2026 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

KHALID ISHAQ, J.

This judgment will decide the following Constitutional Petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the "Constitution"), as all these petitions involve common questions of law that require determination by this Court. However, the Constitutional Petitions are divided into two categories, "A" and "B", due to the distinct nature and legal status of the petitioners involved. Category "A" petitions: These petitions pertain to the petitioners who were admittedly not employees of the Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone's Department ("T&T Department") and rather joined Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation (the "Corporation") or Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited ("PTCL"), subsequent to the promulgation of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 ("Act, 1991") and the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 (the "Act, 1996"): Sr. No. Title Sr. No. Title i. W.P. No.47407 of 2023 ii. W.P. No. 75467 of 2017 iii. W.P. No. 12694 of 2024 iv. W.P. No. 12102 of 2024 v. W.P. No.47980 of 2023 vi. W.P. No.30309 of 2025 vii W.P. No.6522 of 2025 viii. W.P. No.64364 of 2024 ix. W.P. No.47759 of 2023 x. W.P. No.28610 of 2025 xi. W.P. No.78448 of 2023 xii. W.P. No.43927 of 2023 Category "B" petitions: These petitioners of this category were employees of the T&T Department and were subsequently transferred, firstly to the Corporation and then to PTCL: Sr. No. Title Sr. No. Title i. W.P. No.13062 of 2024 ii. W.P. No.42928 of 2025 iii. W.P. No.28677 of 2023 iv. W.P. No.35055 of 2023 v. W.P. No.11579 of 2017 vi. W.P. No.48653 of 2023 vii W.P. No.56532 of 2023. viii. W.P. No.49394 of 2023 ix. W.P. No.38709 of 2023. x. W.P. No.24612 of 2024 xi. W.P. No.53395 of 2023 xii. W.P. No.3143 of 2024.

2. The petitioners of both categories are aggrieved of disciplinary proceedings initiated by the respondent PTCL. At the time of filing of these petitions, the challenge was essentially directed towards the show-cause notices or charge sheets served upon these petitioners. The common thread of the grounds agitated through these petitions is premised on the submission that since the petitioners' services are protected under statutory safeguards in terms of the provisions contained in Sections 35 and 36 of the Act, 1996, thus, by virtue of said statutory protections, the disciplinary proceedings, if any, are to be regulated under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1973 ("E&D Rules, 1973"). It is extensively argued by the learned counsel for petitioners that the terms and conditions of petitioners' services have been afforded the statutory protections, therefore, the Constitutional Petitions of all the petitioners, irrespective of their positions as T&T Department employees or Corporation/PTCL employees, are maintainable. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the respondent PTCL is under statutory obligation to invoke and follow the E&D Rules, 1973, if it intends to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners; adds that though in some cases the reference to E&D Rules, 1973 has been made, however, the provisions contained in the said Rules have not been followed, whereas, in other cases the petitioners have been proceeded against in absolute violations and complete oblivion of the statutory rules i.e. E&D Rules, 1973; it is argued with vehemence that by virtue of Notification No. C.E.(C&C)/RULES/1992, dated 9th February, 1992, the Corporation had adopted the rules and procedures, which were in vogue for the T&T Department Employees/Officers, therefore, all the petitioners are required to be dealt with and governed under the same statutory rules which were applicable for the T&T Department's employees; while referring to Notification No. RRR.1-24/95, dated 07.11.1995, issued by the Corporation, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that under the said Notification, specific authorities are designated as competent authority to initiate and conduct disciplinary proceedings against various category of employees; adds that the same Notification continues to hold the field for the petitioners and since the impugned disciplinary actions have neither been initiated nor conducted by the designated 'competent authority', therefore, all such actions are without jurisdiction and non est. Much reliance has been placed upon "Masood Ahmed Bhatti's case1 as well as "Masood Ahmed Bhatti Review Judgment 2 by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In order to substantiate his submissions viz the question of maintainability of these petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that since the applicable rules are statutory in nature i.e. E&D Rules, 1973 and the petitioners have been afforded statutory protections under Sections 35 and 36, read with Section 59 of the Act, 1996, therefore, the petitions in hand are maintainable and consequently the impugned disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners are liable to be declared as having been initiated without any lawful authority and jurisdiction. It is further argued that since the rights of the petitioners are protected under a statute and statutory rules, therefore, in terms of the proviso to Section 1(4)(c) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (Ordinance, 1968), the provisions and remedies under the Ordinance, 1968 are not applicable or attracted either, thus, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners cannot approach the labour Court for redressal of their grievances. The reliance is further placed upon Jan Muhammad v. The General Manager, Karachi and another (1993 SCMR 1440), "PTCL and another v. Muhammad Zahid and 29 others" (2010 SCMR 253). Finally, it is argued that some of the petitioners have already been superannuated, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings have abated for the said reasons of superannuation of the petitioners. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments reported as "Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest Faisalabad and others v. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328), Muhammad Zaheer Khan v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment and others (2010 SCMR 1554), Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan v. Nadeem H. Shaikh and others (2021 SCMR 343), Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Sindh and others (2024 SCMR 1689) and Nasir Kamal v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Islamabad and another (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1226).

