1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

ABDUR RASHID (MEMBER).‑Facts of the case, briefly, are that the appellant, a Superintending Engineer, working in the Office of the C, E. (Purchase and Disposal) WAPDA, was suspended w.e.f. 17th November, 1981. Subsequently, on 7th December, 1981 he was charge- sheeted. The said charge‑sheet and the statement of allegations arc reproduced :‑ Charge‑Sheet You, Mr. Muhammad Fazil Mian, Superintending Engineer (under suspension) Office of the Chief Engineer (Purchase and Disposal) WAPDA, are alleged to have committed the following irregularities while working as Project Director (B‑C) WAPDA :‑ (i) That you purchased a plot of 12 Marlas of land at Egerton Road Lahore and got office‑cum. residential building constructed on this property, without obtaining the prior approval of the competent authority, as required under rule 10‑A of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees' Conduct Rules, 1978. (ii) That having abused your official position you had utilised services of a number of regular and work charged WAPDA employees in the construction of the above‑said building as named in the Statement of Allegation. (iii) That you bad purchased and re‑sold 32 Kanals of land in Kasur and some landed property in Shahpur Village, but you had failed to indicate all these transactions in respect of the above property in your statement of `Declaration of Assets' showing details of property purchased/re‑sold/held by yourself and members of your family as on 30th June, 1981, as required under rule 10(I) of the above‑said Rules. (2) If the above allegations are established, you will be guilty of 'misconduct under the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (E & D) Rules, 1978, applicable to you and will render yourself liable to all or any of the penalties described in rule 4 of the said Rules. (3) You are, therefore, hereby required to put in your written. Defence within 14 days of the receipt of this charge‑sheet stating at the same time whether you desire to be heard in person. (4) Your defence reply should reach the undersigned within the stipulated period, failing which it will be presumed that you have no defence to offer and an ex Parte action will be initiated against you. (5) Statement of Allegations is enclosed. Dated : 7th December, 1981. (Sd.) S. M. AYOOB, Member (Water), WAPDA." Mr. Muhammad Fazil Mian, Superintending Engineer (under suspension) Office of the Chief Engineer (P & D) WAPDA while working as Project Director (B‑C) WAPDA purchased and sold 32 Kanals of land in Kasur and some other landed property in Shahpur Village but he failed to show all this in his `Declaration of Assets' showing details of property purchased/re‑sold/held by himself and the members of family as on 30th June, 1981. Thus, he committed irregularity in violation of rule 10(1) of Pakistan WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules, 1978. (2) Mr. Muhammad Fazil Mian purchased a plot of 12 Marlas of land at Egerton Road, Lahore and got office‑cum‑residential building constructed on this property without obtaining prior approval of the competent authority as required under rule 10‑A of the said Rules. In the construction of this building he used the services of the following regular/work charged WAPDA employees working under his control:‑ (1) Mr. Muhammad Rafique, Painter WAPDA (2) Mr. Mahmood Hussain, Electrician Employees (3) Mr. Abdul Hameed, Electrician. (4) Mr. Muhammad Aqil. Work (5) Mr. Muhammad Fayyaz. charged Thus, he misused his official position by employing WAPDA manpower for his private work which act is unbecoming of a WAPDA Officer. (3) All the above‑noted irregularities committed by Mr. Muhammad Fazil Mian, Superintending Engineer tentamount to 'misconduct' under the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (E & D) Rules, 1978, for which he is liable to be proceeded against departmentally. Dated : 7th December, 1981. (Sd.) S. M. AYOOB Member (Water) WAPDA."

