1999 PLP 2015 (SCMR)

CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.

The above appeals, with the leave of the Court, are directed against the common judgment dated 6-12-1995, passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.A. No.24 of 1992 in W.P. No. 11038 of 1991 and I.C.A. No.279 of 1994 in W.P. No.4077 of 1984, filed by Mian Ata Ullah respondent herein against the order dated 27-11-1991 of a learned Single Judge of the said High Court, dismissing the Writ Petitions Nos.11038 of 1991 and 4077 of 1984, seeking declaration that Reference No.47 of 1982 dated 31-3-1982, 'filed by the appellants hereinbefore the Lahore Development Authority Tribunal culminated in the order dated 7-11-1992 accepting them as some of the legal heirs of the deceased Mst. Sardar Begum for the purpose of claiming compensation of the property acquired by L.D.A. as without lawful authority. These appeals are being disposed of through this common order.

2. The facts, which led to the filing of these appeals, are detailed in paragraphs 3 to 13 of the impugned judgment, which read thus: -- "In the year 1965 the Lahore Improvement Trust, as it then was, started proceedings for the acquisition of this property for NIPA. These proceedings culminated in an Award dated 30-1-1965. Mst. Sardar Begum challenged these proceedings before this Court through Writ Petition No.1530 of 1967. During the pendency of this Constitutional petition Mst. Sardar Begum petitioner died issuless on 1-10-1967. Mst. Data Tasleem and Begum Almas Daultana, her two sisters, were substituted as petitioners as her legal heirs. It may be mentioned here that subsequently Dara Tasleem also died issuless. In pursuance of these acquisition proceedings, the possession of the property was taken over by the Government. The said writ petition was, accepted through judgment dated 13-8-1971 (This is reported in PLD 1972 Lah. 458). It was declared that part of all such proceedings from the stage of section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act onward were without lawful authority, and of no legal effect. The authorities were directed to commence fresh proceedings from section 9 of the Act as a consequence of which the possession of the property was restored to Begurn Almas Daultana. She was also paid approximately an amount of Rs.1,30,000 by NIPA as arrears of rent for the period Begum Almas Daultana remained out of possession. Begum Almas Daultana remained in possession of the house till the year 1982.

4. In pursuance of the said judgment dated 13-8-1971 passed in Writ Petition No. 1530 of 1967, the Lahore Improvement Trust started fresh proceedings by issuing a Notification under section 17 of the Act. An award was made on 31-8-1973 according to which an amount of Rs. 1,30,000 was declared to be compensation of the house and Begum Almas Daultana was declared to be entitled to receive the said compensation as heir of Mst. Sardar Begum. (The above observation has been disputed by learned counsel for the appellants).

5. As observed above possession of property remained with Begum Almas Daultana till the year 1982 as the same was not taken over by the authorities till the said year even after the award was made on 31-8-1973. Since the owner of the acquired property is divested of the title thereof under the law only on his dispossession and taking over of the possession of the same by the acquiring authority. In the year 1975 she wanted to sell the property and invited the offers through advertisements in Pakistan Times dated 24-8-1975. She also got similar advertisement published in the other newspaper also.

6. Mian Atta Ullah the appellant purchased this house from Begum Almas Daultana through registered sale-deed dated 3-4-1980 for an amount of Rs.8,00,000, The then President visited the Civil Service Academy when it was complained to him that there was no adequate space with the said Academy to continue its activities effectively. The President observed that in order to provide sufficient space to the Academy the property in dispute which was adjacent to the premises of NIPA should be acquired. It was on the directive of the then President that the Government of Punjab issued orders for the commencement of fresh acquisition proceedings.

7. The appellant coming to know about this got an appeal published that the property in dispute should not be acquired as he wanted to construct a hospital for deaf and dumb. This appeal attracted the then Governor of Punjab who arranged a meeting between himself and the appellant in which an agreement was signed on 28-11-1981. One of the terms of this agreement was that the possession of the property would be delivered to the Government by the appellant who would not challenge the fresh acquisition proceedings in any Court and in lieu thereof the appellant would be given a suitable plot of the equivalent value. As a consequence of this Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the acquisition of this property was issued on 2-12-1981 in pursuance of which the possession of the property was taken by the Government on 3-2-1982. However, on 14-2-1982 another Notification was published under section '48 of the said Act for withdrawal of the Notification dated 2-12-1981 issued under section 4 stating that the property had already been acquired and the said fresh Notification was issued in ignorance of the same.

