PLD 1969

P L D 1969 Lahore 480 (PLP)

NAFEESA BANO AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus (1) CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND (2) PAKISTAN (GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION, RAWALPINDI)‑ — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Decided Date
Settlement Revision No. 20 of 1963, decided on 20th Novem ber 1968.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Akram and Shameem Hussain Qadri, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1969 Lahore 480 (PLP)
Forum / Court
Bench Members Muhammad Akram and Shameem Hussain Qadri, JJ
Parties NAFEESA BANO AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus (1) CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND (2) PAKISTAN (GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION, RAWALPINDI)‑ — Respondents
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This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

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The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Muhammad Akram and Shameem Hussain Qadri, JJ.

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Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1969 Lahore 480 (PLP) (NAFEESA BANO AND OTHERS‑Petitioners Versus (1) CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE AND (2) PAKISTAN (GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF REHABILITATION, RAWALPINDI)‑ — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah and Ch. Khalil‑ur‑Rehman (on 15‑5‑68, Ch. Khalil‑ur‑Rehman appeared) for Appellants.
  • Major Ishaque Muhammad Khan, S. C. for Respondents.
  • Dates of hearing: 6th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 18th to 21st March, 5th April and 15th May 1968.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958) S. 2 (3) and Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, 1956, Part I, Chapter 1, Para. 1, Cl. (i), and Supplementary Rural Scheme,. Para. 1 (b) and Supplementary Urban scheme Supplementary Scheme No. II), Para. 2 (3)‑"Land"‑Nature of Depends upon direct purpose for which property was occupied by owner at time of Independence i.e. before 15‑8‑1947. The test laid down in section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, and in Part 1, Chapter 1, Para. 1(i) of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, 1956, is the rise to which the land was being put at the time or. 15‑8‑1947. The purpose postulated within the definition of the teen `land' in these provisions is the direct purpose for ‑which the property was occupied by the owner at the relevant time. The land does not cease to be agricultural merely because at the relevant time it was not bearing any crop. Agricultural land are often allowed to remain fallow in the ordinary course of agriculture. On the other hand the mere fact that a plot of land is assessed to land revenue would not make it `land' within, its definition, unless it is proved that was occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, likewise the circumstance that a plot is included in: a revenue estate for which the revenue records are being compiled under the Land Revenue Act, is by no means conclusive. Syed Shaukat Hussain Rizvi v. K. B. Dr. Yar Muhammad Khan and another P L D 1964 Lah. 469 and M. Muzaffar‑ud -Din Industries Ltd. v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commis sioner awl another P L D 1967 Lah. 452 rel. (b) Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958), Ss. 11 & 22 and Chapter VI‑