2. The appellant furnished his defence reply on 26th December, 1981 denying the allegations. A regular enquiry was held and completed on 29th March, 1982. As a result, the appellant was removed from service vide Officers Order dated 5th April, 1982. On 26th May, 1982 he preferred a departmental appeal to the Chairman WAPDA against his impugned removal. The said appeal was turned down by the Chairman and information to this effect conveyed to the appellant vide Deputy Director (Confidential) letter dated 6th July, 1982. Thereafter the appellant filed his appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore on 31st July, 1982 where it was admitted for regular hearing as Appeal No. 509(L)/82. On a miscellaneous petition No. 3/84 for early hearing, the appeal was transferred to Islamabad on 22nd February, 1984 and registered afresh as appeal No. 122(R)/84. It was heard on 8th May, 1984 and it is being disposed of by this order.

3. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondents. 4 careful perusal of the memo of appeal forces us to correct one obvious error visible in the said memo in that the appellant at para. 4 thereof, has stated that he was suspended by the G. M. Administration. This fact is belied by documentary evidence made available by the respondents as Annexure `II' to their written statement. The appellant was suspended by Office Order dated 19th November, 1981 signed by Member (Water) and NOT by G. M. Administration. We shall, in this connection, disregard the assertion of the appellant at para. (e) of Grounds, wherein the subject‑matter has been given a tilt by saying " ....... in the instant case, the effective order was passed by Brig. Asadullah Khan, General Manager (Administration) and the Member simply signed that order which is not in accordance with the provision of clause (xii) and is unlawful." The fact that the suspension order had been signed by the competent authority vie. Member (Water), it was, obviously, passed by the person who was competent to pass the order and the said order is, therefore, lawful.

4. Charge No. (i), really, consists of two parts. The first part relates to the purchase of 12 Marlas of land at Egerton Road for which transaction, the permission of the competent authority is necessary under the rules. The second part of the charge relates to the actual construction on the said plot for which, again, a separate permission is to be obtained from the competent authority. As regards acquisition of Egerton Road plot, the relevant letter regulating the assets is reproduced :‑ PAKISTAN WATER' AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Phones : 63676, 6991, 204 723‑WAPDA House WAPDA Lahore Lahore No. SO (Admn)/1(1117) 66478‑66778, dated August 30, 1977. Office Memorandum Subject : Declaration of Assets Under rule 12 of the West Pakistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1966, adopted by WAPDA, every WAPDA employee, at the time of entering into WAPDA service, is required to make a declaration of all movable and immovable properties belonging to or held by him or by a member of his family (individually or collectively), as defined in the said Conduct Rules. Instances have come to the notice of the Authority where some WAPDA employees, on their first appointment, were not asked to make a declaration of their assets. The Authority has taken a serious view of such omissions. (2) The Authority has decided that, in future, the following clause may be inserted in all letters of appointment :‑ "He will make a declaration, in writing, of all movable and immovable properties, including shares, certificates, securities, insurance policies, and jewellery of the value of Rs. 10,000 (Rs. ten thousand) or more, belonging to or held by him or by a member of his family, individually or collectively, as defined in the West Pakistan, Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1966 (as adopted by WAPDA), within one month of his entering into WAPDA service." (3) All General Managers/Chief Engineers/ Project Directors/Heads of Divisions are requested to instruct the concerned ulcers to obtain Declaration Assets from every new employee and ensure that annual returns are submitted by the existing employees, as required under the Rules/Authority's orders, within the time limit, if there is any accretion to or decrement from the declarations made previously. (4) Employees who have not filed any Declarations of Assets may be required to do so within one month, failing which disciplinary action will be taken against them. These declarations should cover the entire period of their service in WAPDA. (5) Kindly acknowledge receipt. (Sd.) (Aman Ullah Khan), Secretary, WAPDA."

5. From the above letter it is obvious that the appellant had td file his declaration of assets. The declaration of assets as on 31st December, 1979 filed by the appellant is available at page 28 of the memo. of appeal. Anyone who reads the said declaration of assets, will have to examine the appellant at length, to create any meaning out of the said declaration which is much too incomplete and almost totally obscure. For example, the Egerton Road plot has been described in the following manner (without mentioning its location) ;- "(iv) (in whose name) held Daughters & Lahore Land 100,000" Son.

