1982 PLP 361 (CLC)

(iii) The Deputy Commissioner, Multan as well as the Assistant Commissioner, Khanewal, both have reported to the Commissioner, Multan Division, that the affairs of the estate at Khanewal are being properly managed by the petitioner ; (iv) The report and comments could not be called from the Deputy Commissioner, Multan, as well as the Assistant Commissioner, Multan, as the application for assumption of the control of the land was moved directly before the Board of Revenue: The said reports submitted by both the officers have prejudiced the case of the petitioner, both being inimical towards him. Since the Deputy Commissioner himself did not consider it proper to place the control and superintendence of the property in question at the disposal of the Court of Wards as contemplated by section 11 of the Act, therefore, no report could be called from him. (v) The order in question passed by the Court of Wards having been passed on the basis of the aforesaid reports and having not been passed in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction by the Court of Wards under section 6 of the Act the same cannot be sustained in law. (vi) The provision as contained in section 6 of the Court of Wards Act does not contemplate that the property of every minor is to be resumed by the Court of Wards in a mechanical manner. It has to be found first as envisaged by that provision, that the person managing the affairs of the estate is incapable of managing the same. Since no such finding has been made by the Court of Wards in its order therefore, the same cannot be maintained. (vii) The recommendation made by the Deputy Commissioner as well as the Assistant Commissioner for assuming of the control of the property by the Court of Wards is based on no inquiry as the petitioner was never heard before the submission of such reports. Both the reports being mala fide cannot be made basis of the impugned order. (viii) Since respondent No. 2 does not own any property, therefore, her property being joint with the minors cannot be assumed under section 8 of the Court of Wards Act. (ix) The land measuring 504 kanals and 10 marlas situated in Chak Hyderabad in question is exclusively owned by Almas Khakwani, a major daughter of the petitioner. It is not jointly owned by her with any other person. She being major and exclusive owner of the aforesaid land the control and superintendence of the same cannot be assumed by the Court of Wards under any provision of law and the order passed in that behalf is illegal and void. (x) The fact that the petitioner as well as respondent No. 2 have fallen out and their marriage has been dissolved is not a ground at all for assuming the control and superintendence of the property by the Court of Wards unless it is found that the interest of the minors in the land in question is suffering of the hands of the petitioner who has been managing the affairs of the estate being father who is their natural guardian. (xi) Almas Khakwani, major daughter, of the petitioner, was gifted land measuring 594 kanals and 10 marlas situated in Khewat No. 103 of Chak Hyderabad by the petitioner in 1959. The mutation in this behalf was entered in the relevant revenue record and the same has not been altered or set aside by any competent authority. . The admission otherwise made by the petitioner at different stages to the effect that aforesaid land belonged to Almas, his minor daughter, has no bearing so far as his major daughter Almas is concerned. Her interest in the land as such cannot be taken away by the Court of Wards without considering her case in that perspective . . ..

4. There is no doubt that the application was submitted to the Board of Revenue by respondent No. 2 under section 5 read with section 6 of the Court of Wards Act but the learned Commissioner has passed the impugned order assuming the superintendence of the estate under sections 6 and 8 of the Act. The application aimed at resumption of the land belonging to the minors whereas section 5 does not contemplate resumption of any such land by the Court of Wards. It is applicable in the case of a female or if a land holder from physical or mental defect or infirmity or has been convicted of a non‑bailable offence and possesses vicious habits or bad character or is likely to dissipate his property on account of having entered upon a course of wasteful extravagance and as such is incapable of managing the affairs of the state. In such circumstances the Board of Revenue may make an order directing that his property be placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.

5. Section 6 of the Act provides that when any land‑holder is a minor or a person adjudged by a competent Court to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing his affaiRs.the Court of Wards may make an order assuming the superintendence of the property or the person and property of such land‑holder. Section 8 of the Act provides that when there are two or more proprietors of any property and the shares of the several proprietors have not been separated and the Court of Wards acting under section 6 or section 7, assumes the superintendence of the property of one or more, but not all, of such proprietors, the Court of Wards may assume the super intendence also of the shares of such joint‑proprietor or joint‑proprietors as is or are not disqualified. The application was submitted by respondent No. 2 probably on the ground that since the petitioner had allegedly entered upon the course of wasteful extravagance and was likely to dissipate his property, therefore, the superintendence thereof may be assumed by the Court of Wards. The petitioner no doubt was managing the affairs of the property being father of the minors, but since the property otherwise belonged to the minors, therefore, its control and superintendence could be assumed only under section 6 of the Act. The Commissioner while passing the impugned order has only adverted to various allegations levelled against each other by the parties but has not given any finding in relation thereto.

