P L D 1956 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑--This judgment will dispose of Civil Original Nos. 10, 40 and 45 of 1955 which involve common questions of law. The plaintiffs in these three suits are the Amritsar Pathan -kot Transport Co., Ltd., the District Transport Co‑operative Society Ltd., and the National Co‑operative Society, Ltd., respectively. The plaintiffs were operating their buses on the Lahore‑Layallpur via Mangtanwala route. In 1953 a new route called the Lahore‑Layallpur via Shahpur‑Shahkot route was opened and all the three plaintiffs applied for permits to run their buses on the new route. These applications were sub mitted some time in 1953, but they came up for hearing before the Regional Transport Authority in a meeting on the 26th of February 1954 and permits were granted to all the three plaintiffs. The intention was to grant permanent permits as was clarified later, but the permits actually issued were only for a period of one year. The plaintiffs appealed against the permits granted on the ground that they could not be for one year and, by an order of the Appellate Transport Authority, the‑ permits were made permanent which means, in this case, permits for three years. The plaintiffs started running their buses on this route and continued to do so till on the 2nd of April 1954, the Governor of the Punjab, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 43, subsection (4), clause (a), of the Motor Vehicles Act, cancelled the permits of all the plain tiffs on this route. This order had been passed in order that the Punjab Road Transport Board, which had come into exis tence by a notification dated the 21st of August 1951, may operate its own vehicles on this route. The three plaintiffs then filed the present suits challenging the order of the Gover nor and also praying that the Punjab Road Transport Board be prevented from functioning at all either on the Lahore -Layallpur via Mangtanwala route or on the new route. To explain the grounds of attack on the order of cancellation. it is necessary to refer to the amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act XVII of 1951, read with the amending Act of 1953 which had retros pective effect. The Motor Vehicles Act provides inter alia that any person who wants to ply a motor vehicle on hire on a public place can do so only under a permit from the Regional Transport Authority. The object of the amending Acts was to enable the Government to run its own vehicles through the Road Transport Board and to enable the Government to cancel permits of other persons for this purpose. By these amendments were introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act, sections 43‑A, 43‑B and 43‑C. Section 43‑A provided that if the Provincial Government wants to run its own motor vehicles, it may constitute a Road Transport Board. This Board was granted a corporate capacity so as to be able to acquire property, enter into contracts and sue and be sued. The section provided the constitution of the Board and enacted that the Central Government would own 25% of the share capital of the Board. The section provided further for the framing of the rules with respect to the powers and functions of the Board by the Provincial Government with the concur rence of the Central Government. By section 43‑B, the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority was taken away with respect to the vehicles operated by the Road Transport Board. Section 43‑C gave the Road Transport Board power to acquire such property movable or im movable as was being used for the operation of any motor transport conducted under a permit, subject to payment of compensation. At the same time, the amending Act added to section 43, subsection (4) which gave the Provincial Govern ment the power to cancel any permits in order to enable the Road Transport Board to run its own vehicles on the route or the routes thus vacated. It is an order passed under this provision which is the subject‑matter of the dispute in these suits. It is proper to mention here that what I have stated above is the effect of the amendments of 1951 and 1953 taken together. The amending Act of 1953 granted the Board a corporate entity with retrospective effect so as to have effect from the date of the amending Act of 1951. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 43‑A the Punjab Government brought into existence the Punjab Trans port Board and framed rules with respect to its constitution and working: This Board commenced plying its buses on the new route and then in exercise of its powers under section 43 (4) (a), the Punjab Government cancelled the permits of the plaintiffs. The grounds of attack on the order of the Provincial Government cancelling the permits, as stated in the various plaints, are:‑(1) the amending Act of 1951 is ultra vires in so far as it delegates to the Provincial Government the power to frame rules with respect to the Road Transport Board without providing the policy and framework which are essential for delegation of legislative powers to the executive and without the rules the provisions about the Road Transport Board are incapable of bringing into existence a Board at all ; (2) Section 43 (4) (a) is opposed to the provisions of section 299 of the Government of India Act as it enables the Government to take away a permit, which is a right of property, without pro viding compensation ; (3) even if section 43 (4) (a) is intra vires, the cancellation is in excess of the power granted, for the power is intended only for creating a vacancy for the Road Transport Board and the Board was already operating its buses on this route; and (4) the amendment violates Article 12 of the Pakistan Constitution. The case of the plaintiffs with respect to the second relief claimed (that the