P L D 2003 Lahore 73 (PLP)

(6) M/s. Ellahi Cotton Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582). (7) Shaukat Ali and others vs. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 342). (8) Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhry v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1957 SC 9). (9) Muhammad Ilyas Malik v. Ministry of Interior (1995 SCMR 762).

6. Dr. Babar Awan, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No.718 of 2001 submits that section 69-A aforesaid is ultra vires of Articles 2A, 3, 4. 9, 18, 24, 25, 37 and 38 read with Preamble of the Constitution. Mere reading of the section itself shows that the impugned provision is not in accordance with the principles of equality, economic well being of the people, elimination of exploitation and promotion of social justice. He further urges that public at large i.e. passengers are adversely affected and especially the poor class who cannot afford to travel in air- conditioned buses of respondent No.4. Therefore, general public is necessary and proper party. He further urges that petitioners got route permits from the respondents in accordance with the provisions of Punjab Ordinance No. XIX, 1965 with certain conditions which are prescribed in section 50 of the aforesaid Ordinance. The petitioners did not violate any condition prescribed in the said section. In case the petitioners violate any of the aforesaid conditions the respondents have authority to cancel or suspend the route permit of the petitioners under section 62, of the said Ordinance. Therefore section 69-A (4) is in violation of the aforesaid provisions of law which existed in the Ordinance before addition of section 69-A. By referring to the Preamble of the said Ordinance, he contended that the Legislature has specifically mentioned the word "consolidated" in the preamble, therefore, law should be promulgated for whole of Pakistan whereas section 69-A inserted in the said Ordinance is enforceable only in the Province of Punjab. He maintains that section 69-A, which creates a monopoly in favour of a private individual, who does not fall in the category of Federal Government or Provincial Government or a Corporation controlled by any of the aforesaid Governments is directly hit by Article 18 of the Constitution. He further submits that section 69-A as well as the action of the respondents are not in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts. In support of his contentions he relied on the following judgments: (1) Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416). (2) Mst. Zahida Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2002 SC 408). (3) Harman Singh and others v. Regional Transport Authority, Calcutta (AIR 1954 SC 190). (4) The Amristar-Pathankot Transport Co. v. The Province of Punjab (PLD 1956 Lahore 900). (5) Superintendent of Police v. Abu Bakar and others (1972 SCMR 154). (6) Syed Wasaf Ali Shah v. Secretary Interior (1991 PCr.LJ 32). (7) Malik Niaz Muhammad v. Provincial Transport Authority (1989 SCMR 790).

7. Mr. Nazir Ahmad, Ghazi learned counsel for the petitioners in W.Ps. Nos.19239/2002 and 19240/2002 submits that petitioners secured route permits from the respondents under the provisions of the Punjab Ordinance No. XIX of 1965 which are subsisting and have not expired. Therefore, the petitioners have a vested right to do their lawful business and the respondents have no authority to interfere in the business of the petitioners. He further submits that aforesaid section 69-A is hit by Articles 2A, 3, 4, 9, 18, 36, 37 and 253(1)(b) of the Constitution read with Sharia Act, 1991. He further urges that Shariah Law is the supreme law of the country. Therefore, it is the duty of the Courts, to strike down any law which is in conflict with the supreme law i.e. the Injunctions of Islam on the touchstone of Article 2A. In support of his contention he relied on the following judgments:-- (1) Zaheeruddin v. The State (1993 SCMR 1718). (2) Haq Nawaz v. The Province of Punjab (PLJ 1997 Lahore 713). (3) Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 18) He also relied on the following treatises to contend that section 69-A is not in accordance with Injunctions of Islam inasmuch as that it not only creates monopoly but also restricts the use of a public road and takes care of an affluent class only. 1.Qur'an the Fundamental Law of Human Life, Volume One by Syed Anwer Ali).

