P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

SHABIR AHMAD, J.‑In order to fully understand the questions that arise in this Letters Patent Appeal, presented by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and Letters Patent Appeal No. 74 of 1961, presented by Mr. Shabir Hussain, Advocate, and his brother Munir Hussain, against the order dated the 10th of March 1961, passed by my brother Masud Ahmad, which is reported as Ch. Altaf Husain and two others v. Shabir Hussain etc. (P L D 1961 Lah. 449), it is necessary to have a clear picture of some of the material facts. These facts are these. The dispute relates to a house situate in Lahore Cantonment about which an order of transfer has been passed in favour of Mr. Shabir Hussain, one of the appellants in L. P. A. No. 74 of 1961. In the beginning an order of transfer of the house in dispute to Mr. Altaf Hussain, who figures as one of the respondents in both the appeals, was passed by Mr. Abdul Majid Khan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner (VI), Lahore Cantonment, on the 10th of November 1959. While passing order of transfer in favour of Mr. Altaf Hussain, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (VI), Lahore Cantonment, bad agreed with the report on the point made by an Assistant Settlement Commissioner. This report, which ran into more than two pages, said, inter alia, that the house was not divisible and should be treated as one house for the purposes of transfer and that the claim of Mr. Altaf Hussain was superior to that of Mr. Shabir Hussain, each of whom had put in an application for the transfer of the house. The above‑mentioned order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (VI), dated the 10th November 1959 was reversed by Lt. Col. J. D. Malik, Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner who accepted the appeal of Mr. Shabir Hussain and directed that a transfer deed should be prepared in his name. The application of Mr. Altaf Hussain for transfer of the house in dispute to him, which succeeded before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (VI), Lahore, but failed before Lt. Col. J. D. Malik, Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, was based on the fact that his son Javed Altaf had been In possession of the house by virtue of an order of allotment passed in 1953, while the claim of Mr. Shabir Hussain was based on his own possession of the house since October 1958. At the time Mr. Altaf Hussain made his application for transfer of the house in dispute his son Javed Altaf was not a claimant for the purposes of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Lt. Col. J. D. Malik did not dis agree with the view expressed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to the effect that the house was not divisible and should be transferred as a whole, but held that the claim of Mr. Shabir Hussain was superior. The order of Lt. Col. J. D. Malik, Additional Settlement & Rehabilitation Com missioner, directing the transfer of the house In dispute to Mr. Shabir Hussain, was passed on the 1st of December 1959, and on the same day Mr. Altaf Hussain put in another appli cation wherein he applied for the transfer of the house in dispute by reason of the fact that one room in the house bad been given to him by means of an order of allotment which had not been cancelled till the relevant date. He also presented a revision petition against the order of Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik to the Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan. This application for revision, which was heard by Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad, the then Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, was dismissed on the 17th of December 1959. In his order, a certified copy of which is on the record as Annexure F to the writ petition In which the order appealed against was passed, Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad made a mention of the application presented by Mr. Altaf Hussain for transfer of the house to him by reason of his being in possession of a room of the house under an order of allotment, but did not say in so many words that that application did not entitle him to get the property in preference to Mr. Shabir Hussain. The order of Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad make it clear that the question that the house was divisible was not raised before him. Against the order of Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad, dated the 17th of December 1959, Mr. Altaf Hussain presented an application for review which was dismissed on the 5th of June 1960 by Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore, after Mr. Hasham Raza, the then Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, on an application presented to him in this behalf by Mr. Altaf Hussain, passed an order that the application for review be dismissed disposed of by the successor of Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad. During the pendency of this review application, Javed Altaf and his mother Mr. Altaf Hussain presented an application on the 30th December 1959 for transfer of the house in their favour. At the hearing before Mr. Farzand Ali Khan this application of Javed Altaf and his mother was tried to be pressed into service by Mr. Altaf Hussain but as the house had been transferred already and the delay in the submission of the application had been condoned on the condition that the house was not in the list of houses which had to be sold by open auction (ear‑marking list) and had not been transferred already the application of Javed Altaf and his mother was not considered of any avail. The order of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan said that the parties had admitted that the house was indivisible. Against the order of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, dated the 5th of June 1960, an application for revision was presented before the Chief Settlement & Rehabili tation Commissioner by Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and his son Javed Altaf. This application, which contained an assertion that the house was divisible into two portions, was dismissed on the 16th of July 1960 by Pir Ahsanuddin, the present Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan. Before Pir Ahsanuddin passed his order which amounted to a refusal to exercise powers of revision which undoubtedly vested in the Chief Settle ment Commissioner, the case was gone into by Mr. Ahsan‑ul‑Haq Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Policy), who, In his report dated the 7th of July 1960, said that though the house had been admitted before Mr. Farzand Ali Khan to be indivisible it had been prayed in the application for revision presented to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, that it should be held to be divisible, and that the claim of Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and his son to the house could not be preferred to that of Mr. Shabir Hussain. Javed Altaf and his mother were parties in this application for revision as applicants because, as mentioned already, after the two applications presented by Mr. Altaf Hussain, in the first of which he claimed the transfer of the house on the strength of the possession of his son Javed Altaf by virtue of an order of allotment passed In his favour In 1953, and in the second, dated the 1st of December 1959 transfer of the house In dispute was claimed by him on the strength of an order of allotment of one room passed in his favour in 1950, his wife and his son had presented an application on the 30th of December 1959 for transfer of the house to them. Having failed before the ultimate Settlement Authority, Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf had presented in this Court a petition (Writ Petition No. 509/11 of 1960) which had been accepted by my brother Masud Ahmad by means of his order, dated the 10th of March 1961 against which Letters Patent Appeals No. 73 and No. 74 of 1961 have been presented. The respondents in Letters Patent Appeal No. 73 of 1961, which has been presented by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, are Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf, Mr. Shabir Hussain and his brother Munir Hussain, while the respondents in Letters Patent Appeal No. 74 of 1961 which has been presented by Mr. Shabir Hussain and his brother Munir Hussain are Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife, their son Javed Altaf and the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan.

