no finality to its orders. The summary inquiry envisaged by rule 36 cannot be read derogatory to the above requirements of the statute. Indeed the requirement of summary procedure has nothing to do with the right of a person concerned to a notice or to be heard and to produce evidence. By way of analogy reference to summary proceedings relating to Criminal and Civil jurisdiction of Courts would be instructive. Procedure of summary trial of criminal offences laid down in Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and of civil cases laid down. in Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ensure a proper opportunity of being heard and to produce evidence. What really distinguishes summary proceedings from ordinary proceedings is that the evidence produced in the former case may not be reduced into writing and only brief notes or memoranda of evidence will do, or yet again in a given case or class of cases in which no, appeal is allowed even notes or memoranda of evidence may be dispensed with But this is not to say that right of a reasonable hearing which includes a right to produce evidence can be dispensed with. It is for this reason that the Legislature by enacting section 60 expressly made notice to the parties and an opportunity to hear them and their witnesses necessary concomitants of summary hearing. Since no appeal is provided against the order of the Tribunal under section 60 (2) of the Act, it does not seem necessary to keep any record of evidence examined. But to say that the proceedings being summary, the Tribunal is not bound to hear evidence would not only be opposed to the express provisions of the statute but also opposed to the elementary principles of justice. Therefore, respondent No. 1 was sadly mistaken if he thought that summary procedure envisaged in rule 36 made him an absolute master of the situation, so that he could allow or refuse to hear evidence according to his sweet‑will. The petitioners have filed affidavits and copies of the applications to show that all their earnest requests for adjournment for summoning the evidence particularly in view of the short notice of hearing were in vain. Not only that Muhammad Akram, the petitioner in W. P. 580/65, was ready with 22 witnesses .on 19‑3‑65, but respondent No. 1 declined to hear them and perforce they filed affidavits refuting some of the allegations made in the election petition.

9. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that proceedings before the Tribunal being of a summary nature, respondent No. 1 was not bound to adjourn the case, much less to summon witnesses. Support for this argument was sought from the fact, that while a Tribunal established under the National and Provincial Assemblies (Election) Act, 1964 is invested with the powers of a civil Court to summon witnesses, no such power is given to Tribunals under the Electoral College Act. It was stressed that this omission was deliberate and could not be explained upon any hypothesis other than this, that a Tribunal under the Electoral College Act is not bound to adjourn the case for evidence or to summon witnesses. It is important to bear in mind in this behalf, the distinction between the power to summon witnesses and the obligation to afford opportunity to the parties to produce evidence. What the law requires is that opportunity must be real and not illusory. Refusal to adjourn the case in the above circumstances or to summon the witnesses would be tantamount to a denial of a reasonable opportunity to "produce evidence " Moreover, evidence can be produced with) or without the aid of the process of a Court. Ex facie, there was nothing in law to forbid the Tribunal to issue summons or at least a letter of request to a material witness in the case. The following observations in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 1953 Ed. at p. 361 should set at rest all doubts as to they Tribunal's powers to summon material evidence in the case; "Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially, necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdiction data csr, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit. Thus, an Act which empowered Justices to require persons to take an oath as special constables, and gave them jurisdiction to inquire into an offence, impliedly empowered them to apprehend the persons who unlawfully failed to attend before them, for those purposes, otherwise; the jurisdiction could not be effectually exercised." In (1879) 4 Q B 212, 491 power in inferior Court to grant injunction was held to include by implication the power to punish for disobedience to it by commitment, for the power would be useless, if it could not be enforced. It would be illogical to suggest that a Tribunal constituted under the Act to settle election disputes would be powerless to require the attendance of witnesses before it, which is a sine quo non for the exercise o all judicial or quasi‑judicial jurisdiction.

10. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the requirement of notice under rule 36 of the Electoral College Rules, 1964 was satisfied in these cases? On this point the factual position is that, leaving Sardar Khan petitioner in Writ Petition No. 583 of 1965, who is alleged to have refused service of notice on 11‑3‑1965, the petitioners in the other four cases either refused or received notice on 13‑3‑1965 for hearing of election petitions on 19‑3‑1965. Thus except in the case of Sardar Khan, the notice in other cases fell short of the minimum period of seven days prescribed by rule

