P L D 1968 Lahore 758 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD GUL, J.‑

The petitioners are two brothers engaged in business in partnership under two different trade names, namely:‑ (1) Messrs Ghulam Muhammad Khan Muhammad Cotton Ginning and Oil Mills, Sillanwali (hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, called the first firm) and (2) Messrs Ghulam Muhammad & Company, Grain Market, Sillanwali (hereinafter called the second firm). Each firm was allowed cash credit facility by the Central Co operative Bank Limited, Sargodha, respondent No. 3 (hereinafter called the respondent‑Bank) under a separate cash credit account, It is admitted that on the 1st August 1962, the first firm had a debit balance of Rs. 1,39,828 of which Rs. 74,428 are stated to have been advanced by the respondent Bank on the security of cotton bales pledged with the Bank by the first firm. It is also admitted that the second firm had also a debit balance of Rs. 1,23,645.13 on the 30th June 1960.

2. In July 1962, the respondent‑Bank instituted a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Sargodha, for the recovery of Rs. 2,44,065 against four defendants, including the first firm, listed as defendant No. 4 in the suit. The claim arose out of a number of cheques drawn in favour of the respondent‑Bank by defen dants 1 and 2 in the suit, upon the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Rawalpindi for various sums in the accounts of defendant No. 3 or as the case may be defendant No.

4. According to the averments in the plaint, the cheques were accepted by the respondent‑‑Bank on the advice of defendants 3 and 4 and on the basis of this advice, a number of cotton bales belonging to defen dants Nos. 3 and 4 and pledged with the respondent‑Bank‑ were released to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the drawers of the cheques. The cheques were, however, dishonoured by the drawee Bank. Accordingly, decree was claimed against the drawers of the dishonoured cheques and defendants 3 and 4 in whose accounts these cheques were drawn and on whose advice or. assurance the respondent‑Bank released the pledged cotton bales. The bales alleged to have been released by the respondent‑Bank on the advice of the first firm were pledged with the Bank for Rs. 74,428 and, therefore, it seems that the Bank's claim in the suit against the first firm was delimited to Rs. 74,428 vide judgment dated the 22nd July 1965, the respondent‑Bank's claim was decreed in toto against defendants 1 and 2, but was dismissed as against defendants 3 and 4.

4. In the meantime, the Deputy Registrar, Co‑operative Societies, Sargodha (respondent No. 1), in exercise of powers under section 3 of the Co‑operative Societies (Re‑payment of Loans) Ordinance, 1960 (Ordinance XXXIV of 1960), required the petitioners to secure the loan of Rs. 1,41641 outstanding again the first firm in its cash credit account with the respondent‑Bank. In compliance with this direction, the petitioner are alleged to have mortgaged without possession 1223/4 Kanals of land situate in village No. 133‑Shamali. It is further alleged that the petitioners were assured that they shall be allowed corresponding reduction in the amount of the loan outstanding against the firm, fn case suit against that firm was dismissed. 4‑A. In respect of the second cash credit account, which showed a debit balance of Rs. 1,2,645,13 on the 30th June, 1960. the petitioners were prosecuted in the Court of Magistrate 1st class Sargodha under section 3 of Ordinance XXXLV of 1960, on the ground that they failed to secure this loan as required by section 3 ibid. The learned Magistrate, however, vide judgment dated the 24th April 1966, found that the petitioners (accused before him) had "secured the loan fully". Further that the notice issued to them, had not been properly proved. Therefore, they were acquitted.

5. The loan owing by each firm having remained unpaid, the matter was referred to arbitration under the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912 and the Rules framed thereunder. An award was made on the 17th April 1965, in favour of the respondent‑Bank against the petitioners for a sum of Rs. 3,38,259.64, on account of principal and interest due under the two cash credit accounts with future interest @ Rs. 7 % on the principal amount. The entire sum found due under the award was made payable on or before 17-5-65. According to the recital at the foot of the award the petitioners not having appeared before the arbitrator despite their service, the arbitration proceedings were taken ex parte against them resulting In the ex parte award.

