P L D 1981 Supreme Court 176 (PLP)

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This appeal is directed against the order of the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar, under Article 212(3) of the Constitution by special leave of this Court. The facts briefly are that the appellant, while posted as Senior Civil Judge, Hazara, at Abbottabad, was suspended by the Governor, N.-W. F. P. exercising the powers of the authority under the N.-W. F. P. Govern ment Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, in pursuance of the recommendation made by the Chief Justice of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, as an authorised officer under the Rules vide order dated 31-7-1974. This decision was taken in a meeting of the administrative committee of the High Court consisting of Chief Justice, Shah Zaman Babar, Qaiser Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan, JJ. It was further decided in the said meeting that Shah Zaman Babar, J. would hold an inquiry against the' appellant in respect of two charges against him; firstly, for his being involved in a scandal and, secondly, for being reputed to be corrupt. It was decided that in the meantime, the Provincial Government be moved to order his suspen sion till the finalization of the inquiry. The exact charges framed against the appellant and served on him read as follows :- "(1) That you, while posted as Senior Civil Judge, Hazara at Abbott abad, on account of your alleged indiscreet conduct allowed yourself to be publicly named in a scandal which tantamounts to conduct unbecoming of an officer of your status and as such would be misconduct within the meaning of N.-W. F. P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. (2) .That you enjoyed persistent reputation of being corrupt." The summary of allegations in elaboration of the above charges is in the following terms :- "The allegations against - you, Mr. Mir Muhammad Shah are that while posted as Senior Civil Judge, Abbottabad, allowed yourself to be involved in a scandal in spite of having been warned by the District Judge to mend your ways inasmuch as that one Mst. Zarina even named you in her complaint made before Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Abbottabad, and you are, therefore, required to clear your name of the charge levelled against you. The other allegation against you is that you have not enjoyed good reputation inasmuch as you were persistently reputed to be corrupt." The appellant submitted his reply controverting the allegation contained in the charge-sheet both with regard to being involved in the scandal as also with regard to the allegation of corruption claiming on the other hand that he was "the most honest officer in the Department". Mr. Justice Shah Zaman Babar, thereupon, held a detailed inquiry in the matter and after examining the oral and documentary evidence including the departmental files came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of both the charges, namely, of scandalous conduct unbecoming of a judicial. officer in connec tion with the case of Mst. Zarina and, secondly, of having a persistent reputation of being corrupt. He recommended that the appellant be removed from service. The inquiry report was submitted to and placed before the "authorised officer", who, while agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, recommended his dismissal from service. The Chief Minister, being the "authority" designated under the rules on considering the inquiry report and the recommendation of the "authorised officer" ordered the dismissal of the appellant from service on 14-9-1974. The appellant submitted an application for review of the said order of the Chief Minister. He also filed an appeal before the N.-W. ` F. P. Services Tribunal, Peshawar. While the appeal was still pending, it was decided to substitute the penalty of removal from service for the penalty of dismissal from service. Subsequently, the appeal before the N.-W. F. P. Service Tribunal was dismissed vide order dated 18-3-1979. Aggrieved by the said order the appellant filed a petition for special leave to appeal in this Court in which leave was granted. Therefore, this appeal. Mr. Mumtaz Hussain, counsel for the appellant, has raised several grounds for challenging the order of removal from service of the appellant. He submitted in the first instance that the Inquiry Officer, according to rule 5 of the Rules, had to be appointed by the authorised officer which, in the instant case, was the Chief Justice. However, the decision to appoint the Inquiry Officer was taken at a meeting of the Judges of the High Court whereas the Chief Justice could alone appoint the Inquiry Officer. According to Mr. Mumtaz Hussain, when power is conferred on a named or designated person or body then that person or that body alone can exercise it uninfluenced by any external authority or person, noncan he share that power with-any other person. He observes that this point was not raised before the Services Tribunal and has been raised before this Court for the first time. This cannot be permitted. Even otherwise we do not see what prejudice has been caused by the appointment of the Inquiry Officer by the Chief Justice in consulta tion with the other members of the administrative committee of the High Court. There is no force in this contention which is hereby repelled. He has secondly contended that Mr. Justice Shah Zaman Babar, the Inquiry Officer, having participated in the meeting in which it was decided to hold an inquiry against the