P L D 1965 (W (PLP)

(a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959), S. 13 (6)‑Expression "all the rent due from him " Meaning‑Whether Controller competent to direct payment of entire amount due including time‑bared arrears‑Limitation Act (IX of 1905), Ss. 3 &

28. Where the contention was, that the words "all the rent due" used in subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, only meant "tile rent legally due and recoverable" and not the rent which had become time -barred and as such the Controller under subsection (6) did not have the power to order deposit of rent in excess of rent legally recoverable: Held, (Per S. A. Mahmood, J.).‑That the words used in subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 are "all the rent due" and not merely "rent due". In the context in which these words have been used, they mean the entire rent due, irrespective of whether its recovery was barred by the law of limitation or not. If the intention was otherwise the words used would have been different. The word "all" has been added to the words "the rent due" deliberately in subsection (6), with a view to ensure that the Controller directs the payment of the whole of the rent due from the tenant, because otherwise the tenant has forfeited his right to remain in the premises. The basic principle underlying the Ordinance is that a tenant is entitled to occupy the property so long as he goes on paying the rent. If he desires to continue in possession of the premises, it is only fair, just and equitable that he should pay the entire rent of the premises for its use and occupation, and justice and equities in this matter are in favour of the landlord. By operation of law, forfeiture of the tenancy takes place on non payment of rent, and the tenant cannot legitimately insist on staying on in the premises, putting forward limitation as a ground of defence. It is not the intention of the provisions of the Ordinance to give him the protection of the Limitation Act, which is not specifically attracted. If he does not wish to pay the arrears of rent, he can vacate the premises, and there is no obligation on him to pay the rent, which is time‑barred. All that happens is that he has to vacate the premises, but this is what the law intends and no hardship is thereby caused. The Dhurrumtolia Properties Ltd. v. Dhunbai Persoshaw Sorabjee A I R 1931 Cal. 457; Kh. Ghulam Qadir v. Tajammal Husain S. A. O. 193 of 1961 (unreported); (Adyapadi) Vasudeva Udpa and others v. Krishna Udpa and others A I R 1921 Mad. 418; "Halsbury's" Laws of England, Vol. 19, p. 100; "Lightwood" on Time Limit of Action p. 177; Gurupur Vamana Pai v. Venkatu A I R 1936 Mad. 116; Ramrao Raoji Palkar v. Amir Kasem Bhajivan 58 Bom. L R 284; Grifth v. Speaks 63 S W R 465; In re: Gillingham's Estate 69 Allantic Rep. 809, 810; Indian Co‑operative Navigation and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Padamsey Premji A I R 1934 Born. 97; Gajadhar v. Jagannath A I R 1924 All. 551; Sheo Saran Singh v. Mohabir Pershad I L R 32 Cal. 576 and Ram Chander v. Juggat Manmohinre I L R 4 Cal. 283 ref. Per Sardar Muhammad lqbal, J. (concurring).‑The word "due", ,according to its plain and popular meaning, the interpretation placed on it by the Courts and the recognition given to it by the different statutes, is capable of one, and the only one, interpretation that it denotes the entire amount payable by a person, whether or not the same is barred by limitation or the creditor is capable of enforcing it through Courts of law. The words "all the rent due" in clause (6) of section 13, of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) therefore, mean as the rent owing from, and payable by the tenant. There is no reason why one should read into the expression in clause (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance the word "legally" before the words "all the rent .due". It is a cardinal principle of the interpretation of statutes that the words must be construed in their popular sense unless the law has attached a technical sense to them. The word "due" does not carry any technical meaning with it. This word, therefore, must be understood in its primary meaning particularly when there is nothing to show that that was not the meaning intended by the Legislature. Though a debt has become barred by time, it still remains an amount due to the creditor. Thus a right to receive a payment of debt as distinct from a right to enforce its payment, subsists even after the remedy by action has become barred by time. The right of a creditor to receive payment and the obligation of a borrower to repay never die by lapse of time. Since the debt exists, it clearly implies that the amount is still due from the debtor. It may as well be noted that the law of limitation is different from the law of prescription. Whereas the latter prescribes the period on the expiry of which not only the judicial remedy is barred but a substantive right is extinguished by one and acquired by the other, the former does not destroy the right but only extinguishes the remedy. If a creditor whose debt is statute‑barred, has no means of enforcing his claim other than by action or by set‑off, the Limitation Act does not prevent him from recovering by those means. There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt as to the fact that the word "due" does not mean the same thing as recoverable through the agency of the Court and in its plain meaning and popular sense cannot be held to mean as the words "legally recoverable". "Ramanatha Aiyar" on Law Lexicon of British India; "Maxwell" on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. p. 31; Bholi Bhai v. Dwarka Dass A I R 1925 Lah. 32; Chidambara v. Krishna Swami A I R 1916 Mad. 720; Nithoor Thimmanna Bhat v. Aithappa Advanthava A I R 1940 Mad. 908; Punjab National Bank v. Official Receiver, Karnal A I R 1940 Lah. 166 and Krishna Swami lyer v. Nalisa lyer A I R 1930 Mad. 594 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes‑