Punjab Road Transport Board should not ply its vehicles) is that the Board has no legal existence because (1) the delegation of legislative functions, that is, the rule‑making power, is ultra vires, and the provision in the Act itself is insufficient for the creation of a Board; (2) The rules framed by the Provincial Government under the Act are void as they have not been framed by the proper rule‑making authority with the concurrence of Central Government, and section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been violated; and (3) Section 43 (4) (a) being ultra vires on account of sec tion 299, Government of India Act, the whole amendment is ultra vires and the provisions relating to the Board cannot be given effect to. The defendants to these three suits are the Punjab Pro vince, the Federation of Pakistan and the Punjab Road Transport Board. The Federation of Pakistan has not felt interested. The other two defendants have filed written statements. They deny that the orders are invalid or that the Punjab Road Transport Board can be restrained from plying its vehicles. Some preliminary objections which had been raised were disposed of by me after framing preliminary issues. The issues framed on the merits are:‑ (1) Whether the order of the Punjab Government, cancel ling the four permits of the plaintiffs on the Lahore‑Layallpur via Sheikhupura and Shahkot route, is void for reasons stated in paragraph 9 of the plaint? (2) Whether the plaintiffs can be granted an injunction as claimed in view of the cause of action as disclosed in the plaint? (3) Whether the circumstances of the case are such that the discretion of the Court to grant an injunction should be exercised in favour of the plaintiffs? The first question to be considered is whether the amend ment is void because legislative 0power has been delegated without providing sufficient frame‑work within which rules are to be framed. Before proceeding to consider the arguments, it will be convenient to reproduce here sections 43 (4) (a), 43‑A, 43‑B and 43‑C:‑ 43 (4) (a) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing subsections, the Provincial Government may by a notifica tion under this subsection, (a) cancel generally or in relation to a specified area any permit or class of permits granted under this Chapter in respect of transport vehicle in order to enable the Road Transport Board to use its transport vehicles on the routes thus rendered vacant. 43‑A. (1) Where a Provincial Government decides to operate transport services itself, it shall constitute a Road Transport Board. (2) The Board shall consist of seven members of whom four including the Chairman shall be appointed by the Provincial Government and three by Central Government. (3) Members of the Board shall hold office for such period as may be specified in the order appointing them, but not withstanding the foregoing provision any member may resign or may be removed at any time or may be re‑appointed, by the appointing authority. (4) The Provincial Government shall consult the Board in all matters relating to the co‑ordination of road and rail transport and in the fixation of fares and freights under this Chapter. (5) The Road Transport Board shall reserve for and allot to the Central Government, as represented by the railways, not less than 25010 of its total share capital. (6) If a dispute arises between the Central Government and a Provincial Government in respect of any matter con cerning the fixation of fares and freights, and to settlement is arrived at by negotiation, the dispute shall be referred to the arbitration of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or of a judge of the Federal Court nominated by him and the award of the Chief Justice or of a judge aforesaid shall be final and binding on the parties and shall not be called in question in any Court of law nor shall anything in the Arbit ration Act, 1940, apply to such arbitration. (7) The Provincial Government shall make rules, with the previous concurrence of the Central Government and not inconsistently with this Act, prescribing the powers and functions of the Board. 43‑B. (1) The Road Transport Board may operate motor transport on any route it may think fit and where it so operates such transport, the Provincial Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authority shall, notwithstand ing anything in this Act, have no jurisdiction in relation to that transport. (2) Where the Provincial Government has cancelled any permit or class of permits under clause (iii) of subsection (1) of section 43, the Provincial Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authority shall, notwithstanding any thing in this Act, have no jurisdiction in respect of such permit or class of permits. 43‑C. (1) The Road Transport Board shall have power to acquire any property movable or immovable used in, or for, or ancillary to, the operation of any motor conducted under a permit granted under this Chapter. (2) Such acquisition may be made by serving a notice of acquisition on the owner of the property, or if such owner is not readily traceable or the ownership is in dispute, by a notice of acquisition published in the official Gazette of the Province, and shall take effect from the beginning of the day, on which the notice is served or published. (3) For any property so acquired there shall be paid com pensation equivalent to the market value of the property acquired to be calculated in such manner as the Provincial Government may prescribe. (4) If any dispute arises as to the amount of compensa tion payable under subsection (3) it shall be referred to the arbitration of a person who is or has been a High Court Judge and his award shall be final and binding on the parties and shall not be called in question in any Court of law nor shall anything