2. The Principles of State and Government in Islam by Muhammad Asad.

8. He further submits that section 69-A is hit by Article 18(c) of the Constitution as the same creates a monopoly which is not permissible under the Constitution and is not in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts. In support of this contention he relied on the following judgments:-- (1) Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhury v. The Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1957 SC 9). (2) The Progress of Pakistan Co. Ltd. v. Registrar of Companies (PLD 1958 Lahore 887). (3) Muhammad Ismail v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1966 SC 327). (4) Fundamental Rights under Shariat by A.R. Cornelius (PLD 1970 Journal 144). (5) Toyota Hiace City Wagon Owners Association v. Farrukh Ahmad, Secretary Road Transport (PLD 1998 Lahore 376). (6) Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Parvez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869).

9. Mr. Maqbool Ellahi Malik, Advocate-General, Punjab submits that emergency was imposed in the country on 14-10-1999 effective from 12-10-1999 thereby Articles 15 to 19 and 24 of the Constitution stood suspended and therefore, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on this short ground. In support of his contention he relied on Nisar Ahmad and others v. Federation of Pakistan (1999 SCMR 1338) and Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869). He further urges that in view of the aforesaid proclamation of Emergency read with Provisional Constitution Order (No.1), 1999 and Chief Executive's Order No.9 of 1999, the impugned legislation and the action of the respondents is not justiciable. He further urges that impugned action of the respondent is not hit by Article 18(c) of the Constitution. He further urges that mere reading of section 69-A shows that the Provincial Government has control over the affairs of respondent No.4 read with various clauses of the impugned agreement. Therefore, respondent No.4 is an instrumentality and an agency of Provincial Government. In support of his contention he relied on Ghulam Rasool v. Muhammad Hayat (PLD 1984 SC 385). He next contended that Provincial Government has lawful authority to impose reasonable restrictions therefore, action of the respondents and section 69-A are not hit by Article 18(c) of the Constitution. He maintains that Division Bench of this Court in judgment dated 1-2-2001 in Writ Petition No.9436 of 2000 has upheld section 69-A and the action thereunder on the touchstone of welfare of public at large. He asserted that judgment of the Division Bench was not challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court. Therefore, question of law has been finally and properly decided by the Division Bench. He further submitted that Writ Petition No.660 of 2000 was decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 19-4-2001 on the basis of the judgment in the aforesaid writ petition. The aggrieved party filed C.P.L.A. No.2719/2001 against the latter judgment but operation of the impugned judgment was not suspended by the Honourable Supreme Court. The aforesaid C.P.L.A. is pending adjudication. He further submits that action of the respondents is valid and in accordance with law. In support of his contention he relied upon Corpus Juris Secundum, para. 10 of Volume No.73.

10. Mr. Muhammad Arif Raja. Advocate also appeared for the official respondents. He contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to assume the role of a policy maker or to interfere in a concluded contract while exercising Constitutional jurisdiction. He further urges that writ petitions are liable to be dismissed in view of the law laid down by the superior Courts. He relied on the following: judgments:-- (1) Syed Ali Azhar Naqvi v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1994 Karachi 67). (2) Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (1998 MLD 1411). (3) Muhammad Kamran Asghar v. Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, D.G. Khan (1999 YLR 1019). (4) Aamir Ali v. Federal Public Service Commission (2000 YLR 573). (5) Madina Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 Lah. 506). (6) Miss Sarah Malik v. Federation of Pakistan (2001 MLD 1026). (7) Collector, Central Excises and Sales Tax v. Pakistan Pulp Paper and Board Makers Association (2001. MLD 1969). (8) Shabbir Ahmad v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company (2001 MLD 1903). (9) Zaheeruddin Sheikh v. United Bank Limited (2001 CLC 147). (10) Nisarul Haq v. Tehsil Municipal Administrator City (PLD 2002 Lahore 359). (11) Kaleem Haider v. Government of Sindh (1990 CLC 2016). (12) Yahya Gulzar v. Province of Punjab (2001 CLC 9).

