P L D 1975 Lahore 65 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ, J.-The petitioner, Mian Ghulam Jilani, was a Major- General in the Pakistan Army and retired from there in that capacity in 1962. He is a permanent resident of 32, Chinar Road, University Town, Peshawar. He was allotted land by the Border Area Allotment Committee near Narowal, District Sialkot. He decided to .take part in politics in 1969 and joined the National Awami Party in 1970. He was elected as member of the Provincial Assembly of N.-W.F.P. in December 1970 on the ticket of National Awami Party. He was taken into custody on 15-2-1973 at Jamrud under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. He was immediately brought to Rawalpindi and then to Lahore Fort. Later on, he was removed to Sukkur and ultimately was detained in a Canal Rest House near Lahore. The initial period for detention was for one month but the same was extended from time to time. The last detention order passed against the petitioner was to expire on 14-2-1974 at 12 in the night. The petitioner challenged his detention initially through W. Ps. Nos. 380 of 1973 and 1299 of 1973 which have already been finally disposed of by another Bench of this Court. Before the expiry of the detention order, the petitioner was served at 8-20 p.m. on 14-2-1974 with another Order No. 10/8/73-Poll-I(1) dated 2-2-1974 passed under clauses (d), (f) and (h) of sub-rule (1) of rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules read with sub-rule (2) of the said rule. This order was to take effect from 15-2-1974 and is reproduced below :- "Whereas the Federal Government is of the opinion with respect to Maj Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani that, for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Pakistan, public safety and maintenance of peaceful conditions therein, it is necessary to make this order Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (d), (f ) and (h) of sub-rule (1) of rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, read with sub-rule (2) of the said rule, the Federal Government is pleased to direct that - (1) for a period of three months commencing on the 15th February 1974, the movements and conduct of the said Maj.-Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani shall be restricted and regulated in the following manner, namely:- (a) the movements of Maj-Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani shall be restricted to the municipal limits of Lahore and he shall not move out of the said limits without the prior permission in writing of the Home Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore ; (b) he shall not indulge in any political activity, directly or indirectly, nor shall he give any statement to the press; and (c) he shall not see any politician or journalist; and (2) for the due observance of the restrictions and conditions specified in paragraph (1), the said] Maj.-Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani shall enter into a bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000.00 with one surety in the like amount." Subsequently, on 13-4-1974 clause (a) of this order was amended and substituted with the following clause :- "(a) The movements of Maj-Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani shall be restricted to the municipal limits of Lahore and he shall not move out of the said limits without the prior permission in writing of the Home Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore, except when he has to go to the C. M. H.. Lahore Cantonment, for medical treatment in which case he shall inform the Home Secretary to that effect in writing, shall only go direct to that Hospital and return directly to the, said limits without any undue delay and, on return, furnish to the said Home Secretary a hospital attendance certificate signed by the competent medical officer of the C. M. H." The petitioner felt aggrieved with the impugned order and challenged the same through the present writ petition.

