P L D 1961 (W (PLP)

It will be observed that the act was regarded contempt because it was an offence against the dignity of the Court.

8. In Pifard's case ((1864) 1 Hyde 79) Morgan, J., while hearing arguments in a review petition, asked Barrister Piffard, who was repeating himself, to stop. He did not stop at which Morgan, J. said, "Hold your tongue, sir". Later, while appearing in another case before the same Bench, Piffard suggested that Morgan, J. should apologize, at which Morgan, J. left the Court. Piffard then sent Captain Francis to Morgan, J. on what purported to be a pacific errand to demand an explanation. The matter was placed before a Full Bench of eleven Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William. On behalf of Piffard and Francis it was urged that they had no intention whatsoever of committing any contempt. Sir Barnes Peacock, the Chief Justice, and eight other Judges were of the opinion that the conduct of Piffard and Francis amounted to contempt, while the remaining two Judges were of the opinion that it did not amount to contempt. Sir Barnes Peacock said he felt no hesitation in holding that this was a case of contempt. The Court simply announced judgment and did not record its reasons, but there is no ground for assuming that the two Judges who dissented were of the opinion that any publication was necessary. This was not the point which was being argued on behalf of the respondents as will appear from the report of the case. Apparently, the Judges who decided in favour of the respondents did so on the ground that their conduct in the circumstances did not amount to an insult offered to Court. 9. "In the matter of Thomas James Wallace" ((1866) Law Reports I P C 283), appears to be conclusive of the point in dispute and I will refer to it in some detail. Thomas James Wallace, an Attorney and Barrister of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, was himself a party in two suits before that Court. In the decision of both these suits he had some grievances against the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In one case, grievance was that when called upon to file a judgment for the purpose of an application for leave to appeal the learned Chief Justice had filed a written judgment which differed materially from the judgment delivered in Court. In the second suit the grievance was that the learned Chief Justice had acted on information received out of Court from one who was stranger to the proceedings. On the 10th of January 1863, an order was made by Sutherland, J. of the Court of Probate at Halifax, declaring that the appellant had been guilty of contempt of Court and suspending him from practice therein as an Advocate and Proctor. Wallace appealed from the order of the Judge of the Probate Court to the Supreme Court, but on a technical ground the appeal was not entertained. Wallace then moved the Chief Justice in Chambers to grant leave for an appeal against this decision to Her Majesty‑in‑Council. This leave was refused. Being desirous of petitioning Her Majesty‑in‑Council for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court but being apprehensive that additions may be made to the written judgment as had, according to Wallace, been done in the suit to which he was a party, Wallace wrote a letter to the Chief Justice which ran :‑ "The Honourable the Chief Justice. Sir,‑I shall feel obliged by your filing the judgment given in Court, in my case with Mr. Sutherland, without any additions. I say without any additions, because in the case of Dunphy v. Wallace. I had much reason to complain of the decision there filed, as very material additions were made to it, and much said with a view, as I and others thought, of meeting me at England. I must, I think, decline sending to England the decision given on my petition for an appeal, in consequence of a statement made therein, to the effect that other modes were pointed out by the Court by which the matter might have been removed ; but I remember only one way mentioned, that by certiorari, and this certainly is not modes. Now, as regards one's position after the removal of a cause by certiorari, I think I can safely say that no Practitioner at our Bar understands it. In the case of The City of Halifax v. Wallace, according to the decision of the Court, I would not have been allowed to try the cause, only for the defects in the affidavits produced on the part of the City. Remembering this case, I was a good deal surprised to hear the Court say that, had the cause with Mr. Sutherland been removed by certiorari, that it would have been sent to a jury leaving the impression on my mind that the party so removing a cause has a right, as a matter of course, to a trial, the very reverse of what was decided in the case of The City of Halifax v. Wallace. It was in that case I good‑naturedly remarked, that the decision would likely be different when it fell to my lot to be on the other side. And I venture to say, had my case with Mr. Sutherland been removed in the first instance by certiorari, a course, however, which never occurred to the Honourable Mr. Johnston (then my counsel), I would have been met with a thousand objections, resulting in my defeat, as on the appeal. "I may be wrong, but I can't help thinking, that I am not fairly dealt with by the Court or Judges, and that the well‑beaten track is often departed from for some bye‑way to defeat me. Even in that little case of Wallace v. Connolly, the case was not decided upon the affidavits, but a person was spoken to out of doors, and the case decided upon what he said, not under oath, while the rule is, that a Judge can't use even knowledge within his own mind, much less obtain it from others, but must decide