6. The Enquiry Officer, too, has rightly divided the charge into two parts. While dealing with the first part vie. the purchase of Egerton Road plot, the Enquiry Officer has quoted rule 10 of WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules, 1978, hereinafter to be referred to as the Conduct Rules, 1978. Rule 10 ibid is reproduced from the enquiry report :‑ "Rules‑A WAPDA employee or a member of his family as defined in rule 3(c) who intends to transact any purchase, sale or disposal by other means of movable or immovable property exceeding in value Rs. 5,000 (five thousand rupees) with a person residing, possessing immovable property or carrying on business within the station, district or other local limits for which such WAPDA employee is appointed, shall declare his/her intention to the Head of Division/ Authority as the case may be. Any such declaration shall state fully the circumstance, the price offered or demanded and, in the case of disposal otherwise than by sale, the method of disposal. Thereafter such WAPDA employee shall act in accordance with such orders as may be passed by the Authority : Provided that all transactions with a person, who is an official subordinate of the WAPDA employee should be reported to the next higher authority." The conclusion reached by the enquiry officer is :‑‑ "I feel that there is no charge against the accused officer for purchase of this piece of land because he has declared it in the statement of the declaration of assets for the year ending 31st December, 1979. However, it will not be out of place to mention that the statement submitted by the accused officer does not give the complete description of property acquired, disposed of or held by him at the end of the year 1979." Earlier than the above quotation and at page 6 of the report, the Enquiry Officer has said:‑ "The land was purchased by the accused officer in August, 1979 and he declared the same in his declaration of assets ending the year on 31st December, 1979. In this statement he indicated the land to have been purchased for Rs. 100,

000. He had not obtained permission for the purchase of this property."

7. As to the construction of a commercial building at Egerton Road, the Enquiry Officer has the following to say :‑ "The second part of the same charge is regarding the construction of the building thereon. The accused officer did apply for the permission to construct the building on this plot on 24th May, 1980 at the anticipated cost of construction as Rs. 3,00,

000. The permission was not accorded to the accused officer due to the fact that the office could not examine and check the sources of financing of this construction which was also mainly due to the fact that the accused officer had not been regularly and clearly submitting the annual declarations of assets. The accused officer according to the record provided to me submitted annual returns only in 1969, 1975, 1978, 1979 and 1980. In his application for permission the accused officer had stated that he had requested the Lahore Development Authority to accord approval for the construction of this building and that he intended to start the same soon after he receives this Pakistan. WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules started the construction without having obtained previous sanction of the Authority. It has also been clearly laid down that he will have to disclose the source from which the cost of the construction shall be met and as he could not justify and satisfy the competent authority regarding the source of financing, the approval was not accorded. During the course of enquiry the prosecution produced an assessment of the value of the property done by Col. Mamur Gul (cost of land and the building there on) to establish that the accused officer indicated less value of the plot and the construction cost than the real cost for obtaining approval of the Competent Authority. As this aspect was not included in the charge‑sheet served on the accused officer, it has not been touched in this enquiry. An application for sanction does not mean an automatic acceptance of the request. I, therefore, hold him guilty of the charge to the extent that he constructed the building without prior permission from the competent authority and thus violated the provisions of the Conduct Rules."

8. While putting up his defence as to the acquisition of the Egerton Road plot without prior permission and in violation of rule 10 of the WAPDA Employees' Conduct Rules, 1978 (para. 6 above), the learned counsel for the appellant, leaned for benefit on the conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer and quoted at para 6 above. He pleaded that the failure to obtain permission prior to the purchase of the impugned plot can, at best, be termed as a minor technical error by virtue of the fact that the said plot had been mentioned in the assets declaration upon 31st December, 1979 which is available on record. He stated further that as soon as the appellant was asked to make a disclosure of assets in accordance with rule 12 of the Conduct Rules, 1978, he did so willingly on 27th September, 1981 covering the period upto 30th June, 1981. There is, therefore, no evidence of misconduct on the part of the appellant. The learned counsel also questioned the nature of the Conduct Rules, 1978 and termed them as directory and NOT mandatory. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on King's Bench Division, Rex v. Lincoln shire Appeal Tribunal K B D 1916 July,