2. By the order which was passed on the writ petition of Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf, who are the contesting respondents in both the appeals, the correctness of which order has been attacked by the two appeals under con sideration my brother Masud Ahmad gave the following findings :‑ (1) That the failure of the Settlement Authorities to dispose of an application for transfer of a house amounts to refusal to exercise jurisdiction and can be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari ; (2) that if no grounds are given by a Settlement Authority for its finding that the house, the transfer of which is under consideration, is indivisible the order can be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari ; (3) that where the order of a Settlement Authority is not interfered with by the Chief Settlement Commissioner In the exercise of his powers of revision and a writ is sought against the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the omission to challenge the order of the Settlement Authority who had passed the order of which revision had been sought from the Chief Settlement Commissioner did not prevent the Court from issuing a writ which would result in the setting aside of the order which had not been interfered with by the Chief Settle ment Commissioner in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction ; and (4) that though for the purposes of clause (1) of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, a person can, in the event of no one else wanting the transfer of the house, take advantage of the possession of the parent, spouse, daughter and son, such advantage cannot be taken if there is a competitor who, on the basis of his own physical possession of the property, claims its transfer.

3. With regard to Letters Patent Appeal No. 73 of 1961, i.e., ‑the one presented by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Mr. A. R. Sheikh, Advocate, who appeared for the contesting res pondents, namely, Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that this appeal could not be entertained because it did not bear tire signature of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, who was shown as the appellant, but that of an officer in the office of the Chief Settlement Commissioner whose designation is Secretary (Urban) to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan. It was con tended by Mr. A. R. Sheikh that a person other than appellant cannot sign a memorandum of appeal unless the law permitted this to be done and added that the law applicable to the matter did not permit the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, to depart from the usual rule that a memorandum of appeal must be signed by the person who seeks to appeal. Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan, who appeared for the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, in both the appeals replied to this con tention of Mr. A. R. Sheikh that the memorandum of appeal was signed by an officer authorised by the Chief Settlement Commis sioner to do so and could, not, therefore, be considered to be suffering from any defect. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to determine whether or not an appeal which purports to be presented by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, must bear the signature of that officer or may bear that of some one else authorised by the Settlement Commissioner by means of a writing to sign the memorandum of appeal, because it is undeniable that the person appearing to argue the case for the Chief Settlement Commissioner can raise the point which he seeks to raise in the appeal presented by Mr. Shabir Hussain and his brother in which the Chief Settlement Commissioner is a respondent if the appeal presented by the Chief Settlement Com missioner were to be found to be not maintainable on the ground that it did not bear the signature of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The contention raised by Mr. A. R. Sheikh as a preliminary objection does not require determination in this case and should better be left for decision in a case in which if the decision on it goes against the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, the whole appeal will stand dismissed.

4. Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan, whose arguments were in the main supported by Mr. Shabir Hussain and Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, Advocate, who appeared for Mr. Munir Hussain, contended that the learned Judge in Chambers had granted the contesting respondents reliefs which had not been asked for and, therefore, the order under appeal merited vacation on that short ground. He added that the orders of the Settlement Authorities which were quashed were in the circumstances of the case entirely correct and could not have been declared to be inoperative by the learned Judge in Chambers in the purported exercise of writ jurisdiction. With regard to the first of the above two contentions, it was pointed out by Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan that the relief sought in the writ petition presented by Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf, was the quashing of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and even if that order could be quashed which according to Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan It could not be Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf could not benefit at all because the main order was passed by Lt. Col. J. D. Malik on the 1st of December 1959, which order was not set aside by any of the higher Settlement Authorities. Mr. A. R. Sheikh replied that as the Chief Settlement Commis sioner, Pakistan, has refused to entertain the petition for revision presented by Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf, he shall be deemed to have confirmed the order passed by the Settlement Authorities subordinate to him and if the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is held to be a nullity, the orders of his subordinates must also be held to be ineffectual and inoperative. I am clear in my mind that this contention raised by Mr. A. R. Sheikh to support the finding of my brother Masud Ahmad suffers from an infirmity. The Chief Settlement Commissioner possesses powers of revision by reason of their conferment on him by the second clause of section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which reads as under: - "The Chief Settlement Commissioner at any time may, and shall on being directed by the Central Government, call for the record of any case or proceeding under this Act in which a Settlement Commissioner or an Additional Settlement Commissioner or a Deputy Settlement Commissioner or an Assistant Settlement Commissioner has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit." The language of the above reproduced provision of law makes it, clear that it is entirely within the discretion of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to interfere or not to interfere in revision. In these circumstances, if the Chief Settlement Commissioner refuses to exercise the powers of revision which the law confers on him but leaves to him the choice whether to exercise or not, he cannot be considered to have contravened the law because the law itself gives him unfettered discretion to exercise powers of revision or e not as he thinks fit, if the Chief Settlement Commissioner makes it clear in his order that he is not prepared to exercise his powers of revision that order cannot be questioned on the ground that he has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which was vested in him by law because he exercises a jurisdiction vested in him by law when he either declines to change an order passed by an Authority subordinate to him or changes it by exercising his powers of revision. It follows, therefore, that by merely saying that an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner refusing to exercise powers of revision should be declared to be inoperative, a party cannot claim to have the orders passed in that case by Settlement Authorities subordinate to the Chief Settlement Commissioner declared inoperative because when the Chief Settlement Commis sioner refuses to exercise powers of revision the order that be passes is that he would not exercise his powers which the law gives him a discretion to exercise or not. In no sense, however, would an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner refusing to exercise powers of revision with regard to an order of an authority subordinate to him amount to his confirmation of the orders which he did not interfere with though, if so minded, he could have done so. It follows, therefore, that technically Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan was right when he said that the writ petition had not, in so many words, sought the declaration of the orders of Settlement Authorities other than the Chief Settlement Commis sioner as inoperative, and yet that relief had been granted by the order under appeal, but it cannot be said that taken by and large the writ petition did not contain a prayer for the relief which had been granted to the petitioners in the writ petition who are now the contesting respondents in the two appeals. It would certainly have been better if the prayer clause in the writ petition had been so worded as to make it clear that it was sought to have the orders of authorities subordinate to the Chief Settlement Commissioner declared inoperative also but, in my view, the omission to do so is not, in the circumstances of this case, a suffi cient ground for withdrawing a writ which has been granted. Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan argued that the writ granted by the learned Judge in Chambers could not have been granted because the Settlement Authorities whose order was declared to be inoperative by the learned Judge were not parties to the writ petition. This argument would have had force had it not been for the fact that the head of the Settlement Department, namely, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, had been impleaded as one of the respondents, and an order which issued to him from this Court will be carried out by him and the authorities sub ordinate to him. I would, therefore, hold that the appeals cannot succeed on the ground that some reliefs which had not been clearly prayed for in the writ petition had been granted.

5. I will now take up the consideration of the question whether or not the finding of my brother Masud Ahmad that the decision of the Settlement Authorities to the effect that the house was indivisible could not be sustained for the reason that they had given no reasons for that view, can be sustained. The part of the judgment of the learned Judge in Chambers which dealt with this aspect of the case was attacked by Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan, Mr. Shabir Hussain and Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah on the ground that being one on a question of fact the finding of the Settlement Authorities that the house was indivisible could not have been interfered with especially as it was admitted before Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, who had, as mentioned in paragraph 1, disposed of the application presented by Mr. Altaf Hussain for review of the order dated the 17th of December 1959 of Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad, the then Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, that the house was indivisible. The argument on this aspect of the case proceeded on an inaccurate assumption because the learned Judge in Chambers has not said that the finding is wrong but, as would be apparent from para graph 22 of his judgment, has held that the finding of the Settle ment Authorities that the house was indivisible was unsustainable because it was given on no ground at all. The words used by my brother in this regard in paragraph 22 of his judgment are these: ‑ "No doubt, the law has conferred authority on these officers to decide whether the property is divisible or not and if their decision is based on good grounds and is not arbitrary or capri cious no interference can be made by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The decision of this question, however, is not based on any ground, what to say of reasonable ground, and appears to be arbitrary and capricious. In these circums tances, this Court would be justified in interfering by issuing an appropriate writ. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on certain English authorities. In The King v. The Registrar of Companies (1912) 3 K B Div. 23 the Court observed as follows: ‑ `The Registrar having to exercise a discretion in the matter, the Court would not be justified in interfering by mandamus unless either the Registrar had not in fact exercised any discretion in the particular case, or had exercised it upon some wrong principle of law, or had been influenced by extraneous considera tions which he ought not to have taken into account.' In Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wandasbury Corporation (1947 All Eng. L R Vol. 2, p. 680) it was held that the Court was entitled to Investi gate the action of the local authority with a view to seeing whether it had taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or, conversely, had refused to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. It was further observed that once that question was answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, had come to a conclusion so unreasonble that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, and in such a case the Court can interferes." I am clear in my mind that saying that a finding of fact is wrong is entirely different from saying that because no reasons are given to support it, it is unsustainable. But though I am not prepared to consider the finding of my learned brother Masud Ahmad wrong on the grounds urged on behalf of the appellants, I am not saying that it is sustainable.

