P L D 1959 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

SHAHABUDDIN, J.‑--This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of a Karachi Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan dismissing the application of the appellant Messrs S. S. Miranda Ltd., Karachi for (1) the issue of an appropriate writ or direction quashing the order of the Collector of Karachi cancelling the licences granted to the appellant till 16‑5‑1957 and declining to renew the same for the rest of the year 1957‑58 as well as the order of ;he Chief Commissioner dismissing the appeal from the 'said order and (2) the issue of a direction to the Collector to renew the licences of the appellant for the said period. Special leave was granted by this Court for considering whether the cancellation of and the refusal to renew the licences were in accordance with and sustainable under the Sind Abkari Act, 1878. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Karachi with regard to the grant of the licences of the kind under consideration is derived from section 14 of the above‑said Act which is to the effect that no one should manufacture any intoxicant, or cultivate or collect hemp or tap toddy producing trees or draw toddy or bottle foreign liquor or possess utensils or apparatus for the manufacture of any intoxicant other than toddy except under the authority and subject to the condition of a licence granted by the Collector. Under section 30 the licences should be in such forms, subject to such restrictions and conditions and on payments of such fees as may be fixed by the Provincial Government. There is no provision in the Act specifically giving the Collector the power of granting or refusing a licence indicating the matters which should be kept in view in granting or refusing a licence. Nor is there a provision for the renewal of licences. Section 32 of the Act, however, specifies the cir?cumstances in which licences may be cancelled while section 32‑A gives the Collector power to cancel the licence, for any other cause. The Provincial Government and the Commissioner have been given under sections 35 and 35‑A powers to frame rules in matters specified therein respectively. These rules when published have effect under section 64 as if they had formed part of the Act. Under section 64‑A Provincial Government has the power to issue orders in matters covered by clauses (a‑k) thereof. Clause (i) of those clauses which is relevant in this case refers to the specification of persons or class of persons to whom licences may or may not be granted. The only other provisions to which reference need be made are section 60 under which orders of Collector are appealable to the Commissioner and section 60‑A which gives the Provincial Government powers of revision in respect of orders of Abkari officers which expression includes Collector and Commissioner. The material facts are as follows: The appellant‑firm is a private limited company with four share‑holders registered in 1945 under the Companies Act with the head office at Bombay. It was also registered in Pakistan but the share?holders have always been living in Bombay, and a Pakistani has been managing it at Karachi under a power‑of‑attorney. The firm was trading in liquor since 1908, under a licence. Since 1943 it was also blending and bottling liquor under different licences; and it was given also the retail `off' licence since 1946. But when it applied for the renewal of these licences for 1957‑58 the Collector of Karachi enquired as to why they should be renewed and pending a final decision granted the Company provisional licences first till 30th May 1957 and then till 15th June 1957. Finally, the provisional licences which were to expire on 15th June were cancelled on the 10th June, and on the same date and in the same order the Collector declined to renew the licences for the rest of the year `57‑58'. No reasons were, however, given in the order. The appeal filed by the appellant‑firm was dismissed by the Chief Commissioner, Karachi in the following common order:‑ "I heard the appellants. The orders of refusal were issued presumably because the applicants are a foreign concern. There are many Pakistanis who could easily handle the trade and I see no justification for letting the appellants continue enjoying the benefits of this trade. It has been urged that the firm has not transmitted any money by way of profits to Bharat. It is well known that lot of people are smuggling currency out of Pakistan in a surreptitious manner. If we did not have Pakistanis capable of handling this trade, that would be an argument in favour of letting non‑Pakistani continue in the trade. That position fortunately does not exist. Many Pakistanis in Karachi are passing their days in distress and they could easily make a living if they were given the licence held by this non‑Pakistani firm. It is extremely unfair to the people of Pakistan that even ordinary trade which is licensed by the Government should go to foreigners. I have no hesitation in upholding the orders of the learned Collector. The appeal is dismissed". The appellant then filed the petition out of which this appeal arises. In the petition objection was taken to the cancellation of the licences on the basis that none of the grounds mentioned in section 32 of the Act applied to the present case and the words "any cause other than" in section 32‑A refer only to causes of the nature mentioned in the earlier provision; but this objection does not seem to have been pressed before the High Court. It has not been pressed before us obviously because the period of five days lost by the cancellation having expired by the time the petition for writ was, filed the question had become academic. The only question for determination therefore was whether refusal to renew the