6. The amount adjudged tinder the ex pane award as due and payable by the petitioners having remained unpaid before the specified date namely 17‑5‑65, It appears that the Assistant Registrar (respondent No. 2) initiated proceedings for the recovery of the same as arrears of land revenue under the provisions of section 59 of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925, which was extended with certain modifications throughout the Province of West Pakistan (other than Tribal Areas) on the 30th April 1965, by West Pakistan Ordinance VTT of 1965. In the course of proceedings for the recovery of amount due under the award, it is alleged that the petitioner No.1 on his appearance before respondent No. 2 in obedience to a distress warrant was assured that if the petitioners shall pay "immediately" Rs. 10,000 in part‑payment of the sum due under the award, they would be allowed reduction of Rs. 74,428 in respect of which suit of the respondent‑Bank against the first firm had failed and further that the entire sum paid due under the award shall be reduced to Rs. 1,45,1_55.00 free of future interest. Petitioner No. 1 is alleged to have agreed to the above "compromise under duress" and paid Rs. 1,500 agreeing to pay the balance of Rs. 8,500 later by selling the land of his wife. Upon his failure to pay the remainder sum of Rs. 8,500 by the promised date petitioner No. 1 is alleged to have been arrested and Produced before respondent No. 2 on the 26th September 1966 but was released on bail on the execution of a surety bond by one, Ata Muhammad under tag ing to pay the remainder sum of Rs. 8.500 in case the petitioners failed to pay the same by the 30th November 1966. Petitioner No. 1 is alleged to have paid another sum of Rs. 6,000 leaving a balance of Rs. 2,500 out of the promised sum of Rs. 10,000 to secure for the petitioners the various concessions referred to above. It is further alleged that having received Rs. 7,500 out of the promised sum of Rs. 10,000 respondent No. 2 some resulted and expressed his helplessness to abide by the terms of the "compromise" by which on payment of Rs. 10,000 the sum due from the petitioners under the award, namely, Rs. 3,38,259.66 would have been reduced to Rs. 1,45,000, odd. This, according to the petitioners, being a breach of faith amounted to fraud.

7. The petitioners have received two further notices each dated 27‑3‑67 and issued under section 5 of the West Pakistan Co‑operative Societies and Co‑operative Banks (Re‑payment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966 (W. P. Ordinance XTV of 1966) informing them on 31‑12‑66 Rs. 1.85,690.14 and 1,85,584.74 were due against them as principal and interest under the two accounts. The notices further required them to adequately secure the re‑payment of loans by mortgage, etc., within 60 days of the notice and repay 15 % of each loan within six months of the notice and the balance in 12 equal half‑yearly instalments. The notices also Invited them to submit written statement in case they disputed their liability as aforesaid. It appears that the petitioners have ignored these notices and that the cotton ginning factory running under the name and style of the first firm, which incidentally is under a mortgage with the respondent‑Bank, was due to be sold by auction on the 28th June 1967 for the recovery of the loans.

8. Aggrieved by the award dated 17‑4‑65, the notices dated 27‑3‑67 and the threatened auction‑sale of the cotton ginning factory for the recovery of the loans outstanding against the petitioners in the two cash credit accounts, they have moved this writ petition under Article 98 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the award dated 17‑4‑65, against the petitioners and the consequential proceedings for the recovery of the amount under the award as arrears of land revenue as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect. A further relief is claimed that it be declared that the West Pakistan Ordinance XIV of 1966 is ultra vires the Constitution and the notices issued under section 5 of the Ordinance are without lawful authority and of no legal effect. A writ of prohibition is also sought to restrain the respondents from implementing the impugned orders and notices against the petitioners under the W. P. Ordinance XIV of 1966.

9. The petitioners' counsel in the course of his somewhat lengthy arguments attacked the validity of the award, dated the 17th April 1965, on the following grounds, namely‑ (i) that it offended against the principles of natural justice having been made behind the back of the petitioners who were afforded no opportunity whatever to meet the case against them; (ii) that at any rate the award was superseded by the "compromise" between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2 under which on payment of Rs. 10,000 the amount adjudged as payable under the award (Rs. 3,38,259.66) in respect of the two cash credit accounts was to be reduced to Rs. 1,45,155 and at any rate it became invalid because it includes the sum of Rs. 74,428 in respect of which the respondent‑Bank's suit against the first firm was dismissed; and (iii) that with the repeal of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act II of 1912) vide Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925 by the Sind Co‑operative Societies (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 (W. P. Ordinance VII of 1965), the award against the petitioners lapsed, and, therefore, was rendered a dead letter.