appellant on the basis of the material placed before the said meeting of the Judges, must be deemed to entertain a `bias', a that term is understood in law, against the appellant. This submission is also devoid of substance. It is to be noted that two decisions were taken in the meeting of the Judges: Firstly, that Mr. Justice Shah Zaman Babar was to hold an inquiry against the appellant (for his being involved in a scandal and for being reputed to be corrupt and, secondly, that during the pendency of the inquiry, the Provincial Government be moved to suspend him. Even if it was assumed that Shah Zaman Babar, J. was a party to both these decisions, it would not show that he was biased against the appellant. All that the first decision amounted to was that an inquiry will be held by Shah Zaman Babar, J. The said decision did not at all touch upon the merits of the inquiry to be conducted. The second decision was about the suspension of the appellant. According to rule 5(1) of the N.-W. F. P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, it is provided that- "In case where a Government servant is accused of subversion, corrup tion or misconduct, the authorised officer may require him to proceed on leave or, with the approval of the authority, suspend him." It will be seen that for the purpose of suspension, it is not at all necessary to examine the merits of the case. All that is required is that the Government servant should be accused of subversion, corruption or misconduct. The appellant in this case was admittedly accused or corrup tion or misconduct and, therefore, the decision to move the Provincial Government for suspension was no more than a routine action. The decision to conduct an inquiry against the appellant indicated only that prima facie it was considered that some case existed against the appellant. This was obviously a preliminary or a tentative opinion. Just as framing of the charges by the Sessions Judge would not disqualify the Sessions Judge from trying the accused; the participation of the Inquiry Officer in the meeting of the Judges; which decided to frame the charges against the appellant, cannot be held to disqualify him from holding an inquiry against the accused. The appellant also seems to have been conscious of this aspect because during the whole of the inquiry proceedings he did not raise any objection against the appointment of Shah Zaman Babar, J. as Inquiry Officer or allege that the Inquiry Officer did not have an open mind or that he was biased against him. It was thirdly contended that before the Inquiry Officer, an application was moved for permission to be represented by a counsel so as to cross -examined the witnesses produced at the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer rejected the request on the ground that the N.-W. F. P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, did not envisage the accused to be represented by a lawyer. It is submitted that to enable the accused to cross-examine the witnesses produced at the inquiry, it was necessary that be should have been allowed the service of a counsel to assist him. The refusal to allow him the services of an Advocate during the inquiry was against the rules of natural justice. It is also submitted that there was no bar against the appearance of the counsel at that stage and the bar was introduced only through the amendment carried out on 19-4-1975 by the addition of rule 10-A by Correction Slip No. SOS-III (S&GAD) 1-80/73, which reads as follows :- "10-A. Appearance of counsel-No party to any proceeding under these rules or authority, an authorised officer, an Inquiry Officer, or an inquiry committee shall be represented by an Advocate." It is argued that the insertion of this rule shows that without it a counsel could appear in proceedings under the discipline rules. We observe that although the above ground was taken in the grounds of appeal before the Services Tribunal but it has not referred to it in the order passed by it, which is otherwise a very detailed and elaborate order, in which all the points raised before it have been discussed. It appears, therefore, that this point was not pressed before the Tribunal during the arguments. This point has also not been taken in, the petition for special leave to appeal preferred in this Court. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to allow this point to be raised at this stage. We now come to a ground which is of weight and has been very seriously pressed before us. It is submitted that the charges framed were vague and the summary of the allegations attached with the charge-sheet also did not give any specific details to explain the nature of the charges. Consequently, the appellant could not be punished on their basis. The relevant rule in this connection is clause (a) of rule 6(1) of the Discipline Rules which is in the following terms :- "6(1) (a).