8. On 31-3-1982 the private respondents made a reference to Collector under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 alleging that they being the heirs of Ghulam Muhammad deceased who was real brother of Mst. Sardar Begum the original owner of the property as such were entitled to share to compensation awarded by the Collector regarding property in dispute to the extent of one half as residuary under the Muhammadan Law. The reference was referred to L.D.A. Tribunal for decision as Reference No.45 of 1982. In this reference Begum Almas Daultana only was impleaded as the respondent and not the appellant who as observed above had already purchased the property from Begum. Alma's Daultana through registered sale-deed dated 3-4-1980 and the Governor of Punjab had already entered into an agreement to award him compensation in the form of suitable plots of equivalent value.

9. The Governor of Punjab simultaneously constituted a. committee consisting of the Chief Secretary, Mayor of Lahore Corporation, Commissioner Lahore Division and Director-General NIPA to consider the feasibility of allotment of a plot to the petitioner in lieu of this property in implementation of agreement dated 28-11-1981. On 13.4-1982 a meeting of this committee was held in which it was pointed out to the appellant that fresh acquisition proceedings initiated through Notification under section 4 of the "Act, dated 2-12-1981 had already been withdrawn therefore, the appellant should seek remedy before the L.D.A. Tribunal in accordance with law if he was aggrieved of the quantum of compensation already granted under the award delivered on 31-8-1973 in pursuance of the earlier acquisition proceedings, The appellant filed Writ Petition No,4077 of 1984 before this Court which was dismissed in limine on 27-11-1984 by the learned Single Judge. This judgment/order has been challenged in the connected I.-C.A. No.279 of 1984. In the said writ petition (W.P. No.4077/84) from which said I.C.A. has arisen a declaration was sought that the acts done and proceedings taken by the respondents in reviving the abandoned acquisition proceedings of the disputed property was without lawful authority.

10. On coming to know that the private respondents i.e. heirs of Ghulam Muhammad deceased had filed a Reference under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 11038 of 1991 praying that the proceedings before the L.D.A. Tribunal in the said reference may be quashed. This Writ petition was dismissed in limine through judgment dated 27-11-191 which has been challenged in this Intra-Court Appeal No.24 of 1992.

11. It appears that on the other hand, the Provincial Government was convinced that the undertaking given by the Government through agreement dated 28-11-1981 to the appellant should be honoured. The Chief Minister in 1994 constituted a Committee and the appellant on 16-10-1994 was transferred Plots Nos.619 to 659 of seven Marlas each total land of which comes to 16 Kanals in Block G/I of Jauhar Town Scheme in lieu of the property in dispute which was measuring 14 Kanals on the Mall Road. An agreement was executed between the L.D.A. and the appellant on 25-1-1995 in which the allotment of the said plots, to the appellant was confirmed being in full and final settlement of the matter.

12. Begum Almas Daultana died during the pendency of the said reference made by respondents/heirs of Ghularn Muhammad deceased. The said reference remained pending for about 10 long years. It was decided ultimately on 7-11-1992 on the basis of consent/concession made by the heirs of Begum Almas Daultana that Ghulam Muhammad deceased predecessor-in-interest of the respondents was the brother of Sardar Begum deceased as such his heirs were also entitled to a share in the compensation payable regarding the property in question. (some observations in above are disputed by learned counsel for the appellants).

13. Before proceeding further, it may prominently be observed here that Mst. Sardar Begum died on 1-10-1967 whereas Ghulam Muhammad deceased predecessor-in-interest of respondents alleged brother of Sardar Bibi had earlier died on 29-3-1967. Mst. Sardar Begum. having left no male heir having died issuless. Therefore, the respondents as heirs of Ghulam Muhammad are claiming the share in the inheritance of 'Sardar Begum as residuary alongwith Begum Almas Daultana who was the sister of Sardar Begum. as her sister the other sister namely Mst. Dara Tasleem having also died issuless.

3. The case of the appellants, in nutshell, is that they are sons of Ghulam Muhammad, a brother of Mst. Sardar Begum, who expired on 29-3-1967, prior to the death of Mst. Sardar Begum. According to them, they were legal heirs as collaterals, being the legal heirs of the last male legal heir of Mst. Sardar Begum. Their above status was also accepted by the L.D.A. Tribunal, therefore, the learned Division Bench was not justified in non-suiting the appellants.

4. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court to consider the following questions:

"(i) Whether the reference filed by the petitioners before the Tribunal was validly entertained? (ii) whether the learned Judges of the Division Bench were justified in interfering with the order of the Tribunal and non-suiting the present petitioners.

5. Mr. Muhammad Ghani, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellants, submitted that the amount of compensation has not been paid to Any of the legal heirs of Mst. Sardar Begum so far. However, when the award was announced, one Mst. Akhtar Begum claiming herself to be the legal heir of Mst. Sardar Begum, filed a Reference on 9-10-1979 under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 seeking enhancement of compensation awarded (i.e. Rs. 1,46, 276) and for apportionment of the compensation on determination of her status as a legal heirs of Mst. Sardar Begum. Only Mst. Almas Daultana and L.D.A. were impleaded as respondents. However, after a lapse of about seven years, the appellants moved an application under Order 1, rule 10, C.P.C., for their impleadment as party, before the L.D.A. Tribunal, on the ground that their father Ghulam Muhammad being a real brother of Mst. Sardar Begum was entitled to inherit half of her estate which, on his death, had devolved on the Appellants.

6. It is urged that the appellants also filed an application on 21-,3-1992, before the Collector for an independent Reference under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, both the References were consolidated but on 23-7-1990. Mst. Akhtar Begum withdrew her Reference under sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. The application for withdrawal of the above Reference is at page 22 of the Paper Book, filed by the contesting respondent Mian Ata Ullah. It would be advantageous to reproduce paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application, which read thus:-- " That I want to withdraw this petition in favour of the respondent No. 1 Begum Almas Daultana, I do not want to proceed with this petition and that I acknowledge the sole ownership of respondent Begum Almas Daultana who has got legal rights and entitlements to get the benefits or of any other person who derives the title from Begum Almas Daultana, of the Property No.SE-19-R-107 known as Adelphy Hotel, 78-Upper Mall, Lahore comprising Khasra Nos.2028, 2029, 2030 situated in village Mian Mir failing in Upper Mall Development Scheme of L.D.A. and I admit the relationship 6f respondent (Begum Almas Daultana) as sister of Mst. Sardar Begum in the column of ownership, that I also admit and acknowledge as correct the mutation and the sole ownership of Mst, Begum Almas Daultana of the said property. I also admit, confess and acknowledge that the succession certificate obtained by the respondent Begum Almas Daultana, and the pedigree-table as given in para, 25/IY of my petition is correct and good in the eyes of law,

4. I admit that Begum Almas Daultana was having sisters only, and were not having any brother, That late Ghulam Muhammad was an orphan and Begum Almas Daultana adopted him as adopted brother "Laipalak". M/s Saleem, Jamil and Pervaiz etc. are the sons of late Ghulam Muhammad and from real sister of mine, who are applicants against respondent Begum Almas Daultana, in the said reference, Late Ghulam Muhammad was not related to Begum Almas Daultana.

7. Mr. Muhammad Ghani, further submitted that on 6th May, 1972, Mutation No.466 was sanctioned, regarding property in dispute, only in the name of Mst. Almas Daultana. The appellants challenged the correctness of the mutation by means of civil suit on 27-11-1975, Mst. Almas Daultana in her written statement filed on 19-1-1976 conceded that Ghulam. Muhammad died on 20-3-1967 while Mst, Sardar Begum died on 1-10-1967, Ghulam Muhammad predeceased Mst. Sardar Begum and that Mst. Dam Tasneem wife of Khan Bahadur Ahmad Yar Daultana died on 20-6-1971. It is submitted that the suit was decreed orf 10-10-1978 and appeal filed by Mst. Almas Daultana was dismissed on 24-5-1979. Mutation No.466 was then reviewed on 2-8-1979 and half of the property was mutated in the names of the appellants. Precise submission was that according to the contesting respondent, he purchased the entire property from Mst. Almas Daultana. on 1-4-1980, whereas the civil suit dated 26-11-1975, filed by the appellants, which was decreed in their favour on 10-10-1978, whereby they were held entitled to inherit half of the property in dispute was much prior to the alleged purchase by the contesting respondent, therefore, he was not entitled to protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). In support of the above plea, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yamin v. Settlement Commissioner (1976 SCMR 489), wherein it was held that where it was found that the vendor had no right, title or Interest in demised property, no protection could be given to him on the basis of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