10. In our opinion, there is no substance in any of the points urged by learned counsel against the validity of the award. It cannot be, gainsaid that reference to the sole arbitrator (Muhammad Sher) was made, by the Registrar under rule 18 (b) of the Rules framed under section 43(1) of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912. This the Registrar was fully competent to do under the Act, which was in force at the relevant time. According to the recitals in the award, the petitioners did not appear before the arbitrator despite their service, therefore, ex parte proceedings were taken against them under sub‑rule (j) of rule

18. The petitioners did not choose to file an appeal as provided in the said rule before the Registrar and allowed the award to become final against them. It is difficult to imagine how the petitioners can be heard to say that the award violates the principles of natural justice if they choose to stay away from the proceedings despite notice to them.

11. There is no substance in the contention that the award had been superseded by the alleged compromise between petitioner NO. I and respondent No. 2, or that the award included Rs.74,428 in respect of which the respondent‑Bank's suit was dismissed. In the first instance, there is nothing, whatever, to show that respon dent No. 2 had any authority from the respondent‑Bank which was beneficiary under the award to enter into any compromise with petitioner No. 1 so as to reduce the sum adjudged as due under the award from Rs. 3,38,259.66 to Rs. 1,45,155.00. Secondly, the amount of Rs. 10,000 was to be paid "immediately" and on the petitioners' own showing, of this amount Rs. 2,250 still remains unpaid and, therefore, the alleged compromise remains inchoate. And, finally, the terms of the alleged compromise, to say the least, appeared to be two extravagant to be credible. In any event, the questions whether or not any "compromise" was really entered or that the award included sum of Rs. 74,428 are essentially questions of fact which, cannot properly be determined in writ jurisdiction.

12. It is true that the 191.2 Act was repealed and replaced by the 1925 Act on 30‑4‑65 by means of West Pakistan Ordinance VII of 1965. But the repeal of the aforesaid Act does not affect the validity of the award or the petitioners' liability thereunder vide section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which for the material purpose reads: "Where this Act, or any Central Act or 'Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:‑-- (a) (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; (c) . . . . . . . . (d) . . . (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted; continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." It will thus be clear that when the repeal of a statute is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, one has to look to the provisions of the new Act but only for the purposes of determin ing whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. In the instant case, no such intention is discernible in the 1925 Act : rather a converse intention is manifest when we bear in mind that the provisions of section 6 of the 1897 Act were physically incorporated as subsection (4) of section 72 of the former Act.

13. Learned counsel next argued that the amount adjudged due under the award is not recoverable as arrears of land revenue under section 59 of the 1925 Act, because the award cannot, by any stretch, be deemed to have been made under section 54 ibid. The argument so far as it goes is unexceptionable. But it overlooks the fact that even under rule 18 (ii) framed under 1912 Act the amount was recoverable as arrears of laid revenue. The sub‑rule reads as follows:‑ "Whether the decision or award provides for the recovery of money it shall, without prejudice to the provisions of clause (i), be recoverable on application to the Collector accompanied by a certificate signed by the Registrar or any person subordinate to him empowered by the Registrar in this behalf as if it were an arrear of land revenue." Vide section 43(5) of the 1912 Act, all the rules framed under the Act and published in the official Gazette took effect "as if enacted in Clause (c) of the Act". Therefore, the amount adjudged due under the award as payable by the petitioners from its very incep tion was recoverable as arrears of land revenue. The argument also overlooks the fact that the notices dated the 27th March 1967, were issued to the petitioners under section 5 of the West Pakistan Co‑operative Societies and Co‑operative Banks (Re payment of Loans) Ordinance, 1966 (W. P. Ordinance XIV of 1966) and not under the 1925 Act.

14. Learned counsel also strenuously contested the constitu tionality of the West Pakistan Ordinance XIV of 1966 (hereinafter called the impugned Ordinance) on the grounds that there was already in force on the same subject an Ordinance promulgated by the President on the 15th August 1960, namely, the Co. operative Societies (Re‑payment of Loans) Ordinance, 1960 (XXXIV of 1960) and, thus, the field for the relevant purpose became occupied by a Central statute and it was no longer compe tent to the Governor of West Pakistan to promulgate a fresh Ordinance on the same subject and that in any case the impugned Ordinance in certain respects, being repugnant to the provisions of the Central Ordinance would be void to the extent of repugnancy. It was also urged that the impugned Ordinance is repugnant to Fundamental Right, I, which guarantees "personal liberty" and to Fundamental Right 4 and Article 2 inasmuch as section 10 of the Ordinance creates offence retrospectively, besides prejudicially affecting the petitioners' right in the factory to be put to auction‑sale.

