1986 PLP 958 (CLC)

(2) That the number of the employees working with the petitioners being less than 50 the application of the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance was excluded by virtue of the first proviso to clause (c) of section 1 of the Ordinance. (3) That the wages as defined in section 2(vi) of the Act do not include the gratuity payable on discharge and, therefore, the application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for recovery of the gratuity filed by the respondents was not maintainable. (4) That in any case gratuity being payable on the discharge of a worker from service and not otherwise the respondents -who continued in the service of the petitioners could not legally maintain an application for payment of gratuity before the Authority. (5) That under the law no gratuity was payable to a person who was dismissed from the service on the ground of misconduct. (6) That the claim under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act could be maintained only in respect of deduction made from the wages of an employee or in respect of payment of wage which has been delayed by the employer. The claim of gratuity by the respondents before the Authority did not fall in any of the two categories and, therefore, the application for recovery of gratuity was not maintainable on that account as well. (7) That the amendments introduced in subsection (1) anti subsection (2) of section 15 of Payment of Wages Act on 9-5-1977 making it permissible for an employee to make an application f6r recovery of unpaid gratuity was not retrospective in operation and, therefore, the grant of the applications of the respondents allowing payment of gratuity before the period 9-5-1977 was without jurisdiction. (8) That the respondents being work-charge employees and working in work-charge establishment which was of temporary nature were not entitled to payment of gratuity. That the application of respondents before the Authority in some of the cases having been filed through authorized agent was not competent in law as the alleged authority given by the respondents was not in accordance with the law. (10) That in so far the claim of those respondents with regard to payment of gratuity who at the time of making of applications before the Authurty were in the service of the petitioners, the dispute was in substance an industrial dispute of which cognizance can be taken only by a Labour Court under the I.R.O. and not the Authority under the Act. In reply to the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners the learned counsel for the respondents jointly urged the following contentions:- (1) That the petitions are not maintainable in law as the petitioners before the filing of Constitutional petitions failed to avail of the statutory remedy of appeal provided under section 17 of the Ac against the order of the Authority. (2) That the grounds urged by the petitioners at the time of arguments were neither raised before the Authority nor specifically urged in the petition and as such they cannot be considered by this Court. (3) That 'most of the grounds urged by the petitioners at the hearing of the petitions involved investigation into the factual aspect of he case which cannot be done for the first time in exercise of Writ jurisdiction by this Court. (4) That the plea of the petitioners that the number of employees working with them was less then 50 was repelled by the Authority on the basis of the evidence produced in the Court and this being a finding of fact cannot be interfered with in the Writ jurisdiction by this Court unless it is shown that it is perverse or is based on no evidence. (5) That the primary functions of the petitioners were specifically mentioned in every petition filed by the respondents before the Authority under the Act and these assertions of the respondents were not disputed by the petitioners. On the basis of the functions performed by the petitioners as stated in the petition before the Authority the petitioners .will clearly fall within the meaning of a "construction company" as defined in section 2(bb) and within the meaning of "industrial establishment" as defined in section 2(f) of the Ordinance. (6) That on account of non-payment of gratuity the respondents had an independent right to file an application under section 15(1) of the Act. (7) That the provisions of section 15 of Payment of Wages Act being procedural in nature the amendment made in the year 1977 was applicable to an application filed by the respondents in the year 1983 for recovery of gratuity which was payable to them even prior to the period of 1977 and as such the proceedings initiated by the respondents before the Authority were fully competent. (8) That the benefit arising to workman under the Ordinance were available equally to a permanent as well as temporary employee and, therefore, the fact that the respondents were work-charge employees could not make any difference in so far as the application of the provisions of the Ordinance to them was concerned. (9) That the petitioners having refused to recognize and give benefit to the respondents for the period of service rendered by them prior to the date they were given appointment on regular cadre their services prior to the date of the regular appointment stood terminated for all practical purposes and, therefore, they were entitled under the law to the benefit of the gratuity which accrued to them for their past services rendered on work-charge basis. _ Before considering the above contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties I may mention here that the petitioners both before the Authority as well as in these petitions had specifically pleaded and ,raised a contention that the respondents were not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Ordinance as they were civil servants within the meaning of Civil Servants Act and their services are governed under the statutory rules framed by the Government but this contention was given up by the learged counsel for the petitioners at the hearing of these petitions. