1984Q3 (PLP)

(in acres) 29 Deh Pathara Tehsil Hub 182‑0‑11 30 do 45‑3‑22 31 do 2‑2‑09 42 do 168‑0‑37 42/2 do 18‑0‑32 47 do 118‑3‑04 150 do 150‑0‑24 130 do 67‑1‑24

Total : 753‑1‑24 (Sd.) (Col. Abdul Rauf Khan) Commissioner Kalat Division."

3. The Deputy Commissioner Lasbela, on 29‑10‑1980 asked the Galadari Cement (Gulf) Ltd. to deposit the amount in respect of 797‑2‑I1 Acres of land. This assessment was further re‑examined and the enhanced amount was also paid by the respondent No.

5. The Collector made the award on 9‑4‑1981 which is reproduced below :‑ "AWARD ORDER Subject.‑Acquisition of land from Mouza Pathara for Galadari (Gulf) Cements (Gulf) Limited for the purpose of construction/establish ment of cement factory at Hub. Read.‑(1) Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued by the Collector Lasbela District under his No. 6942‑46/5 (160)/80/RB, dated 1‑6‑1980 and No. 8425‑29/5 (160)/80 RB, dated 2‑7‑1980. (2) Notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued by the Commissioner Kalat Division, Khuzdar under his No. 9637‑41/RB/80, dated 1‑8‑1980 and No. 9631‑35/RB‑80, dated 1‑8‑1980. Reasons of Award. Since the area of the private land is coming under Galadari Cement (Gulf) Limited for the purpose of construction/establishment of Cement Factory at Pathara Mouza, Tebsil Hub, District Lasbela, hence the land have been acquired as per notification issued by Commissioner, Kalat Division except those land for which Honourable High Court of Baluchistan has issued a Stay Order. Hence for issue of this award order arises, Ownership The land belongs to various persons as per record of rights maintained by Tehsildar Hub, District Lasbela :‑‑ S. No. Name of Owner. Area. Acre Rod Pole

1. Bolan Co‑operative Housing 514 1 14 Society Ltd. Hub.

2. Sher Mobd s/o Goreech Caste Gujar, r/o Pathara Tehsil Hub. 32 0 00

3. Rashid son of Abdul Latif, Mohd. Ali son of Suleman and Shabir 2 2 09 s/o Pir Mohd. r/o Karachi.

4. Aidoo, Saleh, Guloo, Matoo, Shambey sons of Mandoo, caste 20 2 34 Gujar r/o Pathara Tehsil Hub.

5. Bolan Investment, New Naham 63 2 04 Road, Karachi.

6. Muhammad Siddique son of Umer Baluch r/o Hub. 18 0 32 Total: 651 1 ‑ 13 Notice As the provisions of sections 5 and 5‑A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been waived, therefore, the Baluchistan Government notified that land under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, stating therein that land is needed for construction of Cement Factory by Galadari Cements (Gulf) Limited. Requisition notices under sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 . of the Land tlp.lt~isition Act, 1894 were issued stating therein that Galadari (Gulf) Cement Company Limited is constructing a Cement Factory on the Private land at Monza Pathara and asked that all claims and statements for compensation and for all purposes may be made in the office of the Collector Lasbela, subsequently notices under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were issued to the land‑owners and date for holding enquiry was fixed and the claimants were heard accordingly. Claims In response to the notices issued, the land‑owners have submitted their statements and claims. The rate of compensation claimed by the land owners ranges from Rs. 30,000 to . Rs. 50,009 Messrs Bolan Co‑operative Housing Society Limited have submitted dbcumetary evidence in support of their claims. The claimant claimed the rate of compensation on the grounds that Bolan Co‑operative Housing Society have sold that area to its members at the rate of Rs. 8 per sq. yard. However, keeping in view of the situation and national importance of the the Cement Factory following rates are fixed . (I) Land within one mile of R.C.D. Highway Rs. 5,000 Per acre. (2) Land failing one mile away from R. C. D. Highway Rs. 4,000 do In addition to the above rate of compensation, I award 25 percent statutory allowance as admissible under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (Sd.) Major Nadir Ali. Deputy Commissioner & Collector Lasbela Distt:" The amount of compensation determined by the Collector has been received by Messrs Bolan Co‑operative Housing Society Ltd., under protest. The letter issued in this behalf by the said Housing Society is reproduced below . The Deputy Commissioner/Collector Lasbela District. Uthal Dear Sir, Please refer to your award Order No. 1711/5 (160) RB, dated 8‑4‑1981. awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,000 per acre in respect of land within one mile of R.C.D. Highway and at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per acre in respect of land falling one mile away from R.C.D. Highway in addition to 25 % statutory allowance. We have not accepted and are not accepting your award in relation to the amount of compensation fixed by you and we propose to make an application to you to refer the mattes' to Court for determination of the amount of. compensation under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act of 1894. In the meanwhile, it may be noted that the payment made by you on the basis of your award in respect of our land is received under protest as we do not accept the award given by you and the receipt of the payment by us will be without prejudice to our rights to challenge the award and the amount of compensation awarded therein. Yours faithfully For Bolan Co‑operative Housing Society Limited." The physical possession of the land was handed over, on 6‑5‑1981. The proceedings initiated for enhancement of the compensation at the instance of respondent No. 4 are however pending.

