P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

ANWARUL HAQ, J.

This judgment will dispose of Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1961 and Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1961, both of which raise certain questions regarding the interpretation and application of various sections of Ordinance XXI of 1960, known as the Central Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance, 1960.

2. The facts of the two cases may first briefly be stated. Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1961 is by some of the defendants against whom a suit was filed on the 8th of May 1955 by the plaintiff -respondents in the Court' of the Naib-Tahsildar, Bhag, in the Kalat District, for demarcation of certain lands. The suit was decreed by the Qazi of Bhag on the 15th of April 1957, and the defendants filed an appeal before the Majlis-e-Shoora on 17th of May 1957. This appeal was dismissed in default .on the 9th of September 1960, although the present appellants had sent a letter to the Majlis-i-Shoora that they could not attend due to illness. The appellants then filed a review petition on the 25th of February 1961 before the Majlis-i-Shoora, purporting to be under section 24 (d) of the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, praying that the order of dismissal in default be set aside for the reason that the absence of the appellants was not intentional, and secondly because there was an error of law due to the fact that the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani did not contain any provision for dismissing an appeal in default. The Majlis-i-Shoora, however, dis missed this review petition on the 10th of June 1961, observing :- (a) that although it was correct that there was no provision in the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, for dismissing an appeal in default, yet the application for review had been filed beyond ninety days, the period of limitation prescribed by Article 173 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, which Act had been applied to the former Baluchistan States Union on the 9th of June 1960 by Ordinance XXI of 1960. (b) that by virtue of Ordinance XXI of 1960 the provisions of Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, had been superseded by the Civil Procedure Code and, therefore, an appeal could be dismissed in default under Order XLI, rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, (c) that an application for setting aside the dismissal in default should have been made within thirty days as required by Article 168 in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, and (d) that the application for review was not properly stamped, as it bore only one rupee stamp whereas the Court-fee should have been equal to that paid on the Memorandum of Appeal, namely, Rs. 40 in this case.

3. Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that as the Majlis-i-Shoora concedes that there is no provision in the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, for dismissing an appeal in default, therefore, it was a fit case for review under section 24 (d) of the Dastur-ul-Amal. The learned counsel argues that the learned Members of the Majlis-i Shoora have wrongly invoked the provisions of the Civil Pro cedure Code and the Limitation Act, because these two Acts were made applicable to the Kalat area by President's Ordinance XXI of 1960 which was promulgated on the 9th of June 1960, i.e., on a date when the present appeal was already pending and certain rights had accrued to the appellants which could not be taken away by subsequent legislation. In the alternative, the position taken up by Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad is that if the Civil Procedure Code applies in the present case, then the Majlis-I- Shoora would have no jurisdiction to act in the matter, for the reason that the Majlis-i-Shoora is not a Civil Court as con templated by the Civil Procedure Code, with the result that it could not dismiss the appeal on the 9th of September 1960. Lastly, the learned counsel contends that, in any case, the Majlis-I- Shoora was not justified in dismissing the appeal in default because the appellants had intimated to the Majlis that they were unable to attend due to illness.

4. Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1961 was originally placed before a learned Single Judge of this Court (H. T. Raymond, J.) who ordered on the 10th of April 1962 that it should be heard by a larger Bench in view of the importance of the questions raised. This appeal is directed against an appellate order of the Majlis-I- Shoora of Kalat passed on the 10th .of June 1961 by which the appellant's appeal against a mqjRey decree given by the Qazi of Bhag was dismissed. The suit had been filed by the plaintiff- respondent in the Court of the Naib-Tahsildar of Bhag in the Kalat District on the 23rd of January 1961 for recovery of Rs.