36. On these facts, twofold objection was raised against the validity of notices to the petitioners, namely that‑ (a) mere report of alleged refusal to accept service was not sufficient service of notice; and (b) a notice short of the minimum period of seven days was void and, therefore, all subsequent proceedings were vitiated, In the cases of alleged refusal by the petitioner, it was urged by Mr. Manzur Qadir that there was no proper notice to the petitioners because assuming that they refused to sign acknowledgment even then the requirements of rule 17 of Order V, C. P. C. ought to have been complied with for effective service; that is to say, the process‑server ought to have affixed a copy of summons on a conspicuous part of each petitioner's residence. That not being done, there was no service of notice. A short answer to this contention is that the provisions of C. P. C. have not been made applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal nor is the Tribunal "Court of Civil jurisdiction" within the meaning of section 141 of the Code. Therefore, rule 17 will not in terms apply. Whether it can be made applicable on principles of equity, justice and good conscience remains a question. Be that as it, may, this part of the question is only of academic interest in the case, for the petitioner in each case appeared before the Tribunal on the appointed date and requested for adjournment. The question would have arisen in acute form, if the petitioners had chosen to stay away and the Tribunal had taken ex parse proceedings against them which is not the case before us.

11. On the second ground of attack on the validity of notice elaborate arguments were addressed by learned counsel on both the sides. On behalf of the petitioners it was urged, that judged from the language and tenor of rule 36, the requirement of notice as to its minimum duration is absolute having an obligatory force, a breach of which will render the notice invalid. In support of this contention Jainria Dhar Potdor v. C. I. T. (A I R 1935 Lah. 201) which was a case of notice under section 22 (2) of Income‑tax Act, 1922 and A I R 1951 Mad. 831 were cited. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, treated the provisions of rule 36 as to the duration of notice as merely directory so that its non‑observance did not invalidate the notice or affect the consequential proceedings. In support of this view two recent cases Ch. Sadiq Ali v. Collector, Gujranwala (P L D 1964 Lah. 255) and Abdul Majid v. Province of West Pakistan (P L D 1964 Lah. 531) both of which con cerned notices under rule 3 (2) of the West Pakistan Basic Democracies (Vote of Non‑Confidence Against Chairman) Rules, 1963, were cited. Sub‑rule (2) reads: "Seven clear days' notice shall be given for a meeting convened under the provisions of this rule." It was held in the first case that the requirement as to duration of notice was directory and its non‑observance per se will not render the notice invalid. In the second case, it was also held that plea regarding notice can be waived and it was held so waived on the facts of the precedent case. Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court's Judgment in Tariq Transport's case (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437) in which section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which pre scribes notice regarding publication of applications and bearing of parties came up for consideration. Munir, C. J., with whom other learned Judges agreed, observed that section 57 lays down mere procedural rule regulating the hearing and unless there was been a failure of justice, or the party has been prejudiced in the presentation of his case, non‑observance of the requirement of the section per se will not be a sufficient ground for quashing the proceedings.

12. The question whether the provisions of a statute regulating procedure should be read as mandatory or directory has been succinctly dealt with in section 3 at Chapter 12 in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 1953 Ed. According to the learned author, it is a generally accepted rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment is obeyed or fulfilled substantially. Speaking generally "where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations, formalities, and conditions shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred, and it is therefore probable that such was the intention of the Legislature. But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative". After a review of a number of English precedents of high authority, with a view to drawing a line between absolute and directory enactments, the learned author concludes as follows: "Enactments regulating the procedure in Courts seem usually to be imperative and not merely directory. If, for instance, an appeal from a decision be given with provisions requiring the fulfillment of certain conditions, such as giving notice of appeal and entering into recognisances, or transmitting documents within a certain time, a strict compliance would be imperative and non‑compliance would be fatal to the appeal." Among the numerous cases relied upon by the learned author is Barker v. Palmer ((1881) 80 Q B D 9) in which the county Court rule, which required that in actions to recover land the summons should be delivered to the bailiff 40 days at least before the return day, and be served within 35 days before that day, was held imperative so that, if the summons were not delivered to the bailiff in due time, though the latter should serve it in the prescribed time, the Judge would have no jurisdiction to try the case. It is pertinent to observe that according to the foot‑note the rule was amended in 1883 so as to meet .the point raised in this case. Similarly, reference is made to another set of cases where it was enacted that a person who objected to a voter's qualification might be heard in support of his objection if he had given notice to the voter and it was provided that, besides the ordinary way of serving it, the notice might be sent by post addressed to his place of abode "as described" in the list of voters prepared by the clerk of the peace, it was held that to send by post a notice, not to the address so given, which was incorrect, but to the true address, was not a compliance with the Act, and therefore that the objector could not be heard on mere proof of posting the notice.

