P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑

The petitioners are nine students of the Islamia College, Lahore, who challenge an amendment in the Regulations of the University of the Punjab by which the bi‑annual examination for the B.A., and B.sc. Degrees was abolished. According to Regulation I at page 328 of the Punjab University Calendar 1951‑52, Part V, it had been provided that examination for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts shall be held twice a year, once in September and once in April, (and every student would have .the option to appear either in the April or in the September examination. The Regulation is in the following words :‑ "Examinations for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts shall be held at such places as may be appointed by the Syndicate twice a year, beginning on the 3rd April or such other date as may be fixed by the Syndicate and in September on a date to be fixed by the Syndicate every year. Every candidate shall have the option of appearing for the first time in the examination in April or in September, but he shall offer all the subjects when he takes the examination for the first time". The position with respect to the B.Sc. Examination is the same as will appear from Regulation I at page 440 of the same Calendar. There was also a provision in these regulation that if a student passes in some subjects in the first examination that he takes, he is entitled, if he fulfils certain conditions, to appear only in the subjects ill which he has failed, in the next examination. This is contained in Regulation X at page 337 of the Calendar as regards B.A. and in Regulation IX at page 449 of the Calendar as regards B. Sc. The Regulation referred to above had been framed under section 25 of the Indian Universities Act which was to be read into the Punjab University Act of 1882 by section 2 of that Act. The Punjab University Act of 1882 and the Indian Universities Act of 1904 was superseded in 1955 by the Punjab University Act of 1954. By means of a Statute made under the Punjab University Act of 1954, the Punjab University has amended Regulation I at page 328 of the Calendar relating to bi‑annual examination. The statute which takes the place of this Regulation reads :‑ "Examination for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts shall be held annually at such places and on such dates as may be determined by the Syndicate. Ordinarily the annual examination shall be held in April and the Supplementary Examination, for candidates defined in the Statutes, in September the same year". It will be observed that the bi‑annual examination for the B.A. Degree stands abolished by this Statute. A similar statute has been framed with respect to the B.Sc. examination. At the same time, by means of new statutes, Regulation X and Regulation IX quoted above, which exempted 'a student from appearing in the ‑second examination in those subjects in which he had secured 45 per cent. or more marks, have been deleted altogether. The students must now appear in all the subjects at an examination. The nine petitioners allege that when they joined the III year class of the Islamia College the Regulations mentioned above and printed in the Calendar for 1951‑52 were in force which provided for bi‑annual examination and at the same time exempted students from appearing in those subjects in which they secured 45 per cent. or more marks ; that the petitioners had all along been under the impression that they were governed by the Regulations in the Calendar and did not even know of the statutes by which those Regulations have been superseded ; that under this impression and with the intention of appearing in the September examination they did not send in their admission forms for the examination which was to be held in May ; and that when they were preparing for the September examination, the respondent University sent to their College a copy of the new statutes wherefrom the petitioners received the distressing information that they could not take the examination in September at all. The petitioners attack the new statutes as ultra vices on a number of grounds which will be examined in detail presently, and ask for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ to be issued to University respondent with a direction that the petitioners should not be debarred from availing of the bi‑annual examination and exemptions from appearing in certain subjects as contained in the old Regulations. In its reply the University states that the allegation that the petitioners were under the impression that they were governed by Regulations I and X printed in the University Calendar and that for this reason they did not send in their admission forms for the examination to be held in May 1957 is incorrect. It is pointed out that these statutes, after they received the assent of the Government as required by section 26 (b) of the Punjab University Act 1954, were forwarded for information and necessary action to the principals of all the colleges and that they had been duly received in the Islamia College on the 16th of July 1956 under the signature of the Principal of the College. It is stated too that the allegation in para. 6 of the petition that copies of the new statutes had been sent to the Islamia College now when the petitioners were preparing for the September examination is incorrect. During the arguments it had been stated by learned counsel for the respondent that the question of abolishing the bi‑annual examination had been taken up in, the year 1955, that a sub‑committee had been appointed to consider the question and that its recommendation that the bi‑annual examination be abolished had been accepted on the 24th of December 1955. This is supported by a copy of the proceedings of the Chancellor's Committee. It was further stated that as a matter of fact there