4. The petitioners have filed this Constitutional Petition, on 11‑9‑1982 in this Court and claim that they had beer., allotted, on 3‑1‑1979 pieces of land measuring only 120 sq yards by the Bolan Co‑operative Housing Society (Plots Nos. 633 and 631) and they had. paid the price thereof but the posses sion had not been delivered to them. It is alleged in the petition that in July, 1982 they had asked the Bolan Housing Society Limited to give them possession of their plots but had been informed vide letter dated 19‑7‑1982 that since the Society's land has been acquired by the notifications, dated 1‑6‑1980 and 1‑8‑1980 (Annexures I and J) they are not in a position to give possession; hence the petition has been filed in this Court Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Ltd., for whom the lands were acquired filed a Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1 of 1983 on 11‑1‑1983 and have been impleaded as respondents Nos. 5 by order of this Court, dated 8‑1‑1983. The amended petition has been filed and the affidavit in rejoinder has been filed by the respondent No. 5.

5. The petitioners have raised a number of questions of law attacking the constitutionality of the land acquisition proceedings and the main grounds urged are that (a) the land has not been properly described; (b) The name of the company has not been mentioned in the notifications under section 4/6 of the Act. The notification are, therefore, invalid as there is no provision for acquiring the land for an undisclosed company; (c) Messrs Galadari Brothers whom the Notifications were forwarded is not a Company within the meaning of the Act as such the land cannot be acquired for said concerti; (d) without prejudice and in the alternative the agreement was with a Company namely Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Ltd. which is a different concern namely Messrs Galadari Brothers for whose benefit the land was acquired through the notifications issued under section 4/6 of the Act; (e) No public notice as required under section 9(1) of the Act was issued; (f ) No notice was issued to the petitioners as required under section 9(3) of the Act; (g) It was mandatory to effect service of notice under section 4 of the Act to the persons effected including the petitioners. (h) The action of acquiring land is against the principles of natural justice; (i) No agreement has been executed between the Government and the Company before taking steps under sections 6 and 37 of the Act and one published was subsequent to the notification issued under section 6 of the Act;

6. In reply to the grounds mentioned by the petitioner as said above, the counsel , for the respondent No. 5 has contended that the proceedings for acquisition of land had been conducted properly and entirely in accordance with the Act. The Government has satisfied itself that such acquisition was necessary for public purpose and it was needed for the construction of a cement and housing Society by Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Ltd., Company and which was likely to prove useful to the public and the declara tion to that effect was made published in accordance with section 6 of the Act and by clause 3 of that section such declaration was conclusive that the land was required for the purpose declared. After the declaration the land had been acquired in the manner prescribed by the Act and the acquisi tion was in all respects valid. The possession of the land was obtained after the proceedings were completed.

7. Legal objections about the status of the petitioners to challenge the acquisition proceedings specially when respondent No. 4 has accepted the acquisition has also been made. It has been further contended that the contractual obligation if any between the petitioners and the Housing Society (respondent No. 4) have no bearing on the right and interest of the respondent No.: 5, accruing from the acquisition of land. The petitioners for their grievance, if any, have the remedy under the Act. It is also asserted that this petition is the result of collusion between the petitioners and the respondent No. 4.

8. In order to satisfy ourselves we have perused the record and facts borne out from the record have been mentioned in paras. 2 and 3 above in order to complete the narration of facts so as to appreciate the respective contentions raised by the parties.

