1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

AJMAL MIAN, J.‑‑By this common judgment, we intend to dispose of the above five writ petitions, as they involve the interpretation of the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance XX of 1979), (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) and the Rules framed thereunder. It may be pertinent to mention that the Ordinance had dissolved and amalgamated National Shipping Corporation, which was incorporated under the National Shipping Corporation Ordinance 1963 (IV of 1963) and the Pakistan Shipping Corporation, which was incorporated under the Pakistan Shipping Corporation Act, 1976 (LIV of 1976) and brought about with effect from 1‑1‑1979, Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, the Ordinance repealed the above ordinance IV of 1963 by Act LIV of 1976. The petitioners in all the above petitions, were the employees of National Shipping Corporation but after the enforcement of the Ordinance they had become the employees of Pakistan National Shipping Corporation, hereinafter referred to as P.N.S.C.

2. Constitutional Petition No. D‑608 of 1985 and C. P. D. 42 / 87 can be dealt with together as the services of the petitioners in the above two petitions were terminated in terms of clause 9 of the National Shipping Corporation (Established Officers) Service Regulations, 1965, (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations of 1965), by paying three months' salary in lieu of the notice of the said period. It may be pointed out that the above two petitioners are covered by the definition of 'Established Officer' as given in sub‑clause (iv) of clause (a) of Rule 3 of Regulations of 1965 and they are subject to the same. Petitioner in C.P. No.D‑608 of 1985 was working as Vth Engineer. His services were terminated by respondent No.3's letter dated 3‑7‑1985, whereas the petitioner in the other aforesaid petition No.C.P.D.42/87 was working as the Master of a vessel when his services were terminated by a notice dated 5‑3‑1986 under above clause 9 of Regulations of 1965. The petitioners being aggrieved by the above orders have filed the present petitions.

3. Mr. Muhammad Ali Shaikh in support of the latter petition has urged that the impugned order violates Article 4(2)(a) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), and secondly that the impugned order is against the principles of natural justice. Whereas Mr. Abul Khair Ansari has submitted that under Regulation 12 of Regulations of 1965 the petitioner as an Established Officer was entitled to retire at the age of 60 years and, therefore, the impugned order is in violation of the above Regulations. It may be pertinent to reproduce above Regulation 9 of Regulations of 196aL, which reads as follows:‑ "

9. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT: An Established Officer's engagement with the Corporation may be terminated at any time by giving him three months' notice in writing effective from the date of its receipt by the officer: Provided that the Corporation may terminate the services of an Established Officer forthwith or prior to the expiry of notice period by giving him pay for the corresponding period in lieu of notice." It may be noticed that under the above quoted Regulation 91 engagement of an Established Officer with the Corporation may be terminated at any time by giving him three months' notice in writing effective from the date of its receipt by the officer or on payment of the salary of the notice period. Reverting to Mr. Muhammad Ali's contention that the impugned order violates Article 4(2)(a) of the Constitution, it may be observed that clause (1) of the above Article 4 provides protection to individual by providing that to enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever; he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan, whereas sub‑clause (a) of clause (2) of Article 4 provides in particular that no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law. We are unable to see as to how the above sub‑clause (a) t clause (2) of Article 4 of the Constitution has been violated in the above case as admittedly the petitioners have been dealt with it accordance with Regulations of 1965 which were approved by the Board of Directors of the National Shipping Corporation on 6‑8‑19651 and which were saved by subsection (1) of Section 41 of the Ordinance. The petitioners have been dealt with in accordance with law of which] the guarantee is provided for in the above sub‑clause (a) of clause (2) of Article 4 of the Constitution.