licences was in accordance with the Abkari Act. On this question the main contention before the High Court was that .the ground on which the petition for the renewal was finally dismissed, viz., that the appellant was a foreign concern was extraneous to the facts of the case and therefore the action of the authorities was arbitrary and fanciful and not legal and regular. In rejecting this contention the learned Judges held that even according to the observation of Halsbury, L. C. in Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield and others (1891 A C 173 at p. 179), as to the exercise of discretion in granting licence by justices it could not be said that the Chief Commissioner's exercise of discretion was arbitrary, or based on considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. The last mentioned contention was raised before us also, but before doing so, Mr. Brohi for the appellant, advanced another contention which may be conveniently dealt with first. It was to the effect that there was a difference between the case of an original grant of licence and that of a renewal, that renewal of a licence has to be ordered as a matter of course on payment of the requisite fees and that licences should be granted for a year but in this case the Collector granted the licences for shorter periods. In support of this proposition reliance was placed on (1) certain observations of Lord Bramwell, J. to Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield and others (1891 A C 173 at p. 174), (2) the decision of Bombay High Court in Ratanshaw Nusserwanji Todiwala v. Geoffrey William McElhinny and another (3) a case under the Bombay Abkari Act which is the same as the Sind Abkari Act and (A I R 1942 Bom, 1) paras. 183 and 113 of the Excise Manual of Bombay, printed in 1924. Having been through these authorities and the relevant sections of the Act I find myself unable to accept this con?tention. There is no express provision in the Act giving the' Collector powers to grant a licence, but by reason of the words used in section 14 it seems clear that such a power is impliedly, vested in the Collector. Unless this view is accepted, the clear intention of the section would be defeated as otherwise there would be no licensing authority at all power to grant a licence necessarily implies power to refuse to grant it, as otherwise it would mean that there is an obligation on the Collector to grant a licence and that he has no jurisdiction to refuse the same, but there is nothing in the Act to justify such a conclusion. We have not been shown any provision in the Act regarding the renewal of licences. On the language of the statute therefore there is no justification for holding that there is a difference between the original grant and a renewal of the licence) In Susannah Sharp's case, the licensing justices had declined to renew a licence for the sale of intoxicating liquor at an Inn on the grounds of the remoteness from Police supervision and the character and interests of the neighbourhood. On appeal the Court of Quarter Sessions confirmed the decision of the justices, whereupon Susannah Sharp took up the matter to the Court of Appeal, where the question was whether the justices and the Court of Quarter Session's were entitled to refuse the renewal upon the grounds stated. This question was answered in the affirmative and that view was upheld on the matter going up to the House of Lords. The contention of the appellant throughout, which was rejected by all the Courts, was that the discretion given by the Licensing Act, 1828 to the justices in the matter of granting licences was limited in respect of renewals by the later Acts of 1872 and 1874 to cases where objections could be raised personal to the applicant. On page 184 of the report of the decision of the House of Lords are found the observations of Lord Bramwell relied on by Mr. Brohi. They are to the effect that the Legislature had most clearly shown that it con?templated, that licences would naturally be renewed; that the taking away of a man's livelihood would not be practised cruelly or wantonly, and that throughout England in appeals from orders refusing a first licence the burden was on the appellant, whereas in appeals against refusal of applications for renewal the burden was on the authority competent to grant licences to show that the appellant ought not to have a licence. But the decision in the case was that the discretion vested in the licensing justices was not limited in the case of an application for renewal. For instance, on page 183 of the report Lord Bramwell observed as follows:‑ "Two objections are raised by the appellant. One is, that though by the Act 9, Geo. 4, c. 61, the above might be a good ground for a refusal of a licence applied for the first time, it is not for a refusal of its renewal. Why, I know not I quite agree that different considerations should operate on the minds of the justices, and, I doubt not, do. The hardship of stopping the trade of a man who is getting an honest living in a lawful trade, and has done so, perhaps, for years, with probably an expense at the outset, may well be taken into consideration; but it must be done so in conjunction with considerations the other way, and must be left to the discretion of the justices. The licence is a renewal. That word has been criticised. It may be misleading, but is, I think, correct. It is a "renewal" i.e., a new licence, as we talk of a new lease being a renewal, though parties and terms may be wholly different. And one cannot help seeing this, that if the discretion was to be limited, as contended in the case of a renewal, the legislature might have said so in terms, and has not. Whenever that is the case it seems to me that Courts ought not to put a limit on general words without almost a necessity