6. It has been argued at length by the learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon Saleh Muhammad v. Muhammad Riaz and others (P L D 1962 Lab. 68), Dr. Muhammad Aslam v. The Collector and Deputy Commissioner, Montgomery (P L D 1962 Lab. 124), Sardar Sher Muhammad v. Rao Bashir All Khan and another (P L D 1962 Lab. 172), MRs.Doreen Barkat Ram v. Custodian, Evacuee `Property and another (P L D 1962 Lab. 424), N. M. Khan and another v. Chief Settlement & Rehablilation Commissioner a d another (P L D 1962 Lab. 468), Muhammad Ayub Khan v. The Custodian of evacuee Property and others (P L D 1963 Kar. 551), Malik Ghulam Mani v. The Govt. of West Pakistan and another (P L D 1967 S C 373), Mir Abdul Baqi Baluch v. The Govt. of Pakistan and others (P L D 1968 S C 313), Rashid Ahmad v. Mst. Amina Begum (P L D 1968 Lab. 1045), Govt. of West Pakistan and another v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmir! (P L D 1969 S C 14), Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (P L D 1969 S C 223), Begum Nazir Abdul Hamid v. Pakistan Federal Govern ment, and another (P L D 1974 Lab. 97), Muhammad Zafarullah Khan v. Muhammad Khan and another (1975 S C M R 473), Raja Muhammad Iqbal and 2 others v. Chief Settlement Commis sioner and 2 Government of others (P L D 1975 Lab. 1508) Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbasi Ameer of Bahawalpur v. Pakistan and others (P L D 1978 Lab. 1166), Mls. Jannat Textile Mills Ltd. v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and 2 others (P L D 1979 Kar. 725), Ants Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan and 3 others (P L D 1979 Kar. 709) and Abdul Rashid v. Sessions Judge, Jhang and 2 others (P L D 1979 Lab. 613), that since the petitioner who is managing the affairs of the estate has not been found incapable of managing the property, rather on the contrary the reports submitted by the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner show his management of the affairs to be quite satisfactory, therefore, in the absence of any finding to the contrary property in question cannot be placed under the superintendence of the Court of wards. It has been argued by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that property of a land holder who is minor can be straight away placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards without assigning any reason. He submits that the words "and" and "of such land‑holder" as mentioned in section 6 of Act relate to a person of unsound mind and not to a minor. i am afraid such construction of the language as used in the aforesaid provision of law is not correct. The words "and" and "of such land‑holder" relate to a person of unsound mind as well as a minor. If any of the aforesaid persons are incapable of managing the affairs of their estates then the control and superintendence of their property can be assumed by the Court of Wards. The intention of the Legislature by reading the bare provision as contained in section 6 of A the Act does not appear to give such unrestricted powers to the Court of Wards so as to assume the control and superintendence of a property be longing to any minor or a person' of unsound mind without giving any reason. It has got to be shown that the person who is managing the affairs of his estate is incapable to do so for certain reasons and in that event superintendence of his property can be assumed.

7. In support of his arguments that the affairs of the Court of Wards in assuming the control and superintendence of the property and person under section 6 of the Act is unlimited and no bar or restriction has been imposed there under und: r the law. The learned counsel has placed reliance upon the authorities discussed below It has been held in Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Badridas Ramrai Shop (AIR 1937 P C 133) with reference to section 23(4) of Income‑tax Act of 1922 that Income‑tax Officer is to make an assessment to the best of his judgment against the person who is in default as regards supplying information. It has been held that section 23(4) of the Act places such Officer in the position of a person whose decision as to amount is final and subject to no appeal but whose decision, if it can be shown to have been arrived at without an honest exercise of judgment, may be revised or reviewed by the Commissioner under the powers conferred upon him by section