11. Mr. Ahmad Awais, learned counsel for respondent No.4 submits Nat franchise is a right or privilege granted by Government to do an act which could not be done without a grant from the Government and a contract icy which Government granted franchise to respondent No.4 to operate buses on designated routes for a period of 10 years is not liable to be interfered with before the expiry of the term of the contract. He relied on the definition of "franchise" as given in the Words and Phrases, (Permanent Edition), Volume

17. He also relied upon the meaning of the word "control" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition) i.e. "to regulate" or "to manage". He referred to various clauses of the agreement to contend that, respondent No.4 is, for all practical purposes, successor of the defunct Punjab Road Transport Corporation. He highlighted the history of the creation of the Punjab Road: Transport Corporation which was finally closed by the Government of Punjab in 1997 due to huge losses incurred by the Government. He further urges that Article 18(c) contemplates carrying on business or trade inter alia by the Punjab Government and it is not necessary that such business should also be owned by the Punjab Government or a Corporation controlled by the Punjab Government. Therefore, Legislature in its wisdom intended wider meaning to the expression "controlled" in Article 18(c) of the Constitution. Section 69-A is a valid piece of legislation because the Punjab Government is carrying on business through a designated agency controlled by the Punjab Government. He submits that the contract with respondent No.4 was executed after a public notice in the press. The petitioners were at liberty to compete but they did not come forward. He maintains that the impugned law was framed keeping in view public welfare i.e. to provide better communication facilities to general public. He submitted that respondent No.4 has purchased 150 buses but because of plying of the vehicles by the petitioners on the franchised routes it is sustaining a loss of Rs.5,135 daily per bus. He further explained that the defunct P.R.T.B. (predecessor of the P.R.T.C.) was established under section 70 of the aforesaid Ordinance. Whereas section 71 lays down that Transport Authorities had no jurisdiction in respect of motor transport operated by the Punjab Road Transport Board. Therefore, addition of section 69-A was justified after abolition of the P.R.T.C., the object of which was a properly regulated transport business to uplift the standard of general public and to cut down the traffic hazards on the roads. The respondents have been offered alternate routes to the petitioners to operate their vehicles. Therefore, action of the respondents was also covered by the provisions of sections 70 and 71 of the aforesaid Ordinance. According to him reasonable classification is permissible under the law. Section 69-A prescribes qualifications and thus the same is not hit by Article 18(c) of the Constitution.

12. Mr. Shah Gul, Advocate who also represents respondent No.4 submits that it is the duty of the Government to provide adequate transport facility to the citizens. The respondents initially established a Corporation for the said purpose under the name and style Government Transport Service and Punjab Road Transport Corporation which collapsed due to the mismanagement by public functionaries. The Government sustained huge losses, therefore, the aforesaid Corporation/Service were abolished. He further urges that respondent No.4 is a Corporation controlled by the Provincial Government therefore, section 69-A is not hit by Article