9. The case of Muhammad Yamin (supra) arose out of a settlement matter and is, therefore, distinguishable. In. the Instant case, the matter has not Arisen out of the settlement laws, therefore, the Case of Muhammad Yamin (supra) has no relevance in the context of the controversy involved herein, In any event, even the dictum laid down in the case of Muhammad Yamin (supra), does not advance the case of the Appellants, inasmuch as, the vendor here was Mst. Almas Daultana and It Is not the case of the appellants that she was not an heir of Mst, Sardar Begum, It is well settled that the plea of protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is not available In settlement matters. The same view was reiterated in Mst. Maryam Begum v, Ch. Shah Muhammad (1976 SCMR 342), Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Commissioner (1983 SCMR 1199) and Manzoor Hussain v. Fazal Hussain (1984 SCMR 1027). The case of Muhammad Yamin (supra) was also considered by a Full Bench of this Court In the case of Chaudhry Muhammad Saleem v. Fazal Ahmad (1997 SCMR 31) and the same view was expressed, One of us (Irshad Hassan Khan, J.), who authored the judgment, observed at pages 321 And 322 of the above report as follows:-- "Section 41 of the Act IV of 1882 statutory application of law of estoppel and makes an exception to the rule that a person cannot confer a better title than he has,. The principle underlying the provisions of the section, as highlighted by this Court in Kanwal Nain v, Fateh Khan (PLD 1983 SC 53), is 'whenever one of the two innocent persons had to suffer by the act of a third person he who has enabled the third person to occasion the loss must sustain it', The following conditions are necessary for application of the section namely:-- (i) the transferor is the ostensible owner; (ii) he is so by the consent, express or implied, of the real owner; (iii) the transfer is for consideration; (iv) the transferee had acted in good faith taking reasonable care to Ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer. Even if the appellant satisfies the first three conditions, the fourth condition is not satisfied, inasmuch as, the Border Area Committee had recorded a finding of fact that the appellant had not acted in good faith and 'obtained the allotment through under-hand means. The learned Judges of the Division Bench in the High Court refused to interfere with the order of the Border Area Committee and dismissed the writ petition of the appellant. The appellant, therefore, cannot be allowed to press section 41 of the Act IV of 1882. Be that as it may, the principle embodied in section 41 of the Act IV of 1882, is the principle of natural equity. Here the equities are not in favour of the appellant, inasmuch as, the respondent No, I had Admittedly raised shops and godown on the land in dispute without any objection by the appellant And that the later was in the exclusive enjoyment of the property in dispute As an owner for the last so many years, The High Court was, therefore, right in not Interfering with the order of the Border Area Committee, Additionally, the plea of protection on the principle of section 41 of the Act IV of 1882 is not Available in Settlement matters. Refer Muhammad Yamin v, Settlement Commissioner (1976 SCMR 489) wherein it was held that where It was found that the vendor had no right, title or interest in the demised property, no protection can be given to him on the basis of section 41 of the Act IV of 1882, The same view was reiterated in Maryam Begum v. Ch. Shah Muhammad (1976 SCMR 342). In the case If Bashir Ahmad v. Additional Commissioner (1983 SCMR 1199), it was held that the transfer of purchase was subject to the incidence of sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 and the purchaser is not protected even though the sale was bona fide and for value. The same view was followed in Manzoor Hussain v, Fazal Hussain (1984 SCMR 1027). Needless to add that the case of Sher Muhammad v. Border Area Committee (1988 MLD 826) relied by the appellant is also distinguishable. In the last mentioned case, it was found that the order of allotment of the house in dispute therein was made by one Member of the Border Area Committee acting singly. The house was also found to be in continuous possession of the appellants therein at the time of commencement of the Settlement Scheme, 1961, On these facts, it was held that the order passed by the Border Area Committee for eviction of the occupants of the house, on the basis of Its earlier transfer order made by one Member of the Committee singly, was without lawful authority. The application of section 41 of the Act of 1882 wits not in controversy in the aforementioned case.