Word `final" order in S. 22 used in a qualified sense meaning only that there was no appeal, revision or review against it between parties‑Powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner to cancel any allotment‑Distinguishable from his revisional jurisdiction and trot hedged in by provisions of Chapter VI of Act‑Phrase "subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder" used in S. 11 means only such of the provisions of Act and Rules as are applicable. It was contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was not competent to cancel or terminate an allotment order which had attained finality by lapse of time under section 22, Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958: Held, if this interpretation be accepted, it would have virtually rendered section 11 of the Act redundant, in the presence of the powers of revision vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 19(1) of the Act before it was deleted. Surely that could not have been the intention of the Legislature and any interpretation leading to this absurdity must be avoided. Section 22 of the Act lays down that subject to the provisions in Chapter VI (relating to appeal, revision and review), any order made under this Act shall not be called in question in any civil or revenue Court. It appears that in the context the word `final' order only means that there was no appeal, revision or review against it between the parties. It is also final in the sense that it cannot be called in question in any civil or revenue Court'. But it is not absolutely conclusive. It does not mean that it is necessarily final and conclusive against the Chief Settlement Commissioner, if otherwise he is empowered under the law to hold a probe into the matter. The word `final' in this context has been used in a qualified sense only. Indeed, at times, this word was differently construed in different statutes. Section 11 of the Act stands out separately by itself. It confers an altogether new and original jurisdiction on the Chief Settlement Commissioner to terminate or cancel the allotment and must be distinguished from the revisional juris diction that was once vested in him under section 19 (1) of the Act for the purposes of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by his subordinate. The scope of this section is even wider and the Chief Settlement Commissioner may cancel or terminate any allotment or lease, made before this Act was introduced, under any Scheme. This appears to be the only harmonious construction which must be adopted. Viewed from this angle, section 11 becomes quite compatible with the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Act and is in no way hedged in by those limitations. Perhaps, that is the one reason as to why the Legislature in its wisdom, has retained section, 11 of this Act in tact, and yet at the same time deleted the provisions in section 19(1) for revision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by the promulgation of Ordinance XIII of 1964. Section 11 of the Act, is `subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder'. It really means that section 11 is subject only to such of the provisions of the Act and the rules as may be applicable. Matangini Bebi v. Girish Chandra Ghongdar I L R 30 Cal. 619; Muhammad Ibrahim Moola v. S. R. Jandas A I R 1923 Rang. 94; Ashraf v. Saith Mal 1937 A L J 1101 and Major J. H. Naqvi v. The Director, Enforcement Directorate, West Pakistan P L D 1966 S C 512 rel. (c) Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XL VII of 1958), S. 11‑Chief Settlement Commissioner in exercise of his jurisdic tion under S. II, required to act judicially and to be free from any bias. The Chief Settlement Commissioner before his appointment as such had dealt with the matter in his capacity as Secretary to Government and had proposed cancellation of some allot ments. After his taking over charge as Chief Settlement Commissioner he cancelled these allotments after issue of due notices etc. under section 11, Displaced Persons (Land Settle ment) Act, 1.958. It was contended that the Chief Settlement Commissioner, was biased and consequently disqualified from sitting as a Judge in the cause: Held, virtually he was himself the complainant and had moved for the cancellation of the allotments in question. There fore, after he was appointed as the Chief Settlement Commissioner, he could not sit as a Judge in his own cause. The Chief Settlement Commissioner in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 was required to act judi cially in the matter. He was bound to afford a reasonable opportunity for hearing and to record his reasons in writing in support of his order. Therefore, it was all the more necessary that he should have been free from any bias in him. Because of this legal bias in the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commis sioner, he was disqualified in sitting in judgment in this case under section I1 of the Act. (d) Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act (XLVII of 1958), S. 21‑Revisional jurisdiction of High Court‑Confined to question of lawHigh Court cannot substitute its own judgment on questions of fact.

Judgment & Decree

MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.‑--This will dispose of the four con nected Settlement Revisions Nos. 20 of 1963 by Mst. Nafeesa Bano and others, 21 of 1963 by Mst. Shahzadi Begum, 83 of 1966 by Begum Mirza Bashir Ahmad and others and 2 of 1968 by Mehraj Hussain and others, all under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act XLVII of 1958 directed against the order dated 9‑10‑63 passed by Mr. M. H. Sufi, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan.

2. The relevant facts as they have emerged from the record, and not seriously disputed before us, are these: The revenue estate of Murree Brewery, Tehsil Murree, District Rawalpindi, is comprised of an area of 708 kanals and 18 marlas. This entire estate was owned by Murree Brewery Company Limited for running its business from this premises after having installed a brewery there, it had constructed a number of buildings, including the Malt House, which is a huge three‑storeyed building and the houses for its staff on this land. It appears that the company had also laid out gravel roads and made its own arrange ments for the water supply.

3. In the year 1943, the brewery was shifted to Rawalpindi and the company sold the entire Murree Brewery Estate to M/s. Kirpa Rain Brothers, and in about 11'45 they started a hotel called `Kashmir Hotel' in two large buildings situated on this estate and the other buildings at the site were used as annexes and for the other allied purposes. The owners evacuated to India after the Independence. Most of the buildings situated in this estate were either burnt down or damaged beyond repairs during the disturbances in 1947. However, the building at present known as Girls Guide House is still in tact in a good condition. The Malt House is also standing in tact though in a greatly deteriorated condition. The main Kashmir Hotel building was altogether burnt down and there was nothing left at the site except for the blank burnt walls and some debris. Another building known as the old Post Office building at the site is occupied by Jammu and Kashmir refugee families and the nearby buildings are in use by the Government. A list of these houses and other structures, with their existing conditions, in all comprised of 42 items, spread over the whole of this estate, was prepared by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Murree, and enclosed with his report sent to the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Com missioner, on 1‑8‑1961. A true copy of this is attached herewith as Appendix `A' as a part of this judgment. This estate was for the first time included in the limits of the Municipal Committee, Murree, when those were extended, in the year 1956.