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent PTCL have raised objections qua the maintainability of the petitions in hand on the ground that since it has been unequivocally and authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan as well as by various High Courts of the Country that irrespective of the fact that the employees, who joined their service either prior or subsequent to the promulgation of the Act, 1991 and the Act, 1996, as the case may be, the Rules and Regulations governing their terms and conditions of service are non-statutory, therefore, as a natural corollary, the Constitutional Petitions are not maintainable. This submission has been reiterated in addition to the PTCL's legal objections viz the question of maintainability of the Constitutional Petitions filed by some of the employees/petitioners who were admittedly employed by the T&T Department (category "B" petitions) on the ground that the petitioners in the said petitions are workmen, therefore, they cannot invoke the jurisdiction of judicial review of this Court in either case, despite having joined service as T&T Department employees; submits that the Rules framed under any statute are its progeny and upon repeal of the parent law, the rule framed thereunder shall be automatically extinguished until and unless the same are specifically saved by another law; adds that by virtue of the saving clause of the Act, 1996 i.e. Subsection (2) of Section 59, the Rules framed under the earlier statutes have not been specifically saved by virtue of Section 59 of the Act, 1991, despite the fact that the said saving clause is an elaborate and extensively worded provision, therefore, the statutory Rules, if any, under the earlier enactments had seized to exist for the purpose of all employees of the Corporation/PTCL, be it 'transferred employees' or otherwise; further submits that when an organization is being run under the authority of a statute, having status of a body corporate, the mere fact that the Government is authorized to issue directions would not make the authority to be an establishment being carried out by or under the Authority of the Government concerned, be it Federal of Provincial Government, therefore, the petitioners of category "B" petitions, being workmen, cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. In this respect, learned counsel has placed reliance upon "Amir Khan v. Mineral Development Corporation" (1990 SCMR 1206) "Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal" (1988 SCMR 1725) Lahore Development Authority and others v. Abdul Shafique and others (1992 PLC 1214) "EOBI v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal" (1992 PLC 742). While further explaining the structure and essence of the Acts, 1991 / 1996, learned counsel for the PTCL has referred to the definition of "department employees" as supplied in clause (c) of Section 2, as well as Section 8 of the Act, 1991 and contends that irrespective of the categorization of T&T Department employees and that of the Corporation/PTCL employees, subsequent to the promulgation of the Act, 1991, all such employees are treated alike and thus in terms of subsections (2) and (3) of Section 8, read with Section 9 of the Act, 1991, in conjunction with the provisions contained in the Act, 1996, the Corporation and, thereafter, the PTCL is competent to regulate the terms and conditions of service of all types and kind of employees and may take disciplinary actions under the Regulations prescribed by the Corporation/PTCL from time to time; submits that the claim of statutory protection, as couched under sections 35 and 36 of the Act, 1996, does not render the petitioners/PTCL Employees as civil servants nor this legal dispensation confers any legal right to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court against all/any disciplinary proceedings initiated by the PTCL as the Rules governing the terms and conditions of PTCL Employees are admittedly non statutory; for dispelling the petitioners' contentions that the disciplinary proceedings have allegedly not been initiated by 'competent authority', learned counsel for respondent PTCL has referred to various documents to demonstrate that all disciplinary actions have been initiated with the approval of the 'authority'. In this respect learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the law laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan "Bilal Hussain v. Present National Bank of Pakistan" (2022 SCMR 313) and Lal Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (1995 SCMR 1758). In support of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent PTCL viz. the question of maintainability of these petitions, the reliance has further been placed upon the judgments reported as "Muhammad Zaman and others v. Government of Pakistan" (2017 SCMR 571) Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (1988 SCMR 1725) "Muhammad Din v. Nazar Muhammad Khan and others" (PLD 1966 Lahore 780), "Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Town Municipal Administration, Lahore and others" (PLD 2009 Lahore 657), "Masood Ahmad Bhatt s Review Judgment", "Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Muhammad Samiullah" (2021 SCMR 998) and consolidated judgment dated 10th July 2025, passed in Civil Appeal No.1509 of 2021 titled "Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited v. Imran Aziz and others."