4. As regards Mr. Mohamed Ali's submission that the impugned order is against the principles of natural Justice, it may be mentioned that in furtherance of the above submission he has referred to the case of Rana Muhammad Afzal v. Inspector‑General of Police, West Pakistan, Lahore and another reported in P L D 1974 Supreme Court 31, in which the facts were that history sheet in terms of rule 23.9(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 was opened against the appellant without issuing any show‑cause notice, which was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as being illegal. In that context with reference to the provisions of the late constitution of 1962 It was observed by the Hon ble Supreme Court that "If there is constitutional guarantee for the protection of a person's reputation. As held in the above case," the rule of natural justice is to be presumed to be grafted into every law". In our view, if the services of a person are to be terminated in terms of the employment either contained in an agreement or in the Regulations framed by the employer, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice. However, where an employee is dismissed from service on the ground of misconduct, he is entitled to be heard.

5. As regards Mr. Abul Khair Ansari's contention that under Regulation No.12 of the Regulations of 1965 the petitioner was to retire on completion of 60 years of age, it may be observed that it is true that the above Regulation provides that an Established Officer shall retire on completion of 60 years of age and that the Managing Director may, subject to mutual agreement and medical fitness, extend the period of service of an Established Officer for a specific period' if a suitable substitute is not readily available. It further provides that the Managing Director may, in his absolute discretion, retire any Established Officer from the service of the Corporation on completion of 25 years of service. However, the above regulation is to be read with the other regulations. Since Regulation 9 provides the termination of employment by serving three months' notice or in lieu of the notice three months' salary the above Regulation 12 is subject to above Regulation

9. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the above 2 petitions, namely, C.P. No.D‑608 of 1985 and C.P.No.D‑42/87 have no merits.

6. We may now take up the above remaining three petitions, in which the petitioners were dismissed on the ground of misconduct after holding enquiries. C.Ps.Nos.D‑678/86 and 681/86 can be conveniently dealt with together as they have common facts and there was common enquiry against the petitioners. Petitioners in the above two petitions are inter se sisters. They were employed as Telephone Operators in 1975. Both were dismissed on 19‑12‑1978 on the ground of misconduct, which orders they challenged before the Labour Court through an application under section 25‑A of the I. R.O. 1969, which were allowed by an order dated 15‑11‑1979 and the petitioners were reinstated. Appeals filed by the P. N. S. C. were dismissed on 19‑1‑1980, so also Constitutional Petitions Nos.D‑161 and D‑162 of 1980 by judgment dated 25‑2‑1982. The petitioners were taken back in service in consequence of the above judgments. Both the petitioners were again charge‑sheeted on 17‑7‑1985. Enquiry Tribunal comprising of three senior employees of P. N. S. C. namely, S. K. M. Rizvi as the President of the Enquiry Committee, Mr. S. Iqbal Ahmed and Mrs. Zubaida T. Burhani as the members of the Enquiry Committee conducted the enquiry. From the record, it seems that the petitioners by notice dated 1.1‑8‑1985 were directed to appear before the Enquiry Committee on 12‑8‑1985 at 2.30 p.m. and they were no allowed to bring any workman of P. N. S. C. establishment of their own choice as per Regulation 97(3) of P.N.S.C. (Service) Regulations, 1984 for their assistance. However, the petitioners by their letters dated 13‑8‑1985 asked the President of the Enquiry Committee to furnish the names of the witnesses to be produced, nature of evidence or allegations which were likely to be produced and the copies of the complaints. They also stated that unless aforesaid requirements were met any further proceedings by the Enquiry Committee would be prejudicial. In response to the above letters, the President of the Enquiry Committee sent letter dated 21‑8‑1985 pointing out that the petitioners had failed to appear on 15‑8‑1985 and they were asked to appear on 25‑8‑1985 at ‑2.30 p.m. failing which ex parte action would be taken. The above letter was replied to by the petitioners by letters dated 24‑8‑1985 again pressing for the information' earlier requested by them. The President of the Enquiry Committee again sent a letter dated 3‑9‑1985 stating therein that the petitioners were delaying the enquiry proceedings and avoiding to participate in the enquiry on one pretext or the other. The petitioners were assured that they would be given full opportunity of defence to cross‑examine the management's witnesses and bring any co‑worker for their assistance in the enquiry but not an outsider. The petitioners were again asked to appear on 8‑9‑1985 at 2 p.m. In response to the above notice, the petitioners sent their letters dated 8‑9‑1985 again requesting for the above information which was replied to by the President of the Enquiry Committee by letter dated 15‑9‑1985 wherein, inter alia, it was stated that the statements of the management's witnesses would be recorded in presence of the petitioners, copies of all the papers, documents produced by management during enquiry would be provided to them, the petitioners could bring any co‑worker from P.N.S.C. for their assistance and they were again assured that they would be given full opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses. Again they were called upon to take part in the enquiry on 22‑9‑1985 at 2.30 p.m. It seems that the petitioners again sent similar letters. The President of the Enquiry Committee by letter dated 30‑9‑1985 forwarded copies of the complaints and asked the petitioners to appear on 8‑10‑1985, which was followed by the petitioners' letters dated 1‑10‑1985 in which they had stated that they had not delayed the enquiry and they would furnish the names of their witnesses after the closing of the complainant's side. After that the President of the Enquiry Committee by his letter dated 15‑10‑1985 forwarded the statements of the witness and fixed 21‑10‑1985 for the cross‑examination of the witnesses by petitioners. In response to the above letter the petitioners sent their letters dated 17‑10‑1985 raising certain legal objections as to the legality of the enquiry. After that the petitioners were served pith the second show‑cause notice dated 12‑12‑1985 alongwith the report of the Enquiry Committee dated 21‑11‑1985 which was replied to by the petitioners by their letters dated 17‑12‑1985. Finally they were dismissed by the above notice dated 5‑1‑1986. The petitioners have filed the above two petitions instead of filing proceedings before the Labour Court as vide section 3 of the Ordinance the application of the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 (W.P. Ordinance of 1968) has been excluded.