6. In my opinion the finding of my learned brother Masud Ahmad to the effect that the finding of the Settlement Authorities that the house in dispute was indivsible must be quashed is unsus tainable for various reasons. The first of these reasons is that he himself appears to have held that it was unnecessary to give a decision on that part of the case which dealt with the divisibility or otherwise of the house in dispute. My reference here is to paragraph 17 of the judgment under appeal, while the question of the divisibility of the house has been dealt with in paragraph 22 of the judgment. Paragraph 17 reads as under:‑ "For reasons giver, above, I am inclined to grant the petitioners the relief asked for, on the short ground that the application dated the 1st December 1959, has not yet been disposed of and, therefore, there has been refusal on the part of the Settlement Authorities to exercise jurisdiction vested in them bylaw, but as two intricate questions of law have been raised and argued before meat full length, it would be proper for me to deal with those points before disposing of the case on merits. The above‑reproduced paragraph 17 would show that my brother Masud Ahmad himself felt that it was not really necessary to deal with any points other than those already dealt with by him and it would have been better if the judgment under appeal had closed with that paragraph. The views expressed by my brother Masud Ahmad with regard to the powers of the Settlement Authorities to declare a hone to be divisible or otherwise are being cited as a precedent very frequently and it appears necessary that their correctness should be examined in this judgment which deals with appeal against that very judgment.

7. Having given the matter my most anxious consideration I have arrived at the conclusion that the views expressed by my brother Masud Ahmad that the finding of the Settlement Authorities that the house was not divisible could be questioned cannot be sustained. I have no, quarrel with the view expressed by him that if no ground is given for a finding, a Court which can issue a writ can, on that ground, quash that finding In exercise of the power to issue a writ, but the principle on which my learned brother acted is, as I will presently show, inapplicable to the matter under consideration. At the time when Mr. Abdul Majid Khan, Deputy Settlement Commissions: (VI), Lahore Cantonment, passed the order of the transfer of the house in favour of Mr. Altaf Hussain on the 10th of November 1959, subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, read as follows: - "House' means evacuee residential premises of any value in an urban area, or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more In a rural area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and out‑houses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises, notwithstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or out‑house is in the possession of a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential premises, but does not include any residential building situated within the premises of an Industrial concern, or a building or premises declared under paragraph 16 of the Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel Provided that where any building or premises not so declared consists of more than one residential unit, and such units are in the possession of several persons, then, unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner orders otherwise, the whole of such building or premises shall be deemed to be a house Provided further that where the area of the gardens and grounds attached or appurtenant to a house exceeds three times the plinth area of the house including out‑houses and garages, if any, the area so in excess, or such part thereof as the Chief Settlement Commissioner may determine, shall not be treated as part of the house." Mr. Abdul Majid Khan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner, declared the house to be indivisible because he possessed the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf by virtue of Notification No. 6481‑R‑Reh/59, dated the 14th of October 1959, issued under subsection (2) of section 31 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which section allows the Chief Settlement Commissioner to delegate some of his powers under the Act. It will be noticed that the first proviso makes it clear that though a building may consist of innumerable units, each of which units has been in the occupation of a different person, the building will remain one house for the purposes of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, unless the Settlement Authority competent to do so declare that it is more than one house. All the reasons which my brother Masud Ahmad gave for coming to the conclusion that on no reasonable ground could the house in dispute have been held to be indivisible are mentioned in the first proviso to subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and yet the building is to be considered to be one house for the purposes of the Act unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner chooses to say that it is more than one house. As I read It, subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabili tation) Act, 1958, as it stands after its amendment by Ordinance LIII of 1959, means that if a building which is a residential premises is in possession of one person only the building is one house however big it may be, and it will remain one house even if it is occupied by more than one person unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner say that it shall be treated as more than one house. For the purposes of Court's reasonableness or otherwise of a thing is to be judged in the light of the provisions of the law which have application and if a Judge follows the ordinary standards of reasonableness in preference to those laid down by the law that Is applicable he travels beyond his power, because he is amending the law which no system of law permits a Judge to do. I need hardly add that the power of a Judge to apply the ordinary well‑understood conception of reasonableness to a case will be taken away only by a law which is binding, and if the Judge holds that the law is not binding the standard of reasonableness set up by the law can be ignored by him. The fact that a law is unreasonable does not affect its validity and as my brother Masud Ahmad did not hold that subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was not a binding provision of law and nothing to that effect has been urged during the hearing of these appeals, I am of the view that the opinion of my brother Masud Ahmad that the order of the Settlement Authorities in the present case that the house was indivisible could be questioned by presenting a writ petition is not sustain able.

