2026 PLP 1222 (YLR)

Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34

Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7

Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S.23(1)(a)

Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention, making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, possession of illicit weapon

Appreciation of evidence

Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997

Not applicable

Sentence, modification of

Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money

As per record, on the pointation of accused persons, one hand grenade was recovered from an accused, one unlicensed 30-bore pistol with a loaded magazine was recovered from other accused and one unlicensed 30-bore pistol with a loaded magazine was recovered from another accused

Mere inclusion of offences such as kidnapping for ransom or the unlawful use or control of explosive substances within subsection (2) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA), or their listing in the Schedule appended thereto, did not per se empower the Court to invoke the sentencing provisions contained in S.7(1)(e) or 7(1)(ff) of the Act

Moreover, it would be contrary to legislative logic to simultaneously treat such offences as Schedule Offences and, in the same breath, presumed them to constitute acts of terrorism without satisfying the definitional threshold prescribed under S.6

Legislature had deliberately drawn a distinction between offences enumerated in the Schedule and those that, by their nature and circumstances, fulfilled the criteria of terrorism under S.6

Statutory scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act clearly reflected that the application of S.7 was conditional upon the establishment of a substantive nexus between the alleged act and the elements of terrorism-namely, the creation of terror, insecurity, or panic among the public with intent, act, purpose or design for terrorism

In the absence of such linkage, the Court was bound to restrict its sentencing jurisdiction to the penal consequences provided under the Schedule or the substantive law governing the offence

Therefore, the attempt to prosecute the appellants under the Anti-Terrorism Act framework was legally misconceived and unsupported by the factual matrix

Accordingly, sentencing under Ss.7(1)(e) & 7(1)(ff) of the Anti-Terrorism Act were not sustainable in law and could not be upheld

Prosecution had produced witness of memo of recovery and arrest and his evidence was firm and straightforward and he had also produced memo of arrest and personal search as well as Head Constable; Investigation Officer had also recorded his evidence

Evidence of these three official witnesses' was firm and trustworthy coupled with the facts of recovery which had not been shaken by the defense side

Therefore, the appeal was partly allowed by setting aside convictions and sentences awarded under Ss. 7(1)(e) & 7(1)(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act and Ss.365-A & 302(b) P.P.C while the sentence awarded by the Trial Court was maintained with modification that the sentence awarded under S.7(1)(ff) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 to appellant No. 1 was converted into S.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for 14 years, and the conviction and sentence for 7 years awarded by the Trial Court under S.23(1) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, to each appellant was maintained

With said modification in sentence, the appeal was partly allowed. Ghulam Hussain v. State PLD 2020 Sc 61 and Muhammad Hussain v. The State 2011 SCMR 1127 rel.

Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34

Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7

Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)

Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention, making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, possession of illicit weapon

Appreciation of evidence

Last seen evidence

Scope

Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money

In the present case, the claims of eye-witness was that he had seen the deceased in the company of the appellants

However, a close scrutiny of deposition of said witness revealed significant deficiencies that undermined its probative value to hold the appellants accountable for the charges of homicide

Said witness had failed to assign any specific or individualized role to the appellants in the commission of the offence of murder

Statement of said witness was generalized in nature, merely alleging that all three appellants kidnapped the deceased, without elaborating on which of them exercised physical control over abductee, whether any weapons were used (except one used upon him) or by whom, or how coercion was applied

Crucially, said eye-witness had shown complete ignorance regarding the mode of transportation used to remove the deceased from the scene of abduction to the place of captivity

There was no mention of whether the deceased was taken by foot, motorcycle, car, or any other means

As an eye-witness, such omissions on material particulars significantly eroded the credibility of his account

Moreover, eye-witness admitted that he was not medically examined despite allegedly being struck with the butt of a pistol

Said witness also failed to identify the make, color, or registration number of the motorcycle allegedly used in the commission of the offence

Inability of said witness to describe the sequence of events following his departure from the scene further weakened the reliability of his testimony

Therefore, the testimony of eye-witness did not inspire confidence and failed to meet the standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence

Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges of kidnapping for ransom and murder, thus the conviction under Ss.302(b) & 365-A P.P.C were set-aside

However, sentence awarded to appellant No. 1 under S.7(1)(ff) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted to one into S.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for 14 years and conviction and sentence for 7 years awarded by the Trial Court under S.23(1) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 to each appellant was maintained

With said modification in sentence, the appeal was partly allowed.

Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34

Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7

Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)

Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22

Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention, making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, possession of illicit weapon

Appreciation of evidence

Test identification parade conducted belatedly

Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money

Identification parade in the present case was conducted after an unexplained delay of five days, which casted serious doubt on its credibility

When said delay was read conjunctively with the two-day delay in the registration of the FIR and the 10 days' delay in recording the statement under S.161, Cr.P.C., the possibility of deliberation and consultation prior to the identification proceedings could not be ruled out

Furthermore, eye-witness had attributed a collective role of kidnapping, demand of ransom and murder of deceased to all three appellants, without assigning any specific or individualized role, except one, who was alleged to have inflicted a butt blow upon eye-witness

Identification of an accused during a parade, without reference to the specific role played by him in the commission of the offence, carried no evidentiary value

Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges of kidnapping for ransom and murder, thus the conviction under Ss.302(b) & 365-A P.P.C were set-aside

However, sentence awarded to appellant No. 1 under S.7(1)(ff) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted into S.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for 14 years and conviction and sentence for 7 years awarded by the Trial Court under S.23(1) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 to each appellant was maintained

With said modification in sentence, the appeal was partly allowed. Hakeem v. The State 2017 SCMR 1546; Muhammad Yameen v. The State 2009 SCMR 84; Arif Masih v. The State PLD 2001 SC 398 and Lal Pasand v. The state PLD 1981 SC 142 rel.

Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34

Explosive Substance Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7

Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)

Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention, making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, possession of illicit weapon

Appreciation of evidence

Recovery of weapon of offence

Fingerprint comparison not conducted

Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money

Record showed that knife allegedly bearing human blood was recovered

However, this piece of evidence suffered from serious deficiencies that substantially diminished its evidentiary worth

Notably, the prosecution failed to conduct fingerprint matching between the recovered knife and the appellants, which could have established a direct nexus between the weapon and the perpetrator

In the absence of such forensic linkage, and given the prosecution's unexplained omission despite availability of the accused in custody, an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, warranted that the prosecution deliberately avoided fingerprint comparison due to uncertainty regarding the actual assailant

Said deficiency was further compounded by the prosecution's failure to produce any DNA or chemical examination report to establish that the blood found on the knife was indeed that of the deceased

Mere recovery of the knife on the discovery of the appellants, without forensic corroboration or an unbroken evidentiary chain, was insufficient to sustain the charge of murder

Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges of kidnapping for ransom and murder, thus the conviction under Ss.302(b) & 365-A P.P.C were set-aside

However, sentence awarded to appellant No. 7 under S.7(1)(ff) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was converted into S.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for 14 years and conviction and sentence for 7 years awarded by the Trial Court under S.23(1) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013, to each appellant was maintained

With said modification in sentence, the appeal was partly allowed.

Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34

Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 4 & 5

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7

Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(1)(a)

Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention, making or possessing explosive substances under suspicious circumstances, possession of illicit weapon

Appreciation of evidence

Delay of two days in lodging the FIR

Accused were charged for committing murder of the father of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money

First Information Report was registered after a delay of two days, and the statement of eye-witness was recorded nearly ten days post-incident both without any plausible justification or supporting evidence

Prompt registration of the FIR was essential to exclude the possibility of deliberation, consultation or fabrication

Unexplained delay in lodging the FIR was fatal to the prosecution's case

Moreover, undue delay in filing the complaint, absent satisfactory explanation, casted serious doubt on its authenticity

Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges of kidnapping for ransom and murder, thus the conviction under Ss.302(b) & 365-A, P.P.C were set-aside

However, sentence awarded to appellant No. 1 under S.7(1)(ff) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was converted into S.5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 for 14 years and conviction and sentence for 7 years awarded by the Trial Court under S.23(1) of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 to each appellant was maintained

With said modification in sentence, the appeal was partly allowed. Noor Muhammad v. The State 2010 SCMR 97; Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan 2010 SCMR 105; Falak Sher alias Sheru v. The State 1995 SCMR 1350; Khalid Javed and another v. The State 2003 SCMR 1419; Muhammad Asif v. The State 2017 SCMR 486 and Hayatullah v. The State 2018 SCMR 2092 rel.

Circumstantial evidence

Scope

In cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish each link in the chain with precision and continuity, where one end touches the dead body and the other the neck of the accused

Any missing link renders the entire chain unreliable. Muhammad Tayab and another v. The State and others 2023 YLR 2207; Gul Muhammad and others v. The State 2021 SCMR 381; Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600; Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State 2017 SCMR 898; Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others 2016 SCMR 274; Niaz Ahmed v. Hasrat Mahmood PLD 2016 SC 70; Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed and others 2016 SCMR 1605; Muhammad Hussain v. The State 2011 SCMR 1127; Zafar Abbas v. The State 2010 SCMR 939; Tahir Javed v. The State 2009 SCMR 166; Ibrahim and others v. The State 2009 SCMR 407; Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103; Akbar Ali v. The State 2007 SCMR 486; Liaqat Ali v. The State 2007 SCMR 1307; Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan and others PLD 2006 SC 538; Munawar Shah v. Liaquat Hussain and others 2002 SCMR 713; Munir Ahmad Dar v. Imran and others 2001 SCMR 1773; Azim v. The State PLD 1965 SC 44; Siraj v. The Crown PLD 1956 FC 123; Ahmed Omar Sheikh's case 2021 SCMR 873; Nasir Javed v. The State 2016 SCMR 1144 and Wazir Muhammad v. The State 2005 SCMR 277 rel.

Benefit of doubt

Principle

If there is a circumstance which creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the accused would be entitled to the benefit of such doubt, not as a matter of grace and concession, but as a matter of right. Tajamal Hussain v. The State 2022 SCMR 1567; Sajjad Hussain v. the State 2022 SCMR 1540; Abdul Ghafoor v. the State 2022 SCMR 1527; Kashif Ali v. the State 2022 SCMR 1515; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2022 SCMR 1328; Khalid Mehmood v. the State 2022 SCMR 1148; Muhammad Sami Ullah v. the State 2022 SCMR 998; Bashir Muhammad Khan v. the State 2022 SCMR 986; The State v. Ahmed Omer Sheikh 2021 SCMR 873; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857; Abdul Jabbar v. the State 2019 SCMR 129 Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772; Hashim Qasim v. the State 2017 SCMR 986; Muhammad Zaman v. The State 2014 SCMR 749; Khalid Mehmood v. the State 2011 SCMR 664; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Faheem Ahmed Farooqui v. The State 2008 SCMR 1572; Ghulam Qadir v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221; Riaz Masih alias Mithoo v. The State 1995 SCMR 1730 and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel. Tahir Saleem Mangi for the Complainant. Muhammad Iqbal Awan, Addl. Prosecutor General Sindh for the State. Judgment Dr. Syed Fiaz-ul-Hasan Shah, J.