4. In the special Jamabandi for 1946‑47, the classification of the land comprised in this estate is shown as under:‑ Ks. Ms. Ks. Ms. Abi 18 0 Lapara 14 11 Maira 1 3 Total Culturable 33 14 Ks. Ms. Ks. Ms. Banjar Qadeem 10 17 Un-culturable road 6 Un-culturable water tanks 2 6 Un-culturable hills 311 14 Un-culturable abadi 172 16 Un-culturable hill abadi 169 5 Total un-culturable 675 4 Total Area 708 18 There is no regular abadi deh in the whole of this estate, Unlike in the plains, those houses and other structures were spread over the area in the form of hamlets.

5. According to the Register RL‑11 kept for this estate, it appears that during June and August 1960, Ch. Muhammad Monir Khan, Tehsildar, Murree proposed an area of 322 kanals and 16 marlas equivalent to 390 Produce Index Units, at Khata Nos. 1 to 10 to the petitioners and some others, against their verified claims for agricultural lands abandoned in India Similarly on 7‑9‑1960 he proposed another area of 255 kanals and 2 marlas equivalent to 193 Produce Index Units, at Khata Nos. 12 to 16 in this estate to petitioners Nos. 1, 3 to 6 in Settlement Revision No. 20 of 1963, against their entitlement for the agricultural lands. A statement containing the details of these allotments as per RL‑11 Register, is attached herewith as Appendix `B' to this judgment. On 8‑9‑1960, the Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, issued a directive to the Tehsildar, Murree, with copies to the S. D. M., Murree, and the Revenue Assistant, Rawalpindi, to stop any further allotment of the lands in this estate. The petitioners Nos. 1, 3 to 6 in Settlement Revision No. 20 of 1963, treating this direction as an order refusing confirmation of the land proposed in their favour, filed an appeal against it. This was accepted by Sh. Ghulam Ahmad, Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Rawalpindi Region, Rawalpindi, on 10‑12‑1960. He was of the opinion that the land having been proposed in the names of the five appellants before him on the Register RL‑II, on 7‑9‑1960 and accepted by them, was liable to be confirmed to them within 15 days in accordance with para graph 68, Part 11 of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. He accordingly ordered that the proposed land should be deemed to have been confirmed in their favour. After this order was passed, on 24‑8‑1960 Mr. A. R. Siddiqi Sub‑Divisional Officer, Murree, exercising power as the Assistant Rehabilitation. Commissioner (Land), confirmed the lands already proposed in the names of the respective petitioners at Khata Nos. 1 to 10 and: 12 to 16 in the Register RL‑11 as mentioned above. Also an area of 126 kanals 8 marlas (Ghair Mumkin Hill) in this estate was proposed to five other claimants but the same could not be confirmed to them. In this manner only an area of 4 kanals and 2 marlas out of the entire estate, was left behind for disposal.

7. According to the note of Patwari on the respective Khatas in the Register RL‑11, the produce index value of the lands allotted to the petitioners in each case was calculated on the basis of the entries in the special Jamabandi prepared for this property. In the last column in Appendix `B' attached to this judgment, we have incorporated the remarks made by the Patwari in the Register RL‑11 against some of these Khatas, showing the existing condition of those properties. This shows that on the land measuring 24 kanals 16 marlas, allotted to Mirza Bashir Ahmad (the predecessor of the petitioners in Settlement Revision No. 83 of 1966), at Khata No. 2, there is the debris of a damaged bungalow, another complete bungalow and some quarters found at the site. Similarly on the area allotted to one Mahmood Khan at Khata No. 4 there is situated a bungalow in a damaged condi tion. Also on the land allotted to Mohammad Sarwar Khan at Khata No. 7 there is the building of the Malt House, four quarters and damaged bungalow. There is a damaged bungalow and a quarter on the area allotted to Masroor Jehan Begum (petitioner No. 2 in Settlement Revision No. 20 of 1963), at Khata No.