8. What I have said in the last paragraph with regard to the finding of competent Settlement Authorities that a house was indivisible, as distinguished from a finding that it was divisible, being inviolable, receives support from another thing also. I allude here to the definition of the word "house" given in subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as it stood originally. This Act which was passed by the Parliament of Pakistan set up under the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which came into force on the 23rd of March 1956, but was abrogated on the imposition of Martial Law on the night of the 7th of October 1958, was amended twice in the year 1959 for the first time by Ordinance I of 1959 and for the second by Ordinance LIII of 1959. It was by means of section 2 of Ordinance LIII of 1959 that sub section (4) of section 2 of the Act was given the form which it possessed at the time that the matters regarding the house in dispute were dealt with by the Settlement Authorities. The original subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was in the following terms: ‑ 11 'House' means evacuee residential premises of any value in an urban area, or of the value of ten thousand rupees or more in a rural' area, together with the gardens, grounds, garages and out houses, if any, attached to or appurtenant to such premises, not withstanding that any such garden, ground, garage or out‑house is in the possession of a person other than the person or persons in possession of such residential premises, but does not include any residential building situated within the premises of an industrial concern, or a building or premises declared under paragraph 15 of the First Schedule to be a big mansion or hotel PROVIDED that where a building not so declared consist of more than one residential premises, and such premises are in the possession of several persons, the premises in the possession of anyone of such persons shall be deemed to be a house." It will be noticed that the original definition gave the Settlement Authorities no power to say that a building which had more than one unit in each of which units a different person resided was not as many houses as there were units in possession of different persons. The change in the subsection brought about by means of Ordinance LIII of 1959 resulted in the conferment of powers on the Chief Settlement Commissioner to declare a building to be more than one house only in specified circumstances but even if a building may, by ordinary standards, be entitled to be treated as more than one house it will not be so treated unless the Chief Settlement Commissioner chooses to treat it as more than one house. Mr. A. R. Sheikh, Advocate, learned counsel for the three contesting respondents, contended that it could not have been the intention of the law‑maker to confer such wide powers on the Chief Settlement Commissioner and when asked by what process of reasoning could the Court arrive at the conclusion that the first proviso to subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 as amended by means of Ordinance LIII of 1959, did not give the Chief Settlement Commissioner the power to refuse to say that a residential premises occupied by more than one person at the time when the question of its transfer under the Act arose was more than one house, replied that as the Act dealt with rehabilitation of refugees it should be so construed as to ensure that the largest possible number of refugees are rehabi litated. It is true that interpretation of a statute in the light of its avowed object is permissible under firmly established canons of interpretation, but this method can be resorted to only if the language of which interpretation is to be give by the Court is ambiguous. The basic principle is that when called upon to interpret a provision of law the Court has to find what the intention of the law‑maker was and while doing so has to act on the assumption that the words used have their well‑accepted meaning unless the law itself or another law such as the General t Clauses Act of this country says that the words shall be deemed to have some other meaning. If the language in which a provision of law is couched is unambiguous it is not open to a Court of law to say that the words have not the meaning they appear to have because one of the principles of interpretation of statute is that the law‑maker Is to be presumed to have intended that the law means what it has said.

9. In order to have it held that the amendment by means of Ordinance LIII of 1959 of the definition of "house" given originally in subsection (4) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, did not confer any powers on the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Mr. A. R. Sheikh, Advocate, contended that the proviso to subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act as it stood originally (reproduced in the last paragraph) did not apply to the same thing to which the first proviso to subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act as amended by means of Ordinance LIII of 1959 (reproduced in the last but one paragraph) did, and, therefore, the change should not be taken to indicate that it has been left to the Settlement Authorities to declare whether a building was to be treated as one or more than one house. In this connection he pointed to the fact that while the proviso to the subsection as it stood originally dealt with residential premises the first proviso to subsection (4) of section 2 as amended by means of Ordinance LIII of 1959 dealt with residential units. It appears to me that the learned counsel relied upon a difference of language which is clearly without any significance. I am inclined to think that one of the objects of changing the language was to make it more elegant. It cannot escape notice that while the opening part of subsection (4) of section 2 of the Act, as it stood originally, spoke both of "building" and "premises" the proviso dealt with "building" and the word "premises", was employed to indicate a part of the building while the first proviso to the subsection as amended by means of Ordinance LI11 of 1959 like its opening part dealt with "building" and "premises" and. employed the word "unit" to indicate a part of either

10. In view of what I have said above, I have arrived at the conclusion that under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as it stood at all times relevant for the purposes of this case and as it stands at pr6sent, a Chief Settlement Commissioner, and in case they have been delegated his powers, the other Settlement Authorities are not bound to declare a house to be more than one house when parts of it are in possession of different persons and that a house can be declared by them to be more than one house only if parts of it are in possession of different persons. The result of this finding would be that the finding of my learned brother Masud Ahmad to the effect that the order of the Settlement Authorities declaring the house to be indivisible can be quashed by this Court by issue of a writ is held to be unsustainable.