7. The petitioner in Constitutional Petition No.D‑338 of 1987 had joined P.N.S.C. on 18‑11‑1968 as Assistant in Stores Department and was promoted as Store Officer and thereafter as Assistant Commercial Manager. At the relevant time he was working as Assistant Manager Estate). The petitioner addressed a letter dated 10‑3‑1985 to the Chairman P.N.S.C. pointing out that his juniors had been promoted and he was not promoted. This was followed by exchange of certain letters. It seems that the petitioner lost‑‑patience and in his letter dated 6‑8‑1985 addressed to the Chairman P. A. S. C. made serious allegations as to the harassment, metal torture/shock caused to him Wd the factum that the employees who had been working against the national/corporation's interest had been enjoying all facilities and were awarded with the words of appreciation and known as most favourite/closer to the authorities and that on the other hand honest and hard working under greater national interest/spirit were constantly in the hot :eater/under pressure and were being treated step‑motherly. The above letter was followed by some other letters. The petitioner also served a legal notice dated 6‑3‑1986 through his Advocate that he would initiate case before the Special Judge (Central) Karachi against all concerned in respect of various irregularities in P.N.S.C. The above legal notice was followed by suspension order dated 8‑4‑1986 passed by the General Manager (A&P), which was followed by a charge‑sheet dated 8‑4‑1986 alongwith the statement‑ of allegations, in response to which the petitioner submitted a reply dated 15‑4‑1986. Upon the receipt of the above reply the petitioner was served with the letter dated 20‑4‑1986 stating therein, that his reply was found not satisfactory and that the competent authority had decided to hold enquiry and the following persons were appointed as the members of the Enquiry Committee:

1. Mr. S.Mustafa Hasan, General Manager (Bills) President

2. Mr. Nazar Sajjad Saeed, Superintendent Member

3. Mr. S. Iqbal Ahmed, Dy. Manager (Finance) Member The witnesses were examined and cross‑examined. The petitioner was served with a second show‑cause notice dated 30‑9‑1986 alongwith the copy of the Enquiry Committee's Report dated 8‑7‑1986. After that the petitioner .vas dismissed by letter dated 22‑12‑1986. The petitioner teas, therefore,' filed the above petition.