9. In order to determine the present controversy it is necessary at this stage to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act has the following preamble: "Whereas it is expedient to amend the law for the acquisition of land needed for public purposes and for Companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be .made on account of such acquisition." The words "company" and "public purpose" are particularly noteworthy in section 3 of the Act. The expression company has been used in comprehensive sense of including not, only the companies under several statutes, but also includes a Society registsred within the meaning of the Co‑operative Societies Act. The expression public purpose as defined in section 3(f) does not determine its scope. All that has been said in the Act, is :‑ "The expression "public purpose" includes the provisions of village sites in districts in which the Provincial Government shall have declared by Notification in the official Gazette that it is customary' for the Government." In the case of Lt.‑Col. Muhammad Amin Khan v. Government of Pakistan and others (P L D 1966 (W. P.) Lah. 111), Mushtaq Hussain, J. (as he then was) at page 11.7 of the report has expressed :‑ "that one of the two words means or includes is generally employed to define the scope of a word in the interpretation Clause of a statute. The former is used to restrict the scope of the word to the four corners of what is stated in the clause and to deprive it of any other meaning that it may have in the English Language. The word "include" on the other hand is used with a view to enlarging the meaning of the word, by also clothing it with the connotation given to it in the interpretation clause in addition to the sense which it conveys in common parlance." "Include" is not used in a sort of a conjective sense so as to make only such things correspond to the word "defined" as answer to the meaning given to the word in the ordinary language as well as the scope assigned to it by the definition. Since the purpose is to extend the scope of the word it will cover not only cases which are covered by the dictionary meaning plus the meaning given in the interpretation clause but also by either of teem individually. To hold otherwise is to defeat the very purpose for which the word include is used in the interpretation clause." The question of what is public purpose has been considered by the Courts. In the words used by Mahajan, J. in State of Bihar v. Kontsor Singh (AIR 1952SC252) ;‑ "that "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. In other words the definition of the expression is elastic and takes it colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual." Das, J in the same case has expressed the opinion that "with the onward march of civilization our notions as to the scope of the general interest of the community are fast changing and widening with the result that our old and narrow notions as to the sanctity of the private interests of the individual can no longer stem the onward following tide of time and must necessarily give way to the broader notions of the general interest of the community." In A I R 1960 S C 1023 buildings of residential quarters for industrial labours was declared as public purpose. The result of the authorities may thus be summed up. Acquisition of property for public purpose includes whatever results in advantage to the public and any work of which the public can in any way derive benefits whether by direct use of the work or by enjoyment of the fruits of activities carried on there will be a public purpose. It might be in favour of the E individuals provided they are benefited not as an individual but in further ance of a scheme of public utility. It follows that whetever furthers the general interests of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual must be regarded as a public purpose.

10. The proceedings begin with a Government notification under section 4 of the Act that the lands in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. On the issue of such a notification it is permissible for a public servant to enter upon the land to do certain things specified therein with a view to ascertaining whether the land is adapted for the purpose for which it was proposed to be acquired as also to determine the boundaries of the land proposed to be included in the scheme of the acquisition. Section 5 makes provisions for hearing of objections by any person interested in any land notified under section 4 and makes reference not only to public purpose, but also to a company. It is noticeable that section 5(a) of the Act predicates that the notification under section 4(1) of the Act may not only refer to land needed for a public purpose, but also to land needed for a company and after the enquiry as contemplated by section 5(a) of the Act has been made and the Collector has heard objections if any, by interested parties; he has to submit his report to the Government alongwith the record of the proceedings held by him and his recommendations on the objections. Thereupon, the Government has to make its mind whether or not the objections were well‑founded, and the decision of the Government on these objections is to be treated as final. If the Government is satisfied that the land was needed for a public purpose or for a company, a declaration must be made to that effect and such a declaration has to be published in the official Gazette and has to contain the particulars, of the lands including its approximate area and the purpose for which it is needed. Once the declaration under section 6 of the Act has been made it shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company: Then follow the usual proceedings after notice is given to the parties concerned to claim compensation in respect of any interest in the land in question and the award after making the necessary investigation as to claims to conflicting title, the compensation to be a lowed in respect of the lands and if necessary apportion ment of the amount of compensation amongst the persons believed to be interested in the acquisition of the land.