10. Here, the contesting respondent satisfies all the four conditions. Thus visualized, the contesting respondent was entitled to the statutory protection available under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The material available on record does not show that the contesting respondent/transferee had not acted in good faith, In taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer, as is apparent from the fact that an agreement was arrived at between the contesting respondent and the then Governor Lt..-Gen, Ghulam Gilani Khan in 1981 that the answering respondent would be given plots of equal value in consequence of the acquisition of the land in dispute for a public purpose. It would be advantageous to reproduce paragraphs 2 and 3 of the concise statement filed by the contesting respondent, which read thus:-- That an agreement was arrived at between the answering respondent Mian Ataullah (the sole owner in possession) and the then Governor Lt.-Gen, Ghulam Jilani Khan in 1981, the major clause was that he will deliver the possession to the Government and will not challenge in any Court and the answering respondent will be given plots of equal value, the Government before entering into the agreement, verified the record of revenue department, excise and taxation department, the NIPA, the advertisement to sell. The succession certificate in favour of Almas Daultana and her receipts of moveable jeweler etc etc. worth millions of rupees received by Almas Daultana from the deceased Sardar Begum, above all the judgment/order dated 1971 of the Honourable Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1530 of 1967 in favour of Almas -Daultana, the return of possession of the said property (the Edulphy Hotel) and payment of arrears of rent of rupees one hundred and thirty thousand by N.I.P.A., to the sole legal heir Begum Almas Daultana and after being satisfied of the bona fide of Almas Daultana then the registered sale- deed registered in favour of the answering respondent (Mian Ataullah by Almas Daultana and Excise and Tex receipts of Edulphy Hotel Building as tax paid amounting to Rs. fifty nine thousand by the answering respondent and his possession as well as Ataullah Hospital record etc. as thereafter the Government in 1981 being satisfied with the sole ownership and bona fide of the answering respondent as he was, the Government entered into the agreement with the answering respondent in 1981.

3. That before entering into the agreement the answering respondent (Mian Ataullah) refused the offer and also the acquisition of 1981 was resisted through huge appeals dated 1981 to the then President Gen. Ziaul Haq as advertised in daily newspaper spending about Rs. One Lac by the answering respondent but the appellants remained ignorant and did not challenge any of the above given facts in any Court and never appeared in any Court since 1965 to 1986, during these twenty one (21) years. "

11. Learned counsel for the respondent was right in contending that the appellants neither challenged the agreement nor the registered sale deed nor the delivery of possession to the Government by the answering respondent and that they approached the LDA Tribunal after a lapse of over seven years for being impleaded as a party, which ought not to have been allowed, in facts and circumstances of the case, notwithstanding the fact that no period of limitation is prescribed under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act.

12. When faced with the above situation, Mr. Muhammad Ghani learned counsel for the appellants reiterated that, the Reference was not filed under section 18 but it was filed under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, and no limitation was provided for a Reference under section 30 of the above Act. He submitted that even LDA Tribunal could implead a person who is entitled to inherit from the owner, whose land had been acquired. In support of the above proposition reliance was placed on the following decisions: Dr. G.H. Grant v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 237), wherein it was observed:

"But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector, if he is not served with notice of the filing, may raise a dispute relating to apportionment or to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the Court for a reference under section 30 for the determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award or which may have devolved upon him since the award. Under section 18 an application made to the Collector has to be made within the period prescribed by clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 18 But no such period is prescribed under section 30... Reference was also made to the case of Ghulam Muhammad v, Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 191), wherein it was observed as under:-- "

It seems to me that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act must be read as a whole and reading it in this way it appears that the Act has provided for 2 kinds of reference, one under section 18 and the other under section 30 of the Act, but the scope and the object of these two references are quite distinct and separate, Under section- 18 the reference is of a dispute with regard to the area or the quantum of the compensation or as to the apportionment of the same amongst the persons interest, This reference is strictly limited to the above matters, whereas under section 30 the reference may be made if a dispute arises as to the method of apportionment of the compensation or as to the persons to whom the same or any part there is payable. The subject matter of this latter reference is limited to dispute purely of title in which the Government is not directly inserted. The award of the Collector, as pointed out by Lord Buckmaster in the case of T.B. Ramchandra Rao v. AX Ramchandra Rao and others is an award of the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons interested in the land of whose claims the Collector has information meaning thereby people whose interest are not in dispute, but where there is a dispute as to who are the persons interested or as to the extent of their interests or as to the nature of their respective interests that would not be for the Collector to decide under section 18, but should be left to the Courts to adjudicate upon under section 30. " Reliance was also placed on Government of West Pakistan v. Mat. Asmatun Nisa (PLD 1983 SC 109), wherein it was observed as under:-- "So far as the second contention is concerned, there is no difficulty in repelling the same as, while disposing of a similar point, this Court In PLD 1981 SC 5 16 held that the Court cannot go into the question where the application under section 18 was barred by limitation," And lastly, reference was made to the case of Government of West Pakistan v. Arbab HAJI Ahmed Ali Jan (PLD 1981 SC 516), wherein it was observed thus:-- "It is only when a reference is made under section IS that the designated Court is empowered to act and not otherwise; and while exercising its jurisdiction, It cannot go behind the reference and hold that it was illegally made for the reason that the Collector had no power to do so as the application for making the reference was made beyond time. Such exercise of judicial power must be eminent from the jurisdiction otherwise it cannot be exercised ......