The Appellants have filed the instant Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Jail Appeal on being aggrieved with and dissatisfied by the Judgment dated 30.08.2023 passed by learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.V. Karachi [Trial Court] in (1) Special Case No.18/2021 under FIR No.314/2016 under sections 365-A/302/34 P.P.C read with 7(e)(a) ATA registered at PS Malir. (2) Special Case No.18-A/2021 under FIR No.03/2017 under sections 4/5 Explosive Substances Act read with Section 7 ATA registered at PS AVCC, (3) Special Case No.18-B/2021 under FIR No.04/2017 under section 23(1)/a SAA registered at PS AVCC and (4) Special Case No.18-C/2021 under FIR No.05/2017 under section 23(1)/a SAA registered at PS AVCC; whereby they were convicted and sentenced as under: (i) He is found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 365-A P.P.C and sentences to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (ii) He is also found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (iii) He is found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 302(b) P.P.C and sentences to suffer Imprisonment for life as Tazir and also directed to pay Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) each as a compensation to the L.Rs of deceased as provided under section 544-A Cr.P.C in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (iv) He is also found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 7(1)(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (v) I also convict the above named accused in case/ crime No. 03/2017 under section 5 Explosive Substances Act, 1908, read with Section 6(2)(ee) and Section 27-A of ATA, 1997 and sentenced him under section 7(1)(ff) R.I for 14 years with fine Rs.1 lac, in case of default of non-payment of fine accused shall suffer S.I six (6) months more. (i) He is found guilty for the offence, convicted under section365-A P.P.C and sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (ii) He is also found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more: (iii) He is found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 302(b) P.P.C and sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life as Tazir and also directed to pay Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) each as a compensation to the L.Rs of deceased as provided w/s 544-A Cr.P.C in case of default accused shall suffer S.I one (01) year more. (iv) He is also found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 7(1)(a) of Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (v) I also convict the above named accused in case/ crime No.04/2017 under section 23(1)/a Sindh Arms Act, 2013 and sentenced him R.I for seven (7) years with fine Rs.50,000/- in case of default of non-payment of fine accused shall suffer S.I for three (3) Months more. (i) He is found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 365-A P.P.C and sentence to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (ii) He is also found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (iii) He is found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 302(b). P.P.C and sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life as Tazir and also directed to pay Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) each as a compensation to the L.Rs of deceased as provided under section 544-A Cr.P.C in case of default accused shall suffer S.I one (01) year more. (iv) He is also found guilty for the offence, convicted under section 7(1)(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, sentenced to suffer Imprisonment for life with fine Rs.2,00,000/- (two lacs) in case of default accused shall suffer R.I one (01) year more. (vi) I also convict the above named accused in case/ crime No.05/2017 under section 23(1)/a Sindh Arms Act, 2013 and sentenced him R.I for seven (7) years with fine Rs.50,000/- in case of default of non-payment of fine accused shall suffer S.I. for three (3) Months more.

2. The learned Trial Court extended the benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. to the appellants, ordering that all substantive sentences shall run concurrently, with the exception of the sentence pertaining to the fine. Additionally, the movable and immovable property of appellant Muhammad Asif was forfeited to the Government under Section 5-A of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

3. Prosecution Case - Brief Facts: The prosecution's case, as set forth in the FIR registered on 14.12.2016 at Police Station Malir City by the complainant Muhammad Shahbaz, is that on 12.12.2016, while the complainant was at home, his father Muhammad Faryad and his brother Owais had gone to Madina Colony, Quaidabad, Landhi, for the construction of their house. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the complainant contacted Owais via mobile phone No. 0321-2807107. Owais informed him that their father and their brother-in-law were returning home on a motorcycle. Shortly thereafter, the complainant received a call from his brother-in-law, who narrated that while he and Muhammad Faryad were travelling on a motorcycle and reached Katcha Road near Malir Nadi Bridge (Malir Homes), they were intercepted by three unidentified young men on a motorcycle. Two of the assailants were armed with pistols. The accused assaulted the complainant's brother-in-law with the butt of a pistol and ordered him to flee, after which they forcibly abducted Muhammad Faryad. Following the abduction, the complainant attempted to contact his father on mobile No. 0324-2985462. The call was answered by an unknown individual, who informed him that his father had been kidnapped and a ransom of Rs. 10 to 15 lacs was being demanded for his release. Upon the complainant's expression of inability to pay the amount, the abductors murdered his father by slitting his throat and abandoned the body in the bushes near Samu Goth. The accused retained the deceased's mobile phone and CNIC. The complainant stated that his brother-in law, Shabir, could identify the culprits upon seeing them again. After the funeral rites, the complainant reported the incident to the police, resulting in the registration of the FIR against the unknown accused for the offences of abduction for ransom and murder.