11. During the course of his arguments, Mr. A. R. Sheikh, Advocate, attacked the finding of my brother Masud Ahmad to the effect that under the provisos to paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as it stands after its amendment by means of the two Ordinances promulgated in 1959, a person cannot take advantage of the possession of a parent, spouse, daughter or son. The acceptance of the contention in this regard could be of avail to the contesting respondents because if the house were to be treated as indivisible but the two applications for transfer of the house In dispute one presented on the 1st of December, 1959 by Mr. Altaf Hussain and the other presented jointly by his wife and son Javed Altaf on the 30th of December 1959 were held to be useless, Mr. Altaf Hussain who had put in his first application for transfer of the house in dispute on the strength of the possession of his son Javed Altaf will have nothing left to support his claim as paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as it stood at all times relevant for the purposes of this case just as it stands now is In the following terms :‑ "A house In possession of a claimant or a parent, son, daughter or spouse of the claimant, being a house which such parent, son, daughter or spouse does not claim under the provisions of the Schedule, and if there is more than one such house, then anyone of the houses which the claimant desires to retain, shall be transferred to him at a price determined on evaluation basis: Provided that if a house or a part thereof is in possession of more than one person and one of them is a claimant, then the house shall be so transferred to the claimant: Provided further that if a house or a part thereof is in possession of more than one claimant, then the house shall be so transferred to the claimant who obtained prior possession." The contention of Mr. A. R. Sheikh, learned counsel for the three contesting respondents, was that just as for purposes of the main clause of the above‑reproduced paragraph a person can take advantage of the possession of a parent, spouse, daughter or son for the purposes of the provisos to the paragraph, and that consequently the order of my brother Masud Ahmad which Is under appeal and that passed on the 17th of December 1959 by Mr. Riazuddin Ahmad, Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, both of which had taken the contrary view, were wrong. The argument of Mr. A. R. Sheikh was that a proviso to a provision of law must be held by Courts to deal with an aspect of that matter which has been dealt with in the part that precedes it and, therefore, it should have been held by my brother Masud Ahmad that in case the only application which could be acted upon for the benefit of Mr. Altaf Hussain was the one he had presented in the beginning i.e., on the 15th July 1961 in which he had based his claim to transfer of the house in the possession of his son, Javed Altaf, under an allotment order passed by a Rehabilitation Authority, the claim of Mr. Altaf Hussain to the transfer of the house was superior to that of Mr. Shabir Hussain whose possession started sometime in October 1958. I have no hesitation in holding that these contentions of Mr. A. R. Sheikh regarding the first paragraph of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, have no weight. There may be some force in his contention that a proviso is to be assumed by Courts to apply to an aspect of that matter which has been dealt with in what precedes it, but such an assumption is not an inviolable rule. The correct approach is that unless .I there is anything to indicate to the contrary, a proviso is to be assumed to apply to what has been dealt with In the main provision preceding It. Now, the language employed in the opening part of paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, makes it clear that an applicant for transfer of a house can take advantage of the possession of a parent, spouse, daughter or son provided the applicant is a claimant and there is no one else to compete with the applicant. The two provisos to the paragraph deal, with entirely different situations and come into play only in those cases in which there are more than one applicant for transfer of al house‑a case entirely different from the one to which the opening part of the paragraph is applicable. The language used in the paragraph under consideration is so unambiguous that the interpretation contended for by Mr. A. R. Sheikh could be placed on it only if the Courts were prepared to overlook legal principles by doing inexcusable violence to the plain language used. This obviously cannot be done and consequently I would uphold the interpretation placed by my brother Masud Ahmad on paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compen sation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.