upon the affidavits. Better tell me at once to bring no affidavits into Court ; for if Mr. Smith, or any such person, shall even state to me that there is a different impression of the facts on his mind, you must fail as a matter of course. I could also recall cases where the decision was, I believe, largely influenced, if not wholly based, upon information received privately from the wife of one of the parties by the Judge. Is this justice ? I think a Judge in England would be a little startled to hear that a Judge in Nova Scotia listened to, much less decided upon, information obtained in this way. "I was on more than one occasion almost tempted to bring these things to the notice of the Legislature, but I overlooked them, as I trust you will overlook anything in this, should there be anything in it not strictly within allowable limits. Your very obedient servant‑T. J. Wallace." I have deliberately reproduced the whole letter so as to make it clear that this is all that the letter contained. Having written this letter and being apprehensive that some proceedings may be started against him on its basis, Wallace met the Chief Justice. He offered full apology and stated that he had no intention what sover of offending or insulting either the Chief Justice or any of the puisne Judges of the Supreme Court, his only object being to state in temporate language the grievances of which he felt he had reason to complain. In spite of this apology, however, a rule of the Supreme Court was issued to Wallace to show cause why he should not be suspended from practice as an Attorney and Barrister till he made suitable apology in open Court for the contempt committed by him. In the affidavit which was filed in respect of this notice, Wallace stated that he had no intention of insulting the Chief Justice and that he had offered an apology. The rule issued was, however, made absolute and Wallace was suspended from practice for an indefinite period. The following extract from the judgment of the Supreme Court gives the reasons for the finding that Wallace was guilty of contempt : ‑ "On the 26th of the same month. Mr. Wallace thought fit to send to me the letter which has led to these proceedings. In that letter be not only impugns, in very offensive terms, my decision of the 24th of January, which appeared on the face of it to have been concurred in by the other Judges, but he assails also the judgment of the whole Court, on his appeal in December from the Court of Probate. He then makes a general charge against the Judges, in language too insulting to be repeated, and winds up with a criticism, in the same style, on some of the pettier matters which I had decided at Chambers. A letter of this character from a Practitioner to a Judge of an English Court is an outrage which probably was never perpetra ted before, and which it was impossible to pass over in silence. Neither was it a fit matter to be dealt with by any one Judge and, therefore, I contented myself with stating, in the presence of Mr. Wallace and of the Bar at the next Chamber day, that I had received a letter of this extraordinary kind, and that, on the first day of the ensuing Trinity Term, Mr. Wallace would be called upon to answer it. While the utmost boldness and liberty of speech and action are fully and freely conceded to every member of the Bar, as belonging to his position, and as essential to the rights of his clients, no less than to his own, and none on this Bench would attempt or desire to restrain them, on the other. hand, a gentlemanly conduct, and a decorous and respectful treatment of the Judges of the land, in all intercourse between them and the Bar, must necessarily be observed by the latter. If the Judges can be insulted by language or letter addressed to them, and such a contempt of their persons and authority committed with impunity, their weight and influence would be lost, and, failing to vindicate the dignity of their office thus outraged, they would forfeit, and deserve to forfeit, the public respect and confidence so necessary to their character and the due administration of justice. It was this feeling, and the necessity thus imposed on us by the letter of Mr. Wallace, rather than any personal consideration, which has compelled us to take steps against him* * * * *. In Lechmere Charlton's case (2 My. and Cr. 316) Lord Cottenham, then Lord Chancellor, pursued the course we have adopted here. Letters having been addressed by Mr. Charlton, a Barrister and Member of Parliament, to one of the Masters of the Court of Chancery, and to the Lord Chancellor, of a highly objectionable kind, and reflecting upon the proceedings of the Master in an inquiry then before him, his Lordship, after directing copies to be served upon the parties concerned, took notice thereof in open Court, and after declaring that the letter to the Master contained scandalous matter, and that the conduct of Mr. Charlton, in writing the two letters, was a contempt of the Court of Chancery, passed an order that he should show cause on a certain day, why he should not be committed to the Fleet Prison for his contempt. Mr. Charlton having failed to show cause, the Chancellor, after remarking that every writing, letter, or publication; which has for its object to divert the course of justice, is a contempt of the Court, and that every insult offered to a Judge in the exercise of the duties of his office, is a contempt, concluded by order Mr. Charlton's committal. This was effected at a subsequent day, and the House of Commons having refused to interfere, and Mr. Charlton having made a suitable submission, and expressed his contrition for the offence he had committed, he was discharged, after having been in prison for three weeks."