2. On the conclusion of arguments on 10-5-1974, the learned Deputy Attorney-General made a statement at the Bar that the Government had already passed orders extending the restriction order for a further period of 3 months and that the same would be served upon the petitioner in due course. The Court reserved judgment on that day. On 12-5-1974, when judgment was not yet announced, the petitioner was served with the Following fresh order dated 7-5-1974 which was to commence on 14-5-1974 :- "Whereas the Federal Government is of the opinion with respect to Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani, that, for the purpose of preventing ,him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Pakistan, ,public safety and maintenance of peaceful conditions therein, it is necessary to make this order ; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (d), (f) and (h) of sub-rule (1) of rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, ,,the Federal Government is pleased to direct that- (1) for a period of three months commencing on the 14th May 1974, the movements and conduct of the said Maj-Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani shall be restricted and regulated in the following manner, namely (a) the movements of Maj.-Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani shall be restricted to the municipal limits of Lahore and he shall not move out of the said limits without the prior permission in writing of the Home Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore, except when he has to go to the C. M. H., Lahore Cantonment, for medical treatment .in which case he shall inform the Home Secretary to that effect in writing, shall only go direct to that Hospital and return directly to the said limits without any undue delay and, on return, furnish to the Home Secretary a hospital attendance certificate signed by the competent medical officer of the C. M. H. ; (b) he shall not indulge in any political activity, directly or indirectly, nor shall he give any statement to the press ; and (c) he shall not see any politician or journalist." The petitioner moved an application under Order VI, rule 17 and section 151, C. P. C. read with the writ rules (C. M. No. 2 of 1974) with the prayer that the writ petition should be amended to include a challenge to the new order and the amendments added with the petition be permitted to be made in the writ petition. Along with this petition he also placed on record the amended writ petition. This amendment was vehemently opposed by the learned Deputy Attorney-General. According to him, on the expiry of the earlier order on 14-5-1974, the writ petition automatically came to an end and that the new order should be challenged, through a fresh writ petition as it is an independent order. In a habeas corpus petition filed under the Constitution the Court has to satisfy itself that the ,detenu has not been held in custody without lawful authority or in and unlawful manner. Thus, it is the illegal custody and not a particular order which is challenged in a habeas corpus petition. If we accept the technical plea suggested by the learned Deputy Attorney-General then in certain cases the whole object of a habeas corpus petition can be defeated. We can conceive of an extreme case. Suppose a person is detained by the Executive for a day or two and the detaining authority repeats such orders one after the other. In such a situation, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to give any relief to the aggrieved person, although the impugned order may have been passed without lawful authority, because before any relief can be granted by the Court after issuing notice and affording an opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, the life of such an order will be over. In this way the validity of such an order would never be tested. Ends of justice cannot be defeated by allowing such plea. After' hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that a habeas corpus petition under the Constitution impugning the initial order will cover all subsequent continuous orders of same or similar nature. The learned Deputy Attorney-General tried to rely upon the earlier decision in W. P. No. 380 of 1973 which was dismissed as having become infructuous, because the impugned order in that writ petition was, revoked by the Government. No petition or even a verbal request for amendment of the writ petition was made on behalf of the detenu in that writ petition. The position, however, in the present writ petition is entirely different. In this case an application under Order VI, rule 17 and section 151, C. P. C. has been filed for the amendment of the writ petition: Undoubtedly, the Court has ample power to allow such an amendment. If the argument of the learned Deputy Attorney-General is accepted, it may amount to denial of power given to the Court under this rule to allow the amendment of pleadings. Moreover, along with this petition. amended writ petition has already been filed. This amended writ petition can be treated as a fresh petition and no exception or objection can be taken against it. The Deputy Attorney-General has already filed his written statement to the said amended writ petition. Thus, no prejudice whatever is likely to be caused to the respondent for allowing the proposed. amendment, rather it will advance the ends of justice for determining the re is question involved in the case. In these circumstances, we allowed the amendment of the writ petition.

3. Another argument advanced by the learned Deputy Attorney General is that against the judgment of the Lahore High Court in General Abdul Hamid's case P L D 1974 Lah. 7 the Government filed a petition for special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. One of the points involved in that case was whether the restriction order passed in the circumstances of that case, amounted to detention or not. The Supreme Court while granting special leave to appeal, also suspended the operation of the impugned order in the meanwhile. According to the Deputy Attorney-General, the order of the:: Supreme Court suspending the operation of the impugned order meanwhile, is binding upon this Court under Article 189 of the Constitution as it amounts to a "Law declared" by that Court. According to him, we must dismiss the present writ petition on this ground alone. We have not the slightest doubt in our mind that any law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all other Courts in Pakistan and all executive and judicial authorities throughout the country are to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Apart from the Constitutional obligation imposed upon us, even the propriety demands that we must follow such a law without any hesitation. However, the question which arises for consideration is whether the order of the Supreme Court suspending the operation of the impugned order of the High Court while granting special leave to appeal, is such a. decision which is contemplated under Article 189 of the Constitution. The binding nature of judicial decisions may be derived either from a Constitutional or statutory provision or from the conventions which the Courts observe in the administration of justice. So far as the former source is concerned; it was provided under section 212 of the Government u. India Act, 1935, that "The law declared by the Federal Court . . . shall so far as applicable be recognized as binding on and shall be followed by alb Courts." In the Constitution of 1956 there was similar provision contained in Article 163 which is reproduced below :- "163 (1).-The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts in Pakistan . . . . . " However, the position in 1962 Constitution was changed and different phraseology was used in Article