12. Questions relating to the application for the transfer of the house in dispute presented by Mr. Altaf Hussain on the 1st of December 1959, may now be taken up. This application bears the date on which Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik, Additional Settlement Commissioner, accepted the appeal of Mr. Shabir Hussain against the order dated the 10th of November 1959, passed by Mr. Abdul Majid Khan, Deputy Settlement Commis sioner (VI), Lahore Cantonment, whereby the house in dispute having been held to be indivisible, the whole of it was transferred to Mr. Altaf Hussain. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that this application was put in by Mr. Altaf Hussain after the acceptance of the appeal of Mr. Shabir Hussain by Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik, while it was urged on behalf of the contesting respondents that the application had been put in before the appeal was accepted by Lt.‑Col. J. D. Malik. If it had been necessary for the purposes of this case to determine whether the application of Mr. Altaf Hussain dated the 1st of December 1959 had been put in before or after the acceptance of the appeal, a very strong circumstance against the claim of Mr. Altaf Hussain that the application had been put in before the acceptance of the appeal presented against the order transferring the house to him would have been that if he did not know that the appeal had been accepted, he should not have felt the necessity of putting in another application for the transfer of the house to him. But, as the point is of but little significance‑for the purposes of the present appeals, I need not dilate upon it. Another contention raised by the appellants about the application was that it was based on a claim of possession that did not subsist at the relevant time. It was argued that though a room of the house in dispute was probably allotted to Mr. Altaf Hussain by an order different from the one by means of which a few other rooms were allotted to him sometime in 1950 when he was serving in the Military Department at Lahore, both the allotments in his favour were cancelled when he was transferred to Rawalpindi and an allotment of a part of the house in dispute was made to his son Javed Altaf and that It was for that reason that Mr. Altaf Hussain had not pressed the allotment of a room of the house In dispute as a claim of possession of a part of the house. The argument is weighty but whether or not it is as weighty as it looks can be determined only after the evidence regarding It has been taken. Taking of evidence for the decision of that point may be the province of the Settlement Authorities but is clearly not that of this Court, and I would leave the matter at that. This application of Mr. Altaf Hussain was addressed to the Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore, and bears on its margin a writing by Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan dated the 1st of December 1959 to the following effect :‑ "May be admitted and forwarded to the D. S. C. concerned for consideration on merits." Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan, who wrote the above note, was, it would appear, an Additional Settlement Commissioner on the 1st of December 1959, and was probably working in the office of the Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan. My brother Masud Ahmad has directed that as this application of Mr. Altaf Hussain has not been disposed of, it should be disposed of now and while dealing with the question of the date of the applica tion being very late which appears to have been raised before him has said that the application could be considered because the time for presentation of applications for transfer of houses for which the original date fixed was the 15th of July 1959, had been extended from time to time, and has in this connection referred to a Press Note issued on the 12th of July 1960 which is reproduced in paragraph 15 of his judgment in which Press -Note dated the 12th of July 190 it is said that the Chief Settlement Commissioner has decided that the entertainment of belated applications for transfer of houses and shops should be totally 'stopped after the 15th of July 1960. My brother Masud Ahmad held that as the last date for putting in applications for transfer of houses had been extended from time to time the applications presented on the 1st of December 1959 could not be considered to have been presented after the date fixed for such applications had passed. It appears to me that this finding has been arrived at on Insufficient material.

13. The relevant facts with regard to the fixation of dates for receipt of applications for transfer of houses and shops are briefly enumerated below: - (i) On the 19th of May 1959, Notification No. 5596‑Comp Reh‑59 was issued by Mr. S. H. Raza, the then Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, which read as follows: ‑ "In exercise of the powers conferred upon me by paragraph 2 of Settlement Scheme No. 1 for the transfer of houses and shops to claimants, non‑claimant displaced persons and locals prepared under section 16 (1) (6) and (c) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, as amended by Ordinance I of 1959, 1, Syed Hasham Raza, Chief Settle ment Commissioner, Pakistan, invite with immediate effect applications for the transfer of houses and shops in the posses sion of claimants as follows (1) A claimant who is in possession of a house which he is entitled to retain under paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the aforesaid Act or a shop under paragraph 8 of that Schedule may, if he desires to retain it, submit his application in Form C R or Form CS, as the case may be, as prescribed in Appendix I and Appendix 11 respectively to Settlement Scheme No. 1. (2) Applications shall be submitted in duplicate to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner of the area in which the house or shop applied for is situated. (3) (a) An application on behalf of a minor or a person of unsound mind shall be submitted by his guardian. (b) An application on behalf of a person may be submitted by his duly authorised agent. (c) An application on behalf of a deceased claimant may be submitted by his successor‑in‑interest provided that where there are more than one successor the application shall be submitted by them jointly. (d) Persons to whom a house ‑or shop was allotted jointly shall submit their applications jointly unless any of such persons is entitled, under the Act, to retain the property, to the exclusion of others. In the case of disagreement between the joint allottees on the question of submission of a joint application each of such allottees may apply under his own signature but shall indicate the names and addresses of all joint allottees and also attach to the application form a note giving brief reasons for dis‑agreement. (4) An application under this Notification shall be submitted not later than 15th day of July 1959." (ii) Notification No. 6566‑P‑Reh/59, dated the 28th of October 1959 with regard to transfer of houses and shops in occupation of claimants, non‑claimants and displaced persons was issued wherein it was said that applications, may be submitted not later than the 10th of November 1959. (iii) On the 26th of December 1959, the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued his Memorandum No. 8163‑P‑CS & RC/59 which read as follows:‑ "The Chief Settlement Commissioner has decided that the Additional Settlement Commissioners may continue to accept Forms A, CH and CS in really deserving and exceptional cases. While accepting Forms CH, CS care should be taken that no such form is entertained if the property applied for has been included in the ear‑marking list. Further no CH or CS form should be accepted from a claimant who does not hold a valid allotment order issued before 20th December 1958 but wants to apply on the basis of declaration of eligibility. When the ear‑marking operations were launched a large number of claimants submitted CH and CS forms. These forms should be carefully scrutinised and the property applied for should not be transferred unless the possession of the applicant is established beyond doubt. There have been reports that non‑claimant displaced persons and locals have been instigating certain claimants to apply for the transfer of properties in the possession of such non‑claimants and locals. If the property is duly allotted to another person or it can be checked up on the basis of the survey register maintained in the office that the applicant has never been in occupation of the property the application should be rejected straightway. Please make sure that no property is transferred to an undeserving person by underhand means." (iv) Then came Memorandum No. 2953‑PI‑Reh./60/1444 dated the 18th of February 1960, which reads as follows :‑ "The Chief Settlement Commissioner has decided to give further chance to the claimants in possession of houses who applied in CH or KCH forms and whose applications were rejected as time‑barred. Such applications may be accepted by the Additional Settlement Commissioner of the area concerned up to 20th February 1960, both from claimants who hold allot ment orders as well as those who do not possess any such order but are in undisputed possession of houses. No application will, however, be accepted if the house is included in an ear‑marking list published by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner or an Additional Settlement Commissioner. No application will be accepted in Forms CS, NCH, NCS, KNCH, KNCS and LH." (v) And, finally came the Press‑Note dated the 12th July 1960 to which reference was made by my brother Masud Ahmad in his order under appeal."