400. The Naib-Tahsildar, by his order dated the 22nd of February 1961, referred it to the Qazi of Bhag, under the pro visions of Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, and the Qazi decreed the suit on the 30th of March 1961. The main contention raised by Mr. I. H. B. Hanfi, the learned counsel for the appellant Dhani Rakhsh, is that on the date the suit was instituted in the Court of the Naib-Tahsildar, Dastur-ul-Amal,.Diwani, Kalat, had been repealed by the Central- Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance XXI of 1960, with retrospective effect from, the 14th of October 1955, with the result that the Naib-Tahsildar of the Qazi of Bhag and subsequently the Majlis-i-Shoora had no jurisdiction whatsoever to deal with the matter.

5. Besides this main contention, Mr. Hanfi has raised three other points which may be disposed-of straight away before we deal, with the legal questions involved in the matters before us. Mr. Hanfi has contended that, assuming the case was governed by Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani; Kalat, the following irregularities have been committed in the conduct of the suit which vitiate the whole trial:- (a) that the Naib-Tahsildar did not frame any issues- as required by section 7 of the Dastur-ul-Amal before referring the case to the Qazi. (b) that some of the plaintiff's witnesses were not allowed to be cross-examined, and (c) that statements of two of the plaintiff's witnesses, namely, Mitha and Jan Muhammad, were recorded without any oath or solemn affirmation having been administered to them.

6. We find that the point regarding the framing of issues was not raised before the Majlis-i-Shoora, nor is it specifically mentioned in the grounds of appeal filed is this Court. The learned counsel referred us to ground No. 4, namely, that "material irregu larities have been committed by the lower Court to the great pre judice of the appellant". This ground is much too vague and general, and we cannot permit the learned counsel to agitate a point which was neither raised before the lower appellate Court nor specifically taken up in the grounds of appeal in this Court. In any case, we are of the view that the non-framing of the issues by the Naib-Tahsildar has not resulted in any prejudice to the appellant, for the reason that the issues were framed by the Qazi who-ultimately decreed the suit. As regards the second point, namely, that no opportunity was given to the appellant to cross examine the plaintiff's witnesses, we notice that there is a finding of fact by the Majlis-i-Shoora, sitting as the first appellate Court, that such opportunity was given. We are not prepared to go behind this finding of fact. As regards the last irregularity pointed out by the learned counsel reference to tire record shows that an oath was administered to the two witnesses in question and, in any case, under the Hanfi Law it is not necessary to administer oath to a witness [See Mst. Bibi Lal Bibi v. Mir Baluch Khan and another (P L D 1962 Quetta 28)]. We, therefore, see no force in any of the point urged by Mr. Hanfi regarding procedural irregularities.

7. We now take up the question of the effect of the pro mulgation, on -the 9th of June 1960, of the President's Ordin ance XXI of 1960 on the jurisdiction of the existing Courts in the Kalat area and the procedure applicable to proceedings before them. As already, stated, this Ordinance is called the Central Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance, 1960. For facility of reference, the Ordinance is reproduced here :- "An Ordinance to reform the Central Statute-book :- Whereas the incorporation of certain former Provinces, Acceding States arid Tribal Areas into the Province of West Pakistan by the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, has rendered it expedient that certain changes should be made in the laws and that certain laws should be extended to parts of the new Province to which they had not extended before ; And whereas such extension has been agreed upon in consul tation with the Provincial Government of West Pakistan and the other authorities concerned ; And whereas it is expedient to remove from the Statute-book certain Acts and Ordinances which have become obsolete or have discharged their function ; Now, therefore, in pursuance of the Proclamation of the seventh day of October, 1958, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the President is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance :-

1. Short title.

This Ordinance may be called the Central Laws (Statute Reform) Ordinance, 1960.

2. Repeal of certain Central Acts and Ordinances.

The Central Acts and Ordinances specified in the First Schedule are hereby repealed, and shall be deemed to have been so repealed on the 14th day of Octocer, 1955.