4. Investigation: Investigation was entrusted to Inspector Habib Ali of AVCC/CIA Karachi. He visited the crime scene, prepared a site memo, and sent the deceased's last-worn clothes for chemical examination. On 06.01.2017, acting on a tip-off, the I.O apprehended three suspects near the railway track adjacent to Darbar Baba Waliyat Ali Shah. The suspects disclosed their identities as: Ali Asghar son of Muhammad Urs Abbas Ali son of Ali Nawaz Muhammad Asif son of Liaquat Ali Bhatti

5. Upon personal search in the presence of police witnesses (due to the unavailability of private mashirs), the following recoveries were made: From Ali Asghar: Rs. 300 From Abbas Ali: Rs. 200 From Muhammad Asif: a Q-mobile E-40 (black color) containing Warid SIM No. 0323-2631732 and Zong SIM No. 0310-1002954, and Rs. 600

6. During initial interrogation, all three Appellants/accused confessed to abducting Haji Faryad on 12.12.2016 and subsequently murdering him after failure to secure the demanded ransom. Subsequently, on 15.01.2017, during further investigation, the accused voluntarily led the police to Panwar Qabrustan near Younus Textile Mills on National Highway, Quaidabad, Karachi. On their pointation, the following weapons were recovered: From Muhammad Asif: One hand grenade From Ali Asghar: One unlicensed 30-bore pistol with a loaded magazine (5 rounds) From Abbas Ali: One unlicensed 30-bore pistol with a loaded magazine (5 rounds)

7. All recoveries were made from bushes in the cemetery area. Separate FIRs were registered in respect of these recoveries. The Investigating Officer completed all formalities, including writing to the BDU and FSL for inspection reports, and obtained CROs of the accused. He also sought permission from the Home Department through the concerned SSP for submission of the challan.

8. Trial Proceedings: Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the appellants before the trial court. Formal charges were framed vide Exh.6, to which all accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial through their statements recorded at Exh.7 to Exh.9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as following 12 witnesses: (1) PW-1 Muhammad Shahbaz at Ex. 10, who has produced FiR at Ex.10/A. memo of pointation of place of kidnapping at Ex.10/B. memo of pointation of place of recovered dead body at Ex.10/C. memo of seizure of churri at Ex.10/D. Subsequently, case was transferred to Anti-Terrorism Court No. XVI, Karachi from this Court vide letter No.4746/MIT-II Hon'ble High Court of Sindh Karachi vide order dated 17.08.2017. Accused Asif moved an application for providing the counsel on State expenses at Ex.11. Order passed there at Ex.11/A (2) PW-2 Mr. Ghulam Akber Asif Ali, learned Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate No.IX Malir Karachi at Ex 12, who has produced application at Ex.12/A. memo of identification parade of accused Asif at Ex. 12/B, memo of identification parade of accused Ali Asghar at Ex.12/C and memo of identification parade of accused Abbas Ali at Ex 12/D. (3) PW-3 SIP Shahnawaz Panhwar at Ex.13, who has produced memo of Inspection of dead body at Ex. 13/A. inquest report at Ex. 13/B. letter addressed to MLO at Ex.13/C. receipt of handing over the dead body at Ex.13/D, entry No.15 at Ex.13/E. letter addressed to SHO of PS Malir City at Ex 13/F. (4) PW-4 Muhammad Waqas at Ex.14. Accused Asif moved an application for providing the counsel on State expenses at Ex.15. Order passed there at Ex

16. Learned APG for the State give-up the PW Muhammad Fayyaz vide statement at Ex:17. (5) PW-5 Muhammad Aijaz at Ex.18. Thereafter, case was transferred to Anti-Terrorism Court No. XI. Karachi from Anti-Terrorism Court No. XVI Karachi vide letter No.2618/MIT-II Transfer of ATC Cases vide dated 08.08.2018. The Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court No.XI was taken the Oath as prescribed under section 16 of ATA, 1997 at Ex.19 (6) PW-6 Shabir Hussain at Ex.20, who has produced notice at Ex.20/A. Learned APG for the State give-up the PW Shahbaz vide statement at Ex.21 (7) PW-7 ASI Abdullah Khan at Ex. 22, who has produced memo of securing CDR data at Ex.22/A: CDR data at Ex22/B, Verisys at Ex 22/C, memo of seizure of motorcycle along with original CNIC card of deceased Faryad at Ex. 22/D. (8) PW-8 SIP Muhammad Umar at Ex.23, who has produced memo of arrest and recovery at Ex.23/A. (9) PW-9 MLO/Rtd. Addl. Police Surgeon Sheeraz Ali at Ex.24, who has produced attested Photostat copy of postmortem report at Ex.24/A, cause of death certificate at Ex.24/B. Thereafter, again case was transferred to Anti-Terrorism Court No. XVII, Karachi from Anti-Terrorism Court No. XI Karachi vide letter No.1814/MIT-II Transfer of ATC Cases vide dated 30.09.2020. The Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court No.XVII was taken the Oath as prescribed under section 16 of ATA, 1997 at Ex.25. Thereafter, again case was transferred to Anti-Terrorism Court No. VIII, Karachi from Anti-Terrorism Court No. XVII Karachi vide letter No.2517/MIT-II Transfer of ATC Cases vide dated 22.12.2020. The Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court No.VIII was taken the Oath as prescribed under section 16 ol ATA, 1997 at Ex.26. (10) PW-10 H.C Muhammad Faheem at Ex.27, who has produced memo of re-arrest and pointation of recovery at Ex.27/A. (11) PW-11 I.O./Rtd. Habib Ali at Ex.28, who has produced order of SSP at Ex.28/A. letter addressed to SSP for CDR at Ex.28/B, entry at Ex.28/C. letter addressed to Chemical Examiner at. Ex.28/D, report of Chemical Examiner at Ex.28/E letter addressed to CRO/CIA at Ex.28/F, entries at Ex.28/G to 28/I remand letter at Ex.28/J, notice under section 160 Cr.P.C at Ex.28/K to 28/M. This PW has also produced entry at Ex 29/A, letter addressed to FSL and report of FSL at Ex.29/B to 29/E, letter addressed to Incharge Chemical Examiner and its report at Ex.29/F and 29/G, letter addressed to SSP for trial at Ex.29/H, permission letter of Home Department at Ex 29/1, letter addressed to ETO and its report at Ex.29/J and 29/K, FIRs and qaimi entries at Ex. 29/L, to 29/Q. (12) PW-12 SIP Muhammad Iqbal at Ex.30, who has produced entries at Ex.30/A to 30/C, clearance certificate at Ex 30/D, inspection report of hand grenade at Ex.30/E. Learned APG for the State give-up PW Sher Muhammad vide statement at Ex.31. Thereafter, prosecution closed its side vide statement at Ex.32. Thereafter, again case was transferred from Anti-Terrorism Court No. VIII Karachi vide letter No.739/Transfer of ATC Cases vide dated 16.03.2021. The Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court No.XI was taken the Oath as prescribed under section 16 of ATA, 1997 at Ex.25. The Oath as prescribed under section 16 of ATA, 1997 was taken by the learned Judge of Anti-Terrorism Court No.V, Karachi at Ex 33.