15. The argument against the constitutionality of the impugned Ordinance, in our opinion, proceeds wholly on a misconception of the true constitutional position. For a proper examination of the argument, it appears necessary to set out some legislative history. After the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution, while the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 remained in force, the President by means of the Legislative Powers (Amendment) Order, 1959 (P. O. 17 of 1959) inter alia, abolished the Provincial Legislative list in the Fifth Schedule in the late Constitution and all Entries in that List were transferred to the Concurrent List of the Schedule. The result, therefore, was that the exclusive power of legislation which hitherto vested in the Provinces under Item 9 of the Provincial Legislative List in the Fifth Schedule to that Constitution to legislate on the subject of Co‑operative Societies disappeared and became vested concurrently in the Centre and the Provinces. In view of this constitutional change the President promulgated Ordinance XXXIV of 19610, to help recovery of the outstanding loans payable to the Co‑operative Societies and Co‑operative Banks in the country.

16. With the commencement of the new Constitution the Central Legislature and, for that matter, the President can no more legislate for the Provinces on the subject of Co‑operative Societies or Co‑operative Banks except for the limited purposes set out in Article 131(2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, Ordinance XXXIV of 1960, after the commencement of the Constitution, can no more be regarded as Central statute but is "an existing law" within the meaning of Article 225(7) of the Constitution. That being so, under clause (1) ibid. the appropriate Legislature, which in the instant case undoubtedly is the Provincial Legislature, can at any time adapt or amend even repeal the 1960 Ordinance albeit it was promulgated by the President, under the power vested in him under P. O. 17 of 1959. Therefore, after the Constitution it is a matter of no consequence that Ordinance XXXIV of 1960 has been promulgated by the President and is still retained on the Statute Book. It can be altered, amended and even repealed by the Provincial Legislature. Under the new dispensation vide provisions of Article 132, the Pro vincial Legislature is fully competent to legislate any law on the subject of Co‑operative Societies and the Co‑operative Banks for the subject not being included in the Third Schedule is not within the legislative competence of the Centre, and if there is any repugnancy between the impugned Ordinance and p Ordinance XXXIV of 1960, the latter stands repealed pro tanto to the extent of inconsistency. Instances are not wanting where a statute originally passed by the Central Legislature has sub sequently been amended or repealed altogether when the subject matter of the statute was transferred to the Provincial Legislative field. Co‑operative Societies Act, 1912 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, the Acquisition of Lands Act, P. P. C. and the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900, are only few of many instances in point. All these Acts were originally enacted by the Central Legislature function ing at the relevant time, but there had been series of subsequent amendments and repeals by the Provincial Legislatures when the relevant subject‑matter became transferred to the Provincial Legislative field. Therefore, as from the commencement of the Constitution the Governor of West Pakistan was fully competent to promulgate the impugned Ordinance under Art. 79(1) of the Constitution notwithstanding the Previous Central Ordinance XXXIV of 1560, bearing on the same subject and for almost identical purpose. Indeed in so far as the province of West Pakistan is concerned, the Central Ordinance is now an almost redundancy, Article 134, which provides that in the event of inconsistency between a Provincial Law and a Central Law, the latter shall prevail and the former shall to the extent of inconsis tency be invalid, will not be applicable to the instant case because Ordinance XXXIV of 1960, for as pointed out already, after the commencement of the Constitution, ceased to be a Central Law and as from that date and became an "existing law" as defined by Article 225(7) of the Constitution. Accordingly we hold that it was perfectly within the competence of the Governor of West Pakistan to promulgate the W. P. Ordinance XIV of 1966 vide the provisions of Article 132 of the Constitution read with Article 79 ibid.

17. Learned counsel also contended that West Pakistan Ordinance XIV of 1966 is unconstitutional being repugnant to Fundamental Rights 1 and 4 which guarantee personal liberty and protection against retrospective punishment. The argument is that section 10 of the Ordinance makes the contravention of any provision of the Ordinance punishable with imprisonment for a period which may extend to seven years and with fine. Section 7 of the Ordinance provides for the repayment of loans by the borrowers in accordance with certain instalments prescribed therein besides securing the loan as the Assistant, or as the case may be, the Registrar may think adequate. It was stressed that the penal provision contained in section 10 of the Ordinance which inter alia to punish failure to pay the instalment due or to secure the loan were not in existence when the petitioners contracted the two loans in the beginning from the respondent‑Bank and section, therefore, creates ex post facto penalties which Fundamental Right 4 forbids. Fundamental Right 4 is in following terms:‑-- "