4. Arguments heard, record perused.

5. Since the question of maintainability and jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution has been raised, therefore, this threshold question has to be decided ahead of all other questions as the deference to jurisdictional spheres has been settled centuries ago in Graham v. Maingay3 whereby it was held: "It is fundamental importance to emphasis that jurisdiction lies at the foundation of all legal proceedings, if not present, the proceeding is void . In the classic words of Chief Justice John Marshall: 'we have no more right to decline she exercise of jurisdiction which is given, then to usurp that what is not given, the one or the other would be treason to the Constitution'.

6. Before proceeding to determine the question of maintainability of these petitions, some of the settled principles viz the question of maintainability of such like causes are reiterated, albeit at the cost of burdening this judgment. It is well settled that where the conditions of service of an employee of even a statutory body are not regulated by statutory rules and are governed under the terms of a contract or the rules/instructions/regulations for internal use, the relationship of the employee with such instrumentality is governed by the principle of Master and Servant, unless the services are protected in terms of the provisions contained in labour laws. The alleged violation(s), if any, qua the terms and conditions of service, if not backed by statutory rules, cannot be redressed while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The said principle is etched in our jurisprudence as tablet of stone and hardly needs any reference to precedent any further, nevertheless, if need be, the reliance may be placed upon the consistent enunciations of the law by Supreme Court of Pakistan

4. For the purpose of completeness, the distinction as to the statutory and non-statutory rules is also well settled by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In a nub, the rules of an organization, if not approved by Government and having been drafted, approved or adopted for internal arrangement and functioning of such organization, are non-statutory5.

7. In order to appreciate the legal status of the petitioners of category "A" petitions, some necessary facts of each of the petitioner are explicated herein below: I. (W.P. No.47407 of 2023): Petitioner Tariq Mabmood was appointed as Assistant Divisional Engineer by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated May, 22nd 1993 which appointment letter clearly manifests that the petitioner joined the service as an employee of the Corporation and his services are governed by the Rules in vogue or prescribed from time to time by the Corporation for its employees. As evident, no statutory rules are applicable viz the terms and conditions of service of this petitioner, nor he can claim the status of a civil servant or the status of an employee of T&T Department; II. (W.P. No.75467 of 2017): Similarly, petitioner Ahmad Jamal was appointed as Engineering Supervisor by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 17th June, 1995, which appointment letter supplies that the petitioner joined the service as an employee of the Corporation and his services are governed by the Rules in vogue or prescribed from time to time for the employees of the Corporation. As evident, no statutory rules are applicable viz the terms and conditions of service of this petitioner as well, nor he can claim the status of a civil servant. III. (W.P. No.12694 of 2024): Likewise, the petitioner Pervaiz Ahmad was appointed as Engineering Supervisor by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 8th December, 1994, which appointment letter also manifests that the petitioner joined the service as an employee of the Corporation and his services are governed by the Rules in vogue or prescribed from time to time for the employees of the Corporation; IV. (W.P. No.12102 of 2024): As above, the petitioner Shabbir Ahmed was also appointed as Engineering Supervisor by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 15th June, 1995 which appointment depicts that the petitioner joined the service as an employee of the Corporation and his services are governed by the Rules in vogue or prescribed from time to time for the employees of the Corporation. Hence no statutory rules are in play; V. (W.P. No.47980 of 2023): Petitioner Gharib Alam Mirza was also appointed as Engineering Supervisor by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 29th October, 1996 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation; VI. (W.P. No.47759 of 2023): Petitioner Nadeem Ahmad was, appointed as Engineering Supervisor by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 13th February, 1995 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation; VII. (W.P. No.30309 of 2025): Petitioner Muhammad Naseem was appointed as Lorry Driver by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 15th, June, 1995 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation; VIII. (W.P. No.6522 of 2025): Petitioner Zulfiqar Ali was appointed as Steno Typist by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 8th July, 1995 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. IX. (W.P. No.64364 of 2024): Petitioner Fazal Rehman was appointed as Accounts Officer by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 31st October, 1992 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation; X. (W.P. No.78448 of 2025): Petitioner Mughees Uzair was appointed as Engineering Supervisor by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 26th February, 1995 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. Through this petition, the petitioner challenged the show-cause notice and subsequently filed another petition i.e. W.P. No.28610 of 2025, whereby issuance of charge sheet was assailed; XI. (W.P. No.43927 of 2023): Petitioner Aurangzeb was appointed as Lineman by the Corporation vide appointment letter dated 25th October, 1995 which reflects that his services shall be governed under the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation;