9. Upon conclusion of the trial and after hearing arguments from both sides, the learned Trial Court delivered a Judgment dated 17.11.2021, convicting all three accused. Subsequently, the R&Ps were transmitted to this Court under Section 25(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The said judgment dated 17.11.2021 was challenged by the Appellants before this Court and after hearing the Appellants and Prosecutor in Special Criminal ATA Appeal No. this Court remanded the matter to the Trial Court for a limited purpose-namely, for re-recording the evidence of prosecution witnesses: PW-2 Ghulam Akbar PW-3 Asif Ali PW-4 Muhammad Waqas PW-5 Muhammad Aijaz

10. The remand order directed that the evidence be recorded in the presence of the defence counsel, who would be afforded full opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses. It was also directed that the prosecution may re-examine the witnesses, if so desired, and thereafter, fresh statements of the appellants under Section 342, Cr.P.C. shall be recorded. The Trial Court was then to render a fresh judgment after hearing both sides. In compliance with the directions of this Court, the undersigned took the prescribed oath under Section 16 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, as reflected at Exh.38. Subsequently, the evidence of the above-named prosecution witnesses was duly recorded at Exh.39 to Exh.42 in the presence of the learned Assistant Prosecutor General (APG) and learned defence counsel within the stipulated time frame. Thereafter, the prosecution closed its side vide statement available at Exh.43.

11. The fresh statements of the three accused were recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C. at Exh.44 to Exh.46. In their statements, the accused denied all allegations levelled against them and professed their innocence. In particular, Appellant/accused Muhammad Asif stated that he had been unlawfully apprehended by Rangers personnel from his residence at approximately 4:00 a.m. on 28.12.2016. Following his arrest, his father submitted applications to the Commander of 82 Wing Rangers, Karachi, as well as to the Station House Officer (SHO) of PS Shah Latif Town, via TCS. The said applications and TCS receipts were produced in court and exhibited as Exh.44/A to Exh.44/D. Muhammad Asif further contended that after his illegal detention by the Rangers, he was handed over to the local police, who then falsely implicated him in the present cases. He denied any recoveries being made from his possession or at his instance and alleged that the Investigating Officer (I.O.) fabricated evidence against him and subjected him to severe physical torture. He earnestly prayed to the Court for justice, invoking the name of Allah. All three accused maintained that they were falsely implicated and reiterated their innocence. However, none of them opted to be examined on oath under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C., nor did they produce any defence evidence. Upon conclusion of the re-trial proceedings, and after hearing final arguments and evaluating the evidence afresh, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced both appellants vide judgment dated 30.08.2023.

12. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Addl. P.G. and with their assistance meticulously perused the record.

13. The two primary issues before us concerns the sufficiency of Conviction and Sentence under section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA) and circumstantial evidence relied upon to sustain the conviction for the charge of homicide under section 302(b) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C) by the Anti-Terrorism Court No.V, Karachi (Trial Court). Conviction under Sections 7(1) e) and 7(1)(ff) of ATA:

14. We have also noticed that learned Anti-Terrorism Court has passed the sentence against abduction for ransom under Section 365-A P.P.C, 1860 as well as under Section 7(e) of the ATA, 1997 so also 7(1)(ff) ATA in absence of ingredients as required by Section 6 of ATA, 1997, which is appropriate to reproduce hereunder: "

6. Terrorism. (1) In this Act, "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where: (a) the action falls with the meaning of subsection (2), and (b) the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public or community or sect [or a foreign government or population or an international organization] or create a senseof fear or insecurity in society: or (c) the use of threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause [or intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, media persons, business community or attacking the civilians including damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson or by any other means, government officials. installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies)]." (2) An "action" shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), if it: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking (ee) the act of terrorism committed fall under section 6(2) (ee), shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall not be less than fourteen years but may extend to imprisonment for life;

15. Upon a plain and harmonious interpretation of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it is evident that subsection (2)(e) or (2)(ee) are not self-executing and must be read in conjunction with the foundational elements set out under Section 6(1). The legislative intent embedded in Section 6(1) ATA is to define the foundational elements or qualify as a "terrorist act," when it is committed with the specific intent or design to terrorize, intimidate, or coerce the public, state institutions, or sections of society and only where those elements are satisfied the provisions of Section 6(2)(e) for kidnapping for ransom or Section 6(2)(ee) for terrorism can be invoked.

16. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that sentencing under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA) must be strictly tethered to the substantive ingredients enumerated under Section 6 of the Act. The mere inclusion of offences such as kidnapping for ransom or the unlawful use or control of explosive substances within subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA), or their listing in the Schedule appended thereto, does not per se empower the Court to invoke the sentencing provisions contained in Sections 7(1)(e) or 7(1)(ff) of the Act. It would be contrary to legislative logic to simultaneously treat such offences as Schedule offences and, in the same breath, presume them to constitute acts of terrorism without satisfying the definitional threshold prescribed under Section

6. The legislature has deliberately drawn a distinction between offences enumerated in the Schedule and those that, by their nature and circumstances, fulfill the criteria of terrorism under Section

6. The statutory scheme of the ATA clearly reflects that the application of Section 7 is conditional upon the establishment of a substantive nexus between the alleged act and the elements of terrorism__namely, the creation of terror, insecurity, or panic among the public with intent, act, purpose or design for terrorism. In the absence of such linkage, the Court is bound to restrict its sentencing jurisdiction to the penal consequences provided under the Schedule or the substantive law governing the offence. Any deviation from this interpretive boundary would constitute judicial encroachment and undermine the legislative intent embedded in the framework of the ATA. The Larger Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has settled this confusion. In Ghulam Hussain v. State (PLD 2020 SC 61), the larger bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.13 that: "...For the purpose of further clarity on this issue it is explained for the benefit of all concerned that the cases of the offences specified in entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are cases of those heinous offences which do not per se constitute the offence of terrorism but such cases are to be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court because of their inclusion in the Third Schedule. It is also clarified that in such cases of heinous offences mentioned in entry No. 4 of the said Schedule an Anti-Terrorism Court can pass a punishment for the said offence and not for committing the offence of terrorism. It may be pertinent to mention here that the offence of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365-A, P.P.C. is included in entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule and kidnapping for ransom is also one of the actions specified in section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Abduction or kidnapping for ransom is a heinous offence but the scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 shows that an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365/A, P.P.C. is merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court if kidnapping for ransom is committed with the design or purpose mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 then such offence amounts to terrorism attracting section 7(e) of that Act. In the former case the convicted person is to be convicted and sentenced only for the offence under section 365-A, P.P.C. whereas in the latter case the convicted person is to be convicted both for the offence under section 365-A, P.P.C. as well as for the offence under section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997...." (Emphasis added)

17. Another dilemma what we find is that the trial Court has convicted the Appellants under ATA and P.P.C. It is a settled principle of constitutional and criminal jurisprudence that no individual shall be prosecuted or punished more than once for the same offence. This protection is firmly embedded in Article 13(a) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which guarantees that "no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once." This constitutional safeguard is reinforced by Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which bars retrial for the same offence or upon the same facts once a person has been acquitted or convicted. Additionally, Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that although a single act may constitute offences under multiple enactments, the offender may be prosecuted under any one of those enactments but "shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence."

18. Therefore, the attempt to prosecute the appellants under the ATA framework is legally misconceived and unsupported by the factual matrix. Accordingly, sentencing under Section 7(1) (e) and Section 7(1) (ff) of the ATA are not sustainable in law and cannot be upheld. Conviction under Section 302(b) P.P.C for Tazir

19. It is not disputed that the dead body of Haji Muhammad Faryad was recovered on 22.12.2016 at 1030 hours from bushes near Samoo Goth, close to Malir Naddi (old river), within the jurisdiction of PS Memon Goth, Karachi, as reflected in Memo of Recovery of Dead body (Exh.10/C). The prosecution's case is admittedly based on circumstantial evidence, as no direct or ocular testimony links the appellants to the commission of murder, other than the last seen evidence presented through PW-6. In Muhammad Hussain v. The State (2011 SCMR 1127), the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that: "Admittedly, it is a case of circumstantial evidence, therefore, as rule of prudence, it is required that each piece of circumstantial evidence shall be supported by independent corroboration, which shall, by itself, be sufficient to establish the guilt. However, each circumstance shall be so connected with each other that it shall make one complete chain, without there any broken link. As it has been discussed hereinabove, there are completely broken links of chain to connect the appellant with the commission of murder of deceased, therefore, he would be entitled to benefit of doubt."

20. To prove the case based on circumstantial evidence and to support it by independent corroboration, the prosecution relies on the following evidence: a. Memo of Recovery of Dead Body - Exh. 10/C b. Testimony of PW-6, Shabbir Hussain (alleged eye-witness) c. Identification Parade dated 11.01.2017-Exh. 12/A d. Recovery of Knife with human blood - Exh. 10/D

21. The first piece of evidence, the recovery of the dead body, confirms the unnatural death of the deceased. However, this alone does not implicate the appellants.

22. Assessment of Testimony of PW-6. The second piece of evidence is testimony of eye-witness PW-6-he deposed: "I informed the incident to my brother-in-law Shahbaz that Haji Faryad has been kidnapped by the three accused persons. After some times, Shahbaz and Waqas reached Anwar Baloch Hotel. From there Shahbaz informed the police station Malir City through his mobile phone regarding incident. On receiving information police came near Anwar Baloch Hotel and we told the police regarding the incident. Police along with Shahbaz, Waqas and I searched the accused and Haji Faryad in the vicinity of Malir Nadi/river. In the meanwhile, accused persons made call from the mobile phone of Haji Faryad to Shahbaz and demanded ransom Rupees 10 or 15 lac for his release. We continued search up to 2 to 2:30 pm but could not succeed and returned back home. On 13-12-2016 police of PS Malir called my brother-in-law Shahbaz at PS. On the same day my brothers-in-law Shahbaz. Waqas and their uncle Haji Fayaz went at police station. After some time they made phone call at their house that their father is no more alive. Dead body of my father-in-law found in the bushes of Samoor Goth near Malir nadi/river. On 14-12-2016 we buried the dead bod of deceased Haji Faryad. After burial I and Shahbaz went at PS Malir. Where Shahbaz lodged FIR of the incident...... On 22-12-2016 I.O Habib Ali called Shahbaz, on that, Shahbaz and I reached at PS Malir. Where I.O. asked to point out the place of incident. I pointed out the place of incident at Malir home where I.O prepared memo of place of incident...........I saw faces of the culprits prior to hitting the butt of pistol on my head. It is correct to suggest that I was not referred for medical examination. I could not notice the make of bike, its color and number. I do not know how the culprits had taken away Haji Faryad from place of incident. When I left the place of incident then what happened I do not know." Emphasis added

