P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

QADEERUDDIN AHMED, J.

This writ petition has been filed jointly by a retail beef dealer and a retail mutton dealer. The object of the petition is to question the legality of the restrictions imposed on the slaughter of cattle and sale of beef and mutton combined with the control of their prices. Mr. M. Akram, advocate, had addressed elaborate arguments on behalf of the petitioners, firstly to establish that the fundamental rights granted by Articles 12 and 5 of the Constitution have been violated, and secondly to show that infringement of the provisions of Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, the rules made under the Act and of the provisions of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, has taken place. He has during the course of his arguments, questioned the authority of the Chief Commissioner of Karachi, as the "Administration of Federal Capital", to restrict slaughter of cattle and sale of their meat. The petition was admitted by Lari and Wahiduddin, JJ., on 11th April 1957. The petitioners applied for its hearing during the vacation on 7th May 1957, and it was ordered by the consent of the parties that the matter may be "put up before the vacation judge". Mr. Valiani appeared before me for the respondents, and soon after the commencement of the arguments of Mr. Akram, he made repeated, requests that notice be issued, to the Attorney General. On the second day of the arguments when the authority was questioned of the Chief Commissioner of Karachi, to act as the "Administration of the Federal Capital" under clause (x) of rule 2 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Rules, 1953, it became apparent that the Attorney General's presence was necessary. 1 ordered notice to be issued to him but he appeared before service of the notice on the following day and I have had the benefit of listening to a well-dressed debate. It will be convenient to examine first the objections based on the Constitution and then to examine the objections relating to the infringement of some provisions of law and inter alia to the vires of some provisions and orders. The background of the case is that restrictions on the slaughter of cattle and the sale of meat have been imposed by notifications issued under the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, and the rules made under it. The Act is a short one consisting of 12 sections only. Apart from the general scheme of the Act, three important provisions of it, namely the preamble, section 3 and section 6 have been subjected to the main criticism. If any one of the two sections is found to be invalid or inoperative, the whole scheme of control on slaughter and sale of meat is bound to become irreparably ,damaged. The scheme of the Act is that certain animals are declared to be 'cattle' and certain cattle are declared to be "useful cattle", (clauses (a) and (b) of section 2), and the slaughter of the latter is prohibited absolutely (section 8). Medically unfit cattle are also excluded altogether from slaughter (section 4). It is provided regarding the rest of the cattle that no person can slaughter them "except in a slaughter house during the hours prescribed therefore" (section 3). Next it is provided that no such cattle can be slaughtered and their meat sold, purchased or procured" on such days as nay be prescribed" (section 6). The expression 'prescribed' is defined to mean prescribed by rules framed under the Act (clause (i) of section 2). The Central Government is empowered to frame rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act (section 12). Contravention of the law is made punishable with fine or with imprisonment or with both (section 11). The object of the Act is stated in the preamble to be as follows :- " Whereas it is expedient to prohibit the slaughter of useful cattle and to regulate the slaughter of other cattle ; it is hereby enacted as follows :-" The petitioners do not object to the absolute prohibition of the slaughter of medically unfit and useful cattle. Their contention is that the remaining provisions of the Act aim at interference with their trade in violation of Article 12 of the Constitution. Article 12 of the Constitution is as follows " Every citizen, possessing such qualifications if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession or occupation, shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation and to conduct any lawful trade or business. Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent- (a) the regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system, or (b) the carrying on, by the Federal or a Provincial Government or by a corporation controlled by any such Government, of any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons." The first part of the Article relates to prescription of qualifica tions to enter upon a profession or occupation and has no application to this case because no qualifications have been prescribed for entering upon the occupation of the petitioners. The petitioners therefore have a right under the Constitution to conduct their trade freely, subject to the regulation of their trade, if any, by a licensing system. There must be a licensing system for regulating their trade. Regulation is different from control. The word 'control' only means dominance of a superior authority. The meaning of the word does not necessarily imply a purpose other than the subjection of the subordinate. It is not so with the expression ' regulation ' because regulation is not an antithesis of disorderliness. It is more than orderliness. It means orderliness with an object in view. The Attorney General referred to new English Dictionary, Volume VIII for the meaning of this word and it was found that some of the meanings given in it are as follows: " To adapt to circumstances or surroundings. " "To adjust, in respect of time, quantity, force etc., with reference to some standard or purpose." The Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, was enacted before our Constitution came into force. It was therefore probably enacted to exercise control, according to its name implies, and no indication was given in it of the object for which the control was to be exercised. The pre amble states the objects of the legislation to be to prohibit the slaughter of useful cattle and to regulate the slaughter of other cattle and nothing more ; but in order that slaughter be regulated in the true sense, and not merely controlled, some object of regulation ought to exist. If there is no object, then it will 'not be possible to judge whether the restrictions imposed are regulation in the correct sense or whether they are in excess of it. Regulation of trade for the sake of regulation, may