9. Similarly at Khata No. 10 the land allotted to Mst. Shehzadi Begum (petitioner in Settlement Revision No. 21 of 1963), includes the building known as the Girls Guide. At Khata No. 11, Masood Ahmad Khan was allotted the area under the road, quarters and a building for the camp. On a part of the land allotted to Khan Abdul Shafi Khan (petitioner No. 4 in Settlement Revision No. 20 of 1963), at Khata No. 13, there is the ground and quarters of a building. The area allotted to Mst. Nafeesa Bano (petitioner No. 1 in Settlement Revision No. 20 of 1963), at Khata No. 16, included two tanks and a baithak of Bari Shah Latif. After the information, concerning these allotments made in this estate, had reached the Central Government, on 6‑6‑1961 Mr. M. H. Sufi, the then Secretary, Ministry of Rehabili tation and Works, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi put up a note bringing the state of affairs prevailing in this estate to the notice of the Minister. He observed that apart from the buildings for the Brewery itself, there was a large number of other residential buildings in this estate. The total number of these buildings was about

49. At the time of the Partition most of these were burnt down, with the exception of two or three which were in tact. He further observed that the Rehabilitation Staff, working under the Deputy Commissioner, had disposed of the land in this estate on an average price of Rs. 40 per acre and that according to the Deputy Commissioner it provided a good building sites capable of fetching Rs. 10,000 per kanal if put to auction. Another objection in the disposal of this valuable land was that one person has been given 10 acres and some others have got about 3 to 5 acres each. In these circumstances in the opinion of Mr. Sufi sthese allotments made to‑the petitioners were objectionable. According to him the Rehabilitation Staff of Rawalpindi District had shown a gross ignorance, if not wilful abuse, of the rules in the disposal of the evacuee assets. He, therefore, asked the Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, to stop any further disposal of the property situated in this estate and to submit a comprehensive report to the Chief Settlement Commis sioner in this connection, with' request to review all those cases in which this property was transferred for ridiculously small consideration. From a copy of D. O. No. 461‑CA‑CSC/O1, dated 11‑7‑1961, from Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, to Mr. Ghias‑ud‑Din Ahmad C. S. P., Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi, on this record produced before us, it appears that in a conference held on 26‑6‑1961, in the Government House at Lahore, during the course of the discussion, the Governor and the Martial Law Administrator had also expressed their dissatisfaction about the disposal of the properties situated in the Murree Brewery estate as agricultural land. According to the record, on 7‑8‑1961, Mr. M. H. Sufi, Secretary Ministry of Rehabilitation and Works, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, by his D. O. No. 2226-PS‑Secy./61, wrote to Mr. Ahsan‑ud‑Din, C. S. P. Chief Settle ment Commissioner, Lahore to the effect that the matter was carefully considered by the Ministry and it was decided that the disposal of the land included in the Murree Brewery estate as banjar land was most improper, the price charged for the land treated as banjar was extremely inadequate and the evacuee rights could not be allowed to be frittered in this manner. He was of the opinion that the whole area could be lawfully declared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner as a potential building site and disposed of as such. He, accordingly, requested him that all the cases so far decided for the disposal of this land should be suitably reviewed.

8. As it happened, in course of time, Mr. M. H. Sufi took over as the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. Therefore, on 15‑7‑1963 in his capacity as the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, he submitted another note to the Rehabilitation and Works Division, for the information of the Minister. In this he has pointed out that in 1959, Lieut -General Muhammad Azam, the then Rehabilitation Minister, on visiting the site, had directed that this property should be demarcated into suitable plots and disposed of by open auction. As the scheme for the disposal of the evacuee plots in Murree was under consideration at the time no action could be taken for the disposal of the plots in this estate and the matter remained #pending. In this note he has also observed that without the knowledge of the Settlement authorities, the local Revenue Officers arrogated to themselves the responsibility for the allotment of the land comprised in Murree Brewery estate. They had proposed large pieces of land in favour of some `influential persons, including themselves'. One Mr. Muhammad Sarwar Khan was given about 105 kanals of land against his claim of 103 rural units and this would roughly work out to one kanal per unit of rural agricultural land, the value of which would be about Rs. 5 per kanal. Similarly Sh. Abdul Latif was given about 87 kanals against 73 units. According to this note, the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner was of the opinion that the Murree Brewery estate was not merely a potential building site, but actually a building site and by no stretch of imagination it could have been treated as the agricultural land and disposed of as Banjur Qadeem against rural units. Therefore, the disposal of this property by the revenue authorities was considered to be manifestly irregular. He has observed that the value of the trees and debris on this land would work out to about 6/7 lacs and the property was likely to fetch Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 10,000 per kanal if parcelled into suitable plots and put to auction. He, therefore, proposed that thes‑, allotments made against rural units should be cancelled after giving the show‑cause notices to all the transferees concerned. On the file there is yet another note dated 18‑7‑1963 in the hand of Mr. Sufi. This shows that he had discussed the matter with the Minister, and it was after this that he decided to issue notices to all the allottees in the estate for the cancellation of the lands held by them.