11. From the preamble as also from the provision's of section 5 (a), 6 and 7 of the Act it is obvious that the Act makes a clear distinction between acquisition of land needed for a public purpose and for a company. The Ac hes gone further and had devoted Part VII to acquisition of land for companies and in subsection (2) of section 38 of the Act with which Part VII begins, provides that in case of an acquisition for a company, for the word "for such purpose the words for the purposes of the company shall be deemed to be substituted. It has been laid down by section 39 of the Act that the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act beginning with section 6 and ending with section 37, shall not be put into operation unless two conditions 1 precedent' are fulfilled, namely (i) the provision consent of the Provincial Government been obtained, and (ii) an agreement in terms of section 41 of the Act has been executed by the Company. When the Government is satisfied as to the purpose of the acquisition in question, the Government shall require the company to enter into an agreement providing for the payment to the Government, (1) cost of the acquisition, and (2) and the terms on which the land shall he held by the company. These are the provisions of the Act. We have to consider with reference to the question of the constitutionality of the land acquisition proceedings now challenged before us.

12. The objections (a), (b) (c) and (d) as mentioned in Para. 5 of this judgment can be disposed of straightaway. The objection that the land has not been properly described is in the face of record not tenable. The recital in the notification of the land needed is clear and there is no ambiguity. The land‑owners had in fact made. objections to the notification issued under section 4 of the Act. The respondent No. 4 through whom the petitioners claim any interest in the land have properly understood the notification and had preferred objections. The Government at no stage of time was in any doubt the company for whose benefit the acquisition was being made/issued. This was clear from the application made by the respondent No. 5 and the intention was clear from the application submitted by Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Limited and letter issued in this behalf by the Government to the Commissioner Kalat Division resproducxd above that the acquisition was really meant for setting ' up a cement factory and the housing colony for the persons to be employed thereon. Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Limited the company had come into existence as is clear from the certificate of incorporation ‑issued by Assistant Registrar Joint Stock of the Quetta, dated 23rd April, 1980, much before the notification was issued under section 4 of the Act. The said company has also made the ,payment and has entered into agreement, dated 1st July, 1980 which agreement has' been published in the Baluchistan Gazette, and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners nor any such prejudice has been claimed in the petition. We found no vagueness and inadequacy. Any omission in not putting the name of the company in the notification remains only technical. The objection of the petitioners thus rests on a mere technicality and has nol' relation with equity and justice and it is not such a material irregularity/i omission which in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case will destroy the whole proceedings specially when it has caused no prejudice to the petitioners. In the circumstances of the case we are not prepared to use our discretion in favour of the petitioners even if the technical objection taken on behalf of the petitioner could have succeeded before us. We are fortified in our view in this behalf by the law land down in Dacca National Medical Institute v. Province of East Pakistan and others (P L D 1963 Dacca 741). The objection (b) is equally without any substance. In fact the letter pad on which the application for acquisition has been written on behalf of the respondent No. 5 has caused this inaccuracy, but the fact remains that it is Messrs Galadari Cement (Gulf) Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1913 for whose benefit the land was acquired through notifications issued under section 6 of the Act. Reference can be made to the recitals in the agreement which states that (i) the second party being desirous to establish a factory for manufacture of cement in Mouza Patbara, Tehsil Hub, District Lasbela approached the Government of Baluchistan for obtaining requisite land for that purpose and (ii) the first agreed to acquire on behalf of the second party under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and (iii) it has been show to the satisfaction of the Government that the proposed acquisi tion is needed for construction of cement factory likely to serve useful to the public and (iv) that the price was to be paid by the company. These recitals clearly show that the land was not being acquired for the company simplicitor but was also being acquired for public purpose and this has been so said as is evident from the recitals in the notification issued under section 6 of the Act, and this as laid down in subsection (3) of section 6 of the Act is a declaration which is conclusive evidence that land is needed for, a public purpose and for the Company,. and there is no reason to doubt the statement of the Government that the land was required for the public purpose. It is not necessary to publish the reason for the satisfaction of the Government. The purpose of the notification under section 4 of the Act is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey etc. whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. What was a mere proposal under section 4 of the Act becomes the subject‑matter of a definite proceedings for acquisition under the Act. Hence any defect in the notification under section 4 is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when the acquisition is for a company and the purpose has to be investigated under section 5‑A or section 40 of the Act necessarily after the notification under section 4 of the Act. This to our mind is a complete answer to these contentions of the petitioners in respect of the notification. The objections are, therefore, without any substance and are repelled.