-Where an Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee is appointed, the Authorised Officer shall- (a) frame a charge and communicate it to the accused together with statement of the allegations explaining the charge and of any other relevant circumstances which are proposed to be taken into consideration." Thus, according to the above Rule, the accused Officer should be communicated- (1) the charge-sheet; (2) statement of allegations explaining the charges; and (3) the relevant circumstances which are proposed to be taken into consideration. It is submitted that in the charge-sheet, as framed, Charge No. 1 is to the effect that the 'appellant, while posted as Senior Civil Judge at Abbottabad, allowed himself to be publicly named in a scandal on account of indiscreet conduct which was unbecoming his status and amounted to misconduct. This charge is elaborated in the summary of allegations by adding that he allowed himself to be involved in a scandal in spite of having been warned by the District Judge to mend his ways inasmuch as that one Mst. Zarina even named him in the ,complaint made before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. However, the second charge, it is submitted, is completely bald and devoid of all particulars and specifications. The said charge is to the following effect :- "That you enjoyed a persistent reputation of being corrupt." and this charge is elaborated in the summary of allegations as follows :- "The other allegation against you is that you have not enjoyed good reputation inasmuch as you were persistently reputed to be corrupt." The question, therefore, is whether the evidence, which was produced during the inquiry proceedings to establish this charge, can be taken into consideration although the charge itself, as elaborated by the summary of allegations, does not contain the full particulars on which it is based. The contention is that the Inquiry Officer was bound in law to confine him self to the charge so framed and communicated to the appellant and not to supplement it by any material not referred to in the charge-sheet. It is argued that this basic principle of law has been violated by the Inquiry Officer by referring to a large 'amount of extraneous material including judicial files of cases. therein orders bad been passed by the appellant and the matters were still sub judice in appeals. As the findings of the Inquiry Officer were based on materials extraneous to the charge-sheet, his findings that the charges stood proved stood vitiated. The statement of allegations does not show on what material the charge is framed and what was the basis for saying that the appellant did not, enjoy a good reputation and was persistently reputed to be corrupt. Further material, however, in this connection, was brought on the record during the course of the inquiry proceedings. This material was to the effect; firstly, that the appellant had demanded illegal gratification as a motive for payment to a decree-holder, one Abdur Rehman his decretal amount Rs. 59,250.00 during the pendency of his application for execution of his decree in his Court; secondly, there were instances of certain references under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act wherein the appellant had proceeded to award compensation to the objectors of amount even in excess of what they had actually claimed and that it was suggested that this was done for dishonest and mala fide reasons; thirdly, instances were given of the grant of injunctions in circumstances suggesting receipt of illegal gratification; fourthly, there was the instance of the restoration of a suit, earlier dismissed for non-prosecution in contravention to the provisions of rule 4, Order IX, C. P. C. for dishonest reasons. Fifthly, evidence was also produced to the effect that the general reputation enjoyed by the accused among the members of the bar was that lie was a corrupt officer. (Some other members of the bar, however, deposed that be was an honest officer). On the basis of the above instances, it was found that the accused enjoyed a persistent and general reputation of being corrupt. The question that, therefore, arises is whether the material which was taken into consideration by the Inquiry Officer for holding the second charge to be proved and which also formed the basis of the similar view later taken by the authorised officer and ultimately by the Authority could, in law, be rightly taken into consideration. As already pointed out, rule 6 of the Rules laid down that a charge will be framed and communicated to the accused together with the statement of allegations explaining the charge alongwith the other relevant circumstances which are proposed to be taken Onto consideration. The terms of this rule clearly warrant that all the allegations explanatory of the charge and all other relevant circumstances which are proposed to be taken into consideration must be communicated to the accused at - the very outset. If this condition is not fulfilled, the provisions of rule will not be complied with and the final action taken shall stand invalidated on the ground that, as the accused was not apprised of all the circumstances which are proposed to be taken into consideration in the charge and the statement of allegations explaining the said charge, he will be deemed not to have been made aware of the misconduct alleged against him. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Muhammad Nawaz v. Pakistan (P L D 1970 Lah. 811), which was followed in the case of Muhammad Sadfq v. Divisional Forest Officer, Lahore (P L D 1978 Lab. 972). The law of England is also to the same effect. The following passage from Judicial .Review of Administrative Acts by S. A. de Smith (1959) First Edition at page 109 may be quoted with advantage :- "In proceedings of a disciplinary character the nature of the allegations must be clearly specified beforehand so that the party concerned may have a proper opportunity- to prepare his defence; but the degree of particularity with-which the charges must be set out may vary according to the degree of informality with which the proceedings of a tribunal may be conducted, and even where they are inadequately specified the defect may