3. Amendments to effect adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinances necessitated by the establishment of West Pakistan. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in any Central Act or Ordinance, the Central Acts and Ordinances specified in the Second Schedule shall extend to the whole of Pakistan, and shall be amended in the manner indicated in the fourth column thereof, and shall be deemed to have been so extended and amended on the fourteenth day of October, 1955. (2) nothing in subsection (1) shall be deemed to have extend, or ever to have had the effect of extending the operation of, any Central Act or Ordinance so extended or amended, to- (a) any Scheduled District to which, immediately before the fourteenth day of October, 1955, such Act or Ordinance did not extend, or is not otherwise extended or applied thereafter ; or (b) any of the Special Areas to which, immediately before the fourteenth day of October, 1955, such Act or Ordinance did not extend, or is not otherwise extended or applied thereafter ; or (c) any Acceding State, not being an Acceding State incor porated, on and from the fourteenth day of October, 1955, into the Province of West Pakistan, whose Instrument of Accession does not authorize, nor is deemed to authorise, the Federal Legislature to make for that State such law as is contained in any such Act or Ordinance ; nor shall the extension of any Central Act or Ordinance by this Ordinance be deemed to have or ever to have had the effect of retrospectively creating any offence, or of retrospectively enhancing the punishment for any offence provided in any law for the time being in force.

4. Repeal and re-enactment of certain laws in force in certain Acceding States before their incorporation into West Pakistan. (1) Subject always to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 3, where the operation of any Central Act or Ordinance has been extended by an amendment indicated in the Second Schedule to any area which, before the fourteenth day of October, 1955, formed part of the territories of an Acceding State, any law in force in that area before that date and cor responding to the provisions of such Act or Ordinance shall stand repealed and shall be deemed to have been re-enacted by such Act or Ordinance, as amended by this Ordinance, as if such law were a Central Act, and the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), shall apply accordingly. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any thing done, action taken, right accrued, or liability penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred under any such law as aforesaid during the period commencing on the fourteenth day of October, 1955, and ending with the commencement of this Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been validly done, taken, accrued or incurred, as the case may be, and the Central Act Or Ordinance by which such law is deemed to have been re enacted shall, to that extent, be deemed not to have come into f,3rce during the said period in the area to which such law applied immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance.

5. Savings.

Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Ordinance, the repeal by this Ordinance of any Central Act or Ordinance shall not affect- (a) the previous operation of any Act or Ordinance so repealed or the validity, invalidity, effect or consequences of anything already done or suffered thereunder ; or (b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder or any release or discharge already granted of or from any debt, penalty, obligation, liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity, already granted, or the proof of any past act or thing ; or (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any Act or Ordinance so repealed ; or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, title, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Ordinance had not been enacted ; nor shall the repeal of any Act or Ordinance by which the text of any law was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, affect the continuance of any such amendment unless a different intention was expressly stated in the Act or Ordinance by which the amendment was made ; nor shall this Ordinance revive or restore anything not in force or existing at the time of its commencement, or affect any law in which any Act or Ordinance hereby repealed has been applied, incorporated or referred to, or affect any principle or rule of law, or established jurisdiction, form, or cause of pleading, practice, or procedure, or existing usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment, not withstanding that they respectively may have been in any manner affirmed, recognized or derived by, in or from any Act or Ordinance hereby repealed.

6. Adaptations.

As soon as may be after the commence ment of this Ordinance such adaptations as the President may see fit to make in the Central Acts and Ordinances shall be effected in such Acts and Ordinances as reformed by this Ordinance."

8. It seems to us that one of the purposes to which the Ordinance is directed is to secure the unification of laws applic able to the various areas which were integrated into the Province of West Pakistan with effect from the 14th of October 1955, and to achieve this end, certain Central Acts and Ordinances have been extended so as to apply to the whole of the Province, and as a necessary consequence some local and special laws have either been expressly or impliedly repealed. We find that they Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, has not been expressly repealed as it does not appear in the First Schedule referred to in section 2 of the Ordinance. The question, therefore, is how far has it been impliedly repealed or otherwise affected by the provisions contained in sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Ordinance.