8. As evident from the above facts, the petitioners of category "A" petitions are neither civil servants nor were they employed as employees of T&T Department and were rather appointed by the Corporation, therefore, in view of the settled law on the subject, the petitions mentioned in category "A" are not maintainable since the services of these petitioners were never regulated under any statutory rules as they started their employments being employees of the Corporation and were then transferred to PTCL as transferred employees. The mainstay of the petitioners' submissions, with an endeavor to cross the bridge of maintainability of these petitions, is premised on contention that since the earlier statutory rules/regulations were purportedly adopted by the Corporation by virtue of the above-mentioned memorandum/letters dated 09.02.1992 and 07.11.1995, therefore, the petitioners' services are also governed under the statutory rules. This submission has no force in law as it is well settled by now that mere adoption of statutory rules does not render the rules statutory for the purpose of organization which adopts such rules. The reliance may be placed upon the case of M.H. Mirza6 which judgment enunciated this question in the following terms: "None of its Regulations whether framed by it itself or adopted by reference had a statutory basis in law. This view is supported by the view taken in Ch. Abdul Rashid v. Capital Development Authority, Islamabad and another (PLD 1979 Lahore 803) and the Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. Muhammad Shoab Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170). The adoption of the rules of the Government or their application by reference will not lend a statutory cover or content to these rules, as held in Lahore Central Co-Operative Bank Limited v. Saif Ullah Shah (PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 210) and finally very recently in Chairman, Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Islamabad and 3 others v. Dr. Mrs. Khalida Razi (Civil Appeal No.270 of 1993). There being no statutory rules in the field, a Constitution petition as not at all competent on the subject."

9. It is also well settled that after PTCL's privatization under Act, 1996 and subsequent amendments thereto, the petitioners' status, in both categories "A" & "B" seized to be that of civil servants and they are governed by the PTCL's internal rules and regulations or Standing Orders. Consequently, the E&D Rules, 1973 are no longer applicable. The reliance may be placed upon the authoritative judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, i.e. "Masood Ahmed Bhatt Review Judgment" "Employees of Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department on their transfer to the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation (the Corporation) became employees of the Corporation under Section 9 of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Act, 1991 and then of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (Company) under Section 35 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996. Their Terms and Condition of Service were fully protected under Section 9(2) of the Act of 1991 and 35(2) of the Act of 1996. None of the terms and conditions of service could be varied to their disadvantage, Legislature also bound the federal Government to guarantee the existing terms and conditions of service and rights including pensionary benefits of the transferred employees. Since such employee became employees of the Corporation In the first instance and then the Company they did not remain "Civil Servant" any more. But the terms and conditions of their service provided by sections 3 to 22 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and protected by Section 9(2) of the Act of 1991 and Sections 35(2), 36(a) and (b) of the Act of 1996 were essentially statutory. Violation of any of them would thus be amenable to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Though in the cases of Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation and another v. Riaz Ahmed and 6 others and Divisional Engineer Phones, Phones Division, Sukkur and another S. Muhammad Shahid and others (supra) it was held that the departmental employees on their transfer to the Corporation and then to the Company would continue to be Civil Servants, but this interpretation does not appear to be correct as they on their transfer become employees of the Corporation under section 9 of the Act of 1991 and then of the Company under section 35 of the Act of 1996, Retention of their status as civil servants is thus not supported by the words used in the aforesaid provisions."