8. In support of the above two petitions namely, C.P. No.D 678/86 and C.P.No.D‑681 of 1986, Mr. Ahmed Yousuf Ali Rizvi learned counsel for the petitioners has urged as follows: (i) That the petitioners' terms and conditions were protected under section 41(2) of the Ordinance and, therefore, they are entitled to maintain constitutional petitions. (ii) That there have been serious irregularities in conducting the enquiry inasmuch as that the charges were vague, the witnesses were examined in the absence of the petitioners etc. Mr. Gul Zaman Khan learned counsel for the petitioner in C.P. No.D‑338/87 has also maintained that by virtue of section 41 of the ordinance read with Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Service) Regulations 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations of 1984), the petitioner is entitled to maintain the petition particularly writ of certiorari and that there have been many irregularities in the conduct of the enquiry inasmuch as one of the members namely Nazar Sajjad attended only one meeting of the Enquiry Committee and that the Enquiry Report was in fact drafted by the office of the P.N.S.C. and not by the members of the Enquiry Committee.

9. The basic question for consideration is, as to whether the ratio decidendi of the famous case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court namely, R.T.H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation reported in P L D 1974 Supreme Court 146 is applicable to the present case or not. In the above case the facts were that the petitioner was employed as Regional Officer at Lahore by the National Shipping; Corporation which was established as observed hereinabove under the National Shipping Corporation Ordinance 1963. He was served with the charge -sheet. Eventually he was dismissed from service with effect from 2‑9‑1972. After his appeal was dismissed by the Chairman. Board of Directors, he filed writ petition which was dismissed in limine by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, against which a petition for leave in the Hon'ble Supreme Court ‑.vas filed and leave was sought on the following two questions: "(1) That the petitioner was riot afforded reasonable opportunity contemplated by Regulation 59 of the National Shipping Corporation (Service) Regulations, 1965 framed under section 32 of the 1963 Ordinance, either to meet the charges or to. show cause against his removal from service and the proceeding; against him were mala, fide and farcical; and (ii) that in any case the order of the petitioner's removal from service was bad in law firstly because, at penultimate stage, notice to show cause against his removal from service was issued by the Secretary to the Corporation secondly, Regulation 59, under which the petitioner was proceeded against does not contemplate "removal from service." The Hon'ble Supreme Court declined the petition for leave. While declining leave reference was made to the cases of Abdul Salem Mehta v. Chairman, Water and Power Development Authority and another (1970 S C M R. 40), Shahid Khalil v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi (1971 S C M R 568), The Chairman, East Pakistan Industrial Development of Corporation and another v. Rustom Ali and another, (P L D 1966 5 C 848), Zainul Abidin v. Multan Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Multan and The Lahore Central cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Pir Saifullah Shah (P L D 1959 S C (Pak) 210, and it ws observed that: "The broad proposition laid down in all these cases was, that the Constitutional safeguards available to the generality Civil Servants against arbitrary dismissal or removal from service are not available to the servants of a registered company, or a statutory Corporation. The precedent cases (with the exception of the case of Pir Saifullah Shah) which was the case of a Commercial Manager of a Co‑operative Bank) related to the removal from service of statutory Corporations like, PIAC, WAPDA, and EPIDC, each of which was established by a statute, over which the government exercised control in varying degree. In ail these cases, the grievance related to alleged arbitrary dismissal from service of an employee by an incorporated company or statutory Corporation in which the general law of master and servant was held applicable and it was laid down that the only remedy available to the aggrieved servant in such cases is to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and not a writ of mandamus or certiorari." The above case was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Muhammad Aslam v. National Shipping Corporation, Karachi, through its Chairman and 2 others reported in P L D 1979 Karachi, 246, in which the facts were that the petitioner's services were terminated after the charge‑sheet. The Division Bench, to which one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.) was a member, after referring to the case law held that constitutional safeguards available to civil servants against arbitrary dismissal or removal from service were not available to servants of a registered company or a statutory corporation. Such servants could be governed by general law of master and servant and only remedy available to them is to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and not for writ of mandamus or certiorari. However, learned counsel for the petitioners have invited our attention inter alia to the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Aansoorul Hassan, which was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 5‑2‑1982, reported in N L R 1985 Service