26. A copy of the said 16‑page judgment was very kindly made available to us by the learned counsel. We have carefully gone through the said judgment. We are not convinced that the case‑law cited by the learned counsel helps him in any manner because, in nutshell, the Rex v. Lincolnshire judgment has held :‑ "There are a number of cases in the books where non‑compliance with regulations has deprived an appellate Court of jurisdiction ... And there are cases in which regulations have been held imperative as to part and directory as to part And there are many cases also in which they , have been held to be directory only."

9. The learned counsel questioned the rule‑making power of the WAPDA conferred under section 18 of the WAPDA Act, 1958. He also argued that once an institution borrowed any rules by adoption, then it, did not lie with that institution to modify those rules. He elaborated by saying that the E & D Rules, 1978 had been adopted by the WAPDA from the Civil Servants (E & D) Rules, 1973 and the WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules, 1978 were, similarly, also adopted or borrowed regula tions. Since the said Rules had not been assented to by the Government, as per section 29 of the WAPDA Act, 1958, they were void ab initio.

10. The learned counsel then touched on rule 11 of the Conduce Rules, 1978 where under the declaration of property is to be made. This declaration is to be made by an employee at the time of entering the service and was not even binding on the appellant. What was binding on the appellant, he had done under rule 12 and as such no charge could be made out as to the failure to declare his assets, or to hide fact; to this effect.

11. While building his defence as to construction without permission the learned counsel for the appellant highlighted the fact that the application for construction had been made on 24th May, 1980. The respondents raised various objections which had been replied to. However, the department concerned finally refused permission on 14th November, 1981 without giving any reasons. Since the respondents were clearly pro crastinating, it was not possible for the appellant to keep waiting indefinitely. The building at Egerton Road was, therefore, completed sometime in November 1981. Arguing further, the learned counsel said that since possession of the private property was a fundamental right, the appellant could not be deprived of exercising this right. If a department failed to grant or refuse permission within a reasonable time, it would be presumed that such a permission was automatically granted. Again, the learned counsel pleaded exoneration on the ground that it was the failure of the department to decide the case of his permission within a reasonable time, which was a manifestation of arbitrary power to an unreasonable extent which, in turn, forced the appellant to begin and complete the construction of a commercial building at Egerton Road without awaiting the. departmental sanction.

12. Replying to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents said that in so far as charge No. (i) was concerned, the appellant had failed to obtain prior departmental permission and had, thus, purchased the 12 Marlas Egerton Road plot by violating the mandatory provisions of rule 10 of the Conduct Rules, 1978. Furthermore, the appellant had failed to obtain prior permission before embarking upon the construction of a commercial building at Egerton Road which was in violation rule 10(A) of the Conduct Rules, 1978 which says :‑ "10‑A : Construction of Building etc. No WAPDA employee shall construct a building, whether intended to be used for residential or commercial purposes, except with the previous sanction of the Authority obtained upon an application made in this behalf disclosing the source from which the cost of such construction shall be met."

13. Now, to summarize, we would say that the charge No. (i) has not been properly constructed. It should have been in two clearly defined parts viz. (1) purchase of Egerton Road plot without permission which was violative of rule 10 of the Conduct Rules, 1978 and (2) construction of a commercial building on the said plot without permission, which action of the appellant was in violation of rule 10‑A of the Rules ibid. However, this lacuna notwithstanding, the appellant was, in substance, charged with two violations as stated and the charge (i) should be viewed and construed as such.