4. Protection against retrospective punishment.‑No law shall authorize the punishment of a person‑ (a) for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of the act or omission; or (b) for an offence by a penalty greater than, or of a kind different from, the penalty prescribed by law for that offence at the time the offence was committed." The above guarantee obviously imposes limitation on ex post facto criminal legislation. It forbids the punishing of an act not punishable when committed. Similarly it also prohibits infliction of greater punishment in relation to an act, than was prescribed at the time of the commission of the act. However, the crux or gist of the guarantee is that a person can be punished or penalised only for the conduct which is subsequent to the coming into operation of the penal law. It has been held both in U. S. A. and in India (where almost similar guarantee is provided by the Constitutions of these countries) that in case of continuing or recurring wrongs, some acts may constitute sub sequent conduct even though some part of the same transaction took place prior to penal law. Thus according to Sameuls v. McCardy ((1925) 267 U S 188) a law which penalized the continued possession of liquor even though it was acquired prior to the coming into operation of that law was held valid Waters‑Peirce Oil Co. v. Texas ((1909) 212 U S 86) is even more apt to the instant case. In that case, penalties imposed on the continued performance of contract which" initially had been entered into prior to the enforcement of the relevant law prohibiting such contracts was held not to offend against the guarantee against ex post facto law. Similarly, it was held in Pulin v. Satyaranjan (A I R 1953 Cal. 599) that Article 20 of the Indian Constitution requires that the law under which a person is sought to be convicted must have been in force at the time, when the act with which he is charged was committed. Bearing this principle in mind, in our opinion, section 10 of the 1966 Ordinance is not hit by Fundamental Right 4, for it does not penalise or punish the petitioners in respect of the failure or default to discharge o to secure their debt prior to the coming in force of the Ordinance. The Ordinance in substance, provides for the machinery or the procedure for the recovery of "loans" as defined in section 2 (f) which inter alia includes "an award given by an arbitrator, or a decision of the Registrar...". Sections 5 and 6 provide for the procedure to determine the liability of the borrower when it is disputed by him. Section 7 provides for securing the loan and its payment in accordance with certain instalments. Section 9 pro vides for the recovery of the outstanding loans as arrears of land revenue, "without prejudice to the provisions of section 10 . . . . ."

18. It is not disputed in the instant case, that the petitioners had two cash credit accounts under which loans advanced to them still remain unpaid, though there is a dispute as to the exact amount payable by them. But the notice dated the 27th of March 1967 issued to them under section 5 of the impugned Ordinance inter alia require them to submit written statement to the Deputy Registrar, in case they dispute their liability to pay the sums specified in the notice. This is obviously to enable the Registrar to determine under section. 6 the exact liability of the petitioners. Therefore, what the impugned Ordinance essentially provides is a procedure for the recovery of loans, which it must be conceded is more summary than the one provided under the relevant law when the petitioners initially opened the cash credit with the respondent‑Bank. It was held in Sh1v Bahadur v. State of V. P. (1953 S C R 1188). "What is prohibited under Article 20 is only conviction or sentence under an ex post facto law and not the trial thereof. Such trial under a procedure different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence cannot ipso facto be held to be unconstitutional. A person accused of the commission of an offence has no fundamental right to trial . . . . . by a parti cular procedure, except in so far as any constitutional objection by way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right may be involved." It is not the petitioners' case and indeed they cannot possibly be heard to say, that the amount advanced to them by the respondent Bank can be recovered only in the manner provided under Act II of 1912 and the Rules framed thereunder. This is certainly not the intention underlying Fundamental Right 4 which, as pointed out earlier, guarantees only protection against restrospective punish ment. And what section 10 of the impugned Ordinance provides is the penalty for default committed if any, by the petitioners in respect of any provisions of the Ordinance after it came into force and not In respect of any act or omission committed prior to the coming into force of the Ordinance. On this view of the matter, therefore, It is wrong to contend that section 10 of the impugned 1966 Ordinance is repugnant to Fundamental Right 4.

19. Reference to Fundamental Right 1, In the course of argument, was wholly fallacious The constitutional guarantee is in the following terms‑ "No person can be deprived of life or liberty save In accordance with law." This Provision amounts to a declaration that no person is to take the life or liberty of another person except under a law authorising him to do so. In the instant case no criminal proceedings have been initiated against the petitioners so far. And if they are at any subsequent stage prosecuted and convicted, that will be tin accordance with section 10 of the Impugned Ordinance.