not be fatal if the "defendant" is not thereby prejudiced-e.g., because he is already conversant with their general nature or because he does not dispute the allegations of fact on which they are founded." Although in the two cases decided by the Lahore High Court there is an observation that if there is non-compliance with an obligatory rule of procedure, the amount of prejudice, which would be caused to the person concerned, need not be taken into consideration, for the non-compliance with the rule itself would constitute denial of a reasonable opportunity which per se would vitiate the action taken; yet the background m which these remarks were made was that in both the cases the accused officials had been altogether denied a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves, and prejudice had, in fact, been caused to them by virtue of non-compliance with the `relevant rules. Id this background, it seems to us that the rule enunciated by S. A. de Smith, in the passage quoted above, is the correct rule to follow in cases of disciplinary inquiries; namely, that if an omission, defect or irregularity in the conduct of the inquiry has not caused material prejudice to the accused official in the matter of his defence, then such an irregularity, omission or defect would not, by itself, vitiate the action take against him. Now, in the instant case, the allegations on which the charge of persistent reputation for corruption was based were not clearly specified beforehand to afford the accused a proper opportunity to clear his position with regard thereto. Therefore the question is whether the accused Officer can indeed be said to have been prejudiced by this omission. Here we may point out that he was made aware of these allegations during the course of the inquiry by the 'Inquiry Officer and at the close of the evidence these allegations were also put to the appellant and his answer obtained in respect of them: It appears, therefore, that the failure to spell out details in the statement of allegations did not, in the facts and circumstances of this case, cause any prejudice to the appellant, and this omission would not be fatal to the action taken against him. This brings us to the other point raised by Mr. Mumtaz Hussain, vie. that the viva voce examination of the appellant at the conclusion of the inquiry was not enough and that he should have been furnished a copy of the inquiry report and afforded an opportunity to explain his position with regard to the findings therein. According to the learned counsel, this was the only way in which the accused could effectively have rebutted the material brought against him at the stage of the inquiry proceedings. The learned A. A: G., in this connection, pointed out to us that the relevant rules did not require a copy of the report to be furnished to the accused and the effect of the argument of the learned counsel that a copy of the report should be supplied to the accused with a view to enable him to make a representation against the findings contained there in was nothing more than an attempt to introduce the concept of a second show-cause notice, through the back door, although such a require ment stood specifically excluded by the provisions of Article 240 of the 1973 Constitution and the relevant law framed thereunder. In this connection, he pointed out that the terms of rule 5 are very clear and they provide that if the authorised officer on receipt of the report of the Inquiry Officer is of opinion that the charge has been proved and it is proposed to impose a major penalty, he shall forward the case to the Authority alongwith the charges and the statement of allegations served on the accused, the explanation of the accused, the findings of the Inquiry Officer and the recommenda tions regarding the penalty to be imposed. The Authority shall then pass such orders thereon as it deems proper. There is no provision of any further representation in regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer. In these circumstances, there was neither any requirement nor any need to supply a copy of the Inquiry Report. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that if this, indeed, was the true interpretation of the rule, then grave injustice would result in those cases where- all the details .of the misconduct were not contained in the charge-sheet or the statement of allegations accompanying it and those were supplemented during the inquiry proceedings. In such a situation, the authorised officer and the Authority, while recommending deciding the case, would simply have the report and findings of the Inquiry Officer arrived at on the basis of material placed in some cases, as in the present case, for the first time during the enquiry proceedings without any explanation being available of the accused Officer, in respect to these matters. It was, therefore, submitted that the demands of natural justice required that an opportunity ought to be granted to the accused to explain the new material which was brought against him during the enquiry proceedings. This would not be a second shove-cause notice as was provided for by the earlier Constitutions, but a step to comply with the demands of fairness and natural justice. In this connection, reliance was placed on a judgment of the Lahore High Court, incidentally also written by me, namely, Punjab Road Transport Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others P L D 1972 Lah. 699, and the following passage is relied upon :- "In the present case after the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet detail ing the allegations against him and he had denied the said allegations and it was considered necessary to conduct a face to face enquiry into the matter. Thereafter an enquiry was held and the enquiry Officer forwarded a copy of the enquiry report to the appointing and removing authority, namely, the District Manager. The order passed by him on 5-6-1968 shows that he took the following matters into consideration while ordering the dismissal of the respondent-- (a) the charge-sheet dated 4-1-1966 served on the respondent ; (b) the reply of the letter ; and (c) the enquiry report dated 31-10-1966 holding the respondent guilty of the charges framed against him. Thus, the employer did not base his decision merely on- the charge-sheet and the reply submitted to it, but also on the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer wherein the respondent was held guilty. It is not denied that a copy of the said enquiry report was not supplied to the respondent. The respondent had no doubt appeared before the Enquiry Officer but he had asserted before him that he was not guilty. He cross-examined the P. Ws. in the light of his defence and also led evidence in his defence. In the absence of the Enquiry Officer's report he could not possibly know as to why his defence bad not been accepted. In case he was supplied a copy of the Enquiry Report he may have been able to satisfy the employer that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were erroneous or not justified. In these circumstances, the supply of the Enquiry Officer's report was not only necessary in order to satisfy the interests of natural justice but was essential in order to fulfill the requirement of clause (4) of Standing Order 15 itself: Under its terms, a workman is assured of an oppor tunity to explain all the circumstances alleged against him. On account of the omission to supply a copy of the Enquiry report to the respon dent he was deprived of the opportunity of explaining the adverse findings recorded therein. The omission in this respect, therefore, amounted to a contravention of clause (4) of Standing Order 15." This decision -was upheld by this Court in Punjab Road Transport Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others (1973 SCMR 455) wherein it was. observed as under :- "In our opinion, therefore, it was necessary and consistent with the principles of natural justice that not only the respondent should have been furnished with a copy of the enquiry report but also he should have been given an opportunity to show cause why the order of dismissal should not be passed against him. Evidently such an oppor tunity must take the form of written show-cause notice to the respon dent. The mere fact that the respondent had a .personal audience with his employer when he asserted he was not guilty cannot replace the aforesaid requirement of law." The learned counsel also referred us to Islamabad Club v. Punjab Labour Court No. 2 etc. (P L D 1980 S C 307), in which it has been held That a copy of the Inquiry Report should have been furnished in order to enable the employee to rebut the findings recorded against him. After giving our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we have formed the view that in a case where a formal inquiry is held, it seems to be an implicit requirement of the relevant rules that a copy of the inquiry report should be furnished to the accused official so as to enable him to offer his explanation with regard to the adverse findings, if any, recorded against him by the Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, as the case may be. Such a requirement cannot be brushed aside by saying that it would amount to a second show-cause notice. . It would be well to ,recall at this stage that the relevant rules in this behalf are rules 5 and 6 of the North-West Frontier Province Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. Sub-rule (2) of rule 5 leaves it to the Authorised Officer to decide whether in the light of the facts of the case or the interest of justice an inquiry should be conducted through an Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee ; and if he so decides, the procedure indicated in rule 6 shall apply. According to sub-rule (3) of the same rule, if the Authorised Officer decides that it is" rot necessary to have an inquiry conducted through an Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee, he shall inform the accused of the action proposed to be. taken in regard to him and the grounds of the action ; and give him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against that action. In case where an Inquiry Officer or an Inquiry Committee is appointed, the procedure is more formal. - According to sub-rule (1) of rule 6 the Authorised Officer has to frame a charge and communicate it to the accused together with statement of the allegations explaining the charge and of any other relevant circumstances, which are proposed to be taken into considera tion ; and the accused is then required to put in a written defence within a reasonable time of the service of the charge-sheet upon him, and to state at the same time whether he desires to be heard in person. It is clear that at this stage the explanation required from the accused is only of a preliminary nature ; and if he denies the charge or charges a formal inquiry will follow according to the procedure outlined in sub-rules (2) to (5) of rule