63. Later on, in the Interim Constitution of 1972, same position was maintained in Article

191. Article 189 of the present Constitution is also similarly worded and the same is reproduced below .- "

189. Any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates principle of law, be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan." Thus, the expression used earlier under the Government of India Act, 1935, as well as the Constitution of 1956, was "the law declared" by the Federal Court or Supreme Court. Under those enactments before a decision of the Supreme Court could acquire a binding force, it had to be a "Law declared" by that Court. Thus, it was not every decision, judgment or order of the Supreme Court which could have the binding force, but it was only the law declared which was made binding. There is no doubt that the law so declared by the Supreme Court or earlier by the Federal Court was to be treated as the law for the land. In other words, it was not every decision or judgment of the Supreme Court or Federal Court which can be said as "law declared" but only that decision where the Supreme Court or the Federal Court deliberately and with the intention of settling law, pronounces upon a question on principle of law that such pronouncement will be considered as the "Law declared" by that Court and will be binding on all Courts in Pakistan. Thus, the expression "law, declared" implies that the point decided by the Supreme Court is a legal one and of such general or public importance that it will occupy the place of law for the land. It will be the final decision of the Court on that particular point given after hearing the parties concerned. In other words, it will be final adjudication of that particular point and so far as that point is concerned, nothing should remain pending before the Supreme Court after the declaration of that law.

4. As regards the provisions contained in Article 189 of the present: Constitution and Article 63 of 1962, the expression "any decision" can include all decisions including interlocutory ones. Yet such a decision has been further qualified by this Article. This Article read as a whole makes it quite clear that only that decision of the Supreme Court will be binding which fulfils any of the following conditions :- (a) it decides a question of law, or (b) it is based upon a principle of law, or (c) it enunciates a principle of law. Here the word "decides" or "decision" will necessarily mean final decision, after hearing the parties and perusal of the relevant record. In other words, so far as that particular point is concerned, the decision should be final and after that nothing should remain pending before the Supreme Court regarding that point. Similarly, the expression "question of law` connotes that the point so decided must be a question of law. As regards (b) above, it is clearly means that if a decision of the Supreme Court is based upon a principle of law already settled, then that decision will also acquire the binding force. The last category of such a decision :namely, (c) above, is where it enunciates some principle of law. It means -the Supreme Court enunciates not only some principle but it must relate to law. "Enunciation" also can be when a point is finally adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court. Now let us apply these conditions to the case referred to by the learned Deputy Attorney-General. As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court while granting special leave to appeal in General Abdul Hamid's case suspended the operation of the impugned order of the High Court meanwhile. According to the learned Deputy Attorney -General, this order suspending the operation of the impugned order is binding upon all Courts in Pakistan under Article

189. In other words, it amounts to law declared which has a binding force. It is an admitted fact that while granting special leave to appeal, interim relief according to the nature of each case, can be granted to the petitioner. Sometimes the operation of the impugned order is stayed, sometimes status quo is granted and sometimes possession of a party is protected. In other words, some interim relief is granted to the petitioner during the pendency of his case before the Supreme Court. It is also not denied that after the grant of special leave to appeal if ultimately the appeal is accepted, that interim relief merges into the final decision given by the Court. If on the other hand, the appeal is rejected,, then the interim relief granted earlier automatically disappears. The result is that interim relief given at the time of grant of special leave to appeal, cannot be termed as final. It can be altered or modified later on. After careful consideration of Article 189 of the Constitution, we are clearly of the view that none of the .conditions enumerated above is attracted or applicable to the interim or interlocutory order passed by the Supreme Court in General Abdul Hamid's case. This order neither decides a question of law, nor is based upon a principle of law, nor enunciates a principle of law. In this view of the matter, this order suspending the operation of the impugned order is not covered by Article 189 of the Constitution and consequently is not binding on the Courts in Pakistan, except of course on the parties in that case.