had been, against the abolition of the bi‑annual examination, representations by the Students' Federation, long before the new statutes were framed. Had it been true that the petitioners were in fact under the impression that they could appear in the examination in September and for that reason they did not send in their admission forms for the May examination they would have a case which would demand serious consideration from all concerned whatever the legal aspect. There is little doubt however that this case is not true. Even the agitation of the students against the abolition of the bi‑annual examination started long before the new statutes were made in July 1956, and to say that they did not know of the change in the Regulations is to take up a hopeless plea. Learned counsel for the petitioners now explains that although they knew of the acceptance of this recommendation by the Chancellor's Committee, they had approached the Vice‑Chancellor with a request that 'the bi‑annual examination be retained and that they did not know whether the Vice‑Chancellor had decided in favour of the bi‑annual examination or against it. It is not possible for us to accept this statement. The new statutes had been received in the. Islamia College as in all other colleges in July 1956. Even if they had not been formally received in the College they would be known to the students for the decision of the Vice‑Chancellor related to a matter of importance and it is nobody's case that it was being kept a secret. In fact when learned counsel was addressing us on this point he did not say, as was alleged in the petition, that the students came to know of the new statutes from a copy of the statutes sent to their College at the time when they were preparing for the September examination, because this was obviously not true. When called upon to state as to when and how the petitioners came to know of the change in the Regulations, learned counsel was unable to state either the time or the source. The allegation therefore that the petitioners did not send in their admission forms for the May examination under the alleged impression is incorrect and the success of this petition depends only on the legal objections to the new statutes. Before beginning with the objections, it is necessary to refer briefly to the enactments relating the Punjab University. This University was created by the Punjab University Act XIX of 1882. Then there came into existence the Indian Universities Act VII of 1904 by section 2 of which that Act became a part of the Punjab University Act XIX of 1882 and was to be read into it. By section 25 of the Indian Universities Act, the University had power to frame Regulations. The Regulations printed in the Calendar have been accepted before us by both parties as valid Regulations framed under section 25 of the Indian Universities Act. The Punjab University Act XIX of 1882 and the Indian Universities Act, 1904, were superseded by an Act which was called the Punjab University Act, 1954, though it was enacted in 1955. This Act provided for the making of statutes, Ordinances and Regulations by the various Authorities of the University and by section 46 it saved the previous Regulations except to the extent of their inconsistency with the provisions of this Act or of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations framed there under. The impugned statutes have been framed by the power granted to the University under the Punjab University Act, 1954. We will now consider the various objections raised by learned counsel for the petitioners as to the legality of the new statutes. For the decision of the first objection reference has to be made to sections 26, 40 and 47 which relate to the framing of statutes: They run :‑ Section 26. "Framing of statutes.‑Statutes may be made, repealed or amended in the following manner :‑-- (a) The Syndicate may propose the draft of any statute to be passed by the Senate. The Senate may approve such draft and pass the statute, or may reject it, or refer it back to the Syndicate for reconsideration together with such suggestions as the Senate may deem fit to make. (b) when any Statute has been passed by the Senate, it shall be submitted to Government which may refer the Statute back to the Senate for further consideration or may assent thereto, or withhold assent or may give assent thereto with such modifications as it may think fit to make. Government may also frame any Statute without the same having been proposed and passed as mentioned above. The Statute passed by the Senate shall have no validity until it has received the assent of Government. (c) The Syndicate shall not propose a draft of any Statute affecting the status, power or constitution of any existing Authority until such Authority has been given an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the proposal. The. recorded opinion of such Authority shall be considered by the Syndicate and shall be submitted to the Senate which will, in its turn, if it approves the Statute, forward the same to Government. (d) The Syndicate shall not prepare the draft of any Statute, affecting matters referred to in clauses (iii), (iv), (vii), (viii), (x) and (xii) of section 25 without having first obtained the written opinion of the Academic Council". Section 40. "First Statutes.‑‑‑Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the Government shall frame the first statutes which shall be deemed to be the statutes framed under section 26 of this Act and shall continue to remain in force until amended or repealed or till such time as new statutes are framed in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Act." Section 47. "Transitional.‑From the date of commencement of this Act and till such time as the various Authorities are con stituted under this Act, the Chancellor shall appoint a Committee which, subject to the control of the Chancellor, shall, so far as may be, exercise all the powers and per form all the duties of the various Authorities under this Act . Provided that if no Authorities are constituted within six months of the commencement of this Act, Government may take such action as it may deem necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act". It will be observed that the Statutes are ordinarily made in the manner stated in section 26, but so far as the First Statutes are concerned they have to be framed by the Govern ment. The impugned Statutes have been made by the Chancellor's Committee under section

47. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned Statutes are First Statutes because on the subject with which they deal there existed no Statute before, and, therefore, they could have been framed only by the Government. According to learned counsel "First Statutes" in section 40 include every statute which is framed with respect to a matter on which there exists no Statute before. On behalf of the respondent it is pointed out that there is a set of First Statutes which were in fact made by the Government and which were published on 18th March 1955 and which deal with the constitution and functions of the Authorities of the University and it is contended that once the Govern ment has framed a set of Statutes, all subsequent Statutes irrespective of the subject to which they relate are to be framed by the Authorities of the University or the Chancellors Committee, as the case may be, and that there is no obligation at all on the Government to frame Statutes on each and every subject. The point for decision is this when it was provided in section 40 that the Government was to frame First Statutes, was it the intention that it must frame Statutes which cover all subjects on which Statutes could be framed and the only power left to Authorities of the University, was to amend, modify or withdraw the Statutes? There are no express words in section 40 saying that Government must frame Statutes on all subjects. Is there then any necessary implication to that effect ? Contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Legislature had in mind the complete over‑hauling of the existing Regulations of the University which had been saved by section 46 and which related to those subjects on which as detailed in section 26 statutes are to be framed and that in its wisdom the Legislature did not regard the various authorities of the University as fit persons to recast and amend those Regulations and therefore it entrusted the task of amending those Regulations for the first time to a much superior body, i.e., the Government, which is in a far better position to amend these Regulations properly. Learned counsel refers to rules of business of the Govern ment and points out that when the Government wants to frame some rules, regulations, bye‑laws etc. under the Statutes, the persons actually concerned in the framing thereof are the Secretaries to the Government and the Law Department of the Government. Learned counsel assumes that the Secretaries and the Law Department are persons much better equipped to frame Regulations for the University than the various Authorities of the Punjab University assumption which can only surprise one. It can hardly be denied that the University Authorities, i.e, the Senate, the Syndicate, the Academic Council, the Faculties and the various Boards are the persons really competent to frame the Statutes that relate to the details of the working of the University. They may not, because they are not experts in drafting, be able to put them in as good a form as the Law Department may, but it is impossible to assert that as regards the substance of such statutes the Secretaries or the Law Department are to be preferred to the Authorities of the University. The suggestion that when the Punjab University Act, 1954, was enacted, the Government had some intention of completely overhauling the old Regulations by means of some experts is unsupported by anything in that Act If that were really the intention of the Government, there would be a clear reference in the Act to some body of experts and we would find further provisions in the Act relating to the amendment of Regulations. Learned counsel also forgets when he puts forward this argument that the field covered by the Statutes is a part only of that covered by the existing Regulations which relate to all subjects on which Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations can be framed under the present Act. But it is only the First Statutes that are to be framed by the Government, there being no similar provision with respect to framing of First Ordinances and First Regulations. Learned counsel is unable to suggest any reason as to why there should be an intention to amend only those existing Regulations which related to subjects on which Statutes are to be framed and to leave the other Regulations untouched. Learned counsel for the petitioners asks: what was the necessity of this provision if the intention was not the over hauling of the regulations ? The answer does not present any difficulty. This provision relating to the First Statutes will be found in one form or other in almost every University Act. In some Acts the First Statutes may be provided by the Act itself and in others they may be left to be framed by the Government. The necessity of such a provision is apparent when one considers that for the bringing into existence of the various Authorities of the University that re to frame the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations, some statutes are required. The University Act of 1954, in order that the University may begin to function, requires to be supplemented by some Statutes. It is by the Statutes that the Constitution and powers of the various Authorities of University, the Academic Council, etc., are to be provided. Section 23 of the Act runs :‑ "Constitution, powers and duties of the Authorities. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Constitu tion, powers, and duties of the Authorities shall be such as may be prescribed". 'Prescribed' means, as provided in section 2 (f), prescribed by Statutes. Ordinances and Regulations. What is meant by Authorities is stated in section 14, which runs :‑ "Authorities.‑The following shall be the Authorities of the University :‑ (i) Senate, (ii) Syndicate, (iii) Academic Council, (iv) Faculties, (v) Boards of Studies for Various Subjects, (vi) Board of Appointments, (vii) Standing Finance Com mittee, (viii) Such other Authorities as may be provided for in the Statutes". It should be obvious that even after the Act has been enacted there have to be some Statutes relating to the Constitution, powers and duties of the Authorities before those Authorities which are to frame the Statutes, Ordinances A and Regulations begin to function. It was essential therefore that power be given to some body other than the Authorities for the framing of such essential Statutes. That power has been given by section 40 to the Government. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that there was no need of any Statutes in order that the University may begin working, because the Authorities that already existed under the repealed law could function under the previous Regulations which had been saved. Here he labours under a grievous mistake. It is clear from section 47 that the previous Authorities are not to function at all. If the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, that First Statute means every Statute framed for the first time on a subject, were to be accepted, the result would bel6 that even if after '30 years of the coming into existence oil the University a Statute was to be framed which could be said to relate to a new subject, the only authority which could frame it would be the Government. It will be observed that already there existed detailed Regulations on all subjects covered by Statutes. According to learned counsel if any existing Regulation is to be amended by means of a Statute the amendment must be made by the Government, because that would be the First Statute on that particular subject. On this interpretation all amendments in the present Regulations relating to the subjects covered by Statutes whenever they are to be made, have to be made by the Government only. Learned counsel is unable to put forward any reason as to why an interpretation which leads to such extraordinary results should be accepted. Next point urged is that there was no proof of Provincial Government having given its assent to the impugned Statutes in accordance with section 26 of the Punjab University Act, 1954, Government as defined by section 2 (43‑A) of the Punjab General Clauses Act means the Governor, and it is contended that there is no proof of the Governor's assent. The University respondent has placed on the record an approval of the Government to the Statutes which is in the following words :‑ "In exercise of the powers vested under section 26 (b) of the Punjab University Act, 1954, the Government of West Pakistan is pleased to accord approval to the accompanying amendment of statutes relating to B.A. and B.Sc. Examination and cases of illness." This is signed by the Deputy Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Education Department. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that under Article 74 of the Con stitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan all executive action is to be taken in the name of the Governor. Article 74 runs :‑ "(1) All executive actions of the Government of a Province shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor thereof. (2) The Governor shall by rules specify the manner in which orders and other instruments made and executed in his name shall be authenticated, and the validity of any order or instrument so authenticated shall not be questioned in any Court on the ground that it was not made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall also make rules for the allocation and transaction of the business of the Provincial Govern ment." Learned counsel urges that the presumption in sub section (2) applies only in a case where an order or an instrument executed "in his name" is authenticated in the manner specified in the rules and that as the document relied upon is not in the name of the Governor, no presumption arises that the Governor has in fact given his assent. We are not inclined to accept this argument. It is true that a presumption would not arise under Article 74, because that' only applies to documents executed in the name of the Governor. But that is no reason why we should not be able otherwise to presume the assent of the Government from this order. In section 26 it is provided that the Government is to assent. This document, which is signed by a Secretary, says the Government, has assented. The genuineness of the document is not questioned. We can presume by virtue of section 114 of the Evidence Act that the Government has in fact assented. It is for the petitioners to bring on the file material which at least suggests an inference that this is not so. If such material existed, we may not have raised the presumption at all, but in the absence of anything on the record to suggest an inference to the contrary, we see no objection to raising the presumption of assent of the Government from this order. Learned counsel for the respondent relied in this connection on a judgment of this Court in Khalid Wahid v. The Crown (P L D 1956 Lah.541) but that is a case which does not really relate to the point in dispute. It was held in that case that the word "shall" in section 17 of the Government of India Act which was similar in wording to Article 74 