amount simply to the control of trade. It is common-place to state that complete prohibition is not included in the idea of regulation, but it is also equally true to say that the exercise of some restraint is implicit in it. How much of restriction is consistent with the idea of regulation can be determined only with reference to the object with which a situation, things or actions are regulated. It is the purpose of regulation which can provide the measure of permissible restraint. It was this realization of the importance of the object of regulation which induced the Attorney General to refer to the statement of the objects of the bill and also induced the respondents to file a " further counter-affidavit " dated 28th May 1957. It is stated in the further counter affidavit that the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, was enacted because of an alarming drain on the cattle wealth of the Federal Capital owing to indiscriminate or wasteful slaughter of useful animals ; while the meat eating population has in creased and the number of slaughtered cattle has multiplied by four to six times since Partition the supply of cattle from the neighbouring country, namely India, has stopped ; if slaughter of cattle is not checked then production of live stock being a slow biological process, serious diminution of cattle and elimination of best strains of milch cattle would result making it necessary to import cattle, thus causing heavy drain on the country's meagre foreign exchange resources. The petitioners have not submitted a rejoinder although the Attorney General drew the attention of their counsel to the further counter-affidavit. Mr. Akram only objected to it by asking how the further counter-affidavit could be taken into consideration to explain the object of an Act. There are, however, precedents as for instance, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1952SC123) of the Courts taking into consideration detailed affidavits containing facts forming the back-ground of enactments. Such facts, do not fix and limit the objects of the legislation because it is not possible to limit its purpose by the statements made by the executive, but they do clarify and explain the situation's existing at the time of the enactment and at the time of its enforcement so that the facts forming the basis of the legislation may be elucidated, and the limits within which the executive means to enforce a law may be discovered ; and thus at least attacks on those matters which may be outside these limits may be eliminated. The petitioners' counsel therefore changed the direction of his attack and cited many rulings of Indian Courts, including- P. J. Joseph v. Assistant Excise Commissioner arid others (AIR1953TC146) ; Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State and others (AIR 1954SC 224) ; Tahir Hussain v, District Board Muzaffar Naga? (AIR 1954SC630) and R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore and another (A I R 1954 S C 747) with a view to show that unreasonable, arbi trary and unguided powers granted by law are legally invalid irrespective of the reasonableness, if any, in their exercise by the administration. The Attorney-General's counter argument consists of two parts. Firstly he argued that under Article 12 of our Constitution, the legislature has the power to declare any, trade or business to be unlawful and to the extent to which it does so declare, the fundamental right of citizen to conduct trade or business is modified subject to the exception laid down by our Supreme Court in Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdury v. The Province of East Pakistan and another (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 9) which exception according to the Attorney-General, for the purposes of this case, is that such a modifica tion of the fundamental right should not be a fraud on the Constitution. It is not difficult to see that this argument of the Attorney General irrespective of being correct or not, is irrelevant for the purposes of this case, because no law has declared the trade of the petitioners to be unlawful, and the imposition of restrictions on trade is not equal to declaring it unlawful. Secondly, his argument is that the expressions "reasonable restrictions" and "in the interest of the general public" do not occur in Article 12 of our Constitution, as distinguished from clause (6) of Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. These considerations according to him are foreign to Article 12 of our Constitution, and, therefore, Indian rulings have no persuasive value in this respect. With regard to the second argument, I agree with him that Indian rulings on constitutional questions cannot be referred to without due regard to the differences which exist between the Indian Constitution and our Constitution. There is considerable difference between Article 12 of our Constitu tion and Article 19 (6) of the Indian Constitution. The expression " reasonable restrictions " does not exist in our Article 12, but this does not mean that imposition of unreason able restrictions on trade is permissible under our Constitu tion. The measure of reasonableness in our Constitution as indicated above, is provided by the concept of the expression "regulation" itself. The restrictions should be consistent with the purpose of "regulation" and not so unreasonable as to be in excess of it. The Chief Commissioner has ordered by Notification No. F. 1 (15)/53-L.S.G. dated 7th December 1955 read with Notification No. F.1 (15)/53-L.S.G. dated 20th October 1953 that Thursdays, Fridays and Tuesdays shall be meatless days, that is to say, no meat shall be bought, sold or procured on these days, and he also ordered that all slaughter-houses shall remain completely closed on Mondays, Thursdays and Wednesdays. The petitioners' objection is that these restrictions are in excess of the limits implied in the meaning of 'regulation' and amount to prohibition. This argument is also unhelpful because no factual basis for this contention has been disclosed and unless it is shown in a concrete manner as to how the restrictions imposed are in excess of the object or the actual limits of regulation for the purposes of this case, it is impossible to judge whether the restrictions are proper according to the circumstances or in excess of the need and, therefore, unreasonable. Mr. Akram's additional argument is that even if there is flexibility in the meaning of the word 'regulation' from the point of view of its purpose, there is implicit in the idea of regulation a continuity of the rights which are regulated and that such continuity cannot be allowed to be broken. He has relied on Corporation of Toranto v. Virgo (73 L T 449) and Bhola Prasad