10. The reliance may further be placed upon on the case of Muhammad Sami Ullah7 supra whereby it has been settled in the most authoritative terms that an employee, who, at no point, had served in T&T Department, cannot claim that his terms and conditions of service are baptized by any statutory protections. The operative part of the aforementioned law report is reproduced herein below: "

16. Now coming to the principal question in the present case, whether the terms and conditions of the Respondent's employment enjoy statutory protection? The answer is in the negative because neither the record nor the relevant law contains anything to Support such a conclusion. The Respondent was employed as a workman on daily wages by Pakistan Telecommunications-Corporation in 1992 whereafter his services were regularized in 1998 and subsequently terminated. At no point in time was he working in the T&T department. In this regard, it is essential to draw a 2012 SCMR 152, 2016 SCMR 1362, 2012 SCMR 152 distinction between departmental employees of the T&T Department whose terms and conditions of service on their transfer to the Corporation and Company were protected by law and those who were employed by the Company on contract or work-charge basis whose terms and conditions of service were governed by the rules of the Company that are clearly non-statutory. The case of the Respondent falls squarely in the latter category. Therefore, any alleged violation of non-statutory rules was not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In this regard reference must be made to the case of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others (PLD 2011 SC 132) wherein it was categorically held that employees of governed by principle of Master and servant and in the absence of statutory rules, constitutional petitions filed by employees were not maintainable". [Emphasis Supplied]

11. The precise issue has once again been decided recently by a three-member bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Imran Aziz and others supra. Though there is a dissenting opinion by one of the Hon'ble member of the Bench on a particular question of law viz the protection of pensionary benefits of the 'transferred employees', however, so for as the question in hand is concerned, the judgment rendered by her Ladyship and their Lordships in Imran Aziz and others supra is to the same effect, as already settled by virtue of the above mentioned judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. If need be, the relevant observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the said case are reproduced: "

2. With utmost respect, I am unable to agree with her concluded view. While I concur that it is a settled position of law that employees lost their civil servant status following their transfer from T&T to PTC, and later PTCL, I find that this alone does not extinguish their accrued and preserved pensionary entitlements, particularly in light of the fact that the transferred employees, though no longer civil servants, were transferred under a statutory framework that expressly safeguarded their terms and conditions of service ". "16. [T]his Court in the Masood Bhatti review judgment did confirm the cessation of the civil servant status of transferred employees following their transfer from T&T to PTC and thereafter, PTCL. However, it drew a clear distinction between administrative status and the protection of vested rights by acknowledging that, while employees ceased to be civil servants, their pensionary entitlements, once vested, continued to enjoy statutory protection . "

23. In summation, my considered view is that the employees transferred from T&T to PTC, and subsequently to PTCL, retained not only their right to pensionary benefits but also the character of those benefits as dynamic and evolving rights. While these employees ceased to be civil servants, the statutory framework governing their transfer safeguarded their pensionary entitlements in full: not just as frozen benefits fixed at the time of transfer, but as living rights that were to progress in accordance with prevailing standards applicable to similarly situated public servants. The scheme under Sections 9 of the PTC Act and 36 of the PTCL Act guarantees the continuation of these entitlements, and the administrative mechanism created under the PTCL Act, including the establishment of PTET was intended to facilitate, not frustrate, this guarantee. PTCL and PTET are duty-bound to ensure that the full measure of these entitlements is met, and any interpretation that reduces these rights to static or discretionary payments is contrary to the legislative mandate".

12. Thus, the legal position, viz those PTCL employees, who were never part of or in service of the T&T Department and joined the Corporation or PTCL as employees, is clear and unambiguous to the effect that the terms and conditions of such employees are not governed under statutory rules, therefore, such employees cannot invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article, 199 of the Constitution, for agitating the grievance(s) pertaining to their service matters. Thus, the petitions falling in category 'A' mentioned above are hereby dismissed on the question of maintainability and jurisdiction.

13. As regards the fate of the category B cases are concerned, the threshold objection to the maintainability of these petitions, is based on the contention that the petitioners are workmen from the very inception of their appointments and never retained the status of 'civil servant', irrespective of their position of joining the service as T&T Department Employees, therefore the petitions are not maintainable per se. As a second limb of attack to the sustainability of these petitions on merit, without conceding to threshold objection of maintainability, the respondent PTCL has placed reliance upon various documents appended with these petitions and replies thereto, for refining the petitioners' contentions viz the merits of the case; it has been argued that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners are in accordance with law and settled principles of administration of justice i.e. notice, opportunity of hearing, charge sheet, inquiry etc. have been complied with but the petitioners had prematurely filed the petitions by assailing the show cause notices / charge sheets etc.