9. The Civil Procedure Code of 1908 finds mention in the Second Schedule to the Ordinance, with the result that it applies to the whole of West Pakistan subject to the amendments indicated in the Schedule. Subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance mentions certain areas to which the enactments listed in the Second Schedule shall not apply, but the Kalat State does not appear to fall within any of the exceptions indicated in this subsection. The result, therefore, is that the Civil Procedure D Code is to be deemed to have been extended to the Kalat area from the fourteenth day of October, 1955.

10. Under section 4 of the Ordinance "where the operation of any Act or Ordinance has been extended by an amendment indicated in the Second Schedule to any area which, before the fourteenth day of October, 1955, formed part of the territories of an Acceding State, any law in force in that area before that date and corresponding to the provisions of such Act or Ordinance shall stand repealed, and shall be deemed to have been re enacted by such Act or Ordinance, as amended by this Ordinance, as if such law were a Central Act adt the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), shall _ apply accordingly. Now the question is whether Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, is a law corresponding to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908. If so, whether the whole or any parts thereof stand repealed and are to be deemed to have been re-enacted by the Civil Procedure Code, as amended by this Ordinance.

11. The word "corresponding" or the phrase "to corrcsnond"r does not usually or properly mean "to be identical with", but "to,' harmonize with" or "to be suitable to" (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 645). According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the word "correspond" means to be "in harmony", "be similar", "analogous". Thus in order that a law may be a law cor responding to another law, it should deal broadly with matters dealt with in the other law. It need not be substantially and materially identical with the other law. Viewed in this broad sense, the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, 1952 appears to us to be a law corresponding to the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, inasmuch as both the laws are intended to regulate the procedure of Courts of civil jurisdiction. But the matter, however, does not rest here. On the one hand, section 4 speaks of "any law in force in that area" (meaning the Acceding State), and on the other, it uses the words "corresponding to the provisions of such Act or Ordinance", when speaking of the Central Acts or Ordinances which have been extended to the Acceding States by this Ordinance. It, therefore, seems to us that the intention underlying section 4 of the Ordinance is not to repeal the law of an Acceding State in its entirety, but only to the extent that it corresponds to the provisions of the Central Act or Ordinance. To put it differently, it seems to us to be the intention that if the local law of the Acceding State, although dealing with a corresponding subject matter, has provisions which are not to be found in the Central Act or Ordinance which has been extended to the area concerned, then those particular provisions will continue in force. If the intention had been that the law in force in the area of an Acced ing State should stand repealed in its entirety for the reason that it corresponds to the Central Act or Ordinance in question, we think that the words "corresponding to the provisions of such Act or Ordinance" would not have been used, and instead it would have been sufficient to say "corresponding to such Act or Ordinance."

12. The intention to keep alive certain provisions of the law in force in an Acceding State also becomes apparent from the last part of section 5 of the Ordinance, namely, "nor shall this Ordinance revive or restore anything not in force or existing at the time of its commencement, or affect any law in which any Act 6r Ordinance hereby repealed has been applied, incorporated or referred to, or affect any principle or rule of law, or established jurisdiction, form, or cause of pleading, practice, or procedure, or existing usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment, notwithstanding that they respectively may have been in any manner affirmed, recognised or derived by, in or from any Act or Ordinance hereby repealed". It will be seen that established jurisdiction, cause of pleading, practice and procedure and existing usage and custom etc., have been allowed to continue in force irres pective of the application of corresponding Central Acts or Ordi nances and the express or implied repeal of local laws. It appears that while the Government was aiming at unification of laws in the whole of West Pakistan, it was conscious of the existence of peculiar local institutions, practices and procedures, usages and customs etc. and was not willing to disturb or abolish them abruptly, so as to ensure smooth transition to the new pattern of uniformity. We are, therefore, of the view that, except in a case of express repeal under section 2 of the Ordinance, sections 3 4 and 5 of the Ordinance do not have the necessary effect of repealing, in its entirety, a local law obtaining in an Acceding State, simply for the reason that it deals with a subject-matter dealt with in the Central Act or Ordinance extended to the whole of West Pakistan by Ordinance XXI of 1960. On the other hand G the combined effect of the three sections, just mentioned, is that the local law shall stand repealed only in so far as it corresponds to the provisions of the Central Act or Ordinance in question ; and the established jurisdictions, practices and procedures etc., shall continue in force.