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, is directory and that an order which was not expressed to be passed by the Governor General was not for that reason invalid. There was no contention in that case that the order had not in fact been passed by the Governor‑General. The objection was only to the form of the order, the contention being that the order was in valid because it was not expressed in the proper form and this argument had been repelled. Another argument put forward by learned counsel for the respondent was that as in the' General Clauses Act "Government" means the Governor, there fore, the word "Government" occurring in this order should be construed as referring to .the Governor, and therefore Article 74 is complied with and the presumption arises. This argument fails on the simple ground that Article 74 directs the order to be expressed in the name of the Governor and this order is certainly not in his name. The next objection to the new Statutes is that they have also retrospective effect and this being a case of legislation by an executive body that possesses only delegated powers of legislation, there was no authority to give retros pective effect and, therefore, the new statutes in so far as they are intended to have a retrospective effect are void. It is contended that in the old regulations which were in force at the time when the present petitioners joined college the petitioners acquired vested rights which cannot be taken away except by legislation which has retrospective effect. In order to explain that it was in fact a case of retrospective effect, learned counsel took us through various provisions in the Regulations contained in Volume I of the 1951‑52 Calendar. It is not necessary to reproduce here the various provisions to which learned counsel referred. Suffice it to say that they provide for particular courses of study, periods of instructions, times for examinations, marking of papers, criteria for passing the examination and so on, and if we were to accept the contention that what was contained in a regulation that was in force at the time when a student joined a college would be applicable to him as long as he wanted to appear in an examination it will be possible to argue that it was a vested right, at least in a wide sense of the word "right". Learned counsel for the University respondent conceded that the University could not frame statutes with retros pective effect but disputed that the impugned statutes were retrospective in effect. The first question to be considered is whether there existed any vested right which the impugned statutes are taking away. Contention of learned counsel for the peti tioners is that when a student joins college he becomes vested with the right that the examinations which he takes shall be governed by the regulations as they stood at that time. The incidents of the examinations in which he may appear become fixed. If certain courses of study are provided in the regulations, he can only be examined it those courses and not others ; the past percentage provided will remain unchanged as long as he intends to appear in an examination of the Punjab University ; if there are facilities provided as regards appearing in different subjects at different times, they can never be withdrawn; the marks relating to different subjects cannot be changed ; and so on. In fact, although he has not said so himself, to carry the argument to its logical conclusion, if it was provided that the time in answering question paper would be three hours, it cannot be reduced to two and a half hours, and if the fee for the examination is Rs. 30 it cannot be raised to Rs.

40. According to learned counsel the University enters into a kind of standstill agreement with every student who joins college that everything will remain unchanged qua him as long as he wants to appear in any examination. Such an interpretation is obviously not easy to accept. On this interpretation the University may have to conduct in any particular year a large number of examinations for the B. A. degree for the candidates appearing in the exami nation may have joined college in different years and the regulations may have been amended each year. That this could never have been the intention of those who framed the regulations we have little doubt. When asked whether the vested right which learned counsel claims did not depend upon the intention Of those who framed the regulations, it was difficult for learned counsel to deny that that was so, for he depends for this right only on the regulations and the effect of a regulatio9 has to be in accordance with the "intent of them that made it Could it possibly be the intention of the University when it framed the regulations that every student who had joined college at a time when any particular regulations were in farce will have the right, as long as he intended appearing in an examination of the University, to be governed by those and those regulations alone ? These regulations were not intended to grant any such right. In order that the University might function regulations had to be framed, but there was no undertaking that they regulations would remain in force. If at the time when al student joined college a particular regulation was in force, there was no contract by the University that his examination would take place only in accordance with that regulation. If that regulation remained in force till the time that he appeared in the examination, he would be governed by it, if not, he would be governed by the regulation which super seded it. Learned counsel forgets that by the interpretation which he is placing on the regulations he is denying to the University (as it existed before the Act of 1954) full powers to amend the regulations although such powers had been granted to it by section 25 of the Indian Universities Act. By that section