10. As already stated, Wallace had been suspended because of the contempt which he had committed and ordinary proceedings for contempt had not been taken against him. He appealed to the Privy Council on the ground that his conduct did not amount to professional misconduct so as to expose him to the penalty of suspension from practice. Their Lordships of the Privy Council accepted this appeal on the ground that the act with respect to which Wallace was proceeded against was done not in his pro fessional but in his individual capacity and the act itself was not such that per se rendered him unfit to practice as an Attorney and Barrister. From the judgment of their Lordships it is clear that they regarded it as a case of contempt of Court and they were of the opinion that the proper proceedings against Wallace would have been for contempt. The judgment of their Lordships is not lengthy and I prefer reproducing it in extenso :‑ "The appellant in this case is an Advocate, and also an Attorney, admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. It appears that he was also a suitor in that Court. In two or three cases in which he was such suitor he seems to have supposed that he had reason to complain of the conduct of the Judges of the Court, and he accordingly wrote a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, reflecting on the Judges, and on the administration of justice generally in the Court ; which undoubtedly was a letter' of a most reprehensible kind. "This letter was a contempt of Court, which it was hardly possible for the Court to omit taking cognizance of. "It was an offence, however, committed by an individual in his capacity of a suitor in respect of his supposed rights as a suitor, and of an imaginary injury done to him as a suitor ; and it had no connection whatever with his professional character, or anything done by him professionally, either as an Advocate or an Attorney. It was a contempt of Court committed by an individual in his personal character only. "To offences of this kind there has been attached by law and by long practice a definite kind of punishment, viz., fine and imprisonment. It must not, however, be supposed that a Court of Justice has not the power to remove the Officers of Court if unfit to be entrusted with a professional status and character. If an Advocate, for example, were found guilty of crime, there is no doubt that the Court would suspend him. If an Attorney be found guilty of moral deliquency in his private character, there is no doubt that he may be struck off the Roll. "But in this particular case there is no delictum brought forward or assigned, except that which results from the fact of addressing an improper and contemptuous letter to the Chief Justice of the Court, in respect of something supposed to have been done unjustly to the writer in his private capacity as a suitor. We think, therefore, there was no necessity for the Judges to go further than to award to that offence the customary punishment for contempt of Court. We do not find anything which renders it expedient for the public interest, or right for the Court, to interfere with the status of the individual as a Practitioner in that Court. In that respect, therefore, we think that tile judge departed from the course which ought to have been pursued, by adopting a different description of punishment from the ordinary punishment for offences of this nature. "When an offence was committed which might have been adequately corrected by that punishment, and the offence was not one which subjected the individual committing it to anything like general infamy, or an imputation of bad character, so as to render his remaining in the Court as a Practitioner improper, we think it was not competent to the Court to inflict upon him a professional punishment for an act which was not done professionally, and which act per se, did not render him improper to remain as a Practitioner of the Court. "On this ground, therefore, we do not approve of the Order. At the same time we desire it to be understood that we entirely concur with the Judges of the Court below in the estimate which they have formed of the gross impropriety of the conduct of the appellant. But we are still of opinion, that his conduct did not require and did not authorise a departure from the ordinary mode and standard of punishment ; and upon that ground, and that ground only we shall advise Her Majesty to discharge the order, in respect of its having substituted a penalty and mode of punishment which was not the appropriate and fitting punishment for the case in question." Their Lordships have clearly held that the letter was a contempt of Court. At the same time, they have stated that this is an offence committed by an individual in the capacity of a suitor, and they have added that the offence committed should have been met with an ordinary punishment. Now, what was contained in the letter was only an imputation of improper conduct as a Judge. The basis of the decision as to contempt was not that there was any attempt to influence the Chief Justice in a decision of the case which was pending before him but that it was an insult offered to him as a Judge. Their Lordships of the Privy Council said it was a letter reflecting on the Judges and on the administration of justice generally in Court and their Lordships regarded it as contempt. The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia had also regarded it as a contempt because of the insulting language used in the letter. The letter had been sent only to the Chief Justice and there was no allegation that there was any publication of it to any other person.