14. For category 'B' petitions, this Court has to decide two questions; firstly, whether the constitutional petitions are maintainable per se; secondly, if the answer to the first question is in affirmative, whether the relief claimed by the petitioners may be granted on merit. First things first, as regards the question of maintainability, since it has been held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Masood Ahmed Bhatti Review Judgments8, also followed recently by a learned Single Judge in Chambers of this Court in the case of Asghar Ali v. PTCL9 that the petitions filed by those employees who were part of the T&T Department are maintainable for the reason that such employees had statutory rules relating to terms, and conditions of their service which were protected by Section 35, read with section 36 of the Act, 1996, so their terms and conditions could not be varied to their disadvantage, therefore, the Petitions are maintainable.

15. As regards to the insistence of the petitioners of category "B" petition that since they were employed by T&T Department, therefore, they have the legal right to impugned all/any disciplinary action initiated against them by way of filing the Constitutional Petitions, this submission is utterly misconceived in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cases of "Masood Ahmad Bhatti Review Judgment" and "Imran Aziz" supra. The overwhelming reliance placed upon the case of "Masood Ahmad Bhatti" supra by the petitioners to contend that all employees of T&T Department are entitled to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, is evidently misplaced. A perusal of the said judgment would reflect that the petitioners/appellants of the said case were admittedly 'civil servants', which is not the case of the present petitioners. Thus, it is not axiomatic that all employees of T&T Department would have ipso facto right to challenge any/all actions, if so initiated against them, by invoking judicial review jurisdiction of this Court. This is premised on the undisputed legal position which emerges from the joint reading of "Masood Ahmad Bhatti Review Judgment" with "Imran Aziz" and "Muhammad Samiullah" judgments. In this respect the following Paragraphs from the judgment of "Imran Aziz" are reproduced:

16. The misreading of the statutory framework is further compounded by a misapplication of the Masood Bhatti review judgement. While the adopted view cites the ease to support the conclusion that civil servant status, and by, extension the entitlement to federally revised pensionary scheme, was extinguished upon transfer, such a reading fails to appreciate the reasoning actually adopted by this Court in said judgment. This Court in the Masood Bhatti review judgement did confirm the cessation of the civil servant status of transferred employees following their transfer from T&T to PTC and thereafter, PTCL. However, it drew a clear distinction between administrative status and the protection of vested rights by acknowledging that, while employees ceased to be civil servants, their pensionary entitlements, once vested, continued to enjoy statutory protection.

17. Given that the Court in Masood Bhatti review judgement may not have expressly discussed the evolving nature of pensionary rights, its logic, especially in light of the statutory framework discussed above, supports the conclusion that vested rights, once transferred and protected by statute, must retain their operative, features, even after the formal status of the employee changes. For former civil servants, pensionary, entitlements had long included periodic revisions aligned with governmental adjustments, reflecting a broader understanding of pension as a living right rather than a frozen benefit. To treat the loss of status, as also entailing a rupture in the evolving framework of pensionary rights, as the adopted view does, is to both neglect the pervasive protective intent of the legislature behind enacting the PTC Act and the PTCL Act, and to misapply precedent set by the Court in Masood Bhatti review judgement. Taken together, these sources affirm that pensionary benefits were intended to endure beyond administrative transition, an approach that the adopted view neglects in reaching the conclusion contained therein.

18. Based on the correct understanding of the decision in Masood Bhatti review judgement and the legislative intent underpinning the statutory protections afforded to transferred employees, the dismissal of the distinction between civil servants and workmen among transferred employees in the adopted view risks oversimplifying a legal reality that is both structurally and historically significant. The statutory framework did not adopt a blanket approach to all categories of employees; rather, it preserved rights according to their pre-existing legal character. In this context, the categorization adopted by the Islamabad High Court (impugned judgment dated 02.11.2021) distinguishing between those 'with vested statutory rights and those without was not only logical but necessary to preserve the integrity of the statutory scheme and the differential protections embedded therein.