14. The fact that the appellant declared the Egerton Road plot in his assets declaration upto 31st December, 1979 and that this fact as pleaded by the learned counsel for the appellant should be construed to have fulfilled the requirement of rule 10 of the Conduct Rules, 1978 meaning thereby that the said declaration of assets ought to be taken as something equal to prior permission for the purchase of the said plot is an issue which we would like to deal with before proceeding further. As stated by us earlier, we do not approve of the manner in which the Egerton Road plot has been declared. There are no details given as to its location. To us, therefore, the said declaration does not fulfil the requirement of a proper declaration and we are not sure that the said plot is really the Egerton Road plot because the declaration does not say so. For all we know, it may be some other plot ! !

15. Since rule 10 is very precise, the employees have to follow it in the manner and method they are directed to do so. We have no doubt that prior to the purchase of Egerton Road plot, it was incumbent upon the appellant to obtain departmental permission. His failure to do so makes him guilty of violation of rule 10 of the Conduct Rules, 1978.

16. As regards appellant's failure to obtain prior permission for construction of a commercial building at his Egerton Road plot and thus violating rule 10‑A of the Conduct Rules, 1978, the learned counsel for the respondents highlighted the fact that vide appellant's letter dated 24th May, 1980 addressed to the M. D. (Water) for departmental permission, said : "Lahore Development Authority has already been requested to accord approval for this construction and I intend to start the same soon after I receive this approval" and thus a violation of rule 10‑A of the WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules had already taken place because the departmental permission for the projected construction should have preceded and not followed the permission from the L. D. A. Whereas we do agree broadly as to the application of Rules as brought out by the learned counsel for the appellant, we cannot overlook the substantial arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant wherein he has highlighted the fact that a department cannot keep a prospective builder, who may be their employee, on the lenter‑hooks indefinitely as in the instant case. We would have expected that the WAPDA had decided the request of the appellant one way or the other within a reasonable time which, in our opinion, should not have been more than three months Since, however, in the instant case, we do not know when the actual construction was begun, though we have been told that it was completed in November, 1981 and since our interpretation of a "reasonable period" within which to grant or refuse permission for construction to the employees is three months applicable to future cases, we hold the appellant guilty of violation of rule 10‑A of the WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules, 1978.

17. We have held elsewhere (Appeal No. 726(L)/1982, Muhammad Aslam Chishti v. Chairman, WAPDA and others) that WAPDA have the power to prescribe procedure for appointment and terms and conditions of service of its employees as well as be competent to take disciplinary action as enshrined in section 18 of the WAPDA Act, 1958. We have no reason to change our opinion and hence repel the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard. We do not know what prompted the said learned counsel to argue that the rules adopted by the WAPDA (or any other institution for that matter) could not be changed, In our considered view, this argument is fallacious, to say the least. Apart from the fact that this argument appears to have no purpose, or at least we are not aware of one which as disclosed before us by the learned counsel it furtherance of his case, we shall be loath to accept that 'the strait‑jacket of rules as suggested, once donned, would be there for ever, is highly undesirable even to think of apart from being totally misconceived. In case the WAPDA adopted any rules, it will have, doubtlessly, the fullest power and authority to modify those rules to suit its own convenience.

18. As a result of analysis of charge No. (i), we hold the appellant guilty of violation of rules 10 and 10‑A of the WAPDA Employee; Conduct Rules, 1978.

19. As regards charge No. (ii), viz. abuse of the services of the WAPDA employees for his private work at the Egerton Road construction, even the learned counsel for the appellant conceded that this had been' so. However, be qualified his statement by saying that it was two electricians who did one and a half hours' work and a painter worked for three days including a Friday. He triad to link this abuse of manpower in a quantitative ratio to the advantage derived by the appellant and the corresponding loss suffered by the WAPDA and tried to make us believe that since there were no such (profit/loss) findings, the charge, apart from being vague, would not be deemed to have been proved to the hilt. He, then, went on to the quantum of punishment which was, in his opinion, too severe in the circumstances. The enquiry officer has this to say with reference to charge (ii) :‑ "XXX the accused officer, if not for the entire work, then at least for a part of the work had used WAPDA employees on the electrification work .. Further :‑ ..one Mr. Muhammad Rafiq who is a regular employee has stated that he had also carried out the painting work for about three days and was marked present in the office at WAPDA House ........ Still further :‑ " .. However, the fact remains that the mere presence of both these work charged employees found working at the building is sufficient proof that they had been employed by the accused on his private work." And Finally :‑ ..I proceed to hold that the accused officer utilized the services of the WAPDA employees for his private work and is therefore, guilty of the charge."