11. In re : Tulsidas Amanmal Karnai (A I R 1941 Bom. 228), an Attorney of the High Court had served a notice under section 80, C. P. C. on a Judge of the Court of Small Causes saying that a suit would be filed for a declaration that the remarks of the Judge in his judgment in a small cause suit were false, unjustified, malicious and irrelevant. With respect to this conduct of the Attorney, Broomfield and Wassoodew, JJ., said "It is difficult to see how there could be a grosser contempt than to allege that a Judge has acted with prejudice, bias and malice in the course of his judicial duties, that he decided a case not according to his own convictions but so please somebody else and that he had abused his powers as a Judge and acted dis honestly and in bad faith."

12. There is another case which does appear to support the conclusion I have arrived at, i.e., In the matter of Sudhir Chandra Ray Chaudhuri (A I R 1952 Cal. 258). In that case, a letter had been sent to a Judge after the case had been finished. During the hearing of the case the Judge had made observations relating to an attorney. He said that the attorney had attached certain copies to an affidavit only to make money and not because they were needed for the case and that he would disallow costs. Actually the Judge did not disallow costs. The attorney, on coming to know of the remarks, wrote a letter to the Judge trying to justify his conduct as a protest against the observations made in Court. The case was heard by a Full Bench. Harries, C. J. and Banerjee, J. were of the opinion that the conduct of the attorney did not amount to contempt while Chakravartti. J. was of the opinion that it did amount to contempt. The majority did not proceed on the ground that there was no publication. There had in fact, been no publication because the letter had been addressed only to the Judge and was not published by the respondent, but in their judgment the majority did not even refer to this fact. They ,found on the merits that the communication did not amount to contempt. The majority appears to have assumed that publication was not needed for if the absence of publication was fatal, there was no need for the lengthy discussion in the judgment. It would have been sufficient for the learned Judges to say that as the contents of the letter had not been disclosed to any person other than the Judge, there could be no contempt. Harries, C. J., considered the question whether the letter could be said to scandalise the Judge and it is apparent from the judgment that if he found that the letter was scandalous, he would have found the respondent guilty. Harries, C. J., found that there was nothing in the letter which could be said to have scandalised the Judge. Similar is the conclusion which one would reach on reading the judgment of the other learned Judge, i.e., Banerjee, J. Had they found that the letter did scandalise the Court, they would have found the respondent guilty of contempt.

13. I would hold, therefore, that the act of the respondent amounts to contempt of Court. So far as the punishment is concerned, he has offered a full apology and it appears to me that his act is more foolish than criminal. As I have already observed, Judges would in many cases ignore letters of this kind, and I am inclined to, take a lenient view. I would accept the apology of the respondent and take no further proceedings against him. I do not think there is any need even of awarding costs. SHABIR AHMAD, J. (26‑5‑1960).‑I have carefully gone through the order of my learned brother Kaikaus, but have not been persuaded to change the view expressed by me in my order of reference to larger Bench dated the 28th of July 1959, which should be read as a part of this order. To some the case may appear to be nothing but of academic importance, because my learned brother proposes no punishment to the respondent, while I hold him not guilty, but if the matter is looked at carefully, it would become apparent that an important question of principle is involved, the decision of which is of utmost importance. That question is the extent of immunity of the decisions of the judicial officers from criticism. An allied question is the meaning of the expression "Contempt of Court".

2. I have said in my order of reference that the expression "Contempt of Court" has not been defined by the Legislature and that innumerable judicial decisions which have defined that expression make it clear that the best definition is the one given by Oswald who said as under :‑ "To speak generally, Contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with, or prejudice, the parties, litigant or their witnesses, during the litigation." Nothing said by counsel, who were good enough to render me assistance at my request or by my learned brother in his order, has convinced me that the definition I have quoted above is inapt or incomplete. It is keeping this definition in view that one has to approach the question whether or not the respondent had been guilty of Contempt of Court by doing what he is proved and admits to have done. It can hardly be doubted that anyone can think anything about the judgment of even the highest Court in the country, and the question to determine is to what extent one can give expression to those thoughts. "Justice is not a cloistered virtue", said the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council in a case from British India, and as far as I know the correctness of this dictum has never been doubted or questioned. If a person writes to a Judge and in that communication says disparaging things about a judgment of that Judge, his act is certainly not in good taste, but the act being in bad taste does not necessarily make it an offence punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act. Before a Court is justified in punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act for doing saying or writing a thing, the ingredients of the offence of Contempt of Court which, as I have already said, are contained in the definition given by Oswald, should be established beyond all reasonable doubt. No doubt, if any disparaging thing is said about a judgment of a Judge to whom the communication is made, the Judge will generally feel upset, but that can .hardly be a valid ground for holding that Contempt of Courts was committed. The mere fact that an act of a person has annoyed a Judge cannot attract the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act but if it were so, lives of persons other than those who are fortunate enough to be Judges would be unbearable. For example, the act of a man passing in a big cart by a Judge, who is walking on a road and ,throwing some dust on him may annoy the Judge but cannot attract the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act Examples of this type can be multiplied a hundred‑fold.