for doing so". There are observations in the speeches of the other noble Lords also to the effect that modification by the subsequent legislation related to matters of procedure but that there was no difference between an application for a licence for the first time and that for a renewal in respect of the discretion vested in the justices. In the present case, even the difference in procedure referred to by Lord Bramwell on page 184 of the report, on which Mr. Brohi relies, is not present. We have not been shown any provision in the Abkari Act indicating that the Collector in dealing with applications or the Commissioner in dealing with the appeals from the orders of the Collector should make a difference between an application for a first licence and that for a renewal of a licence. The above decision, therefore, does not, in my opinion, apply to the present case. Similarly the Bombay decision relied on by Mr. Brohi is not applicable. There, after the introduction of prohibition ad. Bombay the Collector declined to issue a Tapping licence to the petitioner before the High Court, who owned lands on which Toddy producing trees grew, though he had been granted such a licence from 1939 onwards. He therefore presented a petition to the High Court under section 45 of the Specific Relief Ac; against both the Collector and the Commissioner for direction them to grant and issue a licence. In exercise of the power conferred by subsection (3) of clauses (a) and (e) of section 35‑A of the Abkari Act the Commissioner of Excise Bombay had framed a set of rules called the Bombay Toddy Tapping Rules, 1928. With reference to the language of these rules, Blackwell, J., of the Bombay High Court, who heard the petition, held that no question of the exercise of all discretion by the Collector in the granting of licence arose provided that the requirements of the rules were complied with. The Advocate‑General, relying on certain decision of the Bombay High Court under the City of Bombay Municipal Act, where the language with regard to the prohibition for doing various things except under a licence was practically to the same effect as in section 14 of the Abkari Act, had argued that Collector had an absolute discretion for grant or refuse a licence and that as long as he exercise that discretion not arbitrarily, but legally and regularly, it could not be questioned. The learned Judge distinguished those cases observing:‑ "It is however to be observed that in neither of these cases were there any rules prescribing the manner in which the power was to be exercised". (page 7) This clearly shows that his earlier observation that there was no discretion left to the Collector with regard to the grant of licence was confined to the licence of Toddy Tapping in view of the language of the rules, Which under Section 64 had as much force as any provision of the Act. The learned Judge then went on to refer to Rex v. Metropolice Police ((1911) 2 K B 131),. where the relevant section of Metropolitan Carriage Act had empowered the Commissioner of Police to grant licences for hackney and stage carriages, if the Secretary of State so directed. Regulations made by the Secretary of State empowered the Commissioner to issue a licence subject to certain exceptions. It eras held that the provision made by the Secretary of State did limit the discretion of the Commissioner. This again is an indication that the decision of Blackwell, J. mainly depended on the restriction imposed on the discretion of the Collector in the Toddy Tapping Rules. If similar rules had been framed with regard to the grant of licence generally, the discretion which according to the form of the licence is entirely vested in the Collector could have been held to be as restricted as it was found in respect of the Toddy Tapping Licences. But we have not been shown any such rules with regard to the grant or renewal of licences of the kind under consideration. As regards, paragraph 183 of the Excise Manual, on which Mr. Brohi relied very strongly for the position that a licence should be renewed as a matter of course, it does not contain a rule framed under section 35 of the Act, but appears to refer to an order issued by the Provincial Government in the Revenue Department. It is as follows:‑ "Retail `off' licenses are licenses under which spirits, wines, etc., subject to a special exception in the case of the small bottles of champagne and stout which are mainly used in hospitals, are to be sold in full corked quart and pint bottles for removal only and not for consumption on the premises. These licences are renewed to existing holders on payment of fixed annual fees as shown below:‑ (Vide G. R., R. D., No. 102‑C, dated the 9th March 1922)". The scale of fees was subsequently amended by an order dated the 17th February 1925. As has already been pointed out section 64A of the Abkari Act empowers the Provincial Government to issue general or special orders with regard to various matters mentioned in that section; but as that provision was enacted only in 1943, the above order of 1925 cannot be said to be as effective as an order passed under the powers conferred under section 64‑A. However, even if for argument's sake this order is regarded as having the same force as an order issued under section 64‑A it R does not in terms state what Mr. Brohi contends for. There is nothing in it to show that the licences should be renewed as a matter of course. The words "these licenses are renewed to existing holders on payment of fixed annual fees as shown below" mean that when the renewal is ordered the licences will be renewed only on payment of the fixed fees. If the intention was that the discretion of the Collector should be taken away altogether in respect of an application for renewal the order would have said so but it has