9. Accordingly, on 7‑8‑1963, Mr. M. H. Sufi, the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner issued notices to all the allottees to the estate to the effect that these properties respectively held by them could not have been allotted as `land' in view of the fact that the whole of it was an `industrial concern', not liable to be disposed of under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Moreover, the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Murree, was not invested with the powers of an Assistant Settlement Commissioner and as such all these allotments made by him were incompetent. Accordingly the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner called upon them to show cause as to why the allotments held by them in the estate should not be cancelled under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958.

10. After hearing the parties, Mr. M. H. Sufi, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, on 9‑10‑1963, by a single order, passed in these cases cancelled all the allotments held by the petitioners in this estate. On going through the facts he has held that the land comprised in the Murree Brewery Estate was never used for agricultural purposes, except for a small portion measuring about 33 kanals. The rest of the area not only constituted potential building sites but actually building had been raised on an extensive part of the estate measuring 172 kanals 12 marlas. Special Jamabandi for 1946 shows that another area of 169 kanals 5 marlas was under abadi hill. He has also held that the Sub‑Divisional Officer, Murree, who had made these allotments, on the proposals submitted to him by the Tehsildar, was not invested with the powers of Assistant Settlement Commissioner under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 to make them. In the opinion of the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner, under the circumstances, he was fully competent to cancel all these allotments under section 11 of the Act.