3. My learned brother has in his order said that if a person sends a communication to a Judge which contains disparaging remarks about his judgment, the Judge likely to be affected if the case of the same person or of a similar person comes before him. I am not in agreement with my learned brother that a Judge will be affected in the second case, and if he is, it would appear to me that he was failing in his duty. But assuming that a remark made with‑regard to the judgment of one case is likely to affect the decision in some other case. I do not see how the act of the person who made that remark can fall within the four corners of the definition of "Contempt of Court". I will concede that if someone tries to impress on a Judge that his judgment given in a similar case was wrong and he does this at a time when the second case is pending before the Judge, provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act will be attracted because it can be inferred that it was intended to influence the decision of the Judge, but if the circum stances are not as mentioned by me, I cannot bring myself to agree with my learned brother in holding that the remote possibility of a similar case of a similar person or the same person coming before the Judge and the decision of the Judge being affected by the communication made to the Judge will attract the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act.

4. My reason for looking at the matter from all aspects is simple. The law gives Judges of superior Courts the power to punish for contempt of themselves, a power to be a Judge in one's cause which is but rarely enjoyed by any other authority and I G think the power should be used only if the case is clear and punishment of the wrong‑doer is essential. soon after my decision in the case Mian Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani v. Z. A. Suleri (P L D 1958 Lah. 747), I received innumerable communications, about half a dozen of which were disparaging because they attributed sinister motives to me but it never even occurred to me that the person who had criticised my judgment and scribed motives to me in communi cations made to me were guilty of Contempt of Court. I am clear in my mind that a communication of the kind under con sideration does not amount to Contempt of Court. This however, does not mean that the law allows such communications and it is by no means improbable that some provision of the Pakistan Penal Code will be attracted, but with that aspect of the matter I do not consider it necessary to deal with in the present case. SHABIR AHMAD AND KAIKAUS, JJ. (26‑5‑1960.)‑As we are not agreed with regard to the order that should be passed, we refer the case to his Lordship the Chief Justice for nominating another Judge or Judges to hear the case. KAYANI, C. J.‑This case has come to us on a difference of opinion between Shabir Ahmad and Kaikaus, JJ. In view of the importance of the subject I thought I should associate another Judge with me, but we were at no stage of the argument in doubt as to what our opinion should be.

2. The question is whether the respondent, Abdul Latif, committed a contempt of Court by addressing a letter to Abdul Aziz Khan, J., imputing injustice to him after he had decided a transfer application against Abdul Latif. Shabir Ahmad, J., stare thought that since it had not received publicity and did not affect Abdul Garif a pending cause, it did not constitute contempt. Kaikaus, J. was of the view that publicity was not necessary, and it was enough Kayant, C J that the Judge had been charged with injustice in relation to his duties as a Judge.

3. Abdul Latif was complainant in a case pending in the Court of Mirza Azam Beg, a Magistrate in Lahore, and the accused having applied for the transfer of the case from the Court of Mirza Azam Beg, the application came for hearing before Abdul Aziz Khan, J., who accepted it. Abdul Latif thereupon wrote to him a letter covering six pages in autograph, enclosing also a cheque for rupees one thousand. It said that on a charge having been framed by the Magistrate, one Sheikh Latif, head clerk of the "General Branch" in the High Court, had undertaken to have the case transferred by order of Abdul Aziz Khan, J., on the strength of an assumption that the Judge in question was opposed to Mirza Azam Beg. Abdul Latif respondent had consequently warned his counsel that the case will appear on the list of Abdul Aziz Khan, J., and when on the 30th March 1959 it did appear Abdul Latif said to his counsel : "Did I not tell you that this will happen 7" The letter then goes on to say : "Now I shall also make a request to you. Whereas you have transferred my case from the Court of Mirza Azam Beg by reason of your annoyance with him or with a vi‑.w to pleasing the High Court staff, you will also do a favour to me by ordering trial in a military court, so that it may be concluded in three or four weeks. But if you have not transferred it for those reasons, then it is the requirement of justice that you should do justice to me." He then narrates the facts of the case at some length, and how he had been harassed during the trial by the procrastinating tactics of the accused. Finally, "I enclose a cheque for rupees one thousand with this application (No. 002533) to cover the expenses of tea for the accused and of the illness of Barkat accused and of .communicating to the Magistrate the orders of the High Court". The draft is not very coherent at this point, but it says further "Out of this money each of the accused may be paid fifty rupees and each of the others (defence witnesses) a hundred rupees, and they may be asked to take an oath on the Quran and then make a statement whether the case is a true one."