14. It will be noticed that the extension of time granted' by means of the memorandum dated the 28th of October 1959, [shown at No. (ii) in the last paragraph], expired on the 11th of November 1959, and as the next order of extension of time came on the 26th of December 1959, it is clear that on the 1st of December 1959, when Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan is stated to have condoned the delay in presenting the application of Mr. Altaf Hussain, no power was vested in him to do so. The fact that he exercised the power at a time when he did not possess it cannot be taken to be the exercise of power by him at a time when he became authorised to condone the delay on the 26th of December 1959 for more reasons than one. The first of these reasons is that there is no proof on the record that on the 26th of December 1959, or thereafter, Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan was an Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Second is that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner regarding the extension of time for receipt of applications, issued on the 26th of December 1959, is clearly to the effect that delay in putting in applications for transfer of houses and shops was to be condoned only in deserving and exceptional cases and not automatically. There is not one single word in the order of Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan that the applications for transfer put in by Mr. Altaf Hussain on the 1st of December 1959 was of the type which would satisfy the order issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on the 26th of December 1959. Order issued by the Chief Settlement Commis sioner after the 26th of December 1959 with regard to acceptance of applications presented with delay cannot be availed of by the three contesting respondents with regard to the application put in by Mr. Altaf Hussain, who is respondent No. 1 in both the appeals, because the conditions mentioned in those orders were not satis fied. It would appear from the note of Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan dated the 1st of December 1959, which has been reproduced in the last paragraph, that Mr. Altaf Hussain had not disclosed to him that an order of transfer of the house in dispute passed in his favour by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner concerned had been set aside by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, or, if the application was put in before the disposal of the appeal, that the order of transfer in his own favour was the subject of an appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, otherwise Mr. Bashir Ahmad Khan could not have said in his note that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner should consider the application on merits because the consideration by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner of the application on merits could result in reversal or modification of the order of a higher authority, namely, the Additional Settlement Commissioner. No one can consider an order obtained by keeping the person who has been asked to pass ft in the dark about the facts of the case to be an order that the case was so deserving and exceptional as to call for the enter tainment of the application presented with great delay. Moreover, the matter having been finally disposed of by the Chief Settlement Commissioner it could not on any legal basis be directed to be re opened now. It should be borne in mind that Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Javed Altaf, invoked the revisional jurisdic tion of the Chief Settlement Commissioner by means of an application. If they did not press into service Mr. Altaf Hussain's application dated the 1st of December 1958, they were to thank themselves if it remained unconsidered by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and if they did press into service that application it has to be deemed to have been disposed of by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and found to be of no avail to Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife or their son Javed Altaf. At any rate, issuing of a writ is discretionary and I am clear in my mind that the circumstances of the case did not call for the exercise of the power the exercise of which is not obligatory.

15. In view of what I have said above, I would accept both the appeals and withdraw the writ issued by my brother Masud Ahmad and would further direct that the appellants get their costs in the appeal and the writ petition from the three contesting respondents, namely, Mr. Altaf Hussain, his wife and their son Jayed Altaf. ABDUR RAHIM KHARAL, J.‑I agree. A. H. Appeals accepted.