not. On the other hand, in the forms prescribed in 1930 and 1942, which are found pinned to the front page of the old copy of the Excise Manual, which was produced by Mr. Brohi, one of the conditions is as follows:‑ "It is entirely within the discretion of the Collector whether he will or will not renew this license at the expiration of the term for which its is granted. It is also entirely within the discretion of the Collector whether he will or will not permit the assignee of the holder of the license, in case of sale or transfer, or the heir or legal representative of the holder of the license, in case of death, to have the benefit of the license for the unexpired portion of the term for which it was granted." It is common ground that the forms in vogue now also contain the condition that the grant or renewal of licence is entirely in the discretion of the Collector. These forms are obviously those prescribed under section 30 of the Act and as such are of greater authority than any direction issued by a Government Department, but as stated already, even paragraph 183 of the Manual does not, in my opinion, admit of the construction contended for by Mr. Brohi. Para. 113 of the Manual also is an order of Government and it is as follows:‑ "Government have directed that all Abkari licenses (with the exception of toddy licenses of all kinds) should continue to be granted for the financial year, that is to say, from April to March and toddy licenses for the revenue or financial year as the case may be, in different districts mentioned in para? graph 324 infra. ??????????? (G. O., R. D., No. 6685, dated 27th November 1922.)" Apart from the fact that like para. 183, this paragraph also has not the same force as an order under S. 64‑A, it does not prohibit C the issue of a provisional licence pending decision as to whether a licence for a year should be granted or not. Further as the appellant took advantage of the provisional licences it is not open to them to raise this objection at this stage. The next contention of Mr. Brohi was that under the Abkari Act the Collector and the Commissioner in dealing with applica?tions for licences act in a quasi‑judicial capacity that they should therefore, exercise their discretion judicially, but that the Collector and Chief Commissioner of Karachi acted arbitrarily in this case, the former in not giving reasons for his refusal to renew the licences and the latter in taking into consideration circumstances extraneous to the matter before him. I am unable to agree with this contention also. ??????????? In Tariq Transport Co. Lahore v. Sargodha Bhera Bus Service (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 437) this Court has indicated the main points of difference between an administrative and a judicial or quasi‑judicial Tribunal. It was pointed out there that in the case of an administrative Tribunal the emphasis is on policy, expediency and discretion and the approach is subjective to the determination of the conditions limiting the exercise of power, while a judicial Tribunal which determines disputes relating to rights and liabilities is bound by a fixed objective standard. It does not create rights and liabilities but the administrative Tribunal can itself determine the policy to be followed by it. That was a case of licensing under the Motor Vehicles Act which provides that an application for a permit can be opposed by anyone and the objector should be given the opportunity of being heard in person or by an authorised represen?tative, and that when the application is refused reasons for its rejection should be given. The said Act states in S. 47 the matters which the transport authority has to keep in view in deciding whether it should or should not grant a permit, and all these matters except one relate in terms to public interest while the remaining one, though it appears to relate to the operators of a service as it refers to uneconomic competition, is in effect con?cerned with public interest as such competition impairs the efficiency of the service. It was held that these provisions do not create any right in anyone to a permit but merely emphasise that the main consideration in granting or refusing a permit should be public interest, and that the mere fact that the authority has to consider the matters specified in S. 47 before taking a decision or that it should hear the applicants and objectors does not make its act judicial. Applying these propositions to the case under consideration, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the Collector in dealing with the applications for licences and the Commissioner in the appeals from the orders of the Collector act, in an administrative and not in a quasi‑judicial capacity. As already indicated, there is nothing in the Act indicating how the applications should be dealt with, but the form of licence prescribed under S. 30 contains the condition that the grant or renewal is entirely in the discretion of the Collector. Under S. 64‑A Government can issue orders restricting this discretion, but we have not been shown any. such order. Mr. Brohi relied on the following observation of Lord Halsbury L. C., in the case of Sharp v. Wakefield ((1891) A C 173 at p. 179) (referred to already in another connection):‑ "An extensive power is confined to the justices in their capacity as justices to be exercised judicially; and `discretion' means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that that something .is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion . . . . . . ." This was no doubt a case of licensing for the sale of liquor, and this observation does support the position taken by Mr. Brohi, but two later decisions of the House of Lords Boulter v. Kent Justices ((1897) A C 556) and Lord Mayor of Leeds v. Ryder and others ((1907) A