4. There can be no doubt that this letter ascribes extra -judicial motives to a judicial act of Abdul Aziz Khan, J. and thus tends to impair the dignity of law. It also ridicules the Judge by sending to him a cheque for disbursement among the accused, as though he were a disbursing officer for the administration of oaths. From every ordinary point of view‑that is, the point of view of persons not claiming acquaintance with law‑the attitude of the writer is contemptuous of the judicial conduct of Abdul Aziz Khan, J. and it is also the tenor of the judgment of Shabir Ahmad, J. that the letter is, at places, "highly objectionable". I shall, therefore, reproduce some of the accepted definitions of contempt with a view to determining whether it falls within their broad meaning. 5. "Contempt", says Oswald in the very first sentence of his book on Contempt, Committal and Attachment, "in the legal acceptation of the term, primarily signifies disrespect to that which is entitled to legal regard." Further, it is "so manifold in its aspects that it is difficulty to lay down any exact definition of the offence." Quoting from Miller v. Knox (4 Bing. N C 574 at p. 589), the book says : "It is defined or described ,to be a disobedience to the Court, an opposing or a despising the authority, justice or dignity thereof". Lord Hardwicks, L. C. said in the St. James' Evening Post Case ((1742) 2 Atk. 469 at p. 471) A "There are three different sorts of contempt. One kind of contempt is scandalising the Court itself. There may likewise be a contempt of this Court in abusing parties who are concerned with causes here. There may also be a contempt of this Court in prejudicing mankind against persons before whom the cause is heard . . . . . There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters." 4 These remarks were cited with approval by Lord Russell, L. C. J., A in Queen v. Gray ((1900) 2 Q B 36 at p. 40) "Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of con tempt. * * * * * The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicks : L. C., characterised as scandalising a. Court or a Judge in re Read and Huggonson (1742) 2 Atk. 469." (The title of the case seems to have been wrongly given. It is the St. James' Evening Post Case and Mrs. Read and Huggonson, were both of them respondents). "That description of that class of contempt is to be taken subject to one and an important qualification. Judges and Court are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument and expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court." At page six of his .book Oswald has evolved the following definition "To speak generally, contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during the litigation." It must be borne in mind that these definitions are not statutory and that we are to be guided by their general meaning, not by the use of any particular word. The first matter of note is that there is nothing in them to suggest publicity, as in the case of defamation. Contempt is a disrespectful attitude of the mind towards a Court of law, and when it expresses itself in words, it brings the authority of law into disrespect. It is the act of the person showing disrespect not the response of the public with which contempt concerns itself. A Judge may have such unquestionable reputation that an unjustified public criticism of his judicial conduct may itself provoke public criticism. Can it then be argued that since the criticism of the Judge does not in fact impair the authority of law, it does not constitute contempt ? When we say that an act is "calculated" to bring a Judge into contempt, we refer to a process in the mind of the person who does the act : it is he who calculates, and when he writes to the Judge, his attitude is contemptuous. It would be strange, indeed, if we thought that he was doing a legal injury if he wrote to a servant of the Judge, but that he was not doing an injury if he wrote to the Judge himself. Contempt, as Oswald said, "primarily signifies disrespect to that which is entitled to legal regard", and quite obviously, you can show disrespect to a Judge without looking round for a witness. The "despising" of the authority, Justice or dignity of a Judge is another description of contempt (Miller v. Knox) and it cannot be reason ably said that such authority is not despised when the despisal is addressed to the authority itself, but that it is despised if the address is to a third person, "possibly a wholly ignorant person". as my brother Kaikaus puts it‑ignorant even of the fact, I may add, that there is such a thing as the dignity of Court : and such persons are not a few. This will amount to introducing almost a legal fiction in the definition of contempt, which is a thing of actual, visible perception, not a sentimental, over sensitive ideology.

6. Now Consider the effect on the mind of the Judge himself. We are human beings like others, and although we are constantly striving towards the attainment of an ideal, we are not all on the same philosophical level. Some of our judicial ancestors may have called some litigant "a little monkey", as though a "monkey", without an adjectival compliment, did not betoken enough belittlement ; others, when righteously provoked, have commanded the counsel to "hold" his tongue, if he was holding it out a little too much ; still others, who contract their olfactory portals at the judgments of subordinate Courts. We, therefore, do not claim to be impervious to abuse, if it is not authenticated abuse, that is to say, properly published. It is true that I and many of my colleagues have thrown into the basket or a burning fire many a scandal‑mongering epistle, mostly in respect of ourselves ; and it is true that our conduct was not always influenced by the fact that the basket had remained empty for a long time or the fire rose in attractive flames. But it is not true that my mind was not influenced by the abuse, that its judicial balance was not disturbed even for a brief minute. When injustice is imputed to me in a private treatise, even though it be marked secret and not negotiable, I do get a throbbing of the heart, which, I hope and believe, is at no great distance from my mind ; a feeling that there is at least one person who is dissatisfied with my sense of justice. That sense of justice in every just mind is like a stronghold against corruption and mischief, and every attack on it, whether private or public, is like a missile with plenty of destructive potentialities. There is both a conscious and a sub‑conscious reaction to attack, and K the measure of that re‑action, being only a psychological phenomenon, cannot be the measure of contempt. One might say that the attack is "calculated" to damage or destroy the sense of justice or the judicial balance which has, and should have, a comfortable seat in the mind of a Judge. If a Judge had the misfortune of being thrown on a society or Government which was constantly critical of his judicial conduct, howsoever privately and confidentially it were done, he would indeed be a super‑human being if his judicial mind were not impaired. And if this be the result of letters addressed privately, I have no hesitation in saying that they are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Indirectly, therefore, as my brother Kaikaus says, they "hamper" the administration of justice, though he confines the remark to a particular class of cases ; where, for instance, a "goonda" accords rough treatment to a Judge by reason of a decision against him, and the Judge says to himself, when again a "goonda's" case comes before him : "What should I expect this time?" With respect, my plea is that the judicial mind is generally enervated, not with reference to a particular class of cases only, when such incidents happen : particularly, if he is told that there is no remedy against it except to appear in Court or engage the services of a "goonda".