Words must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. Pakistan Textile Mill Owners' Association, Karachi and two others v. Administrator of Karachi and two others P L D 1963 S C 137 and The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income‑tax v. John Frederick Pemsel (1891) A C 531 ref. (c) Words and phrases‑Word "due"‑' Meaning. "Shorter Oxford English Dictionary", 3rd Edn.; Wharton's "Law Lexicon", 14th Edn and "Words and Phrases" Permanent Edn. Vol. 13 ref. JUDGMENT S. A. MAHMOOD, J.‑

This reference to tie Full "Fularises out of a second appeal to this Court from an order by the Rent Controller directing Ashfaq‑ur‑Rahman Khan appellant to deposit arrears of Rs. 3,150 by the 10th of July 1959, which order was maintained on appeal by the appellate authority.

2. On an application brought by Ch. Muhammad Afzal for the eviction of Ashfaq‑ur‑Rahman Khan on the ground that a sum of Rs. 7,500 was due from him as arrears of rent, as shown in the statement of rent account attached to the application, the rent of the premises being Rs. 67‑3‑3 p. m., which was admitted by the appellant, the Rent Controller ordered him to deposit Rs. 3,150 as arrears of rent, by the 10th of July 1959. The appellant appealed and contended that the Rent Controller did not have the power to order deposit of rent in excess of the rent which was legally recoverable. The appellate authority rejected his contention, relying on The Dhurrumtolia Properties Ltd. v. Dhunbai Persoshaw‑Sorabjee (A I R 1931 Cal. 457), in which the term "rent in arrear" used in section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act was held to include all that was due to the lessor up to the date when the application for ejectment was heard and order for relief against forfeiture was made. The second appeal came up before me sitting singly, and it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the words "all the rent due" used in subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) meant the "rent legally due and recover able" and not the rent which had become time‑barred. It was contended on the other hand on behalf of the landlord that interpretation meant that the word "all" was redundant and that the word "legally" had to be introduced. In view of the importance of the question involved, on a reference by me, this Full Bench has been constituted to answer the following question: "Whether the words 'all the rent due' in subsection (6) of section 13 of Ordinance VI of 1959, include rent which; though unpaid, cannot be recovered in view of the Statute of Limitation through a civil Court?" The relevant portion of section 13 of the Ordinance is repro duced below: "

13. Eviction of tenant:‑ (1) * * * * * * * * * * (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller, for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that:‑ (i) the tenant has not paid or tendered rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, within sixty days from the period for which the rent is payable; or (ii) * * * * * * * * * * (iii) * * * * * * * * * * (iv) * * * * * * * * * * (v) * * * * * * * * * * (vi) * * * * * * * * * * the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land, and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: "Provided * * * * * * * * * * (3) * * * * * * * * * * (4) * * * * * * * * * * (5) * * * * * * * * * * The words which call for interpretation are "all the rent due". The Controller is required to direct a tenant to deposit all the rent due, and if there is any dispute about the amount of rent, the Controller shall determine it. The Controller shall finally determine the amount of rent due from the tenant and direct that the same shall be paid to the landlord. Therefore, the words "rent due" have been used thrice in subsection (6), but it will be noticed that these words have also been used in clause (i) of subsection (2) of section

13. The words "rent due" in the two subsections have obviously been used in the same sense. The addition of the word "all" to these words in sub section (6) makes the intention clear.