33. It has been further held that there is no justification in the language of the Act for holding that an assessment made by an officer under section 23(4) of `the Act without conducting a local inquiry and without recording the details and results of that inquiry, could not have been made to the best of his judgment within the meaning of the section. The aforesaid judgment does not show that order to be passed by the Income‑tax Officer is to be without any reason. It only lays down that the said order may not contain details and results of such inquiry as may have been held by the Income‑tax Officer in arriving at some conclusion. It does not mean that such inquiry or order would be without any reason. The judgment itself does not find the Income‑tax Officer entitled to act in an arbitrary manner or according to his own whim. He is to act within the scope prescribed by law in an honest and objective manner. In Laxman Vfshramji Pat war! v. Deorao Vishramji Patil (A I R 1940 Nag. 202) it has been laid down with reference to sections 12 and 13 of the Guardians and Wards Act that the aforesaid provisions enable the Court to make any order suo motu in the best interest of the minor. The learned counsel has contended while relying upon this observation that the Court of Wards as such can act suo motu in the best interest of the minors and the justification given by the Court in this behalf is not subject to any exception. I am afraid this contention does not get support from the judgment reported in 1940 Nag. In that case the District Judge appointed himself Guardian of the minor after giving reasons, as according to him the circumstances of the case warranted such decision. As such, the said order was not made arbitrarily.

8. Similar position obtains in P L D 1960 Lab. In that case it was held that the order of the Court of Wards had been passed in the best interest of the landholder. The Tehsildar and Sub‑Divisional Officer concerned in that case both had submitted reports to the Commissioner/ Court of Wards that the agent employed by the petitioner before the High Court for the administration, of the estate was unscrupulous and undepend able person who could not be trusted to manage the estate in the best interest of the minor. They both, therefore, recommended that the property of Mst. Wazir Begum and other may be placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards on the ground that being Pardanashin ladies they were unable to manage their property which was scattered in two tebsils. While referring to the provision as contained in section 5 of the Court of Wards Act it was held in that case that all was necessary for the Court of Wards in taking over the superintendence and control of the property of a female landholder, was to be satisfied after an inquiry that the female land holder was incapable of managing the affairs of her estate. It was further held that although provisions of section 5 and section 11 of the Act were clear that show‑cause notice was not necessary to be issued to the land holder before the superintendence and control of their property was assumed, yet it could not be contrary to the principles of natural justice to deprive a person of the management of his/her estate without giving an opportunity to show that such person was capable of managing the affairs of his estate. It was held ultimately that the action taken by the Commissioner as Court of Wards was quite in accordance with the statutory requirements of the relevant provisions. The Court of Wards was the sole judge of the necessity, expediency and advisability of assuming the control and the superintendence of any estate. It was further held that it was not under an obligation to find the facts in a judicial or a specially prescribed manner. It is contended while relying upon this authority that even if the impugned order does not contain any reason for assuming the control and superintendence of the estate in question, the order cannot be held to be illegal on that account.

9. Be that as it may the fact remains that in the aforesaid judgment/ order of the Commissioner was upheld mainly on the ground that before passing the order due inquiry had been conducted and the Commissioner himself had given full opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. The reports submitted by the local officers contained definite reasons with regard to incapability of the landholder to manage the estate and such reports were relied upon by the Commissioner while passing his order. As mentioned above in para. 10 of the judgment after discussing the facts of the case, it was held that action taken by the Commissioner as Court of Wards was in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions of the Act. There is no doubt that the Court of Wards may be the sole judge of the necessity, expediency and advisability of assuming the control and superintendence of an estate but it can do so on the basis of some material available on the record and as such on the basis of some valid ground warranted by such material. It does not appeal to sense that Court of Wards can otherwise act arbitrarily and capriciously in assuming the control and superintendence of a any estate, even in the absence of any material on record which material can give cause for passing such an order. If it is so only then it may be argued that the necessity, expediency and advisability of assuming the control and superintendence of any property adjudged by the Court of Wards may not be open to any exception provided the order has been passed within the four corners of law. This view gains strength even from certain provision of the Act itself. According to section 11 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner is to satisfy himself as to whether action can be taken under the Act for resumption of the control and superintendence of any property. He is obliged to hold inquiry and probe in this regard before making any such recommendation to the Court of Wards. Even the provision as contained in section 6 of the Act contemplates that when the Court of Wards is satisfied that a minor or a person of unsound mind is incapable of managing his affairs then the control and superintendence of his property may be assumed and not otherwise. It means that in the absence of any material to that effect no order for resumption can be passed. According to section 44 the Court of Wards may at any time release any person or property or both from its superintendence. Similarly it has got powers under section 47 to release the person or property or both of any minor from its superintendence when it deems fit. This provision empowers the Court of Wards to release such property from its superintendence when the cause for resumption of such control and superintendence is reported to have been removed. When the Court of Wards is of the opinion that the landholder can manage the affairs of his estate properly then the control of that estate may be released. Similar is the position with regard to the property of a minor. It means that when the material justifying release such property is made available then the order in that behalf can be passed. The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that the powers of the Court of Wards while resuming the control and superintendence of the property is unlimited is not correct as discussed above.