23. The claims of PW-6 Shabbir Hussain to be an eye-witness to the abduction and the last person to have seen the deceased, Haji Faryad, in the company of the Appellants. However, a close scrutiny of his deposition (Exh.20) reveals significant deficiencies that undermine its probative value to hold the Appellants accountable for the charges of homicide. PW-6 has failed to assign any specific or individualized role to the appellants in the commission of the offence of murder. His statement is generalized in nature, merely alleging that all three Appellants persons kidnapped the deceased, without elaborating on which of them exercised physical control over Haji Faryad, whether any weapons were used (except one used upon him) or by whom, or how coercion was applied. Crucially, PW-6 has shown complete ignorance regarding the mode of transportation used to remove the deceased from the scene of abduction to the place of captivity. There is no mention of whether the deceased was taken by foot, motorcycle, car, or any other means. As an eye-witness, such omissions on material particulars significantly erode the credibility of his account. Moreover, PW-6 admitted that he was not medically examined despite allegedly being struck with the butt of a pistol. He also failed to identify the make, color, or registration number of the motorcycle allegedly used in the commission of the offence. His inability to describe the sequence of events following his departure from the scene further weakens the reliability of his testimony. In view of the foregoing, the testimony of PW-6 does not inspire confidence and fails to meet the standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence.

24. Identification parade evidentiary value The third piece of evidence produced by the Prosecution as independent corroboration is the Identification parade conducted by PW-2 through the eye-witness PW-6. The evidentiary value of an identification parade, being a relevant fact in the nature of explanatory evidence, is governed by Article 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The relevant portion of the provision reads:

22. Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts: Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of anything or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue, or relevant fact happened, or Which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. The identification parade in the present case was conducted after an unexplained delay of five days, which casts serious doubt on its credibility. When this delay is read conjunctively with the two-day delay in the registration of the FIR and the 10 days delay in recording the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., the possibility of deliberation and consultation prior to the identification proceedings cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, PW-6 has attributed a collective role of kidnapping, demand of ransom, and murder of Haji Faryad to all three appellants, without assigning any specific or individualized role, except for Abrar Ali, who is alleged to have inflicted a butt blow upon PW-6. It is now well-settled law that identification of an accused during a parade, without reference to the specific role played by him in the commission of the offence, carries no evidentiary value. Reliance in this regard is placed on Hakeem v. The State (2017 SCMR 1546), Muhammad Yameen v. The State (2009 SCMR 84), Arif Masih v. The State (PLD 2001 SC 398) and Lal Pasand v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 142).

25. Evaluation of Recovery of Knife as Corroborative Evidence The fourth piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution as independent corroboration is the recovery of a knife allegedly bearing human blood. However, this piece of evidence suffers from serious deficiencies that substantially diminish its evidentiary worth. Notably, the prosecution failed to conduct fingerprint matching between the recovered knife and the appellants, which could have established a direct nexus between the weapon and the perpetrator. In the absence of such forensic linkage, and given the prosecution's unexplained omission despite availability of the accused in custody, an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is warranted that the prosecution deliberately avoided fingerprint comparison due to uncertainty regarding the actual assailant

26. This deficiency is further compounded by the prosecution's failure to produce any DNA or chemical examination report to establish that the blood found on the knife was indeed that of the deceased, Haji Faryad. Despite repeated queries posed to Mr. Iqbal Awan, the Additional Prosecutor General during the course of proceedings, no such scientific evidence was brought on record. Mere recovery of the knife on the discovery of the Appellants, without forensic corroboration or an unbroken evidentiary chain, is insufficient to sustain the charge of murder.

27. Assessment of Delay in Lodging FIR and Recording of Witness Statement The prosecution's case is materially undermined by the unexplained and inordinate delays in both the lodging of the First Information Report and the recording of the statement of PW-6, Shabbir Hussain. The said witness, a resident of Lahore, has failed to offer any acceptable explanation for his presence at the scene of abduction in Karachi. The FIR was registered after a delay of two days, and the statement of PW-6 was recorded nearly ten days post-incident-both without any plausible justification or supporting evidence. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that prompt registration of the FIR is essential to exclude the possibility of deliberation, consultation, or fabrication. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Noor Muhammad v. The State (2010 SCMR 97) has categorically held that unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is fatal to the prosecution's case. Similarly, in Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan (2010 SCMR 105), it was observed that undue delay in filing the complaint, absent satisfactory explanation, casts serious doubt on its authenticity. The present case is further weakened by the absence of any cogent reason for the twelve-hour delay in FIR registration, which lends credence to the inference that the time was utilized for consultation and preparation. Reliance may also be placed on Falak Sher alias Sheru v. The State (1995 SCMR 1350) and Khalid Javed and another v. The State (2003 SCMR 1419), wherein similar delays were held to vitiate the prosecution's credibility. In view of these material lapses, the benefit of doubt must be extended to the accused, warranting interference with the conviction. In Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that: "There is a long line of authorities/precedents of this Court and the High Courts that even one or two days unexplained delay in recording the statements of eye-witnesses would be fatal and testimony of such witnesses cannot be safely relied upon."