18. He further submits that petitioners and respondent No.4 are not the transporters of the same kind and the reasonable classification being permissible, there is no discrimination. In support of his contention he relied on Brigadier F.B. Ali's case (PLD 1975 SC 506). He further submits that route permits of the Petitioners have not been cancelled but the petitioners have been offered alternative routes. The. Provincial Government kept in view the principle of equal opportunity and competition and tenders were repeatedly invited for the grant of the franchise. Only thereafter franchise in question was awarded to respondent No.4 in a transparent manner. In support of his contention he relied on Government of Pakistan v. Zamir Ahmad Khan (PLD 1975 SC 667). He further submits that Article 19(g) (1), clause 6 of the Constitution of India contains the words "corporation owned or controlled by the State" whereas in Article 18(c) the expression "controlled" has been used. Therefore, the judgments of the Indian Courts are not relevant to decide the present controversy. Official respondents have executed agreement with respondent No.4 in accordance with law and therefore, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. He relied on Muhammad Sharif and others v. Administrator, Market Committee, Kasur (PLD 1993 Lahore 584). He further submits that the Government was competent to entrust the business in question to a selected agency keeping in view the interest of general public while retaining the regulatory powers to itself notwithstanding that this would create a monopoly in favour of the agency selected for the said purpose. In support of his contention he relied on the following judgments:-- (1) Glass Chatons Importers and Users Association v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 1514). (2) Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa and others (AIR 1963 SC 1047). He further urges that the contents of the agreement clearly show that the same concessions are available to respondent No.4 which were available to P.R.T.C., such as declaration of the franchised bus service as essential service, a recommendation to the Federal Government to exempt respondent No.4 from the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the huge subsidy granted by the Punjab Government to respondent No.4. Reliance was also placed on: Ex parte Datafin, Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ((1987) I All ER 564). Foster v. British Gas ((1990) 1 European Court Review 3313). NUT v. St. Mary School ((1997) 3 Common Market (Law Review) 630). He further submits that judgment of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Saghir Ahmad supra (AIR 1954 SC 728) mentioned in the order of the learned Single Judge dated 1-8-2001 supports the case of respondent No.4 as is evident from para.23 of that judgment.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioners in rebuttal contended that manner of exercise of power by the public functionaries in favour respondent No.4 is mala fide. He further submits that in spite of the emergency 'imposed by the competent authority this Court has ample power to declare section 69-A ultra vires of Article 18 and other provisions of the Constitution. In support of his contention he relied on the following judgments:-- (1) Waseem Shahzad and others v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 233). (2) Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Patvez Musharraf (PLD 2000 SC 869). He further submits that our Constitution is based on trichotomy of powers and power of judicial review of this Court remains intact. In support of his contention he relied on the following judgments:-- (1) Yousaf Abbas v. District Magistrate and others (2001 CLC 1355). (2) Yahya Gulzar v. Province of Punjab (2001 CLC 9). (3) Ghulam Dastagir v. WAPDA through Chairman (2001 YLR 1135). He further urges that section 69-A was promulgated by the competent authority before the enforcement of existing Emergency, therefore, it is not saved by Article 233(1). He next contended that word "controlled" has been used by the competent authority in its wisdom, in Article 18(c) and respondent No.4 was not "controlled" by the Punjab Government before the execution of the agreement with the said respondent. Therefore, Article 18(c) was fully attracted. He further submits that respondent No.4 is not a Corporation envisaged by Article 18(c) of the Constitution. In support of his contention he relied on Zila Council, Jhang v. M/s. Daewoo Corporation, (2001 SCMR 1012). He further submits that public functionaries allowed respondent No.4 to use the public road without imposing any fees etc. Therefore, it entails huge loss to public exchequer. The advertisement issued by the public functionaries does not debar the petitioners to file writ petitions on the principle of estoppel as the route permits issued by the competent authority in favour of the petitioners stand cancelled by operation of law i.e. section 69-A.

14. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The motor transport business was being regulated by the Motor Vehicles Act (No.IV) 1939 when on 18-6-1965 the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance (West Pakistan Ordinance No. XIX of 1965) was promulgated. It inter alia, repealed Act No. IV of 1939. Section 44 of Ordinance XIX regulates transport business under a permit to be issued by the Regional Transport Authority. Section 70 of the said Ordinance authorized the Government to establish a Road Transport Corporation while section 45(3), inter alia, empowers the Government to direct Punjab Transport Authority not to grant or issue any permit or to restrict the grant of fresh permits to a specified number on any route or routes or part of a route on which the Corporation is already operating motor transport of intends to do so. Pursuant to the mandate of section 70 aforesaid, initially the Punjab Transport Board was constituted which was later converted into Punjab Road Transport Corporation to provide inter-city transport facility to the general public as also within the major towns of the urban areas of the Punjab. The Road Transport Corporation carried on its operations till 1997 as statedly the Corporation was incurring huge financial recurring losses. The learned Division Bench while deciding W.P. No.9436 of 2000, noted that after dissolution of the Punjab Road Transport Corporation the Punjab Government planned to improve the facilities to general public. It was, also noted that at least in major cities, the transport facilities were inadequate and the passengers were forced to travel in vehicles in an unsafe and disgraceful manner. On account of tremendous growth of urban population and the consequent increase in the vehicular traffic on the roads it became imperative for the Government to explore possibilities of replacing the number of low occupancy vehicles with large occupancy vehicles and to provide a dignified, comfortable and reliable means of transport to the general public. This was the background noted by the learned Division Bench of this Court in which section 69-A was added to Ordinance XIX of 1965 initially by way of Ordinance No.IX of 1999. According to subsection (2) of the said section "franchise" was defined to mean a permit granted to an operator for operation of stage carriages with a carrying capacity of 70 or more passengers by a Bus Service providing and maintaining the prescribed facilities on routes in respect of which it is declared by the Government that only a Bus Service of the nature referred to above shall be allowed to operate stage carriage thereon to the exclusion of all other stage carriages. The object clearly was to substitute large capacity vehicles with low capacity vehicles such as wagons and mini buses. Section 69-A(4) provides for cancellation of all existing stage carriage permits in respect of a franchised route. In fact the grievance of the petitioner is directed against this provision.