11. The petitioners have filed these revisions in this Court under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act against this order dated 9‑10-1963, passed by Mr. M. H. Sufi, the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and gone through the records produced before us. One of the main questions canvassed before us is concerning the true nature and character of the property comprised in the whole of the Murree Brewery Estate. According to all the petitioners it was truly an agricultural land, included in the revenue estate, assessed to land revenue. They have relied on the provisions contained in paragraphs 29 and 42, Chapter I, Part II of the West Pakistan Scheme, 1956. This lays down that the classification of evacuee land should be taken into account according to the entries in the special Jamabandis prepared for exchange with India. Also according to paragraph 42 when a piece of `culturable land' is allotted to a certain claimant under this Scheme, all trees and buildings standing on that land will go to the allottee concerned. It was, therefore, contended that the land was rightly and lawfully proposed and confirmed to them by the competent authorities on their respective khatas in the Register RL‑II regularly maintained for the purpose. No appeal or revision was ever filed against these allotments which had thus become final by lapse of time and thereafter the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner had no jurisdiction and authority under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 to cancel the land on any ground. The petitioners have also vehemently contended before us that in the circumstances of these cases, Mr. M. H. Sufi, the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner had already made up his mind in the matter and was biased against them. As such he was personally disqualified to pass this impugned order against them. Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan, the learned Settlement Commissioner (Legal), in his reply has, however, refuted all these contentions in support of the order passed by respondent No. 1. 12‑A. We have carefully considered the different contentions raised before us in this connection. In section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 `land' is defined as under:‑ " `Land' means evacuee property consisting of land held for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture including gardens, unsurveyed land and trees or buildings and other structures standing thereon and includes all rights of evacuees in such land, but does not include‑ (a) property as defined in sub‑clause (b) of clause (2) of section 2 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 (III of 1956); or in sub‑clause (d) thereof; or (b) such evacuee land as may be declared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner as a building site." It is the dominant use to which the land was being put that must be seen. The land devoted to agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture including the building standing thereon is treated as `land' within the meanings of the expression to this Act. It does not include the property defined in sub‑clauses (b) and (d) of clause (2) of section 2 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act III of 1956. In other words an industrial concern such as a factory or a workshop situated outside the limits of a corporation, a Municipal Committee, a Notified Area Committee, a Town Committee, a Small Town Committee, a Sanitary Committee and Cantonment, as those limits existed on 15‑8‑1947 and also the substantial house, shops and godown outside these limits, provided their value in each case was not less than Rs. 10,000, are expressly excluded from the definition of the term `land'. Similarly according to Part 1, Chapter 1, Para. I clause (i) of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, 1956 `land' means all evacuee land held for agricultural purposes or four purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture including unsurveyed land, trees or buildings or other structure standing in it and which the Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, 'as been authorised to pool and allot under section 6(1) of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956. In the Scheme, in clause (ix) `urban immovable property' has been defined to mean all immovable property situated within the limits of a Corporation, Municipal Committee Notified Area Committee, a Town Area committee, a Small Town Committee, a Sanitary Committee and a Cantonment as (hose limits existed on 15‑8‑194 7 and includes commercial and industrial structures, such as factories, workshops, outside these limits. Also in para. 1(b) of the Supplementary Rural Scheme, `rural agricultural land' has been similarly defined to paean such land as is defined to clause (i) of Chapter I, Part I of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme situated outside the limits of the Corporation, a Municipal Committee, a notified Area Committee, a Town Committee, a Small Town Committee, a Sanitary Committee and a Cantonment, as these limits existed on 15‑8‑1947. In paragraph 2(3) of the Supplementary Urban Scheme (Supplementary Scheme No. II) as well, `rural agricultural land' has been defined in the same manner. From all these different provisions, it follows that nature of the evacuee property has to be ascertained with reference to the conditions prevailing at the time of the Partition of the sub‑continent, on 15‑8‑1947. The test laid down in section 2(3) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1955 and in Part I, Chapter I, para. 1(i) of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, 1956, is the use to which the land was being put at the time on 15‑8‑1947.

13. In Syed Shaukat Hussain Rizvi v. K. B. Dr. Yar Muhammad Khan and another (P L D 1964 Lah. 469), a Division Bench of this Court has rightly held that the nature of the property at the time of the Partition will determine the scope of the allotment. Similarly to M. Muzaffar‑ud‑Din Industries Ltd. v. Chief Settlement end Rehabilitation Commissioner and another (P L D 1967 Lah. 452), a learned Single Judge of this Court has held that it is the nature of the land at the time of the Partition which would be relevant for the purposes of the disposal of the property. The purpose postulated within the definition of the term `land' in these provisions is the direct purpose for which the property was occupied by the owner at the relevant time. The land does not cease to be agricultural merely because at the relevant time it was not bearing any crop, agricultural lands are often allowed to remain fallow in the ordinary course of agriculture. On the other hand the mere fact that a plot of land is assessed to land revenue would not make it `land' within its definition, unless it is proved that it was occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture. Likewise the circumstance that a plot is included in a revenue estate for which the revenue records are being compiled tinder the Land Revenue Act, is by no means conclusive. But it is unnecessary to pursue this aspect any further as we have rested our decision on an altogether different objection going to the root of these cases before us.

14. The learned counsel for the petitioners have strongly contended that these allotments in question were confirmed to the petitioners on 13‑2‑1961. There was no appeal or revision against those orders which have become final by lapse of time. So, it was argued that even the Chief Settlement Commissioner had no jurisdiction and authority under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, to cancel these transfers afterwards. In dilating upon this argument the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Act relating to appeals, revisions and review. According to section 18 of the Act the limitation for an appeal against an original order is 60 days. Under section 19(1), before it was repealed, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was competent to entertain a revision, on his own motion within 9 months, and on an application made in that behalf within 60 days from an order passed by his subordinates. T hen under section 21 any person aggrieved by an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner involving a question of law may within 60 days of the order file a petition for revision to the High Court. And section 22 of the Act lays down that subject to the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any order made under this Act, shall be final and save as provided in section 21 shall not be called in question in any Civil or Revenue Court. So, it was asserted that these allotment orders having attained finality by lapse of time, were not at all liable to be set aside by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in the exercise of his powers under section 11 of the Act. This is by far the most important question raised before us. 14‑A. Section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is an under:‑ "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, but subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the Chief Settlement Commissioner may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, cancel or terminate any allotment or lease made under a scheme or under this Act, or amend or vary the terms of any such allotment or lease: Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner without giving the persons affected thereby a reasonable opportunity of being heard." According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the power vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner in this behalf under the section is expressly `subject to the provisions of this Act'. So that, according to the learned counsel, the Chief Settlement Commissioner was not competent to cancel or terminate any allotment if otherwise the order has attained the finality by lapse of time under section 22 of the Act.