the University had the power to frame any regulations and this power on the principle contained in section 21 of the General Clauses Act includes a power to amend, vary or rescind the regulations. Learned counsel is at the same time denying the power of the University granted to it by the University Act of 1954 to make any statutes, regulations and ordinances, for if all the existing regulations grant vested rights which cannot be taken away except by legislation that has retrospective effect, and the University which has only a delegated power of legislation, cannot legislate with retrospective effect then obviously no statutes can be framed at all an subjects on which regulations exist except for persons who joined college after the coming into force of the university Act, 1954. Learned counsel is reading into the provisions that grant power to frame regula tions etc. (whether under the old Act or the present Act) words to the following, effect "provided that the University shall have no power to, amend a regulation so as to affect a person who had joined, college when the regulation was in force". The power of the University to frame regulations etc. is not subject to any such qualification. Learned counsel for the petitioners has in this connection referred to regulation 13 at page 339 of the Calendar which says that courses of study can be changed only after notice of two years, and contends on this analogy that even the bi‑annual examination, cannot be abolished without previous notice. But here the right to have a previous notice is based on a regulation which expressly creates such a right. The fact that there is no similar regulation in respect of the bi‑annual examination is an argument not in favour of the petitioners but against them. We would at the same time point out that the right of previous notice in case of change of courses of study would subsist only if the rule conferring the right continued and may discontinue if that rule was amended. Learned counsel has in support of his argument referred to S. K. Ghosh v. Vice Chancellor, Utkal University (A I R 1952 Orissa 1) in which case a result had not been declared by the University in accordance with the rules in force and it was held that there was a right to have the result declared. The case is clearly distinguishable, for in that case there was a breach of duty imposed by the rules as they existed at the time when the duty had to be performed and there was no question as to the validity of an amendment of the rules. Even in that case had the rule relating to the publication of the result of the examination been changed before actually the date for publication arrived, there would have been no breach of duty and the change in the rule may not at all have been open to objection on the ground that there was some vested right in the candidates to have the result declared on the date which was provided by the original rules. While we hold that there is no vested right at all, We would not at the same time accept the proposition that every statute which takes away a vested right is retrospective in effect. That the preposition is not supportable will be clear by a reference to some examples. Suppose by an enactment right of ownership of land vested in particular person is transferred to the State, he being granted compensation in lieu thereof. His ownership is without doubt a vested right and it has been taken away. But is the enactment retrospective ? Or take a case where the owners ‑of land in a particular area are debarred by' a statute from building on the land in future. They did have a right to build upon the land owned by them. This was a vested right and it has certainly been taken away by the statute. But is this statute retrospective ? Or take the case where rights of easement are altogether, abolished in a particular area by a statute which says that no person shall henceforward exercise such a right. Were the rights of easement not vested in the individuals entitled to them on the date when this statute was enacted and have not these rights been taken away ? But will this statute be called retrospective ? A statute provides that no person shall henceforward establish a tannery on his land without a licence. The owner had absolute right of user of his land and that right has been limited by this statute. Can the statute be called retros pective ? The Municipal Act provides that no person shall build on his land within the municipality except by the permission of the municipal committee. The right to build did vest in the owner and has been taken away but the law cannot be termed retrospective. It is not necessary to multiply examples. It is true that in works on interpretation we find it generally stated that a statute which takes away a vested right is retrospective. But it will be clear from the examples cited above that it is incorrect to say that every statute which takes away a vested right is retrospective in effect. A retrospective statute is one which gives a legal effect to facts and circumstances which they did not possess at the time when they came into existence, or which takes away from facts and circumstances a legal effect which they did produce at the time when they came into existence. Or, to put the same in different words, a retrospective law is one which applies to facts and circumstances a law different from the one which governed them at the time when they came into, existence. But a statute is not retrospective simply because it takes away an effect which has already been produced after accepting its production and without saying that the cause which produced it would be regarded as not having produced it at all. This would require an explanation as to the distinction between the taking away of a vested right and the change in the effect of facts and circumstances. Suppose a per‑son purchases property by means of