15. Fundamental Right in Article 18 pertaining to freedom of trade is subject to such qualification as may be prescribed by law which is a clog on the said fundamental right. A perusal of section 69-A shows that it prescribes a qualification for grant of a franchised route, i.e. operation of a stage carriage with a capacity of 70 passengers or more. It does not eliminate a person doing the transport business to claim a franchise if he could show that he fulfils the aforesaid qualification. The transport business is already regulated by Ordinance XIX of 1965 inasmuch that transport operations for commercial purposes require a permit by the competent authority. It may be noted that the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 18 of the Constitution is not absolute in terms. One of the exceptions specified in the said Article 18 is regulation of any trade or profession by licensing system. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Muhammad Sharif and others v. Administrator, Market Committee PLD 1993 Lah.

584. The permit contemplated by Ordinance No. XIX of 1965 is in fact a licence to operate a transport and the Government is fully competent to regulate the business of transport. The word "regulate" has been defined as under in Black's Law Dictionary:-- "Regulate.--To fix, establish, or control, to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws. The power of Congress to regulate commerce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection or advancement to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety; to foster, protect, control and restrain. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No.40, Railway Employees Department of American Federation of Labor, C.C.A. Va., 84 F.2d 641,

650. It is also power to prescribe rule by which commerce is to be governed, and embraces prohibitory regulations. United States v. Darby, 312 US 100, 657, 61 S.Ct.451, 456, 85 L Ed.

609. Regulate means to govern or direct according to rule or to bring under control of constituted authority, to limit and prohibit, to arrange in proper order, and to control that which already exists. Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of Town of Farmington, 25 Conn. Sup. 125, 197 A. 2d 653, 680." The power to regulate necessarily includes even a power to prohibit. The Supreme Court in Messrs East and West Steamship Co. v. Pakistan through Secretary to Government of Pakistan PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 41 noted with approval the following observations from National Labour Relations 3oard v. Jones and Laugh in Steel Corporation 301 US 1 at page. 37: "The power to regulate implies, a power to foster, to protect control and restrain." The contention before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that power to regulate did not include the power to prohibit. This contention was repelled with the following observations: "If the Constitution gives to the Legislature the power to regulate a trade by a licensing system, it must follow that the power to prohibit vests in the Legislature insofar as the trade under such system may only be carried on by the licensed persons or corporations." The abovesaid observations were made while interpreting Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956. It may be noted that Article 18 of 1973 Constitution is in para materia with Article 12 of the 1956 Constitution.

16. We therefore, find that not only Article 18 subjects the fundamental right therein to such qualification as may be prescribed by law, there is a specific authority to regulate any trade or profession by licensing system. The regulation of this trade includes a policy as to the capacity of the vehicles to be deployed on roads for commercial purposes. Therefore, apart from the mandate of Article 18, section 69-A, which is in the nature of Regulatory provision, does not contravene any provision of Article 18 or any other provision of the Constitution. The law has been promulgated within the permissible limits. We will like to add here that while examining vires, of a statute it has to be presumed that the Legislature will not flout a Constitutional provision and all efforts have to be made to lean in favour of constitutionality to save it rather than to destroy it. In arriving at this conclusion we are fortified by the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore v. Custodian, Evacuee Property West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1971 SC 811.