in the Arbitration Act, 1940, apply to the arbitration. The argument of Mr. Abdur Rahim on this point is that the provision in the Act regarding the creation of a Board is too brief and the Legislature has left material elements needed for the creation of the Board to the rule‑making authority. Section 43‑A he urges simply says that there shall be a Road Transport Board consisting of seven members to be appointed by the Central and the Provincial Governments who shall hold office for such period as the Government may think fit and may be removed by the appointing authority. It then goes on to provide that 250% of the total share capital shall be allowed to the Central Government and then there is a provision for arbitration between the Central and the Provincial Govern ments, and that is all. Learned counsel refers to similar enactments wherein, he says, much greater details of the corporation and its functions have been provided. He refers to the Pakistan Development Corporation Act, 1953, which provides for the share capital, the management through a board of directors, appointment of directors and the chairman, disqualifications of directors, appointment of officers and various other matters. Similar provisions there are in the National Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, which contains detailed directions as to share capital, qualifications of shareholders, management, qualifications and disqualifications of directors, terms of office of members, meetings, business to be transacted and so on. Learned counsel says it is a well‑established principle of delegation of legislative powers to the executive that the legislature should provide a framework the details of which may be supplied by the executive. Considering, he says, that the legislation is under entry 33 in the Federal List which relates to "incorporation, regulation and winding‑up of trading corporations" the framework is wanting. The legislature has not itself regulated the incorporation but has left it entirely to the Provincial Government to do it by means of rules. I have asked learned counsel to point out to me what those provisions are which according to him should have been incorporated in this Act in order that a sufficient framework may have been provided to validate the delegation of legisla tive powers and the weakness of his argument will be apparent from his reply. Learned counsel is able to refer only to the four following matters as those which, in his opinion, should have been included:‑(1) A provision as to wherefrom the finances are to come. (2) Some provisions as to management, that is, the manner in which the Board is to function. (3) Qualifications and disqualifications of the members of the Board. (4) Some kind of control to be exercised by the Federal Legislature over the functions of the Board. Learned counsel is unable to refer to any authority according to which the provisions with respect to these matters are necessary in an Act relating to corporations to enable the delegation of legislative powers to the executive Government, except to Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, pages 226 and 227, where it is said: "Terms and conditions upon which a corporation may be created, the powers and capital stock they may have, the purpose for which they may increase their capital stock and the conditions and limitations thereof are exclusively matters of legislative actions which cannot be delegated." The case on which this extract from Cooleys book is based is State v. Great North‑Western Railway‑an American case the report of which is not available. It is not known what exactly were the particular terms, conditions, and powers which are referred to in this extract. The question whether a sufficient framework for the purpose of delegation has been provided is a matter to be decided according to the circumstances of each case and it is difficult to lay down precise rules. I will, therefore, consider the alleged omissions one by one. The first omission, according to learned counsel, is the absence of reference to finances. It is incorrect to say that a reference is absent. It is provided in the section that if the Provincial Government wants to run its own vehicles, it shall constitute a Road Transport Board. It is obvious that it is the Provincial Government which is to function through a Road Transport Board. There is a provision at the same time that not less than 25% of the share capital is to be allotted to the Central Government as represented by the railways. That obviously means that the share capital is to be divided between the Central Government and the Provincial Govern ment. Subsection (6) which provides for arbitration between the Central Government and the Provincial Government also points to the same conclusion. Although section 43‑A does not expressly say so, it is quite clear that the share capital is to be owned by the Central Government and the Provincial Government, I do not see what difference it would have made had the section provided in express words that the share capital shall be provided by the Provincial and the Central Governments. The second alleged omission is as to the absence of provi sion regarding management and manner in which the Board is to function. I do not see what provision about management is needed in the Act. It is obvious that the Board is to run the transport and so far as procedure in voting and passing of resolutions is concerned, it could hardly be urged that that is a matter which cannot be provided for in the rules. The third of objection relates to qualifications and disqualifications of the members of the Board and here too learned counsel is unable to cite any authority that the qualifications and disqualification cannot be left to the same authority as is to appoint the