7. My brother Shabir Ahmad says that if a Judge is affected by such letter, he is "failing in his duty". If that be so; he should not fail in his duty even when a letter is received by him in a pending case. And yet such a letter by all accounts constitutes contempt.

8. I do not agree with my brother Kaikaus, however, that because the Judge and the offender are both members of the public, when one of them writes to the other, the writing becomes public. The word "publicity" is not used in that sense. It involves publishing, proclaiming, divulging to others. Nor do I think that the accused can necessarily expect that the Judge will communicate the writing to his superior. Firstly, if the writing is addressed to a Chief Justice, about himself, on this argument there will be no publicity. Secondly, if the Judge communicates it to his superior, the accused should be able to argue that it was not he but the Judge himself who gave publicity to the matter.

9. Now I shall address myself to case law, mostly English, because the English appreciate the dignity of law better than we do. Of all the cases I have read, those mentioned by my brothers and those apart, there is not one in which it was held that an objectionable letter to a Judge in respect of a case decided by him does not constitute contempt if it is written after the case is over. On the other hand, there is quite a number of cases where such conduct was held to make contempt, and not once was an objection taken that it lacks a necessary ingredient, namely, publicity. Oswald says at page 48 of his book that "writing to a Judge after a case was over, unless the communication contained charges of injustice, as described below, presumably would not constitute a contempt." The use of "presumably" suggests that even those communications which do not contain charges of injustice are just within the borderline of safety. My brother Shabir Ahmad's objection is that this passage is "negative in character". It had to be in the context of the book, which states at this point that "Private communication with Judge" is a contempt, and the exception‑that it is not contempt if mode after a case was over‑had to be expressed negatively. To this exception, however, there was itself an exception, namely that it will be contempt if it contained charges of injustice.

10. In Lord Advocate v. Jamieson ((1822) 1 Sh. 286‑16 Digest 19)), which has been noticed in the judgment of my brother Kaikaus, although the report is brief, it shows that a letter sent to the Lord President of the Court of Session "reflecting on his judicial conduct, containing matter disrespectful and insulting to the Court and injurious to the administration of justice" was held to constitute "a high offence against the dignity of the Court, and which tended to prejudice and to slander the administration of law," There is no indication in these words that the letter was sent during the pendency of case.

11. In Lechsaere Charlton's case (Mylne and Craig's Reports, Vol. II, p. 316), Charlton, a barrister and Member of Parliament, wrote a letter to a Master throwing out insinuations of a calumnious nature, concluding with a direct threat, the object of which was to induce the Master to alter an opinion. It may, therefore, be regarded as a pending case. The remarks, however, which Lord Cottenham L. C. made in that case are of universal applicability, and are to the effect that "every insult offered to a Judge, in the exercise of the duties of his office, is contempt." These remarks were relied upon by the Chief Justice of Nova Scotia in a case of professional misconduct against Thomas James Wallace, a barrister who had addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, questioning a decision which he and the other Judges of his Court had taken against Wallace, and complaining that if he had been on the other side, the decision would have been different. The Court held that this letter constituted contempt, because, "if the Judges can be insulted by language or letter addressed to them, and such contempt of their persons or authority committed with impunity, their weight and influence would be lost," and suspended him from practice. The Chief Justice did not consider it necessary to vindicate the Court in respect of the charges brought by Wallace, because that would amount to a surrender of its inde pendence and dignity : Other remedies, he said, were available to appeal to the Privy Council (Moore's Privy Council Appeals, 1865‑67, Vol. I, p. 283), when counsel for Wallace argued that it was only a private letter, Lord Westbury remarked that "this letter was a contempt of Court which it was hardly possible for the Court to omit taking cognizance of." Their Lordships accepted the appeal, however, on the ground that Wallace bad committed the "offence" in his capacity as a suitor and it had no connection with his professional character. "It was a contempt of Court committed by an individual in his. personal character only", and "to offences of this kind there has been attached by law and by long practice a definite kind of punishment, viz., fine and imprisonment." This did not mean, their Lordships were careful to add, that in suitable cases the Court has not the power "to remove the officers of Court if unfit to be entrusted with a professional status and character."