37. In the above case the facts were that the respondent was working as the Manager, National Bank of Pakistan, Airport Branch, Lahore. In September 1970 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on certain charges and after domestic enquiry he was dismissed from service on 16‑3‑1971. The respondent challenged his dismissal from service by means of a suit seeking relief of declaration and consequential relief claiming that the order of his dismissal from service was wrongful, void and bad in law and that he was entitled to continue in service with all rights and privileges attached thereto. The suit was decreed in favour of respondent on 8‑5‑1976. However, upon appeal the decree was set aside by a learned Additional District Judge, Lahore by his judgment dated 31‑3‑1977, in which it was held that the service rights of the respondent were governed by the ordinary law of master and servant and consequently the suit for declaration that his dismissal was wrongful and, therefore, he continued to be' in service was not maintainable. Against the above judgment the respondent filed a revision before the Lahore High Court, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge by judgment dated 21‑2‑1982 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge was set aside and the decree of the trial Court was restored. It was held by the High Court that the service of the respondent was governed by statutory rules of which there was a violation in so far as no second show‑cause notice was given to him after the inquiry report and the second ground which found favour with the High Court was that the employment of the respondent was subject to the provisions of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) .Act, 1952 and, therefore, the case of the respondent was outside the ambit of the ordinary law of Master and Servant. Leave was granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to examine, whether the Staff Rules of 1953, framed by the National Bank of Pakistan for its employees could be a statutory instrument. The Hon'ble Supreme Court maintained the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court after referring to two other cases of the Supreme Court referred to herein below: It may be advantageous to reproduce paragraph 4 of the above judgment which deals with the question as to the status of the Staff Service Rules framed by the Central Board of the National Bank with the approval of the Government and which reads as follows:‑ "

4. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the Staff Service Rules not having been framed by virtue of the delegated rule making power vesting in the Central Board under section 32 of the Ordinance, these rules do not have effect as statutory rules but are only instructions for the guidance of the officers of the Bank in regard to the internal management of the Bank administration. There is no doubt that as previously observed, the National Bank of. Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules purport to be rules made by the Central Board under Bye‑Law 18 of the National Bank of Pakistan Bye‑Laws. However, in our view this fact makes no material difference as to the effect of these rules. The vires of the legal effect of the rules cannot be judged by the mere form in which the rules are framed or the title by which they are called. In substance and in legal effect the said Service rules for all intents and purposes are Bye‑Laws framed under section 32 of the Ordinance. The legal requirements for giving effect to the subordinate legislation contemplated under section 32 have been complied with in framing the Service Rules, inasmuch as, the rules have been framed by the Central Board and it is not denied that the prior approval of the Central Government was accorded." In the above judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court also reiterated the following observations which were made by it in the case of the Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. Muhammad Shoab Qureshi (P L D 1984 S C 170): "It is, therefore, evident that where the conditions of service of an employee of a statutory body are governed by statutory rules, any action prejudicial taken against him in derogation or in violation of the said rules can be set aside by a writ petition. However, whee his terms and conditions are not governed by statutory rules but only by regulations, instructions or directions which the institution or body, in which he is employed, has issued for its internal use, any violation thereof will not, normally, be enforced through a writ petition." We may also refer to the above case of the Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. Muhammad Shoab Qureshi (P L D 1984 Supreme Court 170) more in detail. In the above case the facts were that two appeals were filed by the Principal Cadet College and the Board of Governors against. the judgments of the High Court setting aside the orders passed by the Principal and the Board of Governors of the Cadet College Kohat in relation to a member of the office staff and a member of the teaching staff respectively, which orders were challenged before the Peshawar High Court through petitions and which were allowed And the orders were set aside. The Hon'ble Supreme Court granted leave to appeal mainly to consider, whether in view of the law declared by it in RTH Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (P L D 1974 S C 146) referred to hereinabove, the High Court was competent to entertain the writ petition filed by the employees of an institution like the Cadet College Kohat and issue writs for restoring them to their offices. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeals against the judgments inter alia observed that has been quoted and reproduced in the above case of the Supreme Court of National Bank of Pakistan. The appeals were allowed for the reason that there were no statutory rules governing the terms and conditions of the non‑teaching, and teaching staff of the Cadet College'. In that context the following observations were made: "It is common ground that neither any rules, as contemplated by section 17 of the Ordinance nor any Regulations under section 18 thereof were framed. The Board of Governors did frame some 'rules' for 'governing the appointment, promotion, retirement, termination of service, and dismissal of staff employed by the Board of Governors of the College' in its meeting held on 29th September, 1964, but these not have been made by the Government, could not be regarded as 'rules' under section 17, nor having been approved by the Government, be treated as Regulations under section 18 thereof. These 'rules' thereof could only be regarded to be in the nature of mere instructions issued for the guidance of the Board of Governors and the Principal of the Cadet College Kohat." We may now refer to the case of Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan reported in P L D 1984 Supreme Court 194, in which the facts were that the petitioner was an employee of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. He was employed through a letter dated 15‑5‑1974, according to which he was to undergo training where after he was required to serve for a minimum period of five years during which period he was not to resign and in case of leaving service he was to pay a sum of Rs.2,

000. He resigned on 6‑10‑1976. In the resignation he stated that he was compelled to resign and he would not be able to pay Rs.2,