13. Applying this principle to the case before us, it appears to us that the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, stands repealed only to the extent of those of its provisions which correspond to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but those of its provisions which deal with other matters, not provided for, in the Code of Civil Procedure, remain unaffected. Further, the jurisdic tion of the existing Courts which are functioning in, the Kalat, area under the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, and the peculiar practices and procedures applicable to proceedings before them, which are not covered by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, have been preserved.

14. Our attention was drawn to the fact that in the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962) Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat has been treated as an enactment which was alive in 1962 and had, therefore, to be included in the list of enact ments which were being repealed by section 28 of the Ordinance just mentioned. Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar pointed out that if the law making authority had regarded President's Ordinance XXI of 1960 as having the effect of completely repealing Dastur-ul Amal Diwani, Kalat, it would not have included this enactment in the list of those enactments which were to be repealed in 1962. Although a provision in a subsequent legislation is not to be regarded as conclusive of the intention lying behind a prior enactment, we consider that the inclusion of the Dastur-ul-Amall Diwani, Kalat, in the Schedule to the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance (11 of 1962) supports the conclusion we have reached above, namely, that this law was not repealed in its entirely by Ordinance XXI of 1960.

15. On this view of the matter, it would be seen that in spite of the promulgation of Ordinance XXI of 1960 and the extension of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the whole of West Pakistan, including the Kalat State, the Courts functioning in the Kalat area continued to exercise their jurisdiction, and, therefore, the Naib-Tahsildar of Bhag as well as the Qazi of Bhag and the Majlis-i-Shoora were competent, on the 23rd of January 1961 and subsequent dates, to entertain the suit and the appeal out of which Civil Revision No. 13 of 1961 has arisen. The matter having been disposed of by competent Courts, we see no reason to interfere and dismiss this appeal with costs.

16. We now proceed to examine the particular questions raised in the other matter before us, namely, Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1961.

17. As already stated, the first contention raised by Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad is that the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, has no provision for the dismissal of any appeal in default and, therefore, the Majlis-i-Shoora acted illegally in ordering such a dismissal on the 9th of September 1960 The argument clearly proceeds on the assumption that only the provisions of the Dastur- ul-Amal Diwani applied to this appeal, irrespective of the promul gation of Ordinance XXI of 1960 on the 9th of June 1960. On the view we have taken of the effect of the promulgation of Ordinance XXI of 1960, it is clear to us that from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance those provisions of the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani which corresponded to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 stood repealed, and instead, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure came into force. Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the subject of appeals from original decrees, and it must be treated as having been substituted for those provisions in the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani which deal with appeals from original decrees. That being so, the Majlis-i-Shoora would be competent to exercise all those powers which are mentioned in Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be remarked here that Ordinance XXI of 1960, while preserving existing jurisdictions, procedures etc., does not contain any bar against the enlargement of powers or jurisdiction of the existing Courts or Tribunals, if such enlarge ment is a consequence of the application of the corresponding provisions of the Central Act or Ordinance which has been extended to the area of the Acceding States. The result, therefore, is that the matter being governed by Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Majlis-i-Shoora was competent to dismiss the appeal in default under rule 17 of that Order.