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length I find that the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents are not without force. I have already referred to the specific ground raised by the petitioners before the Authority while resisting the applications of respondents. It will be seen that in the first group of petitions the applications of respondents before the Authority were opposed on two grounds, namely, that the respondents were civil servants and statutory rules are applicable to them which regulatpd/governed their services and secondly that the number of employees working with the petitioners were less than 50 and, therefore, the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance were not applicable to them. In so far the first ground urged before the Authority is concerned the petitioners have given up the same during the course of arguments of these petitions and in so far the second ground is concerned the Authority in its orders impugned in these petitions specifically held that the number of employees working with the petitioner was over 300 and this finding is based on an admission made in the cross-examination by the witness of the petitioners produced before the Authority. The learned counsel was unable to point out any material in the first group of petitions to show that the findings arrived at by the Authority with regard to the number of workers employed with them is contrary to evidence on record or is perverse. In fact not a single ground has been raised in the first group of petitions to controvert the finding of the Authority. It is not even. alleged in the petitions that the findings of the Authority that the number of employees working with the petitioners are over 300 are the result of misreading of evidence or non-consideration of evidence on record. In these circumstances none of the two grounds urged in the first set of petitions before the Authority could be held to have been established which could call for interference in the writ petitions. In so far the 10 grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the petitions are concerned, out of them only ground No.2 was raised before the Authority which was repelled and I also do not find any reason to differ from the conclusion of the Authority in this regard. None of the other contentions raised in these petitions were urged before the Authority. However, contention No.l has been raised specifically in the petitions which are in the first group. But the other contentions, namely, 3 to 10 have not been specifically urged in any of these petitions. In fact contentions Nos.4, 9 and 10 did not arise at all in the first group pf petitions. In so far the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned I may mention here that in paragraph 4 of the applications filed by the respondents before the Authority in the first group of petitions the respondents had pleaded the primary functions of the petitioners as follows:- "

4. That the primarily and essentially the basic functions of the opponent division are to carry out the mechanical engineering works, which include the maintenance, repair, overhauling of heavy and light duty transport-vehicles Dragline machines used for excavation of canals, dredgers for desilting the canals, pumping sets for supply of water in canals for irrigation purposes. Equipment like tailors, heavy duty vehicles etc. are given on hire-basis to the out-agencies and rental charges including overhead departmental charges are recovered by the opponent division. More than 50 workers are employed in the opponent division." This allegation of the respondents in their application before the Authority was admitted by the petitioners and a reading of the functions of the petitioners as disclosed in this paragraph would show that they were substantially covered within the meaning of a construction company as defined in section 2(bb) of the Ordinance as well as within the meaning of an industrial establishment as defined in section 2(f)(v) of the Ordinance. With regard to contentions Nos. 3, 6 and 7 of the petitioners it may be mentioned that these contentions were neither raised before the Authority nor specifically urged in the petitions but as these contentions are based on the interpretation of the section and no investigation of the facts is required in order to dispose of these contention, I am inclined to consider the same. It is true that the ,,wages" as, defined in section 2(vi) of the Act does not include any gratuity payable on discharge. It is also true that an application under subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act can be made in respect of " ages" which were either deducted or were delayed in payment but the learned counsel for the petitioners clearly overlooked that the claim of the respondents before the Authority was neither for deducted wages nor for the delayed payment of wages. The claim of for respondents before the Authority related to the recovery of gratuity for which they had independent right to make an application both under subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act in the event of non payment. It will be relevant to reproduce here the provisions of subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act which reads as follows:- "

15. Claims out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims.--(1) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil Court or as stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages or non-payment of dues relating to provident fund or gratuity payable under any law or delay in the payment of wares, of persons employed or paid in that area. (2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages or of any dues relating to provident fund or gratuity payable under any law has been delayed, such person, himself, or any legal practitioner, or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act or of any heirs of an employed person who has died or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under subsection (1), may apply to such authority for direction under subsection (3). " (The words in bracket in subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 15 were introduced by amendment of 1977) . The reading of the above two subsections will show that apart from the right of a workman to apply under the above provisions of law for recovery of deducted wages or wages for which payment was delayed, he had a separate and independent right to make application