v. Emperor (AIR 1942 F C 17). According to these rulings, the power to regulate implies the continued existence of that which is meant to be regulated. According to the counsel, interruption in the continuity of trade by long intervals of 3 days in a week which amount to gaps of about half a week in every week and deprivation of occupation for the petitioners for 5 months in a year, is not regulation, and that this restraint on trade is unreasonable, irrespective of the object of regulation. What is lost sight of in his argument, is that once some restraint is conceded to be included in the idea of regulation, it cannot be argued that there can be restraint in respect of volume and not in respect of time; and once restraint in respect of time, or in other words interruption, however short, in continuity is conceded, the length of the period of interruption cannot be questioned without any regard for the object of regulation. In the event of serious scarcity, for instance, meat may have to be rationed and slaughter of cattle may have to be regulated accordingly. Ration may be weekly, fortnightly or monthly. Monthly distribution of ration has continuity in it. Regulation of trade with a view to suit the circumstances amounts to striking a balance between the fundamental right to conduct trade and the social needs. This kind of adjustment can go a long way and has wide possibilities, The flexibility of the meaning of the words 'regulation' increases with the addition to it of the idea of 'licensing system' because there can be intermittent grant of licenses provided there is a system in it. Mr. Akram has referred to Chintamanrao and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1951 S C 118), in which declaration of one month as agricultural season during which all persons residing in notified villages were forbidden from engaging in the manufacture of bidis. The Supreme Court of India held this restriction to be unreasonable. In this ruling the scope of the word 'regulation' was not considered but the following remarks are relevant for the present purpose :- "The effect of the provisions of the Act, however has no reasonable relation to the object in view, but it is so drastic in scope that it goes much in excess of that object." While it is not correct to contend that in Article 12 of our Constitution, there cannot be found any measure to determine whether restrictions imposed by way of regulation are permissible or not and while I think that the word 'regulation' has by itself a reference to some object or purpose and that the needs of such object or purpose provide the measure of reasonableness ; I find that in the present case the petitioners have not been able to show that 3 days inter ruption in the trade of the sale of meat is in excess of the object for which the slaughter of cattle is regulated. I also find that 3 days interruption in a week in the sale, pur chase and procurement of meat is not such as to conflict with the idea of continuity implied in the expression 'regulation'. I have held that restrictions imposed on the slaughter, sale purchase and procurement of meat by Chief Commissioner by his two notifications are not unreasonable within the meaning and scope of the word regulation ; but there is a further objection of the counsel of the petitioners namely that these restrictions do not, nor do the Act and the rules made under the Act, answer the description of regulation by a "licensing system." His argument is that the nature of the scheme of restrictions as envisaged by the provisions of law and enforced by orders, including price control of mutton and beef, is different from what it ought to be if it were to be regulation of the petitioners' trade by a licensing system. The whole scheme according to him is in violation of Article 12 of the Constitution and void under Article 4 of the Constitution. He has explained that the word 'regulation' is aptly used in Article 12 of the Constitution with the expression 'licensing system' because licensing is a well known form of regulation. According to "Words and Phrases" (Second Series) by the Editorial Staff of the National Reporter System, Volume IV, page 235 the power to license is included in the word 'regulate'. This aptitude of the expressions itself should lead us to note the real emphasis which is on the expression 'licensing system'. According to the learned counsel, the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and the Rules made under it do not constitute a licensing system and merely lays down a method on ad hoc basis for permitting or not permitting the petitioners' trade at the discretion of the authorities. The difference between a permit and a licence, as indicated in C. S. S. Motor Service, Tenkasi and others v. 2 he State of Madras (A I R 1953 Mad. 279), is that permits are granted in exercise of absolute discretion,, while licences are granted subject to the fulfilment of conditions. It follows logically from this differentiation that once the conditions which may be laid down for granting a licence are fulfilled, a licence cannot be refused. The difference ,between a method and a system is that a method is a device or a procedure which aims at the achievement of an object ; while a system is an organised scheme capable of serving, more or less fully, as functionally self-contained unit. This meaning of the word 'system' is found in one form or the other in almost all good dictionaries. According to New English Dictionary, Volume IX, Part II, page 393 A system is "a connected and regularly arranged scheme of the whole of some object." According to Words and Phrases judicially Defined (New Series) Volume IV, page 824- The word 'system' imports a unity of purpose as well as an entirety of operation." According to Websters International Dictionary part II at page 2102- A system is "a complete exhibition of essential principles or facts, arranged in rational dependence of connection." If these meanings of the words 'licensing' and 'system' are correct, then the restrictions imposed under the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and the rules made there under, taken with price control, should conform to these meanings. The restrictions are therefore to be examined from this point of view. The keys with which the petitioners' trade is controlled are, on the one hand sections 3 and 6 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, and rules 16 and 17 of the rules made under it ; and on the other hand, sections 2 (b) and 3 (1) of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953. Orders were issued and notified under these provisions. These sections and rules are as follows :- Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and Rules made thereunder.- Section 3.