15. If this interpretation be accepted, it would have virtually render section 11 of the Act redundant, in the presence of the powers of revision vested in the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 19 (t) of the Act before it was deleted. Surely that could not have been the intention of the Legislature and any interpretation leading to this absurdity must be avoided. Section 22 of the Act lays down that subject to the provisions in Chapter VI (relating to appeal, revision and review), any order made under this Act shall not be called in question in any Civil or revenue Court. It appears to us that in the context the word `final' order only means that there was no C appeal, revision or review against it between the parties. It is also final in the sense that it cannot be called in question in any `civil or revenue Court'. But it is not absolutely conclusive. It does not mean that it is necessarily final and conclusive against the Chief Settlement Commissioner, if otherwise he is empowered under the law to hold a probe into the matter. We are of the opinion that the word `final' in this context has been used in a qualified sense only. Indeed, at times, this word was differently construed in different statutes. In Matangini Bebi v. Girish Chandra Ghongdar (I L R 30 Cal. 619) it was held that 'final' order in section 19 (4) of Bengal Act I of 1895 meant that it was not open to appeal. In this respect the Court observed:‑ " we are of the opinion that subsection (4) of section 19 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, I of 1895 in saying that any order made by the certificate Officer under the section shall be final, only means and intends that it shall not be open to appeal such as is provided by section 32, and that the intention is not to make the order absolutely final so as to make it not open to review or revision. Although in most cases the order contemplated by section 19 can only have a remedial effect, there may be cases where a certificate officer erroneously refuses after the deposit to cancel a sale where he ought clearly not to do so; and to hold that there is no power which can set him right by revision, would be to hold what the Legislature could never have contemplated, especially when section 33 of the Act after providing that no appeal shall lie from certain orders, says that the Commissioner may in any case in which he thinks fit revise any order passed by certificate officer or certain other revenue officers. The view we take that the words `shall be final' in section 19, subsection (4) have the qualified meaning indicated above. Similarly, a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court in Muhammad Ibrahim Moola v. S'. R. Jandas (A I R 1923 Rang. 94) has held that the word `final' meant only that the decision to which it applied was not subject to appeal. Also in Ashraf v. Saith Mal (1937 A L J 1101) the word `final' is used in section 45 (5) of the Encumbered Estates Act was interpreted to mean `not subject to appeal, and it did not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in revision.

16. In our opinion section 11 of the Act stands on separately by itself. It confers an altogether new rind original jurisdiction flu the Chief Settlement Commissioner to terminate or cancel the allotment and must be distinguished from his revisional jurisdiction that was once vested in him under section 19 (1) of the Act for the purposes of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by his subordinate. The scope of this section is even wider and the Chief Settlement Commissioner may cancel or terminate any allotment or lease, made before this Act was introduced, under any Scheme. This appears to us to be the only harmonious construction which must be adopted. Viewed from this angle, section 11 becomes quite compatible with the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the Act and is in no way hedged in by those limitations. Perhaps, that is the one reason as to why the Legislature in its wisdom, has retained section 11 of this Act in tact, and yet at the same time deleted the provisions in section 19 (1) for the revision by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, by the promulgation of Ordinance XIII of 1964. Section 11 of the Act, is `subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder'. It really means that section 11 is subject only to such of the provisions of the Act and the rules as may be applicable. In construing a similar expression occurring in section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Major J. H. Naqvi v. The Director, Enforcement Directorate, West Pakistan (P L D 1966 S C 512 at p. 519) held that these words `merely mean that the transfer in such mode too will be in accordance with and subject to such of the other provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder as may be applicable.' For all these reasons we must hold with the Chief Settlement Commissioner that lie was not debarred from cancelling these allotments under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958.