12. My brother Shabir Ahmad distinguishes the case of Wallace on the ground that some other cases of Wallace were also pending and that it could be presumed that his intention was to affect the decision of those cases. He further said that "no reasoning was given for this finding. With respect, it was held that the letter was calumnious, and for arriving at this conclusion it was only necessary to read the letter. As to the other pending cases, no reasoning has been based on them.

13. In Charles Piffard's case Reports of cases in the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, 1862‑63, Piffard a barrister, insisted on arguing a case when he was asked to stop, and was ultimately asked to "hold his tongue." He did hold it then, but in the evening he sent a messenger to the Judge to demand a private apology. This conduct was held by nine out of eleven Judges, including Sir Barnes Peacock, C. J., to constitute contempt, but an apology was accepted. It is true that no reasons are given, but it requires no reasoning to be able to say that the demanding of an apology from a Judge affects his dignity and directly opposes one of the principal objects of the law of contempt, which, accordingly to Wilmot, J. in a celebrated opinion R. v. Almon ((1765) Wilm, 243 at p. 255) is "to keep a blaze of glory around" the Judges. The point to be observed in this case, however, is that there is no indication that the opinion of the other two Judges had any reference to want of publicity.

14. My brother Shabir Ahmad has mentioned two cases in support of the view taken by him, one of‑ these being In the matter of Sudhir Chandra Ray (A I R 1952 Cal. 258), where two out of the three Judges constituting the 'Full Bench held that a certain letter written to a Judge after the case was over did not constitute contempt. They did not hold, as my brother's judgment conveys the impression, that the writing of a letter, after a case was over, did not constitute contempt : it was the contents of that particular letter which was the subject of difference between them. One of the Judges of the High Court at Calcutta had remarked in a case which he was hearing that thirty‑two copies of receipts had been filed for the purposes of swelling costs, and severely criticised the counsel, who was not then present. Subsequently, the counsel addressed a letter to the Judge, protesting that he had not even charged his fee in that case. He referred to the friendship which had subsisted between the elders of the Judge and his own elders, expressed hope that his letter will be taken in the spirit in which it had been written, and ended with "I expect a reply from you". The majority of the Judges held that the letter in question did not constitute contempt as it neither tended directly to interfere with the decision nor indirectly by scandalising the Judge or lowering his dignity or prestige or the dignity and prestige of the Court. The third Judge thought that the last sentence of the letter contained a latent demand for an apology. Whether this view was correct or not, the fact that the difference of opinion was not based on the want of publicity in the case inclines me to think that this is a view which indirectly opposes the view adopted by my brother Shabir Ahmad.

15. The other case is Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General of Trinidad (1936 P C 141) which has been relied upon only for the celebrated observation that "justice is not a cloistered virtue." In that case, nothing had been done of which notice should have been taken. A soldier in port of Spain had fired at his superior officer but missed him, and had been awarded a sentence of eight years' imprisonment for attempting murder. In the same session, another Judge had awarded a sentence of seven years for the same offence to a person who had slashed an expectant woman with a razor and had seriously mutilated her. She was not even the person intended. Thereupon, a newspaper, published an article, merely pointing out the absence of pro portion in the two sentences. The Privy Council, holding that, this was not a contempt of Court, made the following obser vation "The path of criticism is a public way : the wrong‑headed. are permitted to err therein ; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice. Justice is not a cloistered virtue : she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men."

16. That is merely a reiteration of the principle enunciated in Queen v. Gray referred to elsewhere in this judgment, that "Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court." Justice does not live in the seclusion and protection of cloisters : it is an essential part of practical life and should, therefore, be open to fair comment. But it should run in streams pure and clear and should not be contaminated with night‑soil.

17. In my opinion Abdul Latif is guilty of contempt. He has apologised, and Kaikaus, J. thought this should be enough. 1 think, however, that he should pay as fine the amount of the cheque which be sent to Abdul Aziz Khan, J. It is for rupees one thousand, and will be diverted to a better purpose than the `one suggested by Abdul Latif himself. There will be no order as to costs. In default of payment of fine, he will undergo simple imprisonment for one month. M. YAQUB ALI, J.‑I agree. A. H. Order accordingly.