3. While the objects of the Ordinance are to restrict the enhancement of rent by the landlord, and the eviction of the tenant except for certain grounds it is equally intended to ensure the payment of rent due to the landlord. One of the conditions which determines the tenancy is non‑payment of rent within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement, or, in the absence of an agreement, within sixty days from the period from which the rent is payable. Therefore, in principle, forfeiture of tenancy takes place in case of default in payment of rent by the tenant. If the tenant does not pay the rent due, the forfeiture takes place and the operative part of subsection (2) comes into play, namely, that the Rent Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The clear intention, therefore, of the provision, as indicated, is that the tenant must not have committed default in payment of rent in order to entitle him to continue to remain in possession of the leased premises. In this view of the matter, it is the duty of the tenant to clear the entire arrears of rent in order to avoid ejectment. It appears to me that the word "all" has been added to the words "the rent due" deliberately i subsection (6), with a view to ensure that the Controller direct the payment of the whole of the rent due from the tenant, because otherwise the tenant has forfeited his right to remain in the premises.

4. I have held in S. A. O. 193 of 1961 (Kh. Ghulam Qadir v. Tajammal Husain), decided on 16th March 1964, that the words "may make an order" have been used in subsection (2) of section 13 in view of the principle underlying section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. This section provides that‑ "Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non‑payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred." Therefore, in order that the forfeiture that has taken place may not lead to necessary ejectment and the Court may relieve the tenant against forfeiture, it is obligatory that the whole of the rent must be paid. It appears to me for this reason also that the law‑maker has deliberately said in subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance that the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit "all the rent due". In (Adyapadi) Yasudeva Udpa and others v. Krishna Udpa and others (69 Atlantic Rep. 809 (810)), it had been held under section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act that the words rent in arrear under section 13 mean the entire rent due, and not only the rent, which is legally recoverable. It was also observed that there was nothing to show that what the Legislature meant was only such rent as could be recovered if the landlord was suing for rent, that is, such rent as was not barred. The English rule seemed to be that the tenant was to be relieved against forfeiture only on his paying full arrears of rent, (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 19 page 100, foot‑note, and Lightwood on Time Limit of Action, page 177). The principle is that under the Limitation Act only the remedy is barred and not that the right of the landlord to rent beyond the period specified in the Act is extinguished. Similar view was taken in Gurupur Vamano Pai v. Venkatu (AIR 1934 Bom. 97); Dhurrumtolia Properties Ltd. v. Dhunbai Persashaw Sorabjee (3) and Ramrao Raoji Palkar v. Amir Kasem Bhajivan (58 Born. L R 284).

5. The word "due" is of course capable of several meanings. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, the word "due" as an adjective means "owing of payable as a debt; (as substantive) a debt, that which is due legally or morally; a legal charge, toll, tribute, fee or the like." According to Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth Edition, it meaning is "anything owing; that which one contracts to pay o perform to another; that which law or justice requires to be paid or done. It should be observed that a debt is said to be due the instant it has existence as a debt; it may be payable at a future time." In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 13 (West Publishing Company) the word "due" is defined, inter alia, as that which is owed, that which custom, statute of law requires to be paid; the mere state of indebtment, Bouvier defines the word "due" as something that is just and proper, something that ought to be paid or may be demanded.

6. Thus the word "due" is synonymous with "owing". I does not necessarily imply an enforceable obligation. The word "due" or "owing" in its ordinary sense means something which is justly owed; that which the law or justice requires to b paid or done vide Griffith v. Speaks (63 S W R 465 (465, 467)). In re: Gillingham' Estate (A I R 1921 Mad. 418), it was observed that a debt may be due, that is justly and honestly owing, and yet the creditor be without seined to enforce payment because of the plea of the statute of Limita tions. Still the debt is due. It is owing, because the word "due" is used by Judges, Legislatures and lexicographers as synonymous with "owing"