"No person shall slaughter cattle except in a slaughter-house, and during the hours prescribed there under." Rule 16.-"The working hours of slaughter-houses shall be as fixed from time to time by the Chief Officer." Section 6.

"No cattle shall be slaughtered and no one shall sell or purchase or procure cattle meat on such days as may be prescribed". Rule 17.-"All slaughter-houses shall be closed on such days as may be notified by Government from time to time in consultation with the Corporation". The last notification issued under section 6 and rule

17. No. F. 1 (15)/53 L.S.G dated 7th December 1955 is as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred under section 6 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Act, 1950, read with rule 17 and 2 (x) of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Rules, 1953. The Chief Commissioner of Karachi is pleased to declare with immediate effect Thursdays as meatless days in addition to Fridays and Tuesdays already declared as meatless days and beefless days, vide this Administration Notification No. F. 1 (15)/53-L. S. G., dated 20th October 1953. All Slaughter-houses in the Federal Capital Area shall now remain completely closed on Wednesdays also". Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti Hoarding) Act, 1953. Section 2 (b).-" `Essential article' means any article, other than an 'essential commodity' within the meaning of section 2 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, declare by notification to be an article to which the pro visions of this Act shall apply". Notification No. 53/2/Spl./56-4233, dated 23rd October 1956, issued under section 2 (b). "In pursuance of clause (b) of section 2 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953(XXVIIof1953).the Chief Commissioner of Karachi is pleased to declare the following articles to be articles to which the provisions of the said Act shall apply, namely:

1. Mutton.

2. Beef". Section 3 (1).--'The Chief Commissioner may, by notification fix the maximum prices above which no essential article shall be sold by any wholesaler, retailer, trader or any other person, and the prices so fixed may be different in different localities." Notification No. 53/2/Spl./56-4235, dated 24th October 1956, issued under section 3 (1). "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 3 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, (XXVI1 of 1953) read with my Notification No. 53/2/Spl./56-4235, dated 23rd October 1956. I, N. M. Khan, Chief Commissioner of Karachi, hereby fix as follows the maximum prices above which Mutton and Beef shall not be sold on or after the 27th October 1956 by any retailer, trader or any other person within the Federal Capital, that is to say: A. Sheep and goat including Dumba. Meat ... Rs. 2 per seer. B. Cattle (Cow and Buffalo). (1) Beef ... Re. 1 per seer. (2) Sirloin ... Rs. 1-4 per seer. (3) Undercut ... Rs. 1-8 per seer. It is clear from the above that all the powers which have been conferred by law are purely discretionary. Regulation of trade by a licensing system is different from conferment of discretionary powers on executive authorities. The reason of the grant of these powers and of their exercise, as admitted by the respondents in their further counter-affidavit, is that the supplies of live-stock are inadequate. If supplies of livestock are inadequate, then control of retail sales of meat and their prices without the control of the prices at which livestock can be procured, cannot be regarded as systematic. Retail dealers purchase livestock. Livestock is purchased at the proper market places at the ruling rates and the cattle are either kept by the purchasers until slaughtered or are directly moved to the slaughter-houses. This means expense in addition to purchase price. At the slaughter-houses various D charges and expenses are paid and met. A systematic control of prices would require that retail prices should be related to the cost of procurement and necessary overhead charges, in such a manner as to allow a reasonable profit in the turnover of the trade. If there is no, control, as there is none in this case, at the source of the supplies, then the maximum retail prices cannot be fixed with any reasonableness. Maximum prices have been fixed which virtually mean minimum prices also, because the idea of quality is altogether non-existent Fixing at will of maximum prices of mutton and beef, without reference to quality and without control of the price at the source may have the, characteristics of a scheme of permits, but it is not a system of licensing, I, therefore, hold that the scheme of control envisaged and imposed by and under sections 3 and 6 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and orders issued under section 6 of this Act and notified by notifications No. F. 1 (15)/53-L S.G dated 20th October 1953 and No. F.1 (15)/53-L,S.G., dated 7th December 1955 as well as orders issued under clause (b) of section 2 and subsection (1) of section 3 of Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, and notified by Notifications No. 53/2/Spl./56-4233, dated 23rd October 1956 and No, 53/2/Spl./56-4235, dated the 24th October 1956 is un constitutional according to Article 12 of the Constitution and void under Article 4 of the Constitution. I express no opinion regarding the effect of sections 2 (b) and 3 (1) of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, because these sections do not exclusively relate to the subject-matter of the present writ petition. The petitioners' counsel has hesitatingly attacked the restrictions imposed under Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, and the prices fixed under Karachi Essential Article (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, on the ground that there is discrimination in them contrary to Article 5 of the Constitution, inasmuch as these restrictions and prices affect the dealers of mutton and beef only, while dealers in fish and fowl have been left entirely free ; but the contention has little force