10. The aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 is also contrary to the view taken in Nawab Muhammad Abbas Khan Abbas! Amir of Bahawalpur v. The Government of Pakistan and others (1978 S C M R 428) and Federation of Pakistan and others v. Charsadda Sugar Mills Ltd. (1978 S C M R 428). In P L D 1978 Lab. 1166 the Central Government accepted the recommendation made by the Inquiry Commission and passed the impugned order called "Devolution and Distribution of the Property (Amir of Bahawalpur) Order of 1969" accordingly. The order passed by the Govern ment did not contain any reason for the decision taken. It was held that it was not a speaking order at all and as such in the given circumstances of the case the said order was held to be no order in the eye of law. It was held that the aforesaid order did not inspire any confidence as from that one could not with any amount of certainty vouchsafe that the Central Government had applied its own judicious mind to this view. It was held that unfortunate impression derived from the order was that the Government had surrendered its own discretion and judgment in favour of the Inquiry Commission appointed by it and almost mechanically it gave its final approval to the recommendation of the Commissioner. In 1978 S C M R the order passed by the Central Board of Revenue did not contain any reason whatsoever in support thereof. Reasons were given by the Central Board of Revenue in its parawise comments submitted to the Court. It was held that while passing the order the Central Board of Revenue had acted almost mechanically and failed to exercise its discretion vested in it under the law. The impugned order in this case was, therefore, set aside. In the circum stances it cannot, therefore, be said that the Court of Wards though having exclusive jurisdiction in assuming the control and superintendence of a property can act arbitrarily and in the absence of any material on record justifying such action. Such material can only furnish necessary cause for any such action.

11. The long list of the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner aims at showing that extraneous material not available on record cannot be taken into consideration, this Court can' interfere with discretionary order if passed on no evidence, it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute, the Courts of law while exercising their powers given under extraordinary jurisdiction can act under such principles of natural justice as may applicable in the facts and circumstances of a given case, satisfaction with regard to a particular matter is to be objective and not subjective, a special tribunal is to ascertain reasonable ground before taking a decision, special tribunal or an authority cannot pass an .order on erroneous assumption o facts, in the case of an order without jurisdiction and lawful authority interference can be made by the superior Courts in exercise of extraordinary D jurisdiction, superior Courts can interfere with the findings of tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction if such tribunal while arriving at a finding of fact misread the evidence or it considered the evidence which could not have been considered at all or had failed to consider the evidence which it was bound to consider, no authority can be said to have exercised the jurisdiction if it was prevented from knowing the 'true fact, if it took a fact to be material one though it was not so in law, if it proceeds to act in grave and obvious disregard of the material and provisions of law,, if it exercise discretion in the absence of a situation in which it can e exercised, if it violates the principles of natural justice and if it gives reasons for its conclusion which cannot in the given circumstances rationally lead to that. The principles of law as laid down in the aforesaid authorities cannot be disputed. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned order passed by the Court of Wards is without jurisdiction, lawful authority or has been passed in the absence of any material on record without giving any valid reason or the said order has been passed without affording an opportunity of being heard or otherwise has been passed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. It is not denied that the Court of Wards has got exclusive jurisdiction to resume the control and superintendence of any property if deemed fit in the given circumstances of a case. In the 'present case an application was submitted by respondent No. 2 before the Board of Revenue that since the property in question belonged to minors and was being wasted and damaged by the petitioner on account of his bad and extravagant habits, therefore, its control and superintendence might be resumed by the Court of Wards. This application was forwarded to the Commissioner performing the functions‑of Court of Wards for necessary action. It is admitted that no observation with regard to merits of the case was made by the Board of Revenue while forwarding the application. The Commissioner in turn asked for report from the Deputy Commissioner who in turn directed the Assistant Commissioner to submit his report. The Assistant Commissioner while submitting his report recommended that respondent No. 2 may be appointed as Manager of the property after the control of the same was resumed by the Court of Wards. This recommendation was not accepted by the Deputy Commissioner in his report submitted to the Commissioner. Both the aforesaid officers were of the view that since the parties had fallen out and were involved in deep litigation criminal as well civil, therefore, the petitioner would not be in a as position to manage its affairs satisfactorily, in spite of the fact that at the time of submission of their reports his management was satisfactory. The Commissioner after having received the reports issued notice to the parties. Here and them at length and passed a lengthy order incorporating all the respective pleas raised by the parties. He has observed while pas3ing the order that he has also examined the relevant record such as revenue, civil and criminal pertaining to the parties. Even the case‑law cited before him by the learned counsel for the respective parties has also been referred to in the impugned order. In para. 18 of the order the Commissioner has said that in view of the above facts discussed by him in his order it is clear beyond any doubt that there is serious dispute between the parties, who are parents of the wards and there is no possibility whatsoever of their coming to any compromise. Four out of five minor children are in the custody of respondent No. 2 and Rs.8,000 per month have been granted for their maintenance by the Judge, Family Court, Lahore vide his order dated 29‑5‑1980. He has further found in para. 19 of his order that perusal of the revenue record shows that the land in question belongs to the minors and is in their self cultivating possession and not in possession of the petitioner. He, therefore, has held that he is convinced in the given circum stances of the case that the interest of the minors can only be safeguarded if the control and superintendence of the property of the minors is resumed by the Court of Wards. I