members of a body. There is no legal objection to the legis lature merely saying that the Provincial (or Central) Govern ment shall appoint such persons, as it thinks fit. There would be no need for prescribing qualifications in the rules at all. It is necessarily implied in the power of appointment given to the Governments that the qualifications shall be such as the Central Government and the Provincial Government may think proper. The last objection is as to there being no control by the Federal Legislature. Learned counsel is unable to state any principle on which it is necessary that there should be such a provision or to quoted any authority in support of his objection. One way of looking at the matter is this. Suppose there was no rule‑making power conferred by section 43‑A at all or no rules had been framed, then, taking into account only the Act, is there not a sufficient provision for the creation of a Road Transport Board? If the legislative powers be not properly delegated, the only result would be that the rules framed would be invalid. Mere absence of any valid rules cannot invalidate the provisions of Act, which is within legislative competence unless it could be shown that the provisions regarding incorporation are legally inadequate for bringing into existence a Transport Board at all. I am directly concerned in this case only with the validity of the order under section 43 (4) (a). That order is being impeached on the ground that section 43 (4) (a) warrants cancellation only for the assistance of the Transport Board and the Board has not properly assumed an existence at all. If there be a Road Transport Board in existence, the order of the Provincial Government, cancelling the permits of the plaintiffs enabling the Road Transport Board to function freely, would be valid. It is impossible to say in respect of section 43‑A that it is not capable of bringing into existence a proper legal entity. Great reliance has been placed on behalf of the plaintiff's on an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in the North Deccan Transport Co., Ltd. v. The State of Bombay. In that case it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Indian Act 32 of 1948, the Road Transportation Corporations Act, which contains provisions similar to the provisions of our amending Act of 1951, was ultra vires Section 3 of that Act runs as follows:

3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Indian Companies Act, 1913, or any other law, a Provincial Government, having regard to (a) the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of road transport ; (b) the desirability of co‑ordinating any form or road transport with any other form of transport; (c) the desirability of extending and improving the facili ties for road transport in any area in such manner as to provide most efficiently and as cheaply as possible for the needs thereof and of preventing uneconomic competition among any forms of road transport; may appoint, by notification issued in this behalf, a Road Transport Corporation for the whole or any part of the Province. (2) In such Corporation‑ (a) provision shall be made and continue to be made by or under the relevant Provincial law for the reservation and allotment to the Central Government, as represented by its Railways, of such percentage of the share capital of the Corporation, if any, as may be agreed to by the Central and the Provincial Governments; (b) provision shall be made and continue to be made for adequate representation of the Central Government and of the Provincial Government concerned on the Corpo ration; and (c) provision shall be made for the payment of due com pensation in accordance with rules made under section 7 to the owners of any road transport services whose services are taken over by the Corporation: Provided that where no agreement is arrived at or a dispute arises in respect of any matter referred to in this subsection between the Central Government and a Provincial Government, such dispute will be referred .to an arbitral tribunal consisting of one nominee of the Central Government, one nominee of the Provincial Government and one nominee of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court who shall be Chairman of the tribunal and the findings of the tribunal shall be final and binding. The learned judges held in that case that the charter of a corporation should be the Act by which it is incorporated and in the case before them that charter was to be provided not by the legislature itself but by the Provincial Government. In accordance with section 3, the Bombay Government had created a Road Transport Board Corporation and there was a notification by the Government which contained various provisions relating to powers, functions, finances of the Corporation. This Charter, the learned judges were of the opinion, could be granted only by the legislature. There can be no doubt that that case is distinguishable from the case before me. The basis of the decision of the learned Judges will be found in the following extract from the judgment:‑ But when we try to ascertain what are going to be the powers and the functions of this Corporation, there is not even an indication given by the Legislature as to what they should be. The rights and privileges of this Corporation are to be determined entirely by the Provincial Government, and the Provincial Government has no indication given to it by the Central Legislature as to how they should be guided in settling the rights and privileges of this Corporation". The learned judges had reached the conclusion that the Act before them did not reveal the function of the Corporation that it created and it cannot be said that they had not good ground for this conclusion. That Act did not say that the Corporation was to ply vehicles, nor did it contain any state ment as to its function. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contends that by implication the Act did say the Corporation had to run its vehicles. Without considering the correctness of this inference, let me say that truly speaking it does not affect the argument before me. I am not concerned with whether the conclusion of the learned judges in the Bombay case as to the absence of provisions regarding functions of the Corporation was correct or not. I am concerned with whether they laid down any proposition about delegation of legislative Power which if accepted would render section 43‑A invalid. The learned judges proceeded on the assumption that the functions of the Corporation were not mentioned in the Act at all. In that view, the conclusion that delegation of legislative power was not valid, is of no help in the present case where without doubt the function of the Board is pro vided. , Section 43‑A expressly states that if the Provincial Government wants to operate its own vehicles, it will constitute a Board. It is quite clear that the function of the Board is to run motor vehicles. As a result of the above discussion, I hold that the delega tion of legislative power in section 43‑A is not ultra tires. I hold at the same time that the Punjab Transport Board is sufficiently created by the Act even without the help of rules, for the functions of the Board have been specified. The next question to consider is whether section 43 (4)(a) is opposed to the provisions of section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and is ultra vires on that account. Before I proceed, I will here reproduce section 299:‑-- 299. (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. (2) Neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commer cial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for giving compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of the com pensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be determined and given. (3) No bill or amendment making provision for the trans ference to public ownership of any land or for the extinguishments or modification of rights therein, including rights or privileges in respect of land revenue, shall be introduced or moved in the Federal Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor‑General or a Provincial Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of any law in force at the date of the passing of this Act. 4‑A. Nothing in subsection (2) shall be construed to invalidate‑ (a) Any provision in any law of the kind referred to in that subsection which purports to fix the amount of com pensation or to specify the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of that subsection or that compensation is not provided for or is inadequate Provided that such law has been made or passed within a period of five years next after the establishment of the Federation; or (b) Any law having reference either to the administration or acquisition of any property which is, or is deemed to be, evacuee property under any law for the time being in force, or to the remedying of the dislocation in the social and economic life of Pakistan caused by the mass movement of population from and into Pakistan. (5) In this section "land" includes immovable property of every kind and any right in or over such property, and "undertaking includes part of an undertaking. The plaintiffs contend that by virtue of this section no law can be passed which provides for deprivation of property without at the same time making a provision for compensation and the amending Acts are providing for deprivation. The case of the plaintiffs on this point may thus be explained. The public have, it is urged, a right of passage over highways and a right to carry passengers on hire is an incident of such a right. This right is immovable property within the meaning of section 299, being a right in or over land within the meaning of section 299 (3). A permit under the Motor vehicles Act does not create any new right in the person to whom it is granted. The sovereign has an authority to control the right of passage and in the exercise of that authority it is entitled to grant or withhold permits, but the right is antecedent to the permit and is merely recognised by it. The order of cancellation of the permits is, therefore, an order which deprives a person of a right which he has over immovable property. It is also urged that the order of cancellation deprives a person of his interest in a commercial undertaking and, therefore, too it is hit by section

299. There being no provision for the payment of compensation, section 43(4) (a) is void. A question arose at one stage of the arguments as to whether the route with which we are concerned is a highway and, therefore, the public and the plaintiffs have a right of passage on it, There is no allegation to that effect in any of the plaints. However, it cannot be denied that in the route with which we are concerned the public have a right of passage. The Motor Vehicles Act is concerned only with plying of vehicles for hire in a 'public place'. It is only in respect of a 'public place' that permits are issued and section 43(4) (c) allows cancellation of only such permits. 'public place' is defined in section 2(24) of the Motor Vehicles Act as a place to which the public have a right of access. So return to the discussion the first question to decide is whether deprivation is included in acquisition. There is no doubt that the point is of some difficulty, but after giving the matter full consideration I have reached the conclusion that this is the only proper interpretation to place on section