because equality can be demanded amongst those who are placed in the same circumstances. The petitioners could succeed if they could show that the trade circumstances of the dealers in fish and fowl were essentially the same as the trade circumstances of dealers in mutton and beef. This they have not even axtem6ted to do. Turning to the allegations of the petitioners' counsel that the provisions of the two Acts have been violated, it will be convenient to discuss the two Acts separately. As stated above, section 6 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, says that no cattle shall be slaughtered and no one shall sell, purchase or procure cattle meat on such days as may be prescribed; section 2 (1) lys down that 'prescribed' means prescribed by the rules under the Act ; section 12 (1) provides that the Central Government may make rules. Now there is no rule which prescribes the days on which cattle may be slaughtered and on which sale-' purchase or procurement of cattle meat may not take place. The Attorney General's explanation is that the prescrip tion of days under section 6 is permissive and not mandatory and that as such the powers conferred by section 6 can be exercised directly under the section without prescribing days. This argument is untenable on the face of it because section 6 prohibits slaughter of cattle and the sale, purchase and pro curement of cattle meat on the days which may be prescribed. If no days are prescribed, then there is no restriction on the slaughter of cattle and sale, purchase and procurement of cattle meat irrespective of whether it was mandatory or permissive to prescribe days, The emphasis laid in the arguments on the word 'may' is irrelevant from the point of the conclusion which is sought to be drawn. Moreover it is1 not correct that the word 'may' makes the prescription otF days permissive. It is only a word of conventional courtesy,; when used with reference to a public duty. In such circum stances the prescription of days by framing of rules is mandatory, Maxwell has said in his book on Interpretation of Statutes (10th Edition) at page 239 :- " Statutes which authorise persons to do acts for the benefit-of others, or as it is sometimes said, for the public good or the advancement of justice, have often given rise to controversy when conferring the authority in terms simply enabling and not mandatory. In enacting that they `may' or 'shall', if they think fit, or 'shall have power', or that 'it shall be lawful' for them to do such acts, a statute appears to use the language of mere permission but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in such cases such expressions may have to say the least a compulsory force (Per cur R. v. Tithe Commissioners ((1850) 14 Q B 474); Border R. D. C. v. Robers ((1950) 1 K B 716), per Somervell, J.), and so would seem to be modified by judicial exposition." A Full Bench of the Patna High Court has observed in Lachmichand v. Ram Partab Choudhri and others (A I R 1934 Pat. 670 at p. 672) :- " It is true that the words at the commencement of the section are 'it shall be lawful', but in construing Acts of public utility where the framing of the rules and the making of the appointment is necessary in order that the objects of the Act may be attained, such words which might otherwise be considered permissive are really mandatory. The permissive form is a mere courteous convention. The Act really imposes a duty on the executive and it is implied that a public body will carry out the duties indicated by the legislature in order that the purpose of the legislature may not be frustrated." The High Court of Travancore-Cochin has observed in Pich Rowther v. The Pampady Panchayat (A I R 1957 T C 2 at p. 4) with regard to the exercise of powers by the Panchayat :- " . . . . . . we can say that no system applying section 44 (d) or section 80 has been evolved by the framing of necessary rules and notifications and until that preliminary was done the Panchayat authority concerned could not claim to exercise power under those sections." There can be no valid restriction on the slaughter of cattle and on purchase, procurement of cattle meat without the prescription of days by rules made under section 6 read with section

12. The orders purporting to be issued under section 6 of Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, declaring Thursdays, Fridays and Tuesdays as meatless days and notified by two Notifications No. F. 1 (15)/53-L.S.G., dated 20th October 1953, and No. F. 1 (15)/53-L.S.G. dated 7th December 1955, are ultra vices of section

6. The expression "'meatless days" may have been coined for the purposes of the orders issued by these Notifications and is presumably meant to convey the meaning that meatless days are those on which no cattle shall be slaughtered and no one shall sell, purchase or procure cattle meat. It does not, properly speaking, convey this meaning, yet the orders are enforced in this sense. The word 'meat' is not defined in the Act. In fact the expression used in section 6 is 'cattle meat', but the word 'meat' is defined in the rules and accord ing to the definition contained in rule 2 (i) 'meat' means any edible part of cattle and includes edible offal. Even if this definition is kept in view, the expression 'Meatless days' is misleading because meat can be preserved for days in a common refrigerator, and is actually served on the so-called meatless days in the hotels of Karachi. The same Notifica tion also contain orders of the Chief Commissioner of Karachi that all slaughter-houses shall remain completely closed on Mondays, Thursdays and Wednesdays. There is no section or rule which empowers the Chief Commissioner to order that the slaughter-houses shall be completely closed on the days of his choice. Section 3 lays down that no person shall slaughter cattle except in a slaughter-house and during the hours prescribed therefor Rule 16, which is the corresponding rule, does not prescribe any hours but lays down that the working hours of slaughter-houses shall be fixed