12. As held in Muhammad Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and others (P L D 1974 S C 139) the expression in Article 199(1) (a) (ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan being "without lawful authority and of no legal effect is an expression of art and refers to the jurisdictional defects a distinguished from mere erroneous decisions whether on question of fact or even of law. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction is only concerned whether the Court or Tribunal below has acted within its jurisdic tion and if a tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a matter has decided the same wrongly or incorrectly that will not render such decision as without lawful authority. It has been held that it is wholly wrong to consider that constitutional provision is designed to empower the High Court or interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong as in that case it would make the High Court's jurisdiction undistinguishable from that exercisable in a full‑fledged appeal which plainly is not the intention of the constitution makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the same without jurisdiction. Similarly in Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner, Pakistan and another (P L D 1973 S C M), it has been held that although the conditions for grant of writ which obtains in the English Courts did not apply to High Courts of Pakistan, at the same time the extent of this constitutional jurisdiction cannot be enlarged to an appeal on facts or question of law. An appeal is creation of statute and if no appeal is provided by the Legislature the determination of a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction is final. The scope of interference by the High Court is, therefore, limited to the inquiry whether the tribunal has in doing an act or undertaking the proceedings acted in accordance with law. If the answer be in the affirmative the High Court will stay its hands and will not substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the, tribunal. It has been held that the cases of no evidence, misdirection, of failure to follow the judicial procedure are treated as acts done without lawful authority and vitiate the act done or proceedings undertaken by the tribunal in this behalf. In P L D 1974 S C an order passed by the Board of Revenue was interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction mainly on the ground that it was against equity. It was held that the order having been passed on the basis of the material available on record and within the scope of the relevant law was not without jurisdiction and lawful authority and as such was not liable to be interfered with. In 1973 S C the election of a person elected as member of National Assembly, was challenged on the ground that he bad entered into a contract with the Provincial Govern ment for the supply of goods. It was alleged that the contract had been entered into by his son on his behalf. The Election Commissioner while hearing the complaint confined the inquiry to mere perusal of the pleadings of the parties and the copies of the documents accompanying the complaint and the written statement. Neither the parties were examined nor the points on which they were at issue, were settled. No opportunity was given to the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. The Election Commissioner set aside the election and declared the seat vacant. It was held that since the Election Commissioner did not exercise his powers in accordance with the fundamental rules and judicial procedure by‑not settling the issues and granting opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, therefore, his order could not be maintained in law. It can be argued on the basis of the aforesaid authority that since in the present case neither the parties were examined nor they adduced evidence in support of their respective claims nor issues were settled, therefore, the order being against the fundamental rules and judicial procedure cannot be maintained being without lawful authority. I am afraid the aforesaid authority is not applicable in the given circumstances of the present case. There is no doubt that the parties were neither examined nor they adduced evidence nor the issues were settled by the Commissioner before he passed 'the impugned order. The fact, however, remains that there was no need to follow such procedure as the order was passed under section 6 of the Act on the bases of a ground which was not denied by any of the parties that they had fallen out and the children to whom the property belonged were minors. If the order had been passed under section 5(2) (b)(c)(d) of the Court of Wards Act then inquiry and probe might have been necessary in order to find out physical or mental defect or infirmity of the landholder or whether he had been convicted of a nonbailable offence on account of his bad habits and whether he had entered upon a course of wasteful extravagance likely to dissipate his property. All such allegations were made in the application submitted by respondent No. 2 but since the property did not belong to the 'petitioner, therefore, no order was passed under section 5(2) (b) (c) and (d) of the Act. As mentioned above such order was passed under sections 6 and 8 of the Act. The fact that the parties have fallen out and are involved in civil and criminal litigation has weighed with the mind of the Commissioner that the property in question being owned by the minors would not be properly managed by the petitioner who has been managing the same being their father. There is no doubt that if the landholders are minors then their property is to be managed by their father or mother being their guardians. If they are found to be incapable of managing the same then the control and superintendence of such property can be resumed. If respondent No. 2 mother of the minors had been appointed Manager by the Court of Wards for looking after the affairs of the property such order might have been alleged to be discriminatory. As is evident recommendation in this behalf has not been accepted by the Commissioner who has found that on account of the parties having fallen out they are incapable of managing the affairs of the estate. If he had decided the case on the basis of the allegations with regard to the physical or mental defect or wasteful extravagance likely to dissipate the property then the petitioner might have been justified in claiming right of being heard by way of producing evidence in rebuttal of the allegations. The learned Commissioner on the contrary has decided the case on the aforesaid ground and has held that on account of that the petitioner is not capable of managing the affairs of the estate. It may not be a very good ground as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner but the fact remains that such conclusion can be drawn in the given circumstances of the case on account of the dispute, hatred and enmity having developed between the parties to the extent that the petitioner has divorced respondent No.