for recovery of provident fund or gratuity payable to him under the law in case of their non-payment. In the first group of petitions the services of the respondents were either terminated by the petitioners or they had resigned from their job. Their claim for payment of gratuity was based on a right which has been guaranteed in their favour under section 12(6) of the Ordinance. The respondents had alleged before the Authority that the gratuity which was payable to them under section 12(6) of the Ordinance was not paid by the petitioners and, therefore, on these allegations the applications of the respondents before the Authority both under, subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 15 were clearly maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioners have, however, contended that the amendment introduced in subsections (1) and (2) of section 15 of the Act (shown in brackets) conferring right on a workman to make an application to the Authority for recovery of provident fund and gratuity in the event of non-payment was introduced by the Amending Ordinance IX of 1977 on 9-5-1377 and this being a new right conferred on the workman by virtue of amendment was not retrospective in operation and, therefore, the applications of the respondents in so far they related to the claim of gratuity for a period prior to 9-5-1977 was not maintainable in law. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners has not at all impressed me. The provisions of section 15 of Payment of Wages Act are in the nature of procedural law which regulates the making of application by a workman before the Authority for recovery of wages and other dues. No doubt the amendment in subsections (1) and (2) introduced by Ordinance IX of 1977 was brought into effect on 9-5-1977 but the procedure prescribed for the recovery of the dues mentioned in these amendments is applicable to all dues of gratuity and provident fund irrespective of their period. There is neither anything in the amendment nor in the amending Ordinance to show that the Legislature intended that an applications filed for recovery of the gratuity of provident fund in pursuance of the aforesaid amendment in law -would not be applicable to the dues which were payable to workman prior to the period of amendment. Therefore, even if I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the amendment brought about on 9-5-1977 in section 15 of the Act was prospective in its operation the same could not affect the applications of respondents before the Authority as the said amendment was in a procedural law and entitled the workman make an application after 9-5-1977 in respect of the dues which were payable to him under the law prior to the date of the amendment. I accordingly overrule the contentions Nos. 3, 6 and 7 raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Contentions Nos. 4, 9 and 10 do not arise in the first group of petitions which I am presently considering and, therefore, I will deal with them while considering the case of the petitioners with regard to second group of the petitions. With regard, to the contention No. 5 I may say that there is nothing on record before me to show that the respondents in the first group of petitions were proceeded in accordance with the procedure prescribed for taking' action against the employee for misconduct. The record placed before/ me clearly shows that the termination of the services of the respondents in Petitions Nos.75/84, 76/84, 85/84 and 87/84 were cases of termination) simpliciter which did not carry any stigma of misconduct and as such also overrule this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.) There now remains only one other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, namely, contention No.8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents being work-charge employees were not entitled to payment of any gratuity as the petitioners had never agreed to pay the same to the respondents. While dealing with contentions Nos.l and 2 of the petitioners I have already reached) the conclusion that the petitioners were fully covered within the meaning of "construction company" and "industrial establishment" as defined in section 2(bb) and 2(f)(v) of the Ordinance and, therefore, the provision of the Ordinance were fully applicable to the petitioner. The definition of "workman" as defined in the Ordinance makes no difference between a permanent or a temporary employee. In fact the definition of the workman as given in section 2(1) read with the schedule appended to section 2(g) classifying the workman makes it absolutely clear that in so far the application to the provisions of the Ordinance to the "workman" is concerned, they equally apply to permanent, probationers, Badlis, temporary and apprentices. I, therefore, find no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents being work‑charge employees were not entitled to payment of gratuity. The right to receive gratuity upon termination or resignation from service to a workman is granted under section 12(6) of the Ordinance and the learned counsel for the petitioners were unable to show or point out any other provisions in the Ordinance which disentitled the respondents of these benefits on the ground that they were work‑charge employees. Having dealt with all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to first group of petitions, 1 will not consider the contentions of the petitioners with reference to the second group of petitions. In the second group of petitions the applications were filed jointly by a number of workers before the Authority for payment of gratuity. I have already reproduced earlier the grounds on which the payment bf gratuity to the respondents in the second group of petitions were opposed by the petitioners 4n proceedings before the Authority. The payment of gratuity to the respondents in the second group of petitions was opposed on four grounds. Out of them ground No.2 raised before the Authority has been given up by the petitioners in this Court. In so far ground No.l is concerned which was raised before the Authority in the proceedings, it has not been pressed and no arguments were advanced before me in support of this ground. This ground otherwise is also not taken specifically in the petitions. With regard to ground No.3 urged by the petitioners before the Authority the petitioners have relied on their contentions Nos.1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and