20. It was also argued by the petitioners' learned counsel that section 8 of the impugned Ordinance offends against Fundamental Rights 13 and 14 which guarantee rights in property. The argument was that section 6 of the Ordinance allowed recovery of loan as arrears of land revenue which entails a sale of the petitioners' property by summary process and; therefore, amounts to an "unwarranted interference" with the petitioners' right in their property. This argument, in our opinion, is again wholly fallacious. The Fundamental Rights 13 and 14 prevent a deprivation by the State of the private property in the form of acquisition subject to certain reasonable restrictions. In the instant case, the undisputed facts are that the petitioners owed a large sum of money to the respondent‑Bank on the basis of two cash credit accounts. Likewise, it is not disputed, that the cotton ginning factory, which is threatened to be sold by auction, is already mortgaged with the respondent‑Bank to secure the re‑payment of loan. Therefore, the threatened sale is in Pursuance of the mortgage created by the petitioners in favour of the respondent Bank. It is difficult to imagine how in the above circumstances the petitioners can invoke the provisions of Fundamental Rights 13 and 14 to avert the sale by auction of the cotton ginning factory or for that matter any other property belonging to them to discharge the debt due by them to the respondent‑Bank.

21. It is pertinent to point out that the petitioners do not dispute the incidence of liability for the debts under the two cash credit accounts. Their dispute with the respondent‑Bank Is confined only to the quantum of liability under the two cash credit accounts. The petitioners' main grievance is that the respondent‑Bank has not allowed reduction of Rs. 74,428 in respect of which its suit was dismissed by the Civil Judge First Class, Sargodha from the sum adjudged due and payable under the award dated the 17th April 1967. A further grievance is that under the understanding reached between petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 2, the petitioners were allowed relief against future Interest and also a further reduction in the amount found due under the award in case Rs. 10,000 were paid by the petitioners "immediately". The two notices, dated the 27th March 1967, according to learned counsel completely ignore the decree in the civil suit and the reductions promised to be allowed to the peti tioners on their payment of Rs. 10,000 under the award. But the argument overlooks the fact that the two notices, inter alia, require the petitioners to file a written statement before the Deputy Registrar if they in any manner dispute the liability for the payment of the sums specified in the notices. Section 6 of the impugned Ordinance gives ample power to the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar, as the case may be, to determine all such disputes before the borrower is required to secure the re‑payment of the loan under section 7 or a summary process for the recovery of any outstanding instalment is issued under section

8. It is only a violation of any direction or process issued under section 7 or 8, which is penalised under section

10. The petitioners instead of choosing to dispute the quantum of their liability under the two loans as required by the two notices have chosen to thawart the process by means of this writ petition. It can scarcely be disputed that merely because the petitioners dispute the quantum of their liability for the two debts arising out of the cash credit accounts would not make the notices ultra vires, particularly when the notices invite the petitioner to file their written statement if they dispute their liability and section 6 of the impugned ordinance makes ample provisions for the determination of such dispute.

22. Lastly, it was also urged by learned counsel that the petitioners having adequately secured the two loans, the notices dated the 27th March 1967, are ultra vires or at any rate oppres sive in so far as they require the petitioners to offer further security. The argument overlooks the fact that the loan payable by the petitioners was secured some years ago and the interest has continued to run against them all these years. The question whether the security offered by the petitioners some years ago remains adequate or otherwise is entirely for the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar to judge. Therefore, if the Registrar has taken the view that the security already furnished no longer remains adequate, a demand for further security would not, by any stretch, be regarded 'as ultra vires. In any event, the petitioners may dispute their liability to offer further security in their written statement which the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar is bound to determine under section 6 of the Ordinance.

23. For the foregoing reasons, therefore, we hold that the impugned Ordinance and in particular sections 8 and 10 thereof do not offend against any provision of the Constitution and is, therefore, a valid piece of legislation. The dispute between the petitioners and the respondent‑Bank being confined to the quantum and not to the incidence of the liability under the two cash credit accounts, cannot be appropriately resolved in writ jurisdiction; more so when the Ordinance provides adequate machinery for the settlement of all such disputes before the coercive process for the recovery of the loan is issued. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed in limine, the notices dated 27‑3‑1967 not being without lawful authority. A.H. Petition dismissed.