2. The petitioner has applied for the custody of the minors whereas respondent No. 2 has applied for being appointed as their guardian. This litigation as well as litigation with regard to many other matters is pending at present between the parties. Such being the position I am of the view that learned Commissioner has rightly conclude that the interest of the minors can only be safeguarded if their property in resumed and placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards meaning' thereby that the minors' interest may not be safe in the hands of the petitioner if he is allowed to manage the affairs of the estate.

13. It has been argued that since the provision as contained in section 6 of the Court of Wards Act contemplates suo motu order by the Court of Wards, while impugned order has been based on the reports submitted by the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner therefore, it cannot be maintained in law. This contention has no force. There is no doubt that the Deputy Commissioner has not held any inquiry with regard to the resumption of the control of the land by the Court of Wards of his own accord as contemplated by section 11 of the Court of Wards Act, and has submitted his report in compliance with the directions of the Commissioner, the fact, however, remains that his as well as the report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner, both do not adversely comment upon the person of the petitioner in managing the affairs of the estate. They both have taken only one factor into account that since the parties have fallen out, therefore, the whole of the estate may be resumed. This factor has also weighed with the Commissioner who has made it basis for passing his order. His finding, therefore, being based upon the admitted fact cannot be substituted by this Court. It has been argued that since the Assistant Commissioner was pre judiced against the petitioner, therefore, his report could not be relied upon. The fact remains, that the Assistant Commissioner has not at all said a word against the person of the petitioner and as such no prejudice has been caused to him by his report. There is nothing in section 6 of the Act that such report cannot be called by the Commissioner before passing his order. If his aspersion or adverse remark had been made against the petitioner then his assertion that the inquiry was mala fide might bad some force. In the absence of that I do not find any prejudice having been caused to him parti cularly in view of the fact that he has been heard at length by the Commissioner.