8. It may be mentioned here that the contentions preferred to above have not been raised specifically in the memo. of petitions filed in the second group of petitions. However,) as I have already dealt with some of the contentions in respect of the first group of petitions and the matter is of general importance I would prefer to dispose of these contentions of the petitioners on merits. In all the petitions which relate to the second group, the respondents in their respective applications before the Authority alleged the functions performed by the petitioners in details and these functions were admitted by the petitioners in their written statement. A reading of the functions as stated in the applications of the respondents before the Authority in the second group of petitions will show that the functions performed G by the petitioners fully fall within the meaning of a "construction company" as defined in section 2(bb) of the Ordinance as well as an "industrial establishment" as defined in section 2(f)(v) of the Ordinance. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioners were covered both under the definition of a "construction company" as well as "industrial establishment" as defined under the Ordinance and as such the provisions' of the Ordinance were applicable 'to them. In so far the contentions Nos. 3, 6 and 7 are concerned I have already dealt with these contentions while dealing the first group of petitions and these considerations are equally applicable to the second group of petitions as well. Contention No. 5 is not at all applicable to the second group of petitions as according to the petitioners the respondents in the second group of petitions were continuing in the employment of the petitioners. The contention No. 8 that the respondents were work‑charge employees and were, therefore, not entitled to payment of gratuity, has already been dealt with by me in the first group of petitions and is equally applicable in the second group of petitions. The main contention of the petitioners in the second group of petitions which was raised both before the Authority and in these petitions as well specifically is that the respon dents having continued in the employment of the petitioners could not lay claim to the gratuity unless their services were either terminated or they resigned from the job. It may be stated here once again that the admitted position in the case is that the respondents were employees in the work‑charge establishment of the petitioners on a work‑charge basis until 30th June, 1982. It is also admitted position that on 1‑7‑1982 the services of all the respondents were regularized and fresh appointment were issued to them. The petitioners had not placed on record the copy of the fresh appointment orders issued to the respondents after they were taken on the regular basis. However, after close of the arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted a statement on 6‑11‑1985 enclosing thereto the office order issued in respect of some of the respondents in the Petition No. 182/84, 1/85, 9/85 and 22/85. In so far as the first set of petitions are concerned the appointment order produced is no more relevant as in the first set of petitions the respondents have either resigned from their job or their services were terminated, with effect from 1‑7‑1982 and, therefore, the appointment on the regular basis is of no relevance in those petitions. However, in so far the respondents in the other petitions, namely, 182/84, 1/85, 6/85, 9/85, 22/85 and 30/85 are concerned the appointments made on 1‑7‑1982 is relevant for decision of the contention of the petitioners raised before me. The copies of the appointment order placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners are identical and for the sake of convenience I will reproduce here only one of them relating to one Ali Akbar Shah son of Umar Daraz Shah. This office order produced by the petitioners reads as follows:‑‑ OFFICE ORDER Having been ordered by the Government of Sind Irrigation and Power Department, vide his notification Nos. referred to above, Mr. Ali Akbar Shah 'son of Umer Draz Shah caste Mushwani is hereby appointed w.e.f. 1‑7‑1982 forenoon as officiating/ temporary T.W. Operator on starting pay of Rs.304 p.m. in the revised National Pay Scales 1977 No. 4 viz. Rs.280‑8‑352/9‑415‑12‑475 12‑475 plus usual allowances sanctioned by the Government of Sind from time to time on the following terms and conditions:‑ (1) The post offered to him is purely temporary and can be discontinued at any time without assigning any reason thereof. (2) He will remain on probation for two years which period may be curtailed or extended in terms of rule 2 of the Sind Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975. (3) He is liable to serve throughout the Province of Sind. (4) The Department is not bound to provide residential accommodation, there such accommodation is available, it will be provided on payment of usual rent as fixed by the Government of Sind from time to time. (5) If he desires to resign, 14 days notice will be compulsory or in lieu thereof 14 days pay will be forfeited to Government of Sind. (6) The terms and conditions of his service shell be as provided in the Sind Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the roles. His appointment in regular charge shall stari after he is declared medically fit. Sd/ (A.S. MEMON) SUKKUR RIGHT BANK FRESH GROUND WATER DIVISION, RRTODERO." It is an admitted position that the petitioners are not prepared to accept the previous service rendered by the respondents in these petitions on work‑charge basis and they are also hot prepared to give any benefit of that service to the respondents after 1‑7‑1982. The appointment letter reproduced above clearly shows teat the appointments offered to the respondents on 1‑7‑1982 was not at 811 in continuation of their previous service. It was for all practical purposes a new anti fresh appointment on fresh terms and conditions. On these considerations the Authority was fully justified in reaching the conclusion that the previous employment of the