C 420) which were relied upon in the Tariq Transport Company case do not support him. In the first case it was observed by Lord Herschell that the applicant for a licence seeks a privilege and an objector merely gives information which enables the justices to decide if they should grant the privilege, that the consideration that influ?ences the decision is public interest, and that in truth there is no lis nor controversy in a case of licensing. In the other case, it was stated by Lord Loreburn The justices acting under S. 1, subsection 2, of the Act of 1904 act administratively, for they are exercising a discretion which may depend upon considerations of policy and practical good sense‑and they must, of course, act honestly. This is the total of their duty . . . . . ." Mr. Brohi relied also on the decision in the Queen v. The Bishop of London ((1890) 24 Q B D 213), with special reference to the observations on page

225. That was a case under the Public Worship Regula?tion Act, 1874, which gives a certain class of persons a right to make complaints to the Bishop and requires the Bishop, upon the receipt of such complaint, to take steps for the adjudication of the matter in accordance with the provisions of that Act unless he is of opinion after considering the whole circumstances of the case that proceedings should not be taken on the representation, in which case he shall record his reasons. In that case, the complaint made to the Bishop of London was of an unlawful alteration and addition to the figures in the church which tended to encourage ideas and devotion of unauthorized and superstitious kind. The Bishop of London took the view that no action was called for in the complaint and recorded his reasons therefore, and when the matter was taken to Court, it was decided that there was no ground for interference. But during the course of the judgment reference was made to what exactly the scope of the duty Ltd. of the Bishop in the matter was, and it is on the following observa?tion on this point that reliance was placed:‑ "Therefore, what the bishop has to do is to form an opinion as between the parties complaining and complained of as to whether the proceedings should go on and to act upon it. He is pot to decide the controversy as to whether the things which have been done are contrary to statute or the ecclesiastical law. He is to form an opinion whether proceedings should not be taken upon the representation. That it is a matter of discretion cannot be doubted, and is not denied; and inasmuch as; though not a judge, he is a high public authority entrusted with the duty of saying whether the controversy shall or shall not be tried, I have no doubt that his decision on that matter, though not strictly a judicial decision, is in the nature of a judicial decision, and, therefore, that his discretion must be exercised in a judicial manner". It cannot be said that this case is on the same footing as the cases of licensing. Here the Act gives the persons who actually complain a right to make that complaint, and the action which the Bishop is called upon to take relates to such a right, whereas under the Licensing Act no right is given anyone and as to whether a person should be given a licence or not is to be determined with reference to the public interest. This case, in my opinion, can be of no assistance in determining whether the licensing authorities under the Sind Abkari Act, act in a quasi‑judicial or administrative capacity. The cases under the Licensing Acts are relevant to such an enquiry, and from what has been stated already in respect of those cases, it is clear that grant or refusal of a licence is not also judicial act. This, however, does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the Collector or Commissioner can be arbitrary and fanciful h and that if it be so Courts cannot interfere. The following observations of Lord Greene, M. R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd., v. Wednesbury Corporation ((1948) 1 K B 223 at pp. 228, 229 and 233.) with which I with respect agree are instructive as to the scope of interference by Courts with the exercise by the executive of he discretion vested in them by the legislature: "When an executive discretion is entrusted by Parliament to a body such as the local authority in this case, what appears to be an exercise of that discretion can only be challenged in the Courts in a strictly limited class of case. As I have said, it must always be remembered that the Court is not a Court of appeal. When discretion of this kind is granted the law recog?nizes certain principles upon which that discretion must be the exercised, but within the four corners of those principles the discretion, in my opinion, is an absolute one and cannot be questioned in any Court of law. What then are those principles, they are well understood. They are principles which the Court looks to in considering any question of discretion of this kind. The exercise of such a discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion. If, in the statute conferring the discretion, there is to be found expressly or by implication matters which the authority exercising the discretion ought to have regard to, then in exercising the discretion it must have regard to those matters. Conversely, if the nature of the subject‑matter and the general interpretation of the Act make it clear that certain matters would not be germane to .the matter in question, the authority must disregard those irrelevant collateral matters. "It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretion often use the word `unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what lit has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting `unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. Warrington, L. J. in Short