16. It has been veh2mently argued on behalf of the petitioner that since the land measuring 594 kanals 10 marlas situated in Chak Hyderabad, Tebsil Khanewal, exclusively belongs to Almas Khakwani (major) petitioner's daughter from his first German wife which was gifted to her in 1959 and the mutation entered in that behalf has never been altered or rescinded, therefore, the assumption of the control of such land having been shown in the name of Almas Khakwani (minor daughter) cannot be sustained in law. The petitioner has admitted at different stages that Almas Khakwani (minor daughter) is owner with her minor brother and sisters in Khewat No. 103 of the Chak in question. It has been. so admitted by the petitioner himself in Family Settlement Deed "Annexure J". It has been drawn by the petitioner himself and is duly signed by him. It has been attested by certain witnesses who have also signed the document. In para 2 (6) of the Family Settlement Deed it has been admitted that two younger and minor daughters of Mr. M. K. Khakwani and real sisters of Almas Khakwani and Shahzad Khakwani must get that much share of the property which the said settlers have got. It is significant to notice that Almas Khakwani (major daughter) is not the real sister‑of other minor children. In para. 2 (d) it has been admitted that Mr. M. K. Khakwani will give 100 acres in Khewat No.

101. Almas Khakwani (minor daughter) will give 80 acres in Khewat No. 103 and Shahzad Khakwani will. give 34 acres in Khewat No. 104 out of their holdings to Mst. Taskeen Khakwani and Mst. Momina Khakwani minoRs.This settlement deed had been drawn by Mr. M. K. Kbakwani himself in his capacity as father of Almas Khakwani (minor daughter) and other minor children show ing Almas Khakwani (minor daughter) to be one of the owners of the property. Similarly such position is admitted in the plaint (Annexure K/VI) titled Mst. Momina Khakwani and others v. Mst. Almas Khakwani (minor) and another" through their father Mr. M. K. Khakwani. The suit was ultimately decreed on the basis of a compromise between the parties. The statement to that effect admitting the position of Almas Khakwani (minor daughtet) to be owner of the property was made by Mr. M. K. Khakwani himself on behalf of minor children in his capacity as father and natural guardian. Further this decree was implemented in the revenue record and mutation to that effect was entered on the basis thereof. Neither the decree nor the mutation entered on its basis was ever challenged before any appropriate forum.

15. It is correct that Mr. M. K. Khakwani made a gift of his property measuring 594 kanals and 10 marlas in favour of his major daughter Mst. Almas Khakwani born from his German wife. The mutation of gift may be intact uptil now but fact remains that on account of the admissions of Mr. M. K. Khakwani himself that the aforesaid property actually belongs to the minor children from their mother respondent No. 2 and decree having been passed to that effect by the civil Court and having been given effect to in the revenue record, the petitioner now at this stage is estopped to agitate the point that since this property belongs to Mst. Alma's Khakwani (major daughter), therefore, this cannot be treated as owned by minor children jointly. This aspect of the case would have attracted full attention if Mst. Almas Khakwani (major daughter) had approached this Court herself on the ground that the aforesaid Family Settlement deed or any admission by her father that the aforesaid property was jointly owned by the minor children was not binding upon her. Since the petitioner himself has admitted at different stages as mentioned above the aforesaid property is owned by his minor children from respondent No. 2, therefore, he is estopped at this stage by his conduct to agitate the matter conversely.

16. The learned Commissioner in his order has mentioned specifically that since the revenue record shows Mst. Almas Khakwani (minor daughter) as joint owner of the land in dispute with other minor children, therefore, this fact is sufficient for him to treat the property in question as owned by her. He has further observed that if Mst. Almas Khakwani (major daughter) deems fit she may agitate the matter in the civil Court. As such the learned Commissioner has based his order on this point according to the material available on the record.

17. The learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has challenged the locus standi of the petitioner to file the present petition mainly on the ground that he being not the owner of the land or being at the most manager on behalf of the owners cannot challenge the validity of the impugned order. This contention has been controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner being father and natural guardian of the minors has been managing the affairs of the estate and since management of the estate by him is adversely affected by the impugned order, therefore, he has got every right to come before this Court. Since I have disposed of the petition on other material grounds, therefore, I do not intend to deal with this matter.

18. As a result of the above discussion the writ petition stands dismissed without any order as to costs. S, Q, . Petition dismissed.