17. The learned counsel for the petitioners have then raised a serious objection to the impugned order passed by Mr. M. H. Sufi, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner in that he was at the time biased and consequently disqualified from sitting as a Judge in this cause. Before his appointment as the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner he was working as the Secretary to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Works, Government of Pakistan. In that capacity he had already dealt with the case of this property in dispute. On 6‑6‑1961, as the Secretary to the Government he had himself put up a note to the Minister in this respect. Similarly in his D. O. No. 2226/PS‑Secy./61, dated 7‑8‑1961 addressed to Pir Ahsan‑ud‑Din, Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, he had asked him to review all these cases and after this was clone to put tip the proposals to the Ministry for the disposal of the property as plots. From this it is evident that he had already made up his mind in the matter. Virtually he was himself the complainant and had moved for the cancellation of these allotments in question. Therefore, after he was appointed as the Chief Settlement Commissioner, he could not sit as a Judge in his own cause on 9‑10‑1963, when he passed the impugned order. The learned Chief Settlement Commissioner in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him under section 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 was required to act judicially in the matter. He was bound to afford a reasonable opportunity for hearing and to record his reasons to writing in support of his order. Therefore, it was all the more necessary that he should have been free from any bias in him. In this respect in Muhammad Mohsin Siddiqui v. Government of West Pakistan (P L D 1964 S C 64) the Supreme Court has observed:‑ "The Supreme Courts will not tolerate, and certainly not within the frame‑work of the judicial administration itself, conditions in which officials can be made prosecutors, Judges and punishing authorities when they themselves are the complainants, merely on the ground that the power of removal is vested in them as appointing authorities under the rules. There is power and there are facilities available, to place the conduct of the enquiry and the report thereon in other hands and in such a case the officer who is offended complainant must give his evidence in support of the complaint before such officer." Similarly in Muhammad Abdullah v. Road Transport Board (P L D 1964 Lah. 744) this Court has held that:‑ "No doubt administrative tribunals are not required to follow the procedure commonly known to the law Courts but nevertheless in quasi‑judicial matters they are bound to act in conformity with the principles of natural justice and in accordance with the canons of fair play. It is one of the fundament al and wellrecognised principles of administration of justice that justice should not only be done but it should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. If one of the members of a tribunal is biased or, which is the same thing, has prejudged the issue against a party, it is bound to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the party that he is not likely to get a fair and impartial deal at the hands of tribunal. If one of the authority or any one of the authorities hearing a case has any pecuniary or otherwise substantial interest or is biased, the defect goes to the root of the constitution of the tribunal which becomes improperly constituted." This principle is well recognised and universally applicable. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that because of this legal bias in Mr. M. H. Sufi, Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, he was disqualified in sitting in judgment in this' case under section 11 of the Act.

18. Faced with this situation, we have considered our own position in the matter under section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. Can we, in the exercise of our own powers in revision, substitute our own judgment in these cases before us after going into the facts? We have carefully pondered over his matter. Section 21 of the Act lays down that any person aggrieved by an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner "involving a question of law" may file a petition for revision to the High Court. The revision in this Court is confined to the questions of law and the Chief Settlement Commissioner is the sole Judge on the facts. We cannot, therefore, substitute our own judgment, on the disputed questions of fact as to the true nature of this property on the evidence, and cannot hold whether or riot this property in dispute was land meant for disposal under the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme, 1956 and the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. We have, therefore, no alter native but to remand these cases for decision afresh, after notice to all the parties, by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, under section 11 of the Act, in accordance with the law. Mr. M. H. Sufi, has since been transferred, he is no more the Chief Settlement Commissioner now and there should be no difficulty for the present incumbent to take up this matter. It shall be open to the parties to raise any other pleas open to them before the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

19. In Settlement Revision No. 2 of 1968 the property in dispute was confirmed to Mst. Ansar Fatima petitioner No.

2. Afterward she made a gift of this property to her sons and daughters, petitioners Nos. 1, 3 to 6 and the mutation for it was duly sanctioned on 9‑5‑