299. Of course this interpretation is subject to the qualification that all interference with rights does not amount to deprivation. To say that deprivation is not within this section is to take away substantially the protection given by section 299(3) and it would not be consistent with the principle on which the section is based. The principle is that no person should lose his immovable property unless he is compensated for it. It is not because of what the State gains, but because of what the person concerned loses that he is paid compensation. However, all the time there is legislation which interferes with the rights of citizens and it cannot be at the same time held that every interference with a right is a deprivation. A person may not be allowed to build upon his own land except with the permission of the municipal committee and he may not be allowed to build on a part of that land at all where by the by‑laws of the committee some part is to be reserved for use as street. Here if by property we also mean a right in or over property (and property does include a right in or over property), a person is being deprived of his rights to a certain extent; yet it would be impossible to say that in such cases he is entitled to compensation. The criterion I suggest should be whether the law is intended to deprive the person of his right or whether it only regulates the exercise of a right, if it only regulates, it is not possible to call it a deprivation. While I hold that this deprivation as I define it is within the section, I even say that in the present case there is acquisition too. Here a monopoly is intended to be created in favour of the Punjab Road Transport) Board and, therefore, it is not merely a loss of rights to a: permit‑holder but also the gaining of a right to run vehicles on a route for the exclusion of others. If I were to reach the conclusion, therefore, that the right of which a person is deprived when his permit is cancelled is land or immovable property, or is an interest in a commercial undertaking within the meaning of section 299, I would agree with the plaintiffs and hold that section 43 (4) (a) was ultra vires in view of section 299 of the Government of India Act. I will consider now in the first place whether by section 43(4) '(a) the plaintiffs have been deprived of any immovable property. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that in all highways and in all places to which the Motor Vehicles Act applies, the public have a right of passage. There can be no dispute about this, for the right of passage is recognised in the Motor Vehicles Act itself. The next contention is, that this is a right over immovable property and therefore land within the meaning of section 299, and this also I concede. The next question to consider is whether this right has in any way been taken away; Does the order of cancellation prevent any member of the public from passing over the route in a vehicle? Does it even debar a person from carrying other persons in a vehicle? It does no such thing. It only prohibits the receipt of money, the right of entering into contracts for carrying passengers or the right of carrying on a business. The mere fact that a person is prevented from entering into contracts in relation to the acts which he is entitled to perform with reference to immova ble property does not mean that he is being deprived of the exercise of that right in respect of immovable property. He is only being deprived of carrying on a business or entering into contracts. If a person is prevented from selling liquor in a shop which he owns, it does not mean that there is a deprivation of a right in or over immovable property. A person has the right to run horses. on his own land and that is a right over immovable property but if a law prevents him from betting on the running of horses, it can hardly be said that he has been deprived of his right in immovable property. He can still run his horses on his land in any manner he likes, just as the plaintiffs in these cases can carry passengers in their buses without interference. The restriction is on the taking of money or the entering into of contracts or the carrying on of a business. What has been taken away is a right to carry on a business, not a right over immovable property. One way of looking at the matter is this. A right over land possessed by a person who is not the owner is a right in derogation of rights of the owner of the land and can exist only to the extent of such derogation. A right of passage derogates from the rights of the owner of the land inasmuch as the owner cannot prevent persons entitled from passing over the land. It was a right belonging to the owner which vests in other persons. The same could hardly be urged in respect of carrying passengers for money. I would, there‑I fore, hold that the right in question is not land within the meaning of section 299 of the Government of India Act. The next question to consider is whether, by the cancellation, plaintiffs' interest in any commercial under taking is taken away. All that has happened is that a person has been deprived of carrying on a particular business. As I read section 299, the intention by introducing commercial undertaking was to put commercial undertaking on the same level as land or immovable property, and to make the acquisi tion of commercial undertaking also subject to payment of compensation. An interest in a commercial undertaking has a reference to interest which a person may have in the assets and value as a business of such an undertaking. The mere fact that some restraint has been placed on a person in connection with a certain business would not mean that be has been deprived of his interest in the business. A restriction on the income‑producing activity of a person which is obviously otherwise not within section 299 would not become so simply by calling his business a commercial undertaking. If we are