000. However, he sent a telegram on 1‑11‑1976 withdrawing his resignation but in the meanwhile his resignation was accepted by the authority on 30‑1e‑1976. He, thereafter, filed a suit for declaration that he remained in service and for an injunction. The Bank challenged the maintainability of the suit, which objection was overruled and a decree was passed. The High Court after discussing the case law and particularly after relying upon the case of Muhammad Afzal v. H. B. F. C. (P L D 1976 Kar.1121) held that the matter was governed by the principle of master and servant and that as the question arising relates to the terms and conditions of service as incorporated in the contract of service, the suit for declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act was not competent. The petitioner filed a petition for leave against the above judgment of the High Court, which was declined. Inter alia the above case of R T‑ H Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation and the cases of Abdul Razaq Malik v. WAPDA through its Chairman, (P L D 1973 Lah.188), Muhammad Ashraf Parvaiz v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (P L D 1973 Lah.425), Ch. Abdul Rashid v. Capital Development Authority, Islamabad (P L .D 1.979 Lah.8031) and the case of Muhammad Afzal v. H.B.F.C. P L D 1976 Kar.1121) were referred to for concluding that the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was that of master and servant; whereas the cases of Mst. Manni v. Karachi Cantonment Board (PLD 1969 Kar.304), Muhammad Salimullah v. Trustees of the Port of Karachi P L D 1975 Kar.758 and the case of Evacuee Trust Property Board Lahore v. Muhammad Nawaz (P I, D 1.979 Lah.903) were distinguished on the ground that they related to conditions of employment regulated either by statute or by statutory rules. While concluding the above judgment the following observations were made: "The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance (IV of 1961) whereby the respondent Bank was created has left the question of appointment and terms of its employees to the Bank itself. The relevant provisions are contained in coon 30 and section 39 thereof which read as follows: Section 30: Appointment of officers and advisers. The Rank may appoint or employ such persons including advisors as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its operations on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by regulations. Section 39: Regulations.‑(1) The Board may make regulations not inconsistent with this Ordinance or the rules 14,i provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance and the efficient conduct of the affairs of the Hank. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provision of subsection (1) the regulations may provide for‑ (a) to (d) ............. (e) The recruitment of the employees of the Bank, the terms and conditions of their service, the construction and management of Provident Funds for the employees of the Bank and all other matters connected with any of these things: (f) The duties and conduct of employees and agents; (g) and (h) ........... It is clear from the above that the Bank has complete control over its employees, their appointment and dismissal and their terms and conditions of service and that this control is not fettered by any statutory provision. The rule of Master and Servant will, therefore, apply to the case of the servant of the Bank." The present position obtaining in view of the above referred cases seems to be that where the conditions of service for an employee of a statutory body are governed by statutory rules, any action prejudicial taken against him in derogation or in violation of the said rules can be set aside either by a suit or by a writ petition, depending on the facts of the case, but where these terms and conditions are not governed by statutory rules but only by regulations, instructions or directions which the institution or body in which he is employed has issued for internal use, any violation whereof will not normally be enforceable through a writ or a suit. Similarly, if the employer has complete control over its employees, their appointment, dismissal and their terms and conditions for service and the control is not fettered by any statutory provision, the rules of Master and servant will apply to the case. In the instant cases 'Regulations of 1984 are applicable to the aforesaid three petitioners as observed hereinabove which have been framed under section 39 of the ordinance, which provides that the Board may make regulations, not inconsistent with the this Ordinance and the rules, to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance. It may also be stated that section 38 contemplates that the Federal Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance. If we were to construe the Regulations of 1984 as having the statutory force, it would follow that the infringement thereof would entitle the petitioners to maintain either a writ or a suit as the facts of the case demand but if we were to hold that the regulations in fact have no statutory force and have been issued for the internal use of the PNSC, the petitioners would not be entitled to maintain either a writ petition or a suit for a relief for reinstatement. Reference may also be made to the case of Muhammad Yousuf Shah v. Pakistan International Air Lines Corporation (P L D 1981 S C 224), in which Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the above proposition of law and held that P.I. A. Service Code merely contains instructions and not the statutory rules.

11. We are inclined to hold that the above case of National Bank of Pakistan is distinguishable from the instant cases and that Regulations of 1984 cannot be equated with the statutory rules inter alia for the following reasons:‑ (i) That in the above case of National Bank of Pakistan, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in substance and in legal effect the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules for all intents and purposes are Bye‑Laws framed under section 32 of the Ordinance as the same were framed with the prior approval of the Central Government, whereas Regulations of 1984 have been framed by the Board of Directors of PNSC without approval of the Central Government. (ii) That in the above case of Anwar Hussain v. ADBP, the Hobble Supreme Court inter alia, while construing section 39 of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961, of which subsection (1) is couched in the same language as section 39 of the Ordinance, held that the Bank has complete control over the employees as to their appointment, dismissal and their terms and conditions of service and this control is not fettered by statutory provisions and, therefore, the rules of master and servant will apply to the case. (iii) That in the above case of RTH Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (P L D 1974 S C 146), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while construing Regulation 59 of the National Shipping Corporation (Service) Regulations, 1965, framed under section 32 of the 1963 Ordinance, which generally correspond to Regulations of 1984, held that the remedy of the petitioner, if any, was to file suit for recovery of damages and not a writ petition. The above case of the Supreme Court though has been referred to in all subsequent cases of the Supreme Court, but has not been dissented from.

12. We are, therefore, inclined also to hold that the above petitions are not competent for the reliefs prayed for, .the petitioners' remedy, any, is to file suit for recovery of damages for alleged wrongful dismissal from service.

13. The upshot of the above discussion is that the above petitions have no merits and, therefore, they are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. A. A. / M‑533/ K. Petitions dismissed.