19. The distinction between civil servants and workmen among transferred employees is rooted in the legal framework that governed their employment at the time of transfer. Civil servants, by virtue of their status under the civil service laws, held pensionary entitlements that were not only vested but also governed by statutory principles allowing for periodic revision and enhancement. These rights were thus dynamic in nature, shaped by legislative and administrative practice over time. In contrast, workmen, whose terms were contractual or governed by non-statutory instruments, did not possess equivalent entitlements grounded in law. While the legislative framework guaranteed "existing rights" to all transferred employees, the content and scope of those rights necessarily varied in light of the legal status of employees before transfer. Recognizing this differentiation is essential to a faithful application of the statutory protections, as it reflects not discrimination, but adherence to the principle that the law protects rights as they were legally constituted at the time of transfer.

16. The nutshell of the above leads to an ineluctable conclusion that the employees of T&T Department, who were subsequently transferred to the Corporation and then to PTCL, despite having right to invoke the constitutional petitions on the touchstone of maintainability, do not have a vested right to challenge all/any grievance(s) arising out of the terms and conditions of their service, be it disciplinary or other proceedings and only a manifest injustice, inherent violation of the principles of administration of justice or denial of due process will give rise to the successful invocation of the remedy of Judicial review.

17. Coming to the second question posed for determination i.e. the sustainability of Category B petitions on merit, I have considered the record and submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In a nub and at the cost of repetition, it is the case of the Petitioners that since the proceedings sought to be initiated against the Petitioners are in violations of the E&D Rules, 1973, as these proceedings have either not been initiated by mentioning the E&D Rules, 1973 or where even so mentioned, the proceedings were not initiated by the `competent authority', therefore, these proceedings are without jurisdiction. This ground must fail for two reasons. Firstly, the E&D Rules, 1973 have been repealed by virtue of Rule 21 of the Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2020 (E&D Rules, 2020) and the concept or term authorized officer , as couched in sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of E&D Rules, 1973, has been done away with by the substituted/replaced Rules i.e. E&Daules, 2020, thus the entire premise of the case sought to be built by the petitioners is without any foundation. Without prejudice to the foregoing, even sub-rule (3) of the Rule 2 of E&D Rules, 1973 provides that if no officer is so authorized, the authority may proceed to perform such functions. This is besides the point that the Petitioners of Category B cannot insist that they can only and exclusively be proceeded under the E&D Rules, 1973 and the prescribed rules and regulations of Corporation/PTCL, cannot be invoked. Mere maintainability of a Constitutional Petition, owing to statutory protections in terms of Sections 35 and 36 of the Act, 1996, does not mean that the petitioners can stifle the very essence and purpose of the incorporation of the PTCL and the Act, 1996. Be that as it may, I have perused the documents appended with the reply in W.P. No.13062 of 2024 and that of other petitions; these documents i.e. the trailing emails dated 16.01.2024, 19.01.2024 etc. would reflect that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioners were set in motion with the approval of the 'authority'. As to what constitutes the 'competent authority authority' for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners, the reliance may be placed upon an Inter-Office Memo. dated 15th June, 2009, issued by the PTCL, which is to the effect of designating the Authority/Appellate Authority for disciplinary actions against PTCL employees; Inter Office Memo. denotes that the General Manager (HRA-HQS) shall exercise the authority to communicate charge sheet/show cause notice and final orders on behalf of the authority in respect of officers in B-16 and above of the Company. Similarly, as regards to the rest of the employees i.e. up to B-15, the designated authority has also been enumerated in the same document. This Inter Office Memo, when read with the emails and other documents available on record would reflect that the proceedings initiated against the petitioners had commenced with the approval of the competent authority. As regard to the competence of the 'authority/designated authority' and the effect thereof in the matters relating to the disciplinary proceedings, the reliance may be placed upon the case of Bilal Hussain10 supra, the following paragraphs whereof is particularly instructive and is reproduced as under:

16. Learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with the word "authority" as mentioned in the above letter. He stated that the authority itself is not mentioned in the letter. Though such an argument has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant but he has not been able to support the same by any law. It is a routine practice by large organizations that the authority passes an order, which is communicated by the organization's office to the relevant official. The using of the word authority in the letter itself shows that competent authority has passed the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant and the same has been conveyed to him by the Bank officials through the above letter.