13. The question that then really falls for determination is, in which class of cases the requirement of rule 36, which requires; the Tribunal, inter alias to give "at least one week's notice to all the respondents" would fall. To this aspect of the case, we, have given our anxious consideration and in our opinion the; requirement of the rule is mandatory which demands absolute obedience, with the result that if the notice falls short of the minimum of seven days, the whole proceedings before the Tribunal are vitiated. It can scarcely be controverted that the Tribunal is entrusted with‑ judicial functions to decide a US~ between the parties before him and is not merely an administrative tribunal to carry out merely public duty as in the case of Tariq Transport. That was a case of Transport Authority which was, charged with the public duty of issuing route permits as would in the opinion of the Authority be to the best public advantage: there was no lis between the rival claimants for the route permits. Similarly, the two Lahore cases relied upon on behalf of the respondents are plainly distinguishable, for the proceedings for non‑confidence motion were not to take place before a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal but before the Union Council. Under the Electoral College Act, preparation of electoral rolls or issuing of various official notifications or doing of certain other things which are in the nature of mere performance of public duties, within specified times would be instances of directory provisions.

14. Upon the above view of the matter, we hold that requirement of rule 36 of the Electoral College Rules as to the minimum duration of notice to the respondents before the Tribunal is mandatory, a breach of which would invalidate the notice, and therefore. vitiate the proceedings before the Tribunal. Consequently, in all, these cases, except the case of Ch. Sardar Khan (in Writ Petition No. 583 of 1965) there was no valid notice and the proceedings before the Tribunal were vitiated and the impugned orders in the four cases concerned must be quashed on this short ground.

15. This brings .us to the second part of the question, namely, whether the Tribunal allowed proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as required by the law. For a proper determination of the question it is necessary to set out certain facts which are more or less admitted. As observed in the beginning; the defeated candidate in each case challenged the election of his successful rival for various corrupt practices and it required evidence both oral and documentary to prove or disprove these allegations. Being conscious of this fact, the petitioner in each case made frantic efforts to have the case adjourned. Except in two cases applications in writing supported by affidavits as to want of proper notice, etc, were made. These requests were plainly made to enable the applicants to produce evidence to answer the charge of corrupt practices levelled against each of them. From what purports to be the record of the proceedings before the Tribunal, it appears that the request for adjournment was refused in each case, though, however, some of the defeated candidates (Petitioners before respondent No. 1) were allowed to examine evidence. For instance one .witness, namely, Nawab Khan (who retired from the contest) appears to have been examined in support of the case of respondent No. 2, in W. P. 583/65. Similarly, Muhammad Nazir, respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 586 .of 1965, who was also a defeated candidate was allowed to summon some witnesses on 8‑3‑1965, although actual notice to the parties were issued two days later. Even a cursory perusal of the impugned order in each case makes it clear that it virtually takes for granted the allegations made in the election petition and sometime it refers to certain charitable admissions by the counsel for the successful candidates (petitioners herein) as if such counsel were engaged with the sole purpose of making such charitable admissions to facilitate the setting aside of their client's elections. To demonstrate the farcical nature of proceedings, Mr. Manzur Qadir greatly emphasised the fact that in the course of a single sitting lasting not more than an hour, respondent No. 1 not only heard but pronounced orders in as many as seven election petitions in all of which the petitioners before him were declared elected and the contesting respondents were unseated. Respondent No. 1 himself says in his written statement and the affidavit that the proceedings in the seven election petitions lasted about three hours, Assuming that to be true, even then his performance is no less remarkable and should be sufficient to show the perfunctory nature of the proceedings: Apart from the allegations in the election petition, there was no evidence, whatever, of massive impersonation by persons who came to cast their votes, or that they cast their votes in favour of the petitioners only and none of such persons voted for the rival candidate. Respondent No. 1 in fact accepted these allegations as proof of the facts stated therein. Even more astonishing is the process of his reasoning by which he felt justified not only to unseat the petitioner but also to declare respondent No. 2 elected in his place. It should have been obvious even to a person of less than average intelligence that upon the allegations made, even if accepted as wholly true, the only lawful order possible was to declare, the election' void as a whole. In Writ Petition No. 583 of 1965, it is beyond one's comprehension as to how the withdrawal of Nawab Khan in the circumstances alleged in the election petition and the large scale impersonation could have sustained a declaration in favour of respondent No. 2, so also in other cases. It is indeed surprising to note that in the election petition against Muhammad Akram son of Sardar Ahmad (W. P. 580/65) the defeated candidate had only prayed for setting aside the election as a whole and there was no further prayer for a declaration in his own favour and yet respondent No. 1 thought it fit to declare him elected. And what happened in the election petition by Muhammad Akram son of Ahmad Khan (W. P. 582/65) is even more astonishing. In that case one of the grounds taken was that seven women voters 'who would have voted for the petitioner were wrongly prevented by the Presiding Officer from voting. Respondent No. 1 allowed this plea and added 7 votes in the total number of votes polled by the petitioner before him, although no such votes were ever cast and then who knew that if they had cast their votes, they would have voted for the defeated candidate. Similarly, two votes were deducted because respondent No. 1 thought two voters though enrolled were minors and had voted for Muhammad Akram. To say the least, it was making a mockery of the proceedings.