from time to time by the Chief Officer of the Karachi Municipal Corporation. This is ultra vices of section 3 because the Central Government and not the Chief Officer can under section 3 read with section 12, fix the working hours. The duty entrusted by the law to the Central Government without the power of sub-delegation, cannot be entrusted by the Central Government to an officer of the Municipal Corporation. Rule 17 lays down that all slaughter houses shall be closed on such days as may be notified by Government from time to time in consultation with the Corporation. It has been alleged on behalf of the petitioners that the days which have been fixed have not been fixed in consultation with the Corporation ; and the Attorney General has not been able to deny the allegation. This means that the orders of the Chief Commissioner that the slaughter houses should remain closed on the days named in the notifica tion are in direct violation of Rule

17. These notifications mention rule 17 and rule 2 (x) as the foundation of the Chief Commissioner's authority to issue the orders to close slaughter houses. The latter rule defines 'Government' to mean the Administration of the Federal Capital. A question therefore arises whether the Chief Commissioner of Karachi is the "Administration of the Federal Capital". According to Article 211 of the Constitution, the Administration of the Federal Capital vests in the President who may by order make such provision as he may deem necessary or proper. I, therefore enquired from the Attorney General whether any such order has been made and was informed by him that such an order had been made and was being traced out by the Chief Commissioner's Secretariat, in order to be produced in Court. After two days, however, the Attorney General informed me in Court during the continuance of his arguments that according to his latest instructions, no such order had been issued and that he was further instructed to rely on the following portion of Notification No. 3/4/52-Kar.II dated 21st October 1952 in support of the Chief Commis sioner's powers to issue orders as the Administration of the Federal Capital. " . . . . . the Chief Commissioner of Karachi . . . . shall have in respect of Karachi, all the powers and duties conferred or imposed on the Government of Sind under any enactment, notification, order, rule or byelaw referred to in Article 6 of the Pakistan (Establishment of. Federal Capital) order, 1948." Article 6 of the Order is as follows :- "Unless and until other provision is duly made, all enactments and laws and all notifications, orders, schemes, rules, forms or bye-laws issued; made or prescribed there linder, which immediately before the date appointed under Article 3, are in force in, or prescribed for any of the areas comprised in Karachi, shall continue to be in force and shall have effect in Karachi." A short answer to this argument is that this notification may apply to the powers and duties mentioned in the re levant enactments, notifications, orders, rules and bye-laws which were in force before the appointed date, but the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 was brought into force by a notification dated 20th February 1953. The notification is as follows :- "Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Act, 1950 (Enforcement of Act). No. F. 7-2/48-L.llth February 1953. (Gazette 20th February 1953). In pursuance of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Act, 1950 (LXVI of 1950), the Central Government are pleased to direct that the Act, shall come into force in and shall apply within the Municipal limits of the City of Karachi and from the date this noti fication is published in the Gazette and until further orders." This means that the notification dated 21st October 1952, relied upon by the Attorney General is irrelevant and the Chief Commissioner has had no power under rule 17 read with rule 2 (x) of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Rules, 1953, and read with Article 211 of the Constitution, to issue orders to close the slaughter-houses. I must not omit to note an important objection of the petitioners' counsel to the scope of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 Clause (a) of section 2 of this Act defines ` cattle' to mean oxen, buffaloes and sheep of either sex and of any age. There is no mention in this definition of the goat and the dumba which are mentioned in the notification by which prices of meat have been fixed. It was suggested that the words 'mutton' and ' beef ' include meat of these animals, but these words have not been used in the Act. The expression used in sections 3 and 6 of the Act are 'cattle', and "cattle meat". If the word "cattle" does not include goats and dumbas then neither their slaughter nor the sale purchase and procurement of their meat can be controlled by or under the Act. The Attorney General contended that this distinction drawn by the petitioner's counsel amounted to hairsplitting for no other purpose than to defeat the object of the legislation. According to him sheep could be taken to be the genus, and the goat and the dumba to be two species of the genus. He referred to the New Oxford Dictionary, Vol. VIII, page 661, for the meaning of the word "sheep". Some of the meanings of the word as given in it are :- " Any animal of ruminant genus ovis (sometimes horned) closely allied to the goat ; specially of the widely domes ticated species ovis aries, of which there are many verieties and which is reared for its flesh, fleece and skin. The male of the sheep is a ram and the female a ewe and the young a lamb. The flesh of adult sheep is mutton." The goat is described as closely allied to the sheep and not as a specie of the sheep. It appears that the goat is not a variety of the sheep, but the dumba may be a variety of the sheep. No scientific term has been used in the defi nition given in the Act because the intention probably was to use popular words in their ordinary sense. In the ordinary sense of the word also a goat is