13. Mr. Muhammad Ghani next argued that it is only when a reference Is made under section 18 that the designated Court is empowered to act and not otherwise; and while exercising its jurisdiction, It cannot go behind the reference, Reliance was placed on Arbab Haji Ahmad Ali Jan's case (supra),

14. There is no cavil with the proposition of law laid down in the precedent cases quoted by Mr. Muhammad Ghani, Be that as it may, the findings recorded by the learned Judges of the Division Bench do not advance the case of the appellants when considered in juxtaposition with the case of contesting respondent that he is entitled to the statutory protection available under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for the respondent was right in contending that the nephew of Mat. Almas Daultana, as the appellants' claim, could not remain ignorant during three acquisition proceedings in 1965, 1973 and 1981 as also the four time change of possession .of the said property: Edulphy Hotel In 1965,, with the N.I.P.A, In 1971, to Almas Daultana under Division Bench's orders in Writ Petition No. 1530 of 1967 and then in 1975 to the contesting respondent who paid advance of Rs.3,00,000 by Bank Draft No.683256, dated 30.8-1975, copy whereof Is available at page 24 of the concise statement filed by respondent Mian Ataullah, to Mat Almas Daultana, after verification of the orders passed in the above writ petition and It was then that the respondent handed over the possession to the Government under the agreement dated 27 -12-1981.

15. Viewed in the above context, the pleas that before the purchase of property by respondent Mian Ataullah from Begum Almas Daultana, the appellants were shown at owners of half of the property on the basis of Mutation No.466, that there was a dispute between the appellants and Begum Almas Daultana about the property in Vehari, which was left by Mat. Sardar Begum and Mat. Dar& Tasleem and in those proceedings also the appellants were held entitled to inherit half of the property alongwith Mat, Almas Daultana; that Mian Javed Daultana, P,W. 3, In his statement dated 30-6-1987, at pages 276 277 of the Paper Book in C,A.,No, 1224 of 1997, admitted the appellants to be sons of Ghulam Muhammad and Ghalam Muhammad is real brother of Mat, Almas Daultana and that Mat Almas Daultana on 27-7-1974, wrote A letter Exh, D-10 before the Civil Court, Vehari, copy whereof Is at pages 282 to 287 of the Paper Book, which was addressed to Muhammad Jamil appellant, wherein she stated: And further the plea that Mat Alma& Daultana in her statement before L,D.A. Tribunal in the reference of Mat. AkhtAr Begum on 9th October 1980, admitted Ghulam Muhammad as her brother and that she herself purchased the land from Muhammad Saleem one of the Appellants, which had been given to him on the death of Mat, Dara Tasleem, lose significance. The contesting respondent was not privy to any fraud or misrepresentation, having purchased the property in good faith for valuable consideration, making All the requisite inquires into the title of the vendor i.e Mat. Almas-Daultana prior to the purchase, therefore, this circumstance alone is sufficient to uphold the impugned order, 16, We find that the Government of Punjab, Lahore Development Authority and the heirs of Mst..AlMAs DaultanA are parties to the instant cause,. As regards the Government of Punjab and Lahore Development Authority, the actions taken by the contesting respondent in the matter of his objective satisfaction about the title of Mat. Almas Daultana along side negotiations he had with the then Provincial Governor And the Lahore Development Authority, clearly operate as estoppel against them. Reference in this behalf may be made to the first meeting between the then Provincial Governor and the Commissioner, In the second instance, the agreement reached between all concerned including the contesting respondent, fixing his entitlement to (some) plots in Johar Town in lieu of abandonment of his rights in the disputed premises further advances his case in that behalf. None of the afore-referred respondents can be heard complaining against the entitlement of the contesting respondent to stick to the benefits that he received In lieu of his open action taken for the benefit of all concerned. Looked at from whatever angle, the appellants are not entitled to have the Impugned judgment reversed, in that, such a course will be putting premium on their conduct in taking the goods at leisure and not approaching the appropriate forum/s within a reasonable time. A period of more than a decade and a half is sufficient to burden the appellants with the consequences of their inaction. The instant appeals are sins merit and are hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs. M,B.A./M-329/S Appeals dismissed.