5. As regards the second source of authority, namely, the conventions, the Courts follow the judicial precedents of the superior Courts. Only those precedents will have the binding force which decide or settle certain principles. In other words, it is only the principle upon which the case was decided which binds a subsequent Judge. The English doctrine of "precedents" which we follow, is based mainly on the principle that the law must be certain. In the words of Dr. Goodhart, "English Justice, if it were not to remain flued and unstable, required a strong cement. This was found in the common law doctrine of precedent with its essential and peculiar emphasis on rigidity and certainty." Edgar Bodenheimer in his book "Jurisprudence, the Philosophy and Method of the Law" while dealing with the doctrine of stare decisis says as under :- "The doctrine introduces a modicum of certainty and calculability into the planning of private and business activities. It enables people to engage in trade and arrange their personal affairs with a certain amount of confidence that they will not become entangled in litigation. It gives them some basis for predicting how other members of the community are likely to act toward them (assuming that such other members of the community comply with the law). Without this element of calculability, people would be uncertain of their rights, duties, and obligations, and they would be unable to ascertain what they might do without fear of coercive sanctions. Men would never know whether to settle or litigate a dispute if every established rule was liable to be overthrown from one day to the next, and litigation would be increased a thousand fold under such a state of affairs. Stare decisis provides attorneys counseling private parties with some settled basis for legal reasoning and the rendering of legal advice. A lawyer who does not have available to him the benefit of certain tools which are helpful to him in forecasting the probable outcome of litigation is of little use to his clients. In the words of Sir William Jones, `No man who is not a lawyer would ever know how to act and no lawyer would, in many instances, know how to advise, unless Courts are bound by authority'. The doctrine of stare decisis tends to operate as a curb on the arbitrariness of Judges. It serves as a prop for the weak and unstable judge who is inclined to be partial and prejudiced. By forcing him to follow (as a rule) established precedents, it reduces his temptation to render decisions colored by favour and bias. `If the doctrine of precedent were to be abolished in this country (where statutes have a relatively limited scope), the judges would be free to operate according to their individual whims and their private notions of right and wrong throughout the entire area of human relations not covered by statute.' Such a condition would not be conducive to the maintenance of respect for the law and the preservation of public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. One important reason why people are willing to accept judicial decisions as binding is that they are supposed to be based on an objective body of law and on impersonal reasoning free from subjective predilections even though this condition may not always be fully realised in the practical operation of the legal system. The practice of following prior decisions facilitates dispatch of judicial business and thereby promotes efficient judicial administration. Following precedents saves the time and conserves the energy of judges and at the same time reduces the costs of litigation for the parties. It makes it unnecessary for the Court to examine a legal problem de novo each time the problem is presented again. `The labor of judges', said Mr. Justice Cardozo, `would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him'. The doctrine of precedent also receives support from the human sense of justice. The force of precedent in law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewallyn by `that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are properly to be treated alike in like circumstances.' If A was granted relief last month against an unwarranted interference with his privacy, it would be unjust to deny such relief to B this month if the facts shown by B are essentially the same as those that were presented by A a month ago." Professor Rupert Cross in his book "Precedent in English Law" while explaining the significance of this doctrine observed as under :- "When it is said that a Court is bound to follow a case or bound by a decision, what is meant is that the Judge is under an obligation to apply a particular ratio decidendi to the facts before him in the absence of a reasonable legal distinction between those facts and the facts to which it was applied in the previous case." Morgan has defined this expression `ratio decidendi' in the following words :- "those portions of the opinion setting forth the rules of law applied by the Court, the application of which was required for the determination of the issues presented." Similarly, Sir John Salmond pointed out as under :- "A precedent, therefore, is a judicial decision which contains in itself a principle. The underlying principle which thus forms its authorita tive element is often termed the ratio decidendi. The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards the world at large " Sir George Jessel similarly observed that :- "The only use of authorities or decided cases, is the establishment of some principle, which the Judge can follow out in deciding the case before him. The only language in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided." Today, the views of Sir John Salmond and Morgan are also accepted by most of the American Judges. Since we have a written constitution, the doctrines of stare decisis and ratio decidendi have been embodied in Article 189 of the present Constitution. The expression "Law declared" used under the Government of India Act, 1935, and 1956 Constitution was rather vague and too general. On the other hand, the language used in Article 189 of the present Constitution is in more precise, clear and explicit terms. Thus, when applying principle or the doctrine of ratio decidendi or stare decisis to the facts of the present case, it can safely be held that the order, of the Supreme Court in General Abdul Hamid's case suspending the operation of the impugned order in that case cannot be termed as a precedent which may have the binding force upon all other Courts in Pakistan under Article 189 of the Constitution That order has not settled or laid down any question or principle of law for future guidance. It lacks the characteristic of judicial precedent or ratio decidendi. Thus, whether the source is Constitution or the judicial precedent, the result is the same, namely, the decision relied upon by the Deputy Attorney-General lacks the binding force. Consequently, we have no hesitation to repel the contention raised by the learned Deputy Attorney-General.