respondents with the petitioners came to an end with their appointment on the regular basis on 1‑7‑1982 and. therefore, their previous employment having come to an end they were H entitled to claim benefits guaranteed to them under the law upon termination of that employment. I, therefore, find no reason to differ with the conclusion of Authority that the respondents having been employed on i‑7‑1982 on regular basis were for all practical purposes the fresh employees of 'the petitioners on fresh terms and conditions and therefore, they were entitled to maintain their claim in respect of their past employment which came to an end on 1‑7‑1982. I, therefore, find no substance in contention No. 4 raised by toe petitioner. In so. far contention No. 9 is concerned this contention was not raises: specifically before the Authority nor it is specifically pleaded in any of these petitions. However, a reading of subsection (2) of section 15 will show that an application before the Authority for recovery of wages or the gratuity or provident fund could be filed by Such person himself or through his legal practitioner or through an office‑bearer of the registered trade union authorized in writing to aft in this behalf. The petitioners have themselves produced the authority given by the respondents in the second group of petitions to a member of the regis tered trade union and after going through it, I do not find any defect in the said authorization or any incompetence on the part of the office bearer of the registered trade union to move the instant applications before the Authority on the basis of that authorization. The only other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners which remains to be considered is contention No.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that as the respondents in the second set of petitioners were continuing in their employment with the petitioners the dispute raised by them with regard to non‑payment of gratuity amounted to an industrial dispute within the meaning of I.R.O. which could only be decided under section 51 of the I.R.O. by a Labour Court. I have already reached the conclusion while considering contention No. 4 of the learned counsel that the appointment of the respondents on regular‑ J basis in the second group of petitions on 1‑7‑1982 amounted to their fresh employment and coming to an end of their old services which were on the work‑charge basis and, therefore, this contention does not arise in the circumstances of the case. The learned counsel for the petitioners have cited the case of Dilkusha Enterprises Ltd. v. Abdul Rashid and others 1985 S C M R 1882, Secretary, Labour Department v. Colony Sarhad Textile Mills and others P L D 1978 S C 290, A1 Hasan Silk Mills Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court and another P L D 1981 S C 39, Messrs Valika Textile Mills Ltd. v. Chairman, 1st Sind Labour Court, Karachi and 2 others P L D 1978 Kar. 952 and Pakistan v. Devachand Muljimal and others P L D 1968 Kar.

107. Apart from the above-cited cases the learned counsel for the petitioners also cited several cases decided by the Labour Appellate Court, Sind but I will not refer to those citations as they have got no relevancy to any of the points urged before me. In the first noted case of Dilkusha Enterprises, the question consider by the Court related to power of the Labour Court under section 51 of the I.R.O. regarding reinstatement of a dismissed worker with back benefits and it was held that the power of the Labour Court included a direction in. terms of money value in lieu of other benefits to which the workman is entitled under such decision. This case has no application to the contentions raised before me as in the present case there was no such industrial dispute between the parties which could be referred to a Labour Court under section 51 of the I.R.O. There was also no claim for adjudication in the present cases for any back benefits or reinstatement of any worker in service. In the second noted case of Secretary, Labour Department, it was held that the amendment in section 12 of the Ordinance raising the amount of gratuity to 20 days for every completed year of service was procedural in nature and was, therefore, prospective in its operation. It was further held in the case that the right of gratuity conferred by such amendment on a workman was payable only to a worker whose services were terminated after coming into force of the amendment. In the present cases the amendment introduced in subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act are also procedural in nature and they conferred the right on a worker to make an application for recovery of unpaid gratuity or K provident fund. In the cases before me all the applications for the recovery of gratuity were filed in the year 1983 and, therefore, they were fully competent under the amendment. which was introduced in the year 1977. In the case of A1 Hasan Silk Mills, it was held by the Supreme Court. that the Standing Orders 12(5) did not apply to the case of the petitioner as the number of workers employed in the petitioner establishment were less than

50. This case is hardly of any assistance in the present case where the finding of the Authority is that the petitioners employed more than 300 persons. In the case of Messrs Valika Textile Mills Ltd., it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that a workman deprived of benefits accruing to him under the Standing Orders Ordinance could seek redress of his grievance by way of application under section 34 of the I.R.O. for enforcement of such right. No such point arises in the present petitions. In the case of Pakistan v. Devachand subsection (3) and subsection (4) of section 4 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act were held prospective in operation. While considering the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to amendments introduced in subsections (1) and (2) of section 15 of the Act I have already held L that the remedy provided for recovery of unpaid amount of, gratuity and provident fund through this amendment to an aggrieved worker was prospective in its operation but this prospective operation of the amendment could not exclude application for payment, of gratuity and, provident fund to an aggrieved worker for a period prior to the date l of amendment as there was no such indication of the intention of the Legislature either in the amendment or in the amending Ordinance. In addition to the above discussion I may also mention here that the learned counsel for the respondents jointly raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of these petitions which. is also not without force. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondents jointly that the petitioners before filing the present petitions in this Court did not exhaust the alternate remedy provided under the law against the order of Authority. It will be of advantage to reproduce here section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act which is as follows:-- "