6. When the Inquiry Officer or the Committee has submitted its report to the authorised Officer, the matter is governed by sub-rule (4) of rule 5, which is, in fact, a composite rule, dealing with both the situations, namely, where an inquiry is held or where it is dispensed with. This sub-rule is in the following terms :- "On receipt of the report of. the Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee or, where no such Officer or Committee is appointed, on receipt of the explanation of the accused, if any, the authorised Officer shall determine whether the charge has been proved. If it is proposed to impose a minor penalty, he shall pass orders accordingly. If it is pro posed to impose a major penalty, he shall forward the case to the authority alongwith the charge and statement of allegations served on the accused, the explanation of the accused, the finding of the Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee, if appointed, and his own recommenda tions regarding the penalty 'to be imposed. The authority shall pass such orders as it may deem proper." It will be seen that in a case where it is proposed to impose a major penalty as a result of a formal inquiry, the Authority is required before passing orders to take into consideration the following (a) the charge and statement of allegations served on the accused ; (b) the explanation of the accused ; (c) the finding of the Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee ; and (d) the recommendations of the authorised Officer regarding the penalty to be imposed. The explanation of the accused referred to in sub-rule (4) of rule 5 cannot mean the preliminary denial or admission of the accused official in terms of clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of rule 6 ; as at that time all the circumstances and evidence to be marshalled against him during the course of the inquiry are not within his knowledge ; and he would acquire knowledge thereof only when the evidence has been led and the Inquiry Officer or Committee has formulated its findings. A proper explanation of the accused Officer in such a case can only be furnished if he is supplied a copy of the inquiry report so as to offer his comments in regard to the findings recorded therein, and the action proposed to be taken against him on their basis. In reaching this conclusion, we are fortified in our view by the fact that in sub-rule (3), which embodies the shorter procedure for dealing with dis ciplinary matters it is clearly contemplated that the authorised Officer shall inform the accused of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and the grounds of the action ; and shall give him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against that action. There seems to be no logical reason for denying the accused officer a similar opportunity in a case where a formal in quiry is held in terms of rule 6 read with sub-rule (2) of rule

5. It appears to be the salutary requirement of rule 5 that the accused Officer must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. If the shorter procedure is followed and inquiry is dis pensed with, then this stage is reached when the grounds of the proposed action and the allegations are conveyed to him ; but this stage is reached in the case of a formal inquiry only after the inquiry has been completed and the authorised Officer has formulated his views in the light of the inquiry report. It seems to us, therefore, that on a proper construction of rules 5 and 6 read together, it is a statutory requirement that if a formal inquiry is held, then the authorised Officer should, after he has tentatively decided upon the action he proposes to recommend to the Authority, give an opportunity to the accused Officer to offer his explanation against the proposed action in the light of the findings of the Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee, before sending his recommendations to the Authority. This would, of course, necessitate that a copy of the inquiry report be furnished to the accused Officer at this stage, and he should be apprised of the action proposed against him. In this case, a copy of the Enquiry Report was not supplied to the accused Officer by the authorised Officer and he was not allowed an opportunity to submit his explanation with regard to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, which were adverse to him ; nor was he apprised of the action proposed to be recommended against him. Conse quently, the authorised Officer, before formulating his recommendations for the authority, did not have the benefit of the explanation of the accused officer in relation to the material brought on the record during the enquiry proceedings and the findings recorded thereon by the Enquiry Officer. This being essential in order to satisfy the requirement of the Rules, the failure to do so invalidates the - recommendations of the authorised Officer and the ultimate order passed on their basis by the authority against the accused Officer. We consider, therefore, that the Services Tribunal should have allowed the appeal and set aside the order of removal passed against the appellant, leaving it open to the relevant authorities to proceed from the stage from which the error could be corrected ; namely, by supplying a copy of the findings of the Enquiry Officer to enable the appellant to submit his explanation in regard to the material brought against him during the enquiry proceedings and the opinion formed in respect thereof by the Inquiry Officer, as well as the action proposed to be recommended by the authorised Offcer. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. E. A. H. Appeal allowed.