14. The objection (g) is found incorrect from the record. All the persons interested and in whose name the land under ac4uisition were found to be entered in the record were properly served and in fact all these persons have appeared before the Collector in response to the notice. The respondent No. 4, the principal. and through whom the petitioners claim had filed objections to the notification issued under section 4 and were heard. The petitioners were neither in possession of the land no their names appeared in the revenue record like other land‑owners. The respon dent No. 4 also had at no stage of the proceedings furnished any list of the persons whom the allotment was made. In these circumstances the petitioners cannot legally claim any notice. This being the state of facts, the objection (g) stands repelled, and in view of the above no principles of natural justice have been violated in this case. There is no indications in the provisions of the Act to show that the Government while making up its mind has to give opportunity to the parties concerned to produce evidence before it and decide the matter on consideration of the evidence before it. Section 6 of the Act contemplates three stages firstly that the Govern ment should after consideration of the report submitted by the Collector under section 5‑A be satisfied that the land is needed for a public purpose, secondly that the said declaration be made after the satisfaction and thirdly that the said declaration should be published under subsection (2) of the section. In the making of the declaration there is no implied duty on the Government to act judicially. The Government is not even bound to F accept the report made by the Collector under section 5‑A of the Act. The contention of the petitioners is only this that the writ be issued quashing the declaration issued under section 6 as the Government has not heard the petitioners and thus violated the principles of natural justice. The argument is not that the condition precedent for the issue of a declaration under section 6 namely the observance of the procedure laid down under section 5‑A has not been complied with, nor the argument is that the acquisition for constructing the cement factory and the housing colony for the employees does not constitute a public purpose.

15. It has been vehemently urged that no agreement was executed between the Government and the company before taking steps under section 6 and 7 of the Act and the one published was the subsequent to the notifi cation issued under section 6 of .the Act. Such an objection was considered by the Privy Council in the case of Ezra v. Secretary of State for India (1), and it was observed that the application which is made to the Government is made by the company on the allegations that the acquisition is needed for the construction of some work. The company, therefore, has to satisfy the Government as to the reality and bona fide of the said allegation. It has also to satisfy the Government and the Government are to satisfy themselves that the work which is proposed to be constructed is likely to prove useful to the public and the only parties concerned in this enquiry are the Government on one side, which have to be satisfied, and the company which has to furnish materials for the purpose of satisfying the Government. There is no provision in this section that any other person should be summoned or required to attend at the enquiry contemplated. The enquiry provided under section 40 of the Act is of special nature limited to a particular object. Section 40 constitutes the Government as the custodian of public interest, the sole judges of the two facts mentioned therein namely whether the land is required for the construction of some work and secondly whether the work is likely to prove useful to the public. The only other person concerns in the matter is the company which make the application for the lands and so long as they are satisfied upon the two matters which are made conditions precedent to their according their consent to the acquisition of the land, no Court is 1 competent to question the validity of the proceedings under section 40 of the Act and if the Government is satisfied with it shall .require the company to enter into an agreement with the Government provided to the satisfaction of the Government for the several matters which are set forth in that section. This view of the Privy Council was referred to and quoted with approval by Karam Ellahi Chauhan J. (as he then was) in Ghulam Bhik v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1973 Lab, 617), at page 626 of the report it has been observed :‑ "After issuance of a notification under section 4, land owners are to be on alert that their lands are likely to be acquired. At that time they may raise objections under section 5‑A or under section 40 of the Act but in the latter case that in when the matter is proceeding under section 40 (which is the situation here) the intiative is no longer in their lands and it is the Government and the Government alone whiLh is to form its opinion and the land‑owners have no locus standi to participate in said enquiry." The same view. has been taken in Ch. Khushi Muhammad v. The Commissioner, Muttan and others (P L D 1965 Lah. 250), where Yaqub Ali J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench observed at page 255 of the report :‑ "A comparison of provisions of sections 4, 5, 5‑A and 9 with the provi sions of section 40 will show that wherever it was intended by the Legislature that the persons affected will have a right to show cause, a distinct provision to that effect is made. For example, under section 4, "the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of the Notification to be given at convenient places in the locality where the land proposed to be acquired is situated." Section 5 makes provision for inspection of the plan of the land included in the Notification under section 4, and under section 5‑A "any person interested in any land" which has been notified under section 5 as being needed for a public purpose, for a Company, may within thirty days object to the Notification. Section 9 is, of course, entitled "Notice to persons interested." The omission of a notice to "persons interested" in the land to be acquired for the benefit of a Company in section 40, is, thus, deliberate; the underlying consideration being that the satisfaction of the Commissioner is not in the nature of an adjudication whether land belonging to a person shall be acquired for the benefit of a Company or not but is intended to provide material for determining whether the Government shall act on behalf of a Company in that behalf or not. The non‑issuance of the notice to the petitioner in the inquiry under section 40 had, thus, no effect on the validity of the consent given by the respondent No. 1 to the acquisition in question." At page 257 of the said report it is said that‑ "the primary object of requiring the Company to execute an agreement before the provisions of sections 6 to 37 of the Act are put into opera tion is to determine that the acquisition is for purposes enumerated in section 41 of the Act and to safeguard against the Company resiling from the acquisition proceedings after some decisive steps have been taken in the case." The condition of acquisition and the estimated amount of compensation deposited by the Company undertaking for further payment if so required has been furnished. The consideration underlying the . . . . . . . provisions for execution of agreement were thus satisfied. In the undertaking furnished by the company before the making of this application it has been provided that 75 per cent of the labour force and equal percentage ‑of the total managerial staff would .be from amongst the permanent residence of Baluchistan. It has also been undertaken by the company that the company would impart training to the Baluchistan is in sufficient number. This clearly shows that the acquisition was not for the company simplicitor but was also for public purpose. Thus, apart from the satutory presumption contained in the notification under section 6 of the Act, this was the material on record which showed that the land was being needed for public purpose, and this consideration the acquisition was consented as applied and this was done before the issuance of notification under section