7. The words "money owing" were interpreted in Indian Co‑operative Navigation and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Padamsey Premji (A I R 1936 Mad. 116) by Blackwell, J. as denoting, in their natural significance, "money owing whether recoverable or not", i.e. although the right to recover money due or money owing may be barred by a statute of limitation, the money still remains due or owing. Therefore, money owing meant money owing, though not enforceable by action. Beamount, C. J. interpreted the term "money owing" or "money due" as meaning in their primary sense an existing debt, whether or not the right to recover the same is barred under the Limitation Act, though no doubt either expression may bear the secondary meaning of "recoverable in law" if the context so requires. The words used in sub section (6) are "all the rent due" and not merely "rent due." I have already indicated that in the context in which these words have been used, they mean the entire rent due, irrespective of whether its recovery was barred by the law of limitation or not. If the intention was otherwise the words used would have been different.

8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that when the appellant ceased to be liable to pay rent, the rent became time‑barred and was no longer due after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is a settled principle of law that except in cases covered by section 28 of the Limitation Act, under which at the determination of the period limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right, to such property is extinguished. The Limitation Act, with regard to personal actions, merely bars the remedy by suit, but does `not extinguish; a debt or demand. A debt does not cease to be a debt because its recovery is barred by the statute of limitation. This principle is now well established. Gajadhar v. Jagannath (A I R 1924 All. 551) and Sheo Saran Singh v. Mohabir Pershad (I L R 32 Cal. 576) may be referred to.

9. It is also an established principle that even un-appro priated payments may be applied to time‑barred debts. Ram Chander v. Juggat Manmohiney (I L R 4 Cal. 283). If by mistake or otherwise, the tenant has paid a time‑barred debt, could he bring a suit to recover that amount from the landlord on the ground that the rent was not due? The obvious answer would be that no such suit would be competent, because the rent was due. The bar of limitation does not stand in the way of defence. It only bars actions and recovery of the debt. There is no provision in law which prevents or prohibits a debtor from clearing his time‑barred debt. Besides, time barred debts from good consideration for alienation of property by persons whose power of alienation is restricted by law or custom.

10. The basic principle underlying the Ordinance is that tenant is entitled to occupy the property so long as he goes on paying the rent. If he desires to continue in possession of the premises, it is only fair, just and equitable that he should pay the entire rent of the premises for its use and occupation, and justice and equities in this matter are in favour of the landlord. By operation of law, forfeiture of the tenancy takes place on non payment of rent, and the, tenant cannot legitimately insist on staying on in the premises, putting forward limitation as a ground of defence. It is not the intention of the provisions of the Ordinance to give him the protection of the Limitation Act which is not specifically attracted. If he does not wish to pay the arrears of rent, he can vacate the premises, and there is no obligation on him to pay the rent which is time barred. All that happens is that he has to vacate the premises, but this is what the, laws and no hardship is thereby caused.

11. Our attention was drawn to the fact that the Controller is authorised to determine the amount of rent due and to direct the same to be paid to the landlord. This should not make any difference to the situation as the tenant has to pay the rent in order to retain possession of the premises. The basis of hip retaining possession of the leased premises is his paying the, arrears of rent. If he does not deposit the rent, he has to vacate, the premises. He is not bound to deposit the rent due, and the landlord brings a suit for recovery of rent, he can only claim arrears of rent, which are recoverable in law and not those arrears; which are barred by time. But the fact that a suit in the civil Court will not succeed for the whole of the rent due, is of no consideration for the case before the Controller, who has not to decide the question of decreeing the arrears of rent. He controls the eviction of tenants and other ancillary matters under the Ordinance. It is his duty, under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance, to direct the tenant to pay "all the arrears o. rent due", which means the entire arrears of rent, including the arrears which may not be recoverable in a civil Court by reason of the law of limitation, because that is the clear intention of the provision, the right of the tenant to retain the premises and to avoid forfeiture of the tenancy being dependent upon his no being in arrears.

12. I would, therefore, answer the question referred to the Full Bench in the affirmative. J. H. Rizvi, J. ‑

I agree. SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J. ‑

I have had the advantage of going through the order of my learned brother S. A. Mahmood, J. I agree with the conclusion he has reached and the reasons given therefore I wish, however, to add some of my own reasons in support of the conclusion he has arrived at. "Whether the words all the rent due in subsection (6) of section 13 of Ordinance VI of 1959, include rent which, though unpaid, cannot be recovered in view of the Statute of Limitation through a civil Court?"

3. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the rent for a period of more than three years was barred by the law of limitation and the same being not legally recoverable, was not due from him. His contention can prevail only if the words rent due" used in clause (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance mean or are interpreted to mean as an amount the recovery of which is not barred by limitation and the word "due" equates with the words "legally recoverable." This meaning, in my opinion, is not possible, unless a departure is made from the ordinary meaning of the word. In Webster's New International Dictionary the word "due" is defined as "owed" or "owing as a debt". According to Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fourteenth‑Edition, it means "anything owing; that which one contracts to pay or perform to another; that which law or justice requires to be paid or done". It was further observed in the said Law Lexicon that "a debt is said to be due the instant that it has existence as a debt." Ramanatha Aiyar, in his book Law Lexicon o British India, while explaining the meaning of word "due" g as "owing and unpaid", relies on Ex pane Cawley (34 S J 26) by saying, A debt is still due notwithstanding that the statute of limitation may have run against it, for that statute only bars he remedy and does not extinguish the debt". The meaning given to the word "debt" in Webster's New International Dictionary is "that which is due from one person to another; that which one person is bound to pay to another; thing owed; and obligation or liability". Maxwell on Interpretation o Statutes, Eleventh Edition (page 31), says that it is a well‑known the of Courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense and, relying on Kerr v. Kennedy ((1942) 1 K B 409), further says. "In the absence of any judicial guidance or authority dictionaries can be consulted." In the present case, the judicial authority is in consonance with the dictionary meaning of the word "due." In Indian Co‑operative Navigation & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Padamsay Premji (A I R 1934 Bom. 97), the plaintiff‑company instituted a suit for the recovery of a certain amount, being money alleged to be due in respect of call money payable on shares held by the shareholders in the plaintiff‑company. They based their case on Article 45 of Article of Association which provided that any shareholder whose share might be forfeited should not, notwithstanding the forfeiture, be liable to pay to he company all moneys owing upon the shares at the time of the forfeiture and the interest, if any, thereon. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit, holding that "all money owing upon the shares at the time of forfeiture meant money owing and recoverable in law" and inasmuch as at the date of the forfeiture this money was time‑barred. Beamount, C. J., setting aside the excision, observed, "in my opinion the term `money owing' or `money due' in their primary sense denotes an existing debt, whether or not the right to recover the same is barred tinder the Limitation Act". He proceeded to hold that the expression "money due" means "money owing, although not enforceable by action". It may be observed that the relationship of a debtor and a creditor does not cease even though the debt is barred by limitation. The fact that a certain amount cannot be recovered as being barred by, the law of limitation, does not mean that it ceases to be a debt. The debt nevertheless remains. The debtor remains under a constant obligation to pay the amount. In a debt within time and a debt barred by time the only difference is that whereas the obligation in the former can be enforced through the Courts of law, it cannot be so enforced in the latter case. The law of limitation destroys not the principle's substantive right itself ‑but the accessory right of action only. In popular language, the law of limitation bars only the remedy and does not extinguish the right. Notwithstanding this law, the right remains and continues to be available in other ways. Section 3 of the Limitation Act which limits the time after which a suit or other proceeding is barred, does not refer at all to a defendant who, therefore, can always raise a plea of defence based on a time barred debt. In Bholi Bhai v. Dwarka Dass (A I R 1925 Lah. 32) it was held that n a suit for partition the defendant could claim to be reimbursed for expenses incurred by him, though the suit for the recovery of the same would be barred by limitation. In another case a suit was instituted under section 92, Civil Procedure Code, against a trustee for an account of the estate. The trustee in his defence made a claim for the money spent by him. On an objection raised by the plaintiffs that the claim of the trustee was barred by time and he, therefore, was not entitled to any relief in that suit, the Madras High Court, in Chidambara v. Krishna Swamy (A I R 1916 Mad. 720), held that although the remedy to recover the "money due" was barred by limitation, limitation could not be pleaded in the case and the defendant could set up his claim in defence for the amount "due" to him. Again, on the same principle, if a debtor happens to pay a time‑barred debt, he cannot recall it or recover it by a suit on the ground of failure of consideration. Similarly, a creditor can enforce ‑his lien in respect of the debt, though the debt itself is barred. A time barred debt, moreover, can always be a valid consideration for he ‑transfer of property. In Halsbury's Laws of England, III Edition, Volume 24, ‑ in paragraph 591, at page 298, it is said, "In a case where the effect of the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation is merely to bar the remedy and not the right, an acknowledgment or part payment may cause a right of action to accrue afresh, even though the acknowledgment or payment s made after the prescribed period of limitation has expired." A time‑barred debt can also be validity assigned. In Nithoor Thimmana Bhat v. Airhappa Advanthava (A I R 1940 Mad. 908) it was held that a debt can be assigned in spite of the expiry of the period of limitation, and it was further observed, "All that happens after the lapse o: three years after the creation of a debt is that the debt cannot be enforced in a Court of law. The debt does not cease to exist; nor does the relationship of creditor and debtor." It is therefore, a well‑settled principle of law that though a debt has become barred by time, it still remains an amount due to the creditor. Thus a right to receive a payment of debt as distinct from a right to enforce its payment, subsists even after the remedy by action has become barred by time. The right of a creditor to receive payment and the obligation of a borrower tt, repay never die by lapse of time. Since the debt exists, it clearly implies that the amount is still due from the debtor. It may as well be noted that the law of limitation is different from the law of prescription. Whereas the latter prescribes the period on the expiry of which not only the judicial remedy is barred but substantive right is extinguished by one and acquired by the other, the former does not destroy the right but only extinguish the remedy: There are two branches of the law of prescription, the acquisitive prescription and extinctive prescription. In the case of extinctive prescription it bars only the remedy and may not affect the right, but in the other it bars the remedy and extinguishes the right as well. The provisions of the Limitation Act, except those contained in section 28, are only in the nature of extinctive prescription. Section 28 is only an exception to the general rule so far as a suit for possession of property is con cerned, and if the owner suffers his right to become barred by the law of limitation, the effect is the extinction of his title in favour of the party in possession; and in such cases after the expiry of the period of limitation not only the remedy is barred but the title is created by operation of law in favour of the possessor. Except in this case, the Limitation Act, 1908, only takes away the remedies by action or by set‑off. It leaves otherwise the right untouched. If a creditor whose debt is statute‑barred, has no means of enforcing his claim other than by action or by set‑off, the Act does not prevent him from recovering by those means.. . There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt as to the fact that the word "due" does not mean the same thing as recoverable through the agency of the Court and in its plain meaning and popular sense cannot be held to mean as the words "legally recovered able". I see no reason why one should read into the expression in clause (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance the word "legally" before the words "all the rent due. It is a cardinal principle of the interpretation of statutes that the words must be construed in their popular sense unless the law has attached a technical sense to them. The word "due" does not carry any technical meaning with it. This word, therefore, must be understood, its primary meaning particularly when there is nothing to show" that that was not the meaning intended by the Legislature, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, a page 6, says, "The Golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning" and that the Judges cannot, on consideration of sound policy, modify the plain meaning of the statutory words. In the present case, the, words of clause (6) of section 13 are clear and unambiguous. I may in this context refer to the observations of Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rehman in Pakistan Textile Mill Owners Association Karachi and two others v. Administrator of Karachi and two others (P L D 1963 S C 137 at p. 146), which are, "in a taxing statute as in any other statutes we see no reason to depart from the general rule that words used in a statute must first be given their ordinary and natural meaning. It is only when such an ordinary meaning does not make sense that resort can be made to discovering other appropriate meanings." Reference may also be made to The Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income‑tax v. John Frederick Pemsel ((1891) A C 531), where it was observed that if the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such a case best declare the intention of the Legislature. There is no gain‑saying the fact that no such difficulty has been shown to us to exist in giving the word "due" an ordinary and natural meaning which as used in clause (6), section 13 in its primary sense denotes only an existing debt, whether or not the right to recover the same is barred by limitation.