28. Moreover, the prosecution has not established the location of illegal confinement or captivity of the deceased. No material was brought on record to indicate where the deceased was kept after his alleged abduction. This failure significantly undermines the prosecution's theory. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hayatullah v. The State (2018 SCMR 2092) held that when the place of occurrence is already known to the police, any subsequent disclosure leading to the same site is inadmissible and of no evidentiary value.

29. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish each link in the chain with precision and continuity-where one end touches the dead body and the other the neck of the accused. Any missing link renders the entire chain unreliable. In this regard, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Muhammad Tayab and another v. The State and others (2023 YLR 2207), wherein the Division Bench reiterated the settled law by citing a long line of precedents including Gul Muhammad and others v. The State (2021 SCMR 381), Naveed Asghar and 2 others v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600), Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State (2017 SCMR 898), Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274), Niaz Ahmed v. Hasrat Mahmood (PLD 2016 SC 70), Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed and others (2016 SCMR 1605), Muhammad Hussain v. The State (2011 SCMR 1127), Zafar Abbas v. The State (2010 SCMR 939), Tahir Javed v. The State (2009 SCMR 166), Ibrahim and others v. The State (2009 SCMR 407), Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another (2008 SCMR 1103), Akbar Ali v. The State (2007 SCMR 486), Liaqat Ali v. The State (2007 SCMR 1307), Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan and others (PLD 2006 SC 538), Munawar Shah v. Liaquat Hussain and others (2002 SCMR 713), Munir Ahmad Dar v. Imran and others (2001 SCMR 1773), Azim v. The State (PLD 1965 SC 44), and Siraj v. The Crown (PLD 1956 FC 123). In light of the above precedents and the glaring omissions in the prosecution's case, the recovery of the knife cannot be treated as reliable corroborative evidence. It fails to establish the requisite nexus between the appellants and the act of murder, and thus does not advance the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt.

30. It is a well-settled principle that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete, consistent, and lead to the only possible inference of guilt. If any link is missing, broken, or based on conjecture, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt. After a comprehensive analysis of the record and reliance upon binding precedents, including Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600), Ahmed Omar Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873), Nasir Javed v. The State (2016 SCMR 1144), Wazir Muhammad v. The State (2005 SCMR 277), and other authorities, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish a cogent and unbroken chain of circumstances necessary to uphold a conviction of homicide/murder of Haji Mohammad Faryad based solely on circumstantial and last seen evidence, Consequently, the conviction under section 302(b) P.P.C and Sentence to suffer imprisonment for life as Tazir together with compensation under Section 544-A Cr.P.C. awarded by the trial Court to the Appellants are set aside. Conviction for Kidnapping for Ransom

31. Similarly, for the reasons enumerated in paragraphs 14 to 30 hereinabove, the considerable delay in lodging the FIR, recording the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., and pointing out the place of incident when read conjunctively with Exhibits 44 to 46 and Exhibits 44/A to 44/D, which were exhibited in the presence of the prosecution without any objections or explanatory rebuttal-strengthens the assertion that the Appellants were apprehended by Ranger officials on 28.12.2016 at 4:00 AM. Furthermore, the prosecution witness PW-5 (Mohammad Aijaz) failed to disclose the ransom amount, did not produce the mobile phone allegedly used for communication, and offered no evidence regarding any demand for ransom through said device/Mobile number. His testimony also lacks confirmation of any ransom demand, thereby contradicting the version of events narrated by the complainant/PW-1 in his evidence. These material discrepancies cast serious doubt on the prosecution's case as the PW-1/Complainant deposed: "I made phone call on the mobile phone of my father which was attended by another person told me that my father was with him and demanded rupees 10 to 15 for release of my father"..... "On the same day i.e. 13.12.2016 at about 4:00 PM the culprits made phone call from the phone number 0322-22450895089 to the phone of my younger brother Aaijaz 03482319385 and told him that my father was with them and to arrange only eight to 10 lakh for his release". Non-confirmation by PW-5 (Aaijaz) about such demand or phone number undermine credibility. On the other hand, the PW-7 ASI Abdullah Khan of AVCC deposed "Those mobile numbers were 0343 8172119, CDR containing seven pages, 0324-2985462 CDR containing two pages, 0322-2245089 CDR containing three pages and 0310-1002954 CRD containing six pages." Notably, the said PW-7 produced CDR of different phones numbers and withheld the best piece of evidence i.e. the record of phone number of PW-5 Aaijaz which was very material in the light of evidence of the PW-1/ Complainant. Thirdly, the prosecution has failed to bring on record any memorandum of captivity place or illegal confinement or its identification by any of the prosecution witness or any reference or even exact duration of such captivity when as per claim of prosecution, the PW-1 was kept in confinement and the dead body was recovered after two days. Undoubtedly, both the essentials ingredients of Section 365-A P.P.C i.e. demand or ransom and illegal confinement or captivity have no reference or at variance nor any justification for it non-disclosure was given by prosecution. It is an established principle in jurisprudence that for an offence under Section 365-A P.P.C-kidnapping for ransom-the essential ingredients are: (i) the act of kidnapping or illegal confinement, and (ii) a demand or extortionate purpose for ransom, property, or compliance. The Supreme Court has held in Muhammad Nabi and others v. The State (2006 SCMR 1230) and Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704) that even a mere demand for ransom suffices, and actual payment or release is not necessary. Likewise in Junaid Rehman and others v. The State (PLD 2011 SC 1135), it was held that an intent to extort or a demand constitutes the offence regardless of ransom paid. In contrast, the absent a ransom demand or failure to prove, the offence under section 365-A P.P.C cannot be established.