17. Perusal of the record shows that public notice inviting tenders for franchised routes, inter alia, in the Rawalpindi city was first published on 14-12-1998 in daily 'Jung' followed by another public notice in the year 1999 by which applications were invited up to 31-12-1999. None of the petitioners before us responded to the aforesaid notices. Messrs Vatan Tours, respondent No.4 submitted its tender on which an interim agreement was executed between the parties and after series of deliberations and settlement of detailed terms and conditions the impugned agreement was executed on 23-2-2000, on 6-7-2001 a notification was issued under section 69-A(4) of Ordinance No. XIX of 1965 and on 20-7-2001 alternate routes were identified and offered to the other transporters by the Regional Transport Authority. Having not responded to the public notices inviting tenders for a franchised route, the petitioners could not be heard to say that they had suffered a legal grievance. We are quite mindful that in the matter of entering into contracts or grant of licences and permits to the citizens, the Government and its functionaries, are required to act in the matter honestly, justly and fairly. We are satisfied that the action of the Punjab Government under section 69-A was taken in a transparent manner by inviting tenders through public notices not warranting any interference of this Court.

18. Since we have found that section 69-A does not offend against Article 18 or any other provision of the Constitution the question whether its vires could be examined on the touchstone of Article 8 of the Constitution on account of enforcement of the Emergency does not arise and we leave this question for decision in some other appropriate case. We accordingly hold hat W.P. No.9436 of 2000 was correctly decided.

19. As far as the submissions of Mr. Nazir Ahmad Ghazi, Advocate that the impugned provision is ultra vires of the Injunctions of Islam is concerned a may observe that Article 203-G of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of this Court to examine this question because the said question is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the learned Federal Shariat Court. Reference may be made to the Province of Punjab and another v. National Industrial Credit Corporation 2000 SCMR 567, according to which no law can be declared as invalid on the touchstone of Article 2A of the Constitution. We had the benefit of going through the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Our learned brother was impressed by the judgment of Indian Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad and others v. The State and another AIR 1954 SC

728. We had the advantage to carefully examine the said judgment. In the said case the Indian Supreme Court was examining Article 19(1)(g) of their Constitution according to which all citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. This right is subject to reasonable restraint imposed by law. Before the Indian Supreme Court, the U. P. Road Transport Act, 1950, whereby a monopoly was created in favour of U.P. State in respect of the transport business was challenged. The Indian Supreme Court took the view that the word "restriction" in Article 19 seemed to be in the sense of limitation and not extinction so as to include total prohibition. However, exception in Article 18(a) of our Constitution does not find an express mention in Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. Our Supreme Court while interpreting the scope of "regulation", in the case of East and West Steemship Co. (supra) noted that the power to regulate includes power to prohibit. We, therefore, respectfully follow the aforesaid judgment of our Supreme Court with which we are bound. In view of the Indian Supreme Court use of a public road could not be prohibited. We may respectfully state that the right of general public to use a public road and the right to use a public road for commercial purpose "as to be distinguished. While in the case of former, the State may not be empowered to prohibit use of a public road, in case of latter it can be regulated by law.

20. We will like to refer to the Government of Pakistan v. Zamir Ahmad Khan PLD 1975 SC 667, in which the Honourable Supreme Court made the following observations:-- "Therefore, on the wording of Article 18 of the Constitution, the right to enter upon a profession or occupation or to conduct made or business can hardly be described to be a Constitutional or fundamental right when such right may be denied by law. In this respect our Constitution stands in sharp contrast with the corresponding provision of the Indian Constitution which omits the use of word 'lawful' in the relevant provision."

21. In view of the aforesaid findings our answers to the questions erred are as follows:-- Q. No. 1.--Grant of a franchise under section 69-A to a selected agency in a prescribed manner after inviting tenders through public notices in the newspapers does not amount to creation of a monopoly. Q. No.

2. The impugned legislation and the action taken thereunder are fully protected by Article 18 read with proviso (a) to the aforesaid Article of the Constitution. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. M.B.A./A-667/L Petitions dismissed.