16. In the face of the above extraordinary facts, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the conduct of proceedings before the Tribunal was a farce. It is true that respondent No. 1 as Tribunal constituted under the Electoral College Act was invested with very extensive powers to make any order "he thinks fit", but it would be idle to suggest that he could make an fanciful or capricious order unrelated to the case placed before him, thus making a mockery of the summary inquiry. We have no doubt in our mind that the expression "as it may think fit" in section 60 means according to rule of reason and justice and in accordance with the law and not in accordance with humours, caprice or private opinion. The Legislature cannot be presumed to have invested him with arbitrary powers of a despot to make any order to satisfy his caprice. In Board of Education v. Rice (1911 A C 181) at page 182, Lord Loreburn, L. C. dealing with the decision of an administrative body said: "

they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it was a trial . . . They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view." The proceedings before an administrative Tribunal rest on lower plane than the proceedings before the Election Tribunal, which is a tribunal of special jurisdiction performing judicial functions. Therefore, the above observations of the noble Lord would apply with greater force to the present case. In somewhat similar circumstances in the celebrated case of Muhammad Saeed and 4 others v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West. Pakistan and others (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 91.) at page 100, Munir, C. J. dealing with the argument canvassing finality of the recommendations of the Election Tribunal and Governor's order thereon observed: "Coming to the question whether we should interfere with the Tribunal's Report, I may state at the very outset . . that where a special tribunal, like the Election Petitions Tribunal, has functioned within the spirit and the intention of the statute that created it and while so functioning has made a real and honest endeavour to judge facts on the merits of the evidence and to apply the law to them. A finding of fact thus arrived at, however, erroneous, will not be scrutinized or reviewed by this Court, and even if an error of law be committed by the Tribunal that will not be considered to be a sufficient ground for interference unless the law so misunder stood or misapplied raises some general question of fundamental importance to the proper functioning of the tribunal or the decision of the case. But if the Tribunal has made no honest effort to arrive at a correct conclusion or has come to a decision which no reasonable body could ever have come to or has, on no evidence, recorded findings which have deprived persons of important constitutional rights the exercise of which is the very basis on which the whole constitutional fabric rests, this Court will be acting in betrayal of the Constitution if on any such case being made out it did not interfere with the verdict ‑ of the Tribunal." These observations are very apt to ‑the instant case and it is otiose to claim finality in respect of the impugned orders in the circumstances discussed above. We are satisfied from the facts brought on the record that the hearing allowed by respondent No. 1 to each petitioner herein was illusory and the summary enquiry conducted by respondent No. 1 fell far short of even the minimum statutory requirements and the orders made as a result of such proceedings cannot be sustained on any recognised principles of law or equity.

17. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that respondent No. 1 in refusing to allow opportunity to the petitioner in each writ petition to produce evidence failed to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him under section 60.of the Electoral College Act and conducted the proceedings before him, culminating in the impugned order, in an arbitrary and capricious manner. We also hold that except in the case of Ch. Sardar Khan (W. P. 583/65) the proceedings before respondent No. 1 in other four cases are vitiated for defective notice under rule 36 of the Electoral College Rules. We, therefore, accept these petitions with costs and set aside the impugned order in each case as being without lawful authority, and declare that the petitioner in each case continues to be a member of the Electoral College of Pakistan from the unit from where he was declared elected during the general election held in October‑November 1964. K. B. A. Petition accepted.