6. Thus, the provisions of Part V11 were complied with in this case before the declaration was made and issued and before the land was ever acquired the terms were settled between the Government and the Company as contained in the letter of the Government, dated 1‑3‑1979 (reproduced i para. 2 of this judgment) wherein the details of extent of public was had been specified and this was in our opinion sufficient compliance of section 40 of the Act. In Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab (A I R 1950 Pb. 535), their Lordships have gone even further and it is held :‑‑ "Whenever land is required for a public purposes, even though the company is to bear all the expenses and use the land, there is no need to comply with the provisions of Part VII, in the matter of execution of an agreement as contemplated by sections 39 and 41." This view of the authority from Indian jurisdiction has been referred to and relied by Yaqub Ali, J. in Khushi Muhammad's case and appears at page 257 of the report.

16. It has been held in Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore v. The Custodian Evacuee Property West Pakistan Lahore and others (P L D 1971 S C 811), that in cases of acquisition of land another principle which is attracted is that before an order passed by a public authority is struck down, it is the duty of the Court to explore every possible explanation for its validity and examine the entire field of powers conferred on the authority in persuance of which the impugned order has been passed. In persuance of this law laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan we have examined the file of the land acquisition in this particular case and the material relevant for the purposes of this petition has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment in paras. Nos. 2 and