20. The learned counsel for the respondents in rebuttal of the arguments of his opposite number as to charge (ii), said that where senior officers of the level of the appellant, abused their authority for wrongful private gains, thus setting a precedent of corruption, they deserved no leniency or even a consideration for it.

21. We have no doubt that neither charge (ii) is vague and nor are the findings of the enquiry officer. We do not, to that extent, find any force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant. We are also unable to be drawn into the quantification of profit/loss formula in regard to this charge. It is a simple matter where the appellant, a senior officer, has been caught red‑handed in abuse of WAPDA'S employees for wrongful personal gain and we agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that cases of corruption of this nature, where senior officers are involved, cannot be viewed with equanimity.

22. Charge (iii) has been replied to by the appellant, in his defence statement dated 26th December, 1981 in the following words :‑ (a) Purchase of 32 Kanals lands in Distt. Kasur appears in my 'Declarations of Assets' for the years 1979 and 1980. Sale of above land is indicated in my letter dated 4th February, 1981 addressed to the Chief Engineer (Co‑ordination) WAPDA, while working as Deputy Director (Civil) with P. C. pole plants project, in response to his letter No. W. W. Admn. (96216)/M‑2/E‑1/8554, dated 15th December, 1980 which was addressed to General Manager (T & G) WAPDA. Sale of this land is also mentioned in my letter dated 5th April, 1981 addressed to the Project Director P. C. Pole Plant in response to his endorsement No. PD/DP/PF‑139/3980, dated 29th March, 1981. Obviously there is no sense in concealing these declared events, subsequently you would, therefore, kindly agree that my failure to mention this property in the latest statement was a sheer omission and not an attempt to conceal any fact. (b) I do not remember if I have ever shown my property at Serial No. 4 of the said statement as located in Shahpur though Khanpur, in Revenue boundary of which this property falls is said to be the satellite of Shahpur. Property m Khanpur on Shahpur is one' and the same and is shown in every return of mine pertaining to declaration of assets." The Enquiry Officer has said the following with regard to the above charge :‑‑ "This charge pertains to the purchase/resale of 32 Kanals of land in Kasur and some property in Shahpur (Khanpur) village and that he failed to declare these properties in his declaration of assets showing details of property purchased/resold/held by him and his family members as on 30th June, 1981 and thus violated the provisions of WAPDA Employees Conduct Rules. In the statement submitted by the accused officer on 30th June, 1981 regarding the purchase/sale/holding of property by him and his family members he had not indicated anything regarding the property held by him at Kasur. However, in his declaration of assets for the year ending December, 1980 and December, 1979 he had shown the purchase of this particular property against an amount of Rs. 36,

000. He has not shown it in the details asked for from him which he submitted on 27th September, 1981. He is thus guilty of hiding of the facts concerning this property in Kasur. As regards the property in village Shahpur (Khanpur), in his statement for period ending 30th June, 1981 he has indicated that he purchased six Kanals and six Marlas of land on 14th February, 1970 for Rs. 11,000 and sold a part of it i.e. 1 Kanal 14 Marlas on 29th May, 1979 for Rs. 45,

900. He also showed that he is still holding 4 Kanals 12 Marlas. Although this land was purchased by him on 14th February, 1970 for Rs. 11,000 but he failed to indicate the same in his declaration of assets for the year ending December, 1975 and 1978 (No declaration of Assets was submitted for the year from 1970 to 1974 and for 1976 and 1977) which amounts to hiding of facts and thus the charge stands approved against him."