to accept the interpretation put by learned counsel, the result would be that in every case where there is a regulation of the activities of a commercial undertaking by law, section 299 should apply. If a law controls price and prevents a sale at more than a particular price or if there is a law which prevents the sale of any article without permits, then the person prevented would be said to lose his interest in the commercial undertaking and compensation shall have to be paid. I do, not agree, therefore, that the plaintiffs have lost their interest in a commercial undertaking. There is one more reason why I would not apply section 299 to a case of this kind. This is a case relating to a public right and, after a careful consideration of the matter, I have reached the conclusion that section 299 would not relate to those rights which vest in all members of the public, for instance a right of worship, a right of bathing, a right to use a public garden etc. It is impossible in such cases to assess the compensation. For example, a law is passed preven ting passage of the public altogether on a particular highway except that of a few named persons and it is intended to pay compensation to all persons who are entitled to exercise the right. In what manner can compensation be assessed and to whom shall the compensation be paid? The right vests in every member of the public. It vests not even particularly in the citizens of Pakistan, but assuming that it was confined to them, the compensation would, on account of the indefi niteness of the number of persons involved, be not capable of assessment. The compensation it should be remembered will have to be paid not only to those who are now living but to all persons who will be members of public at any future time. By mere birth every member of the Public would be entitled to a right of passage and as the law has not acquired the land itself but only the passage of all except some has been stopped the land continues to be, a highway. Section 299 assumes that a basis for payment of compensation can be stated. It expressly refers to the fixing of compensation itself or to the providing of a principle on which compensation is to be assessed. In the case of a public right, this condition cannot be fulfilled. I hold that section 43(4) (a) is intra vices. It is urged next that even if it is intra vires, the cancellation of permits is in excess of the powers granted because the Punjab Road Transport Board was already running its vehicles. The argument hardly deserves any consideration. The intention of the law is to enable the Government to have a kind o monopoly for running vehicles on particular route and the mere fact that the Transport Board was already running its vehicles cannot in any way fetter the powers of the Govern ment to cancel permits. The next contention is that the amendment violates Article 12 of the Pakistan Constitution. Article 12 runs:‑ "Every citizen, possessing such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession or occupation, shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business:‑ Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent‑-- (a) the regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system, or (b) the carrying on, by the Federal or a Provincial Government or by a corporation controlled by any such Government, of any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons." This Article itself provides that a law may be enacted to enable a Government to carry on a trade to the complete exclusion of the public. There remains to consider only the question whether an injunction can be granted probihiting the Punjab Road Transport Board from plying its vehicles even if the amending Act as well as the order of cancellation of permits is intra vires. Three pints which have already been noted are urged in this connection. As regards the first, I have already found that the delegation of legislative functions was within the power of the legislature. The second point, which relates to the validity of the rules framed by the Provincial Government, is also without force. Even if I were to assume that the rules are invalid on account of the irregularity that they were not placed before the Provincial Legislative Assembly in accordance with section 133, there would be no effect on the present suit. I have already held that the Punjab Transport Board has been sufficiently constituted by section 43(4) (a). That section gives the Board a corporate existence. It provides that the members of the Road Transport Board are to be appointed by the Provincial and Central Governments and it also makes clear the object for which the Road Transport Board is to be constituted. I do not think anything further was essential in order that the Road Transport Board may begin functioning. The third point also depended on section 43(4) (a) being ultra vires and I have already held that it is not ultra vires, There is one more reason why a suit for injunction does not lie. A suit for injunction lies only when there is an obliga tion existing in favour of the plaintiff. While the plaintiff in these suits may be entitled to a right of passage on the highway and may even be entitled to carry other persons, it cannot be said that they have at the same time a right to prevent other persons from plying their vehicles except in accordance with law. If the law provides that a person can only ply his vehicles with a permit, it would be for the Government to take action if any person is plying without such permit, and it is not the right of any other member of the public to file a suit for an injunction that he should be prevented from doing so. All the suits with which this order deals, i.e., Civil Original No. 10, 40 and 45 of 1955, are hereby dismissed with costs. A. H. Suits dismissed.