4. The fact that a time‑barred debt is still owing and remains due, has also received .a statutory recognition. Section 60 of the Contract Act provides that when the debtor has omitted to indicate, and when there are no circumstances indicating, to which of several debts a payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any debt "actually due" and "payable to him" from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to limitation of suits. According to this section, a time‑barred debt remains actually due, and though no action will lie for its recovery on the ground that it was barred by time, the right in the debt still subsists. This was the view taken also in Punjab National Bank v. Official Receiver, Karnal (A I R 1940 Lah. 166). In Krishna Swami lyer v. Nalisa Iyer (A I R 1930 Mad. 594) it was held that when an advance amount was paid by the tenant to the landlord under a stipulation that the same was to be applied towards the last years' "rent due" under the tenancy, the landlord was entitled to appropriate the Sum towards the "rent due" for the "installment due" for the final year, though a suit for "rent due" in respect of such instal lments might be barred by limitation. Again, section 61 of the Act recognizes the principle that the time‑barred debt is payable by the debtor and lays down the rule for the guidance of the Courts that where neither the debtor nor the creditor makes any appropriation, the Court is entitled to declare to apply it in discharge of debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by law. Again, under section 25 of the Contract Act, a time‑barred debt can form a valid consideration for a contract. The principle which is the basis for this provision appears to be that a person who is a master of his own action is competent voluntarily to resign the benefit of law made for his protection. The rule is of a general application, and what is provided by clause (3) of section 25 is not to revive a dead debt but to resuscitate the remedy to enforce payment by contract.