18. Similarly, the reliance may also be placed upon the Lal Khan s case11 supra. Clause (4) of Standing Order 15 which is also relevant to the controversy provides as follows: No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct within one month of the date of such misconduct or of the date on which the alleged misconduct comes to the notice of the employer and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. The approval of the employer shall be required in every case of dismissal and the employer shall institute independent inquiries before dealing with charges against a workman. Provided that the workman proceeded against may, if he so desires for his assistance in the enquiry, nominate any workman employed in that establishment and the employer shall allow the workman so nominated to be present in the enquiry to assist the workman proceeded against and shall not deduct his wages if the enquiry is held during his duty hours. Clause (4) indicates that no order of dismissal against a workman shall be made unless the workman is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. The said clause further indicates that approval of the employer shall be required in every case of dismissal. It also indicates that the employer shall institute independent inquiry before dealing with any charges against a workman. The definition of the term employer indicates that the person referred to as employer in the said definition may either be the owner of the establishment or in case of a factory, any person named under clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the Factories Act, 1934, as the Manager of the Factory. The definition of the word "employer" is a comprehensive definition and it also extends to establishment other than a factory but since in the present case the establishment concerned was a factory, reference to other clauses in the said definition is not necessary. In the present case there appears to be no controversy in regard to the fact that the Directors of the said establishment had executed a power of attorney in favour of the Manager, Personnel and Administration authorizing him to pass an order of dismissal or removal of a workman from the said establishment or to appoint an inquiry officer to conduct an inquiry against him in case of a misconduct. Such authority to the Manager Personnel and Administration was therefore given by the owner of the factory itself which was the Board of Directors in the present case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has nevertheless argued that as indicated by clause (4) of Standing Order 15, at least approval of the employer would be necessary before any such action is taken against a workman. Although the learned counsel is right but in the present case there is nothing to indicate that such approval was not given by the Board of Directors in regard to the action taken against the petitioner. The presumption on the contrary would be that the petitioner had been removed from service with the approval of such Board of Directors. Nothing can be spelt out from the language employed by the Legislature in clause (4) of the Standing Order 15 to indicate that such approval must be in writing. It is also pertinent to point out that clause (4) does not indicate that the inquiry officer who conducts an inquiry against such workman must be appointed under the order of the employer himself. Even the order of dismissal of a workman is not required to be passed by the employer himself. All that is required by the said clause is approval of the employer before dismissal of a workman and as we have pointed out earlier, the petitioner has failed to establish before us that such approval was not granted by the employer in the present case.

6. In the result, the petition is completely devoid of force and the same is, therefore, dismissed and leave to appeal is refused.

19. When juxtaposed the facts of the case with the above position of law, the only conclusion which emerges is to the effect that the proceedings initiated by the respondent PTCL had lawfully been commenced, therefore, the filing of these petitions by way of laying challenges to the mere issuance of the show-cause notices and charge sheets are not tenable. However, the petitioners will have the right to lay their lawful challenge(s) on the ground(s) of illegality or patent irregularity, if so occur(s), at the culmination of the disciplinary proceedings, if so advised. Needless to observe that these grounds will have to be raised before the respondent's authorities/appellate authorities at the first place. Similarly, the submission that some of the petitioners of Category 'B' petitions have attained the superannuation, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be continued against such employees/petitioners; this submission may also be laid before the authority concerned as this ground has certain and definite factual trappings, which cannot be determined by this Court at this juncture.

20. In view of the above, the petitions mentioned in category B are dismissed on merits with the above observations. UN/Z-17/L Petitions dismissed. 1 Masood Ahmad Bhatti and others v. Federation through Secretary and others (2012 SCMR 152). 2 (2016 SCMR 1362) [5-MB] 3 [Grahan v. Maingay (1793) RIDG.L&S.20,72] 4 Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited through Chairman v. Iqbal Nasir and others (PLD 2011 SC 132): Pakistan Defence Officer s case (2013 SCMR 1707) and Pakistan Electric Power Company v. Syed Salahuddin and others (2022 SCMR 991) 5 Shafique Ahmed Khan and others v. NESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 377); Ziaullah Khan Niazi v. Chairman, Pakistan Red Crescent Society (2004 SCMR 189); University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others v. Ch. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093); M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others (1994 SCMR 1024) and Muhammad Rafi and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2016 SCMR 2146). 6 M.H. Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan (1994 SCMR 1024) 7 PTCL v. Muhammad Samiullah (2021 SCMR 1998) 8 Masood Ahmed Bhatti Judgment (2016 SCMR 1362) 9 Asghar Ali v. PTCL and others (PLJ 2025 Lahore 516 = 2025 LHC 922) 10 Bilal Hussain through L.Rs. v. President NBP (2022 SCMR 313) 11 Lal Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (1995 SCMR 1758)