23. Our perusal of the declaration of assets for the year ending 31st December, 1979 reveals that at serial (v), in the name of his son, the appellant has shown Land in Kasur to the value of Rs. 36,

000. No other details, which we would consider minimum essential, have been given. Vagueness in filling in his declaration of assets, seems to be the hallmark of the appellant, and it forces us to infer that the appellant had an innate fear of being caught for possessing property beyond his known sources of income and hence his constant practice at vagueness and incompleteness in his declaration of assets. The three declaration of assets on the file testify to this phenomenon and these are 31st December, 1978, 31st December, 1979 and 31st December, 1980. He made the details available only after he had been ordered to do so. This charge is, there for, established. 24, The learned counsel for the appellant raised a few technical objections thus attacking the soundness 'of the disciplinary proceedings We shall deal with such of the objections as deserve consideration.

25. The first objection was that the Enquiry Officer had violated sub‑rules (1), (3), (4) and (6) of rule 6 of the WAPDA E & D Rules. 1978. Sub‑rule (1) has nothing to do with the Enquiry Officer. It relates to the issuance of a charge‑sheet by the competent authority. The objection is, therefore, totally misplaced. As regards sub‑rule (3), the Enquiry Officer allowed the appellant every right of leading his defence as well as of cross‑examining the prosecution witnesses. It is on record that along with 13 prosecution and 3 Court witnesses. the Enquiry Officer also examined 5 defence witnesses. After these witnesses had been examined, the Enquiry Officer allowed the appellant as well as the prosecution to submit respective additional evidence. The appellant furnished additional defence arguments on 24th March, 1982 and the prosecution did so on 25th March, 1982. The appellant was also given a personal hearing by the competent authority. We fail to see the soundness of the objections. There has been no violation of sub‑rule (4) which relates to the adjournments which the Enquiry Officer may have to give. Although we do not know if every adjournment was reported to the competent authority but if it was not, we do not, think that such non‑compliance could have caused any prejudice to the defence of the appellant. We are satisfied that the enquiry has been conducted with dispatch and no undue delay has occurred. Sub‑rule (6) lays down that the Enquiry Officer shall submit his report within ten days of the conclusion of the proceedings or such longer period as may be allowed by the competent authority. The enquiry was completed in about five weeks on 29th March, 1982 and within one week there from, on 5th April. 1982 the appellant stood removed. We do not see any delay in disposal of this case. 26 The second objection pertained to the enlargement of list of the prosecution witnesses. We do not see any legal hurdle whereby the list of witnesses, once submitted either by the prosecution or the defence, could not be modified. The objection is misconceived and is repelled.

27. The third worthwhile objection was that Member (Water) had acted both as the Authorised Officer as well as the authority which was against the rules. The respondent department have placed on record a chart (Annexure `I') showing delegation of powers with regard to E & D Rules. The delegation has been so articulated that the Member is the appointing authority in respect of the S. Es. and equivalent as well as the authority to award major punishments. In other words, the Member (Water) is both the authorised Officer and the authority in respect of the appellant. This is perfectly in order. The objection being ill founded is repelled.

28. In view of the foregoing analysis, we have come to the conclusion that having been given a reasonable opportunity of defence all the three charges stand established against the appellant upto the hilt. We hold him guilty of grave misconduct which is unbecoming of an officer of his status which he enjoyed in the WAPDA before his removal. We have, as is our wont, given our anxious consideration to the quantum of punish ment. Considering the gravity of the offence which could have resulted in the dismissal of the appellant but has stopped at removal only, due to departmental compassion, we do not find any cause justifying our interference in this case and while upholding the departmental action, we dismiss the appeal with costs fixed at Rs.

100. A. E. Appeal dismissed.