6. The main point involved in this case is whether the impugned orders, restraining the movements of the petitioner within the municipal limits of Lahore and curtailing his other liberties, amount to detention or not. According to the learned Deputy Attorney-General there is no actual confinement or imprisonment of the petitioner as he is free to move about within the municipal limits of Lahore Corporation. According to him, the restrictions contained in the impugned orders do not amount to dentention. He also relies upon the language used in section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to him, if a person is illegally detained in a public or private custody, the High Court can order his production before it and then set him at liberty. In the instant case, there is no such detention and, therefore, according to him there will be no question of setting the petitioner at liberty. It is well settled now that the scope of habeas corpus petition under the Constitution is much wider than under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A habeas corpus petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not restricted only to cases of actual detention or confinement, but this writ is applicable as an effective remedy in all cases of wrongful deprivation of personal liberty. Thus, if any branch or part of civil liberty is taken away or abridged in an illegal manner, that can be made the subject-matter of a writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution. It is admitted by the learned Deputy Attorney- General that now-a-days great importance is attached to personal liberty o citizens throughout the civilised world. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that a writ of habeas corpus filed under Article 199 of the Constitu tion will cover the case of alleged illegal deprivation or curtailment of an liberty of citizens. Apart from the Constitutional position, even otherwise a restriction on the movements of the petitioner will amount to detention. A understood in the ordinary sense, "detention" is complete deprivation of one's liberty, while "restriction" is partial deprivation of such liberty. On principle, there is no difference between the two so far as their actual nature is concerned, as both adversely affect one's liberty. The difference between the two is only of degree. A person can be detained or imprisoned in a cell, in an ordinary jail, in a private house or in a particular area or a town etc. The fact remains that there is lack of freedom to move about. He is not free to move about where and when he pleases. The curtailment of his liberty is there whether his movement is confined to a cell or to a town. It is not denied that even if a person is detained or confined in ordinary jail, he can be permitted to come out of it by the appropriate jail authority. In the instant case, the petitioner can be permitted by, the Home Secretary, Government of the Punjab, to go out of the municipal limits of Lahore. Apart from this curtailment of his freedom, there is another aspect of the case. The impugned order on the face of it, does not appear to be an order of detention but looks only a restriction order. When we go deep into it and examine its implications from various angles, then its true nature becomes apparent. In case the petitioner does not comply with the conditions contained in the impugned order or violates any of them, then the Defence of Pakistan Rules have given ample power to the Government to compel the petitioner to comply with the said conditions. Clause (6) of rule 32 and rule 212 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules are relevant on this point and are reproduced below :- "32.-(6) If any person contravenes any order made under this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to live years, or with fine, or with both.

212. Power to give effect to rules, orders, etc.-(1) Any authority, officer or person who is empowered by or in pursuance of the Ordinance or any of these rules to make any order or to exercise any other power may, in addition to any other action prescribed by or under these rules, take, or cause to be taken such steps and ruse, or cause to be used, such force as may, in the opinion of such authority, officer or person, be reasonably necessary for securing compliance with or for preventing or rectifying any contravention of, such order, or for the effective exercise of such power. (2) Where in respect of any of the provisions of these rules there is no authority, officer or person empowered to take action under sub-rule (1), the Federal Government may take, or cause to be taken, such steps and use, cause to be used, such force as may in the opinion of the Federal Government be reasonably necessary for securing compliance with, or preventing or rectifying any breach of such provision. (3) The power to take steps under sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (2) include the power to enter upon any land or other property whatsoever." A mere perusal of the above-mentioned rules makes it abundantly clear that if the petitioner goes out of the municipal limits of Lahore without permission, the Government can use physical force to bring him back for securing compliance with the impugned order. In such a situation, the area within the municipal limits of Lahore will constitute a sort of prison for him as he would not be able to go beyond the said limits of his own l free will without the permission of the appropriate authority. In addition, the petitioner can also be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine or with both in case he contravenes any of the conditions contained in the impugned order. If as a result of non-compliance or breach of any of the conditions contained in the impugned order, the petitioner can be physically forced to comply with the same in addition to his trial which may result in his conviction, the logical result is that what appears a mere control of his movements within a particular area, can ultimately result in his actual confinement or imprisonment. Thus, the impugned order which per se does not appear to be an order of detention, in fact amounts to detention. This Court has consistently taken a similar view in the following cases (1) Rao Mahroz Akhtar v. The District Magistrate, Dera Ghazi Khan and another P L D 1957 Lah. 676. (2) Muhammad Anwar v. Government of Pakistan P L D 1963 Lah. 109. (3) Muhammad Aslam Malik v. Province of West Pakistan P L D 1968 Lah. 1324. (4) Begum Nazir Abdul Hamid v. Pakistan Federal Government P L D 1974 Lah.

7. In this view of the matter, it can safely be held that the impugned order passed under clauses (d), (f )and (h) of sub-rule (1) of rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, which is described as "restriction order" clearly amounts) to detention order. This being the case, the petitioner already having remained under detention from 15-2-1973 up to 14-2-1974, he cannot be detained beyond the period of 12 months under clause (7) of Article 10 of the Constitution.

8. The learned Deputy Attorney-General has tried to argue that Fundamental Right No. 10, like other Fundamental Rights, stands Suspended due to proclamation of emergency in the country and, therefore, the impugned order would not be hit by clause (7) of this Article. We need not give detailed reasons in this behalf. Another Bench of this Court in W. P. No. 1299 of 1973 filed by the present petitioner has already exhaustively dealt with this aspect and held that Article 10 of the Constitution is still in force. This case is reported as l Mrs. Habiba Jilani v. The Federation of Pakistan P L D 1974 Lah.

153. We also hold the same view.

9. Raja Muhammad Anwar, the learned Deputy Attorney-General, has advanced another argument that this Court should keep the present writ petition pending till the final decision is given by the Supreme Court in General Abdul Hamid's case, because according to him, one of the points involved in that case is the same and that the operation of the impugned order of the High Court in that case has already been suspended. Apart from the Constitutional obligation, even propriety demands that we must show the highest respect for the Supreme Court which is the highest Court of the country. If it had been an ordinarily civil or criminal case, perhaps we would have kept the present case pending and awaited the result in General Abdul Hamid's case. However, the present case is a habeas corpus petition affecting the liberty of a citizen and the life of the impugned order is a limited one. It is possible that by the time the Supreme Court's decision is finally announced, the impugned order in the present case dies its natural death and the Government may not extend the period further. In such a situation, the whole object of the present writ petition would be defeated. Keeping in view the nature and circumstances of the present case, we feel that stay of present proceedings till the decision of the Supreme Court in General Abdul Hamid's case, may amount to refusal to exercise jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution and may render the writ petition itself as infructuous, if the period of the present impugned order is allowed to expire without giving any decision. In this view of the matter, we do not agree with the contention of the learned Deputy Attorney-General and have decided to dispose of the writ petition.

10. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the impugned orders are declared to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. K. B. A. Petition accepted.