5. The word `due' was used in clause (6) of section 13 in the same sense and with the meaning as it has all along been understood and meant. It was futile for the learned counsel of the appellant to contend that clause (6) provides a machinery for a landlord to recover the arrears of rent from the tenant and that in this view of the section the word "rent due" have been used in the meaning of "one and recoverable" in law. If, the context so requires, a construction like this should be placed on the words "rent due", but in my view such a meaning is not warranted by the provisions of the Ordinance. The said pro. At vision is not one for the recovery of rent. The non‑compliance with the order of deposit, does not entitle the landlord to enforce its payment through the agency of Rent Controller, or any other authority. The aim and object of this provision is only to impose a liability on tenant who fails to abide by the order of deposit made in pursuance thereof. The Rent Controller in case of default is bound to strike off the defence, and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession. The wisdom of this provision is obvious. In a case where a tenant has not paid the rent to the landlord, he can explain the reason for non‑payment to avoid his ejectment. There, however, can be no reason why he should not pay off the rent which he is liable to pay. The Rent Controller, therefore, orders a tenant only to deposit the arrears of rent‑which he in fact owes. He can deposit it and litigate on the question of default or any other issue arising in the case. If he does not comply with the order, what better proof is needed of his default than that. The law in such a case empowers a Rent Controller to strike off the defence and direct the tenant to deliver the possession. The order so passed is in consequence of the disobedience of an order passed under clause (6), but in the provision wilful defaulter. The provision is further to protect a provision so incorporated it is implied that a tenant is a landlord against the mechanizations of a crafty tenant who by protected litigation could keep the landlord out of possession of his build ing and also refuse to pay arrears of or future rent to him. He can now fight out litigation, but he cannot with impunity deprive the landlord of his legitimate due. He can do so on the risk of incurring an absolute liability of ejectment. As to the right of the landlord to recover the arrears of rent, he has no other way to enforce. his claim except through a suit. The tenant in that case will be well within his right to raise the plea of limitation and the Court will be bound under section 3, of the Limitation Act to take notice of the question of limitation and pass a decree only for the amount which is within the period of limitation under Article 110 of the Limitation Act which prescribes a period of three years from the time when the arrears became due, The Limitation Act is, therefore, not applicable because this clause does not lay down procedure for enforcing payment. It is thus obvious that the Ordinance does not provide for enforcing the claim of the landlord for arrears of rent. To sum up, the word "due", according to its plain an popular meaning, the interpretation placed on it by the Courts and the recognition given to it by the different statutes, is capable of one, and the only one, interpretation that it denotes the entire amount payable by a person, whether or not the same i barred by limitation or the, creditor is capable of enforcing it through" Courts of law. The words "all the rent due" clause (6) of section 13, of the West Pakistan Urban Ren Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) therefore, mean as the rent owing from,, and payable by the tenant. K. B. A. Reference answered.