18. At this stage, we might also refer to the contention of Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad that the appeal having been filed on the 17th of May 1957, it continued to be governed by the law applicable-at the time of its institution. The argument is really two-fold, namely, that neither the Civil Procedure Code nor the Limitation Act could apply in this case, for the reason that both these statutes were made applicable by Ordinance XXI of 1960 on the 9th of June 1960, i.e., during the pendency of the appeal. The learned counsel strenuously contended that if the law of limitation is made applicable to pending matters, it would have the effect of taking away a valuable right from the appellants, namely, the right of filing a review application without any restriction of time. Suffice it to say that it is now well settled that a procedural law has retrospective application, and governs all matters pending at the time of its enforcement. No party has a vested right in any particular form of procedure. The rules of limitation are prima facie rules of procedure and consequently no one has any vested right in a period of limitation, unless the contrary follows from the rules themselves. When the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for the institution of a particular suit, it does not create any right in favour of any person or define or create causes of action, but simply prescribes that the remedy could be exercised only within a limited period and not subsequently. Nor does the law of limitation create any obligation to sue where none exists. It follows that in respect of any particular suit or proceeding the law of limitation applicable is the law which is in force on the date on which such suit or proceeding is instituted, notwithstanding that the cause of action may have arisen before such Act came into force. It is, therefore, clear that the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as well as the Limitation Act came into force immediately on the 9th of June 1960 and governed all pending matters, including the review petition filed by the present appellants before the Majlis-i-Shoora.

19. The position, therefore, which emerges is this. On the 9th of June 1960 the Majlis-i-Shoora was competent to dismiss the appeal in default under the provisions of Order XLI, rule 17 C. P. C. Once the appeal had been dismissed in this manner, the appellants had to proceed under rule 19 of Order XLI and apply to the Majlis-i-Shoora for the re-admission of the appeal, and in that case, the application had to be made within thirty days of the date of the dismissal in default, as required by Article 168 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. The application for res toration was, however, not made until the 25th of February 1961, i.e., more than five months after the date of dismissal. The Majlis-i-Shoora was, therefore, right in treating it as time-barred.

20. Assuming for the sake of argument that the appeal and the review petition in question continued to be governed by the provisions of the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, it is correct that there is no provision under that law for dismissing an appeal in default. But it is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants that there is a provision in the Dastur-ul-Amal, namely, section 8, authorising the dismissal of a suit in default. W p cannot see any reason why the Majlis-i-Shoora cannot exercise a similar inherent power on the ordinary principles of administra tion of justice. It is clear that if a suit can be dismissed in default at the trial stage, there can be no question of injustice or impropriety if an appeal is dealt with in a similar manner. Courts of law must be presumed to have inherent powers of regulating their procedure in matters for which no provision is made in the procedural law applying to them. If such an inherent power is not presumed, the Courts may often find themselves powerless to proceed with cases and dispense justice expeditiously. We are in respectful agreement with the observations made, in this behalf, by a Division Bench of this Court in Mst. Bibi Lal Bibi v. Mir Baluch Khan and another. While dealing with the absence of a provision in the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, regarding the impleading of the heirs of a Ruler in pending proceeding, their Lordships observed that "it is true that there is no provision to this effect, but in the absence of any bar in the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, on the ordinary principles of the administration of justice, this procedure must be considered to be inherent in any proceedings before a Civil Court". Thus even if the matter was not governed by the Civil Procedure Code and only the Dastur-ul Amal Diwani, Kalat, applied, we would hold that the Majlis-i Shoora had inherent power to dismiss an appeal in default, and no question of an error of law would arise.

21. There is still another aspect of this matter, namely, that if the matter was governed by the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, then the only remedy for the appellants was to file a review application under section 24 (d) of the Dastur-ul-Amal. 1n the Dastur-ul-Amal itself no time limit is indicated in connection with a review application, but we have already held that the Limitation Act had come into operation with effect from the 9th of June 1960 in the Kalat State and applied to all pending matters as well. The order of dismissal having been passed on the 9th of September 1960, the review application should have been filed p within a period of ninety days, as prescribed by Article 173 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, but this was not done. The review application was, therefore, clearly time-barred and could have been rejected on that ground alone.