not a sheep but a dumba probably is a variety of the sheep. The petitioner's counsel does not agree with this method of interpretation and con tends that in this statute the penalty of punishment with fine or with imprisonment or with both is provided and there fore its interpretation should be strict. According to him it is not for the Court to decide what animal is a specie of the genus, because the Court, according to him, should take the words as they are and not take upon itself the responsibility of deciding whether one named animal would scientifically or in its popular sense include another unnamed animal. In popular Urdu at least an ordinary sheep is not called dumba. He has relied on the following lines from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (10th Edition) at 265 :- " . . . a Court was not bound to know that a 'colt' was horse in an Act against horse stealing, or that a pig was a 'hog' in au Act against hog stealing." If a colt could not be declared to be a horse and a hog could not be declared to be pig then according to the counsel a durnba cannot be declared to be a sheep. He has further argued that if the legislature intended to include the dumba in the definition of 'cattle' then it would have said so just as it has stated that cattle include oxen, buffalo and sheep, " of either sex and of any age". The mention of sex and age in the definition excludes the interpretation that all animals which may be distinct species of the sheep though not expressly included in the definition are nevertheless included in it merely on the ground that the sheep can be regarded to be their genus. There is a good deal of force in this argument and I think that neither the goat nor the dumba can be held to be 'cattle' according to the definition L of the word even if the dumba be regarded to be a specie of the sheep. Lastly, I have to examine the objections of the petitioners' counsel against the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding), Act, 1953, and two notifications issued under it in order to control the prices of mutton and beef. Clause (b) of section 2 of the Act defines " essential articles" to mean any articles, other than an '' essential commodity" within the meaning of section 2 of the Essential Supplies' (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which the Chief Commissioner may, from time to time, declare by notification, to be an article to which the provisions of the Act shall apply. The Chief Commissioner has declared mutton and beef to be essential articles by Notification No. 53/2/Spl./ 56-4233 dated 23rd October 1956. The Chief Commissioner is empowered by subsection (1) of section 3 of the Act to fix the maximum prices above which no essential article can be sold, and he has fixed the prices by Notification No. 53/2/ Spl/56-4235, dated 24th October 1956. The objection of the petitioners' counsel is that since according to the definition of "essential articles" given in clause (b) of section 2 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, and an " essential commodity" within the meaning of section 2 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, cannot be declared by the Chief Commissioner to be an essential article, the Chief Commissioner cannot declare mutton and beef to be essential articles because foodstuff is " essential commodity " within the meaning of section 2 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and mutton and beef are foodstuffs. Section 2 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 is as follows :- "(a) ' essential commodity ' means any of the foil -,wing classes of commodities :- (i) foodstuffs, (ii) cotton and woollen textiles, (iii) paper, (iv) petroleum and petroleum, produts, (v) spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles, (vi) coal, (vii) iron and steel, (viii) mica." The petitioners' counsel has argued that the Notifica tion of the Chief Commissioner by which mutton and beef have been declared to be essential articles and by which the prices of mutton and beef have been fixed are therefore ultra-vices of the provisions of law. The Attorney General has tried to meet this objection by urging that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was not a permanent Act as subsection (1) of section 3 of it shows, and was allowed to expire on the 31st of March 1955. It has therfore, lapsed, according to him, and with it have lapsed all its provisions including section

2. When an enactment lapses it disappears completely, as if it was never enacted and no traces of it are left behind except with respect to things done or completed under it. Since it lapsed on 31st of March 1955, there was no " essential commodity" within the meaning of it, there fore the exception made in clause (b) of section 2 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 153, ceased to have effect from the 1st of April 1955. Mr. Akram, however, pointed out that the Act was not allowed to lapse but was actually repealed by subsection (1) of section 17 of the Essential Supplies - (Continuance of Temporary Powers) Ordinance X of 1955 and that the repeal by a legislation of a provision of law which has been incor porated by reference in another law does not affect its R continuance in the later law. This is a recognised principle. Orders has stated on page 263 (3rd Edition) of his book called Construction of Deeds and Statutes :- " Where the provision of one statute are incorporated by reference into a second statute and the first is repealed by a third statute, the provisions incorporated into the second remain intact. There is a rule of construction that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second, as the incorporated provisions have become part of the new (second) statute:' The same proposition is stated in Halsbury's Statutes of England, Volume XXIV, at page 178, as follows :- " When it is enacted that the provisions of Act shall be applicable to a later Act, it is as if the words them selves of the former Act had been incorporated into the later Act