v. Poole Corporation ((1926) Ch. 66, 90, 91), gave the example of the red‑haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. That is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one another. "The Court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may be still possible to say that, although the local authority have kept within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the Court can interfere. The power of the Court to interfere in each case, is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of the powers which Parliament has confided in them." Judging the present case with reference to these principles I am unable to find any ground for interference by Courts. It is true that the Collector did not give reasons for his refusal to renew the licence, but it must be remembered that the Act does not require him to record his reasons. It cannot be said that he passed the order without considering the case fully. He first asked the appellant as to why the licence should be renewed and took time to decide the matter granting meanwhile a provisional licence for a short period. He must have had reasons for his decision and the mere fact that he did not indicate them is not sufficient for holding that he acted arbitrarily. The Commissioner has recorded his reasons in his order and his presumption that the Collector also had the same reasons cannot be said to be unjus?tified on the facts. However, the order, which gave rise to an application for a writ and the appeal under consideration contains reasons, and it now remains to consider whether the matters which the Chief Commissioner took into consideration were extraneous to the case. The learned Judge of the High Court relying on The King v. The London County Council ((1915) 2 K B 466), held that the fact that the appel?lant is a foreign firm was not an extraneous consideration. In that case, the London County Council as the Licensing Authority under the Disorderly Houses Act, 1751 and the Cinematograph Act, 1909, refused to grant the renewal of music and cinematograph licence to a company registered in England on the ground that the majority of its shareholders were alien enemies. It was held by the King's Bench Division that the Council were entitled in their discretion to refuse the licence on the ground stated and this decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Buckley, L. J. one of the Judge of the Appeal Court observed (page 488) "The Council had to consider whether they would give a licence to a company, in the name of an agent, which might be controlled or influenced by persons actuated by hostility to this country. If acting bona fide they thought that was a circumstance which ought to guide them in the exercise of their discretion, it was for them and not for us to determine." Mr. Brohi's contention was that this decision did not apply to the case under consideration. If this means that there is a differ?ence between two cases as to the facts the argument is correct, but the principle of the decision it seems to me is applicable. There, the Licensing Authority took into consideration the fact that the control of the company was with the alien enemy shareholders. The Commissioner in the present case has held that a foreign firm should not be preferred because (1) there are Pakistanis capable of handling the trade in question; and (2) there was possivity of profits being smuggled out of the country as the shareholders lived outside Pakistan. It is true that as Lord Bramwell observed in Sharp's case referred to above, one of the points that may well be taken into consideration in respect of an application for a renewal is the hardship of stopping the trade of a man who has been carrying it on for years as in this case, but the noble Lord has also said in the same sentence "but it must be done so with con?siderations the other way and that must be left to the discretion of the justices". It cannot be said that exclusion of persons or class of persons from the trade was not contemplated by the legislature, for, under S. 64‑A, clause (i) Government can specify the persons or class of persons to whom licences may or may not be granted. It was then argued that Government has not passed orders that foreign companies should not be granted licences under the Abkari Act and therefore the Collector or‑the Chief Commis?sioner had no power to exclude the appellant, but I do not find in the, Act any such prohibition or restriction on the discretion of the Collector which, as has been pointed out already, is unfettered. The effect of S. 64 is that if under the clauses of that section orders are issued by Government then to that extent the discretion vested in the Collector and Commissioner would get limited. In The Queen v. Vestry of St. Pancras relied on by Mr. Brohi the Vestry refused to grant a superannuation allowance to a retiring officer influenced by the view expressed in an earlier decision of the Queen's Bench Division that they had no discretion as to the amount. It was held that that case was wrongly decided and as the Vestry had acted according to it, they could not be said to have exercised their discretion properly. Mandamus was therefore issued. In the present case there was no such misapprehension. On the other hand, as pointed out above, the Act itself contemplates licences being refused to specified persons or class of persons. I, therefore, consider that the decision of the licensing authorities in the present case was not affected by any extraneous considerations. The appeal fails and I would dismiss it with costs. MUHAMMAD MUNIR, C. J.‑--I agree. CORNELIUS, J.‑--I agree. AMIRUDDIN AHMAD,. J.‑--I agree. S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑--I agree. A. H.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed. ???????????????????????