a sale deed from one who is over eighteen but under twenty‑one years of age, and after he has purchased it there comes into existence an enactment which says transfers effected after a particular date (which is before the date of this sale) by persons under twenty‑one years of age shall be void. The enactment is retrospective for it takes away from the transfer an effect which it produced according to law then in force. At the time when the sale was effected it trans ferred the right of ownership to the vendee because the age of majority was eighteen at the time but on account of the new law the sale deed has not the effect of transferring ownership at all. Now assume that instead of raising the age of majority with retrospective effect, a law simply enacted that the owner ship which that vendee possesses shall pass to the State or to another person. The effect of this statute is the same with respect of this vendee in both cases, for his right of ownership is taken away. But the first statute was retrospective and the second is not retrospective. The distinction is that in the first case the legal effect of the execution of the sale deed has been taken away so that no right, passed to the vendee by the sale deed whereas in the second case the rights stand transferred and are retransferred to another person. The sale deed is not in this case robbed of its effect. We have fully considered the question whether there was a vested right and whether the impugned statutes were retrospective in effect. But truly, on the wording of section 46, this question should not arise. Section 46 saves the previous regulations only to the extent to which they are consistent with the statutes, ordinances and regulations framed under the University Act, 1954. The effect of this section is that it enables the framing of statutes on the subjects that are mentioned in section 25 without being obstructed in any way by a previous regulation because that regulation is to be regarded as law only to the extent that it is not inconsistent with a statute. The Legislature obviously intended the University to have power to frame statute unhampered altogether by any previous regulation. The section is also an answer to the argument about vested rights because had the Legislature regarded the previous regulation as creating vested rights and had it been the intention at the same time that those rights should not be interfered with, section 46 would have been differently worded. It would not only have saved the existing regulation but would have said that no statutes, etc., inconsistent with the existing regulation could be framed except with respect to persons who joined a college after the coming into force of the new Act. At the same time, assuming that there were any vested rights created by the existing regulations anti assuming further that those vested rights could not be taken away by subordinate legislation, it should be obvious from section 46 that those rights have been taken away by the Legislature itself which has pronounced the previous regulations to be of no effect except to the extent that they are consistent with the statutes, etc., framed under the University Act of 1954. The Legislature admittedly had the power even to take away vested rights or to legislate with retrospective effect. The next point urged is that there was no proper publication of these statutes as required by section 20 of the Punjab University Act, 1954. Section 20 runs :‑ "Notification in certain cases.‑All appointments made under section 16 ; all resignations and removals under section 19 ; all degrees, diplomas and other academic distinctions conferred and all Statutes and Ordinances made shall be notified in the Government Gazette ; wherein also the record of proceedings of every meeting of the Senate shall be published." It is urged that the word used is "shall" and if these statutes were not published in the official Gazette, they would be of no validity whatsoever. (It may be stated here that admittedly they have not been published in the Gazette up to this time.) Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Mian Akbar Hussain v. West Punjab Government (P L D 1954 Lah. 188) where it was held that when the Government has power to appoint an officer "by notification" then there is no appoint ment unless there is a notification. That authority is not applicable to the facts of the present case because the power given to the Government was to appoint "by notification". Here it has been provided that all statutes which have been made shall be published but section 20 does not say "the University may by notification in the Gazette frame statutes, etc." There are two points which deserve attention in this connection. The first is that according to section 26 (b) rules have no validity till they receive the assent of the Government but there is no provision that they shall have no validity till they are published, and this is some indication that failure to publish was not to have the effect of invalidating the statutes. The second point is that section 20 refers not only to statutes and ordinances, but to appointments, resigna tions, removals, degrees diplomas and other academic distinctions, and it is not reasonable to hold that a diploma, degree or other distinction acquires force only if there is a publication with respect to it in the Gazette. Shall is not always mandatory and it appears to us that in section 201 it is intended to be directory only. It is not irrelevant to consider for the determination of the necessity of publication the provisions of section 5 of the General Clause Act. According to this section if there is no date of commencement mentioned in an Act, the Act becomes law when the assent of the Governor‑General is published. The section does not say that even if an Act is expressed to come into force on a certain day it will not come into force till it is published in the Gazette and the implication is that it becomes law even if it is not published in the Gazette, from the date mentioned in it. If even an Act can become law in the absence of notification, there does not appear an insuperable obstacle, in the absence of a statutory provision, to a statute framed under the University Act becoming law before it is published. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also urged that section 5 of the General Clauses Act directly applies to the present case by virtue of section 3 (17) and as there was no date mentioned in the statutes they are to come into force on the day when the assent of the Govern ment to these statutes is published in the Gazette. Section 5 applies to enactments but learned counsel says it is applicable to " regulations " because by the definition of enactment contained in section 3 (17) enactment includes a regulation. The argument is wholly misconceived. " Regulation" is defined in the same Act as a regulation framed under the Government of India Act. But in fact the General Clauses Act has no application to a provincial law which is to be governed by the Punjab General Clauses Act and in that Act enactment does not include a regulation vide section 2 (17). Also we are not concerned here with any regulation but with a statute framed under the University Act of 1954. Another objection was taken that the impugned statute did not relate to the subjects, mentioned in section 25, with respect to which statutes can be framed and that these matters could only have been provided for by Ordinances. The Ordinances, it may be stated, relate to subjects mentioned in section 29 and are to be framed in accordance with section

30. These sections run:

"

29. Academic Ordinances.‑Subject to the other pro visions of this Act and the Statutes, the following matters shall be provided for by the Academic Ordinances :‑ (i) Registration of students in the University. (ii) The equivalence of examinations conducted by other Universities and institutions: (iii) The conditions of residence of the students. (iv) The conduct of examinations. (iv) Mode of appointment of Examiners. (vi) Institution of Fellowships, Scholarships and Exhibi tions. (vii) All other matters which under the Statutes are required to be provided for by the Academic Ordinances." "

30. Framing of Ordinances.‑The Ordinances shall be made, repealed or amended in the following manner :‑ (a) An Ordinance regarding any administrative matter shall be initiated by the Syndicate and that regarding academic matters by the Academic Council. (b) Every draft of an Ordinance proposed by the Syndicate or the Academic Council, as the case may be, shall be submitted to the Senate. The Senate shall have power, by a majority of not less than three‑fifths of the members present and voting, to reject the same or by a simple majority to pass or refer it back to the initiating Authority for further consideration. (c) An Ordinance passed by the Senate shall be submitted to the Chancellor, who may give his assent thereto or refer it back to the Senate for further consideration or may give assent these to with such modifications as he may think fit to make." The contention as already observed is that the impugned Statutes do not relate to any subject mentioned in section 25 but that they relate to "Conduct of Examinations" mentioned in section 29 and as the procedure for framing of Ordinances is different from that of Statute, the impugned Statutes are invalid. We are unable to agree that these Statutes do not relate to a subject covered by section

25. Section 25 (x) refers to courses of study and the conditions to be complied with by the candidates for examinations and it appears to us that these Statutes fall within this clause because they provide the conditions to be satisfied by those who want to appear in examinations. So far as the words "conduct of examinations" in section 29 (iv) are concerned they refer to the actual conduct of an examination which has already been provided by some Statute. Even assuming that there is overlapping and that the subject is covered by section 29 as well as section 25, a statute can be framed with respect to this subject, for by its express words section 29 is subject not only to the other provisions of the Act but also to the Statutes. At the same time even if we were to assume that these Statutes relate to "conduct of examina tions", we would not hold that they are invalid. They have been framed by the Chancellor's Committee which by virtue of section 47 can exercise the functions of all the authorities of the University. Ordinances require the assent of the Chancellor but the Chancellor is the Governor who has already given his assent and also, the Chancellor's Committee is, under section 47 subject to the control of the Chancellor so that the assent of the Governor has been given with the full consciousness that he is entitled, in his capacity as the Chancellor to veto any proceedings of the Committee. The last contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that under section 47 the Chancellor's Committee could function only for six months and that after the expiry of that period any action taken by it is without jurisdiction. One has only to look at section 47 to reject this contention. The section does not say that the Committee shall function only for a period of six months. The first part of section 47 provides that it shall continue to function till such time as the various Authorities of the University are constituted. The proviso simply says that if the Authorities are not constituted within six months the Government may take such action as it deems fit. The Government is not bound to take any action. It may just allow the Committee to continue. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. A.H. Petition dismissed.