and a subsequent repeal of the former Act will not affect the incorporated part of the later Act " The Attorney General's reply is that the incorporation by reference of a provision of law in a subsequent law means its bodily reproduction in the subsequent law and since section 2 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was not reproduced in clause (b) of section 2 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953, the proposition of law stated by Odgers and in Halsbury's Statutes is inapplicable to the present case. He has relied on The Queen v. Smith and others, Justice Lancashire (8 Q B 146) and Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., (A I R 1931 P C 149) These authorities are clearly unhelpful to him and if anything, they are against him. Apart from the absence of authority in .his favour, I may add that the idea of legislation by reference is itself incon sistent with the reproduction of the borrowed provision. If a provision itself were reproduced then reference to it will be unnecessary and meaningless. In view of the above difficulties in his way the Attorney General advanced another argument, which is that if this Court held that the Notifications issued by the Chief Commissioner declaring mutton and beef to be essential articles and fixing their prices to be invalid, then such an order will be infructuous because concurrent power are enjoyed by the Government under the Federal Capital (Essential Supplies) Order, 1956, and Essential Supplies Act, 1957. He mentioned a number of authorities in favour of the proposition that infructuous orders should not be passed Mr. Akram immediately pointed that no powers have yet been delegated by the Central Government under section 4 of the order and that the Act is meant to provide for price control and regulation of trade between Provinces and between a Province and the Federal Capital and not to provide for price control within the Federal Capital itself. The Attorney General admitted the correctness of these statements of Mr. Akram. Apart from this. I may mention that infructuousness of an order of the Court is quite different from the possibilities of the executive authorities passing new orders under proper provisions of law. I therefore accept the objection and hold that the Chie Commissioner of Karachi could not declare mutton and beaf to be essential articles under clause (b) of section 20 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953 and that the Notifications of the Chief Commissioner, reproduced above, dated the 23rd and 24th of October 1956 are invalid and unenforceable. Before I conclude finally, I may put together those conclusions arrived at above which are in favour of the petitioners. They are that (1) 'mutton and beef cannot be declared to be essential articles under clause (b) of section 2 of the Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti- h Hoarding) Act, 1953, and their maximum prices cannot be fixed under subsection (i) of section 3 of this Act. The orders issued and notified by Notification No. 53/2/SP1/ 56-4233, dated 23rd October 1956 and No. 53/2/SPl/56-4235, dated 24th October 1956 are therefore illegal and of no effect. (ii) The goat and the dumba are not covered by the definition of ' cattle 'contained in clause (a) of section 2 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and neither their slaughter can be restricted nor the sale, purchase K and procurement of their meat can be restricted under this tact. (iii) The Chief Commissioner of Karachi is not empowered under rule 17 read with rule 2 (x) of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Rules, 1953 and read with Article 211 of the Constitution to issue orders as the Administration of the Federal Capital that slaughter-houses should remain closed on the days named by him. The orders chat slaughter-houses should remain closed on the days named in the Notification No. F. 1 (15) J53-LSG, dated 20th October 1953 read with Notification Ny. F. 1(15)/52-LSG dated 7th December 1955 are without authority as well as to violation of rule 17 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Rules, 1953 and as such illegal and of no effect. (iv) Rule 16 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter Control Rules, 1953, is ultra vires of section 3 read with section 12 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950. (v) The orders notified by Notification No. F. 1 (15)/53-LSG, dated 20th October 1953 and No.-F. 1 (15)/53-LSG, dated 7th December 1955 declaring Thursdays, Fridays and Tuesdays to be meatless days F' are ultra vires of section 6 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950, and therefore illegal and of no effect (vi) The scheme of control envisaged and imposed by and under section 3 and section 6 of the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and the orders issued under section 6 of Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950 and notified by Notification No. F. 1 (15)/53-LSG, dated 20th October 1953 and F. 1 (15)/53-LSG, dated 7th December 1955, and the orders issued under clause (b) of section 2 arid under subsection (1) of section 3 of Karachi Essential Articles (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 1953 and notified by Notification No. 53/2/SP1/56-4233, dated 23rd October 1956, and Notification No. 53/2/SPl/56-4235, dated 24th October 1956 does not provide for regulation of the petitioner's trade by a licensing system and is unconstitutional under Article 12 of the Constitution and void under Article 4 of the Constitution. For .the sake of clarification I may repeat here that I express no opinion regarding the prohibition of the slaughter of useful cattle and the medically unapproved cattle, except that goats and dumba are not covered by the definition of cattle as given in the Karachi Cattle Slaughter (Control) Act, 1950. The writ petition is accordingly accepted and the res pondents are directed not to interfere with the trade of the petitioners to the extent stated above. A. H. Petition accepted.