17. Appeal.-- (1) An appeal against a direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 may be preferred within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose. (a) by the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees: Provided that no appeal under this clause shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate of the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with the authority the amount payable under the direction appealed against, or (b) by an employed person or, if he has died, by any of his heirs, if the total, amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from the employed person or from the unpaid group to which he belonged exceeds fifty rupees, or ' (c) by any person directed to pay a penalty under subsection (4) of section 15.. (l A) All appeals pending before any District Court under this section immediately before the commencement of the Labour Laws (Amendment) Act, 1974, shall on such commencement stand transferred to, and be disposed of by the Labour Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose. (2) Save as provided in subsection (1) any direction under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 shall be final." A reading of the above provision of law will show that the orders passed by the Authority impugned in these petitions were open to the incident of appeal under section 17 of the Act: The appeal provided under section 17 of the Act is much larger in scope as all questions of law and facts are open to be agitated by the appellant in such appeal. It is an admitted position that except in petitions Nos. 22/85 and 30/85 the petitioners did not. challenge the order of the Authority by way of appeal under section 17 of the Act and filed these petitions without exhausting the alternate remedy provided under the statute. The two appeals filed by the 'petitioners in Petitions Nos. 22/85 and 30/85 before the Appellate authority under section 17 were also dismissed by the appellate Court as time-barred and no ground was urged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners to show that the order of the appellate authority were not sustainable in law. It is needless to mention here that where a case is decided by a tribunal acting under a special statute and that statute also provided an alternate remedy by way of appeal against the decision of the tribunal then the petitioner must exhaust the alternate remedy provided under the statute before invoking the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by way of a constitutional petition. There are also string of authorities on the point that where constitutional jurisdiction is invoked without first exhausting the alternate remedy provided under any special law the Court will not entertain such a petition. However the Court., may in exceptional cases notwithstanding existence of an alternate remedy to a petitioner under any special law, may entertain a petition on the constitutional side if it is satisfied that the existence of alternate remedy under the special statute is neither speedy nor efficacious and the order impugned before it suffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction of the authority/tribunal passing the order but such cases are rare and these defects must appear on the face of impugned order and the petitioner must make out a strong case in this behalf before asking the Court to grant the relief. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of the Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha and others PLD 1958 S C (Pak) 437, Messrs S.A. Haroon and others v. The Collector of Customs and others P L D 1959 S C (Pak) 177, and reference may also be made to the case of Messrs Ghafoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Fazal Imam and another P L D 1981 Kar. 534 which was relied by the learned counsel for the respondent and which was decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court in respect of a petition which was filed challenging the order of Authority under the Act without exhausting the remedy by way of appeal. In the present cases the Authority had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the applications filed by the respondents in respect of recovery of their dues relating to gratuity. In these circumstances, the existence of alternate remedy by way of appeal N under the relevant statute which is undoubtedly more speedy and efficacious, created a bar against the filing of present petitions on the constitutional side of this Court. No doubt under section 17 it is provided that an appeal before the Labour Court against the order of the Authority, is to be accompanied by a certificate showing the deposit of the amount ordered by the Authority but it is neither contended nor it has been shown that existence of such a condition made the remedy by way of appeal under the Act illusory and inadequate. On the contrary in two of the cases the petitioners did deposit the amount ordered by the Authority before filing the appeal under section 17 of the Act and in all these, petitions, the petitioners while seeking stay against the order of Authority voluntarily offered to deposit the amount in Court. In these circumstances all these petitions were also not maintainable on the ground that the petitioners had failed to follow the alternate remedy by way of appeal provided under the statute. For the aforesaid reasons I dismiss all these petitions but in the circumstances of the case will make no order as to costs. M . Y . H . Petitions dismissed.