3. We are clear in our mind that there was nothing infirm in the section oil acquiring authorities. We further hold that the acquisition was not for the company simplicitor and was also for a public purpose. In any case the petitioner has no locus standi to object to the acquisition proceedings on the basis of any infraction even if any, of section 39 of the Act for he was not person interested in the execution of the agreement. 17. .Before the objection about the non‑issuance of notices under sections 9(1) and 9(3) of the Act as complained are considered, it is desirable that the general scheme of the Act is considered. The general scheme of the Act is this that there is first to be an enquiry by a Government officer into the question (1) whether the proposed acquisition is needed for the construction of some work; and (2) whether such work is likely to prove useful to the public. If the Government officer reports affirmatively on both points, then the Government may issue a declaration that the land is required for the purpose stated; and this being done, the sequel is the ascertainment of value in a second enquiry by the Collector. The decision of the latter officer is conclusive as against the Government but the owner of the land may, if dissatisfied, may get it determined by the Court by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court. The objections of the petitioner relate to the second enquiry which is as to the value of the land. Exactly the same objections were convassed before a Division Bench of the High Court at Karachi in case reported Shailaja v. Assistant Commissioner, Hyderabad (1980 C L C 2075), Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench said at page 2070 :‑ "However as held in aforesaid judgment the omission to serve a proper notice under the said provision does not affect validity of the acquisition proceedings. At the most therefore the non‑service of notice may render the award passed by the Acquisition Officer bad in law. It has, however been pointed out to us that petitioner has accepted the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under protest and on his application a reference has been made to the Court under section 18 of the Act which is pending decision. The question there is whether interference is called for in the Constitutional Jurisdiction when the petitioner has a ready invoked the statutory remedy." At page 2079 it is found that the referee Court before whom the reference under section 18 is pending can award adequate compensation. to the petitioner if it is shown to the Court that no special notice as required under sub section (3) of section 9 of the Act was served on the petitioner. The illegality if any committed on account of non‑compliance with the provisions o section 9 does not have the effect of vitiating the acquisition proceedings. All that remains to be done under the provisions of the‑ Act is to determine and award the proper compensation to the persons entitled. This can be adequately done is the pending reference under section 18 of the Act. The petitioner claims through the respondent No. 4 in this petition who has accepted the acquisition proceedings or at least against whom the acquisition proceedings have become final. At the most present petitioner can claim apportionment from the compensation awarded to the respondent and in case of denial by the respondent No. 4 can have recourse to the proceedings for the recovery thereof in the Court of law, and the remedy invoked already by the respondent No. 4 would be efficacious. Any other action would only cause confusion and create complications. The petitioners through this petition indirectly wants to enforce his contractual obligation with the respondent No. 4 being the allottees of the plots of land. We are afraid, T in view of the precedent furnished in the authority of Shamshad Ali Khan v. The Commissioner Lahore Division (1969 S C M R 122), for breach of agreement the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. The petition on this score also is misconceived.

18. There is yet another aspect of the matter and it is that on the issuance of a notification under section 4 of the Act land‑owners are to be on alert that their leads are to be acquired. At that time they may raise objections under section 5(a) of the Act which prescribed period of 30 days for the hearing of objections. As has been repeatedly said above that the principal of the petitioners namely Messrs Bolan Housing Society Limited1U has filed objections to the notification issued under section 4 of the Act. On the issuance of the said notification it is not be believeable that the petitioner could not know the proceedings after allotment in their favour. The petitioner could have been, vigilent, and could have known The explanation offered by them that they came to know, only on 19‑7‑1982, while the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued, on 1-6‑1980 and 1‑8‑1980 respectively and the proceedings finalized by the delivery of possession of land to the respondent No. 5, on 6‑5‑1981, is not convincing, The petition in our view suffers from lashes. It is settled proposition of law that writ will generally be refused in all cases where petitioner fails to show that he has proceeded expeditiously after discovering that it was necessary to resort to it and especially when great public inconvenience will result from its use. In all such cases of public detriment or inconvenience petitioners must act speedily and any unreasonable delay will warrant refusal. In the land acquisition cases objections against the Acquisition can be preferred under section 5‑A within thirty days after the issue of notification and the intention is obvious that the proceedings should be completed without loss of time. Now the proceedings in the instant case stand finalized. The posses sion of the land has been obtained by the respondent No. 5 who has paid the compensation. In view of our findings that the notifications impugned in this petition were validly issued and the proceedings taken, therefore, were in accordance with law it is not necessary to dilate any further on the preliminary objections raised by the respondent No. 5 about the status of the petitioners to challenge the proceedings in this petition. For the above reasons we find no legal defect in the proceedings under which the land has been acquired for the benefit of the respondent No. 5 for a public purpose namely for the establishment of a cement factory in Mouza Pathara, District Lasbela and the petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHARY, ACTC?. C. J.‑I agree that this petition dismissed on the grounds of laches and that the petitioners want to enforce the contractual obligations, through this petition. The petitioners have claimed their right through respondent No. 4 who was properly served and he had filed objection to the notification. The acquisition proceedings against the respondent No. 4 have become final. The respondent No. 4 had received the compensation though under protest. The reference under section 18 o the: Land Acquisition Act is pending before the competent Court for awarding H, of the adequate compensation. Thus it is clear that respondent No. 4 had accepted the acquisition proceedings and proper compensation is to be determined by the Court. It appears that the petitioner bad in collusion with respondent No. 4 bad moved this petition after preconouncement of judgment by this Court in Abdul Ghani v. Province of Baluchistan (P L D 1982 Quetta 63). The delay in filing the petition has not been satisfactorily explained. The acquisition proceedings started in June 1980 but the petitioner has filed this petition on 4‑9‑1982. ......................................................................................................................................................................... Petition dismissed.