22. The next contention raised by Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad is that in case the matter was governed by the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act, the Majlis-i-Shoora had no jurisdiction to deal with the appeal, for the reason that it was not a Court recognised by the Civil Procedure Code. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that the Civil Procedure Code itself does not create any Courts, nor does it define the word "Court". Its preamble says that it is intended to regulate the procedure of the Courts of civil judicature, and section 3, thereof lays down that the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordi nate to the High Court and the District Court. In other words, it is only by implication that the Code of Civil Procedure recognises Civil Courts of various grades. We find that the Civil Courts in each Province were established under different statutes, for example, in the former Punjab Province they were covered by the Punjab Courts Act of 1918. Basically, the Code of Civil Procedure is a procedural law and, therefore, we see no difficulty in its application to proceedings of a civil nature, pending before Courts of any kind. In fact, this procedure applies, with or without modification, to Revenue Courts and various other Tribunals which are created under different laws from time to time. In other words, for the application of the rules of procedure embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is not necessary that the Court applying them should either be a creation of the Code or recognised by it.

23. As regards the application of the Limitation Act, we have not been able to appreciate the argument put forward by the learned counsel. There is no provision in the Limitation Act that it has to be applied by any particular kinds of Courts or Tribunals, much less is there any restriction or stipulation that the Limitation Act can only be invoked and applied by Courts exercising powers under the Civil Procedure Code. From section 3 of the Limitation Act it is clear that it applies to suits, appeals and applications. Once the Act is extended to a particular area, it will have to be administered by whatever Courts may have the jurisdiction to deal with the suits, appeals and applica tions, as are mentioned in section 3 of the Limitation Act, and such Courts shall be under an obligation to dismiss the suits appeals and applications, instituted, preferred or made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefore by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. We have already held that in the Kalat area the jurisdiction of the existing Courts namely, of the Naib -Tahsildars and other officers as well as the Qazis and the Majlis-i-Shoora, functioning under the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, has been preserved, but in the matter of procedure certain pro visions of the Dastur-ul-Amal stand substituted by corresponding provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is these) Courts in the area of the former Kalat State which have now to apply the Limitation Act, and no question of lack of jurisdiction arises in this behalf.

24. It will be seen, therefore, that the various contentions raised by Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Ahmad have no force. In the first place, the Courts as established and functioning under the old law in the Kalat State have continued in their jurisdiction and are competent to apply the Limitation Act as well as certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. After the 9th of June 1960, the procedure in the matter of appeals from original decrees pending before the Majlis-i-Shoora was to be regulated by Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorises the dismissal of an appeal in default. An application for re admission of the appeal could only be made within thirty days, which was not done. Even if the matter was governed purely by the Dastur-ul-Amal Diwani, Kalat, the lower appellate Court had the inherent power of dismissing the appeal in default. In any case, the application for review had to be made within ninety days of the order of dismissal, but in the present case the application was made more than five months after the date of the order. The Majlis-i-Shoora was, therefore, legally competent, and acted rightly, in dismissing the application for the restoration of the appeal.

25. The learned counsel for the appellants finally raised the point that on merits the dismissal in default was not justified for the reason that the appellants had intimated to the Court that they were unable to attend due to illness, and secondly, because the value of the property involved was substantial. The question whether the reason given by the appellants for their absence from the hearing of the appeal constituted, in the circumstances of the case, a sufficient cause, within the meaning of rule 19 of Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code, was primarily one of fact and we are not prepared to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate Court on that point. It is clear that, when ordering the dismissal of the appeal, the Court did not regard the reason given by the appellants for their absence as sufficient or acceptable. We have no material to differ from that conclusion. Further, the mere fact that the property involved is of substantial value does not by itself justify any interference with a legal and competent order.

26. As regards the question of Court-fee, since we are of the view that the application presented by the appellants on the 25th of February 1961 was an application under Order XLI, rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code for re-admission of the appeal, it was correctly stamped with one rupee Court-fee, and did not require the same amount of Court-fee as was affixed on the Memorandum of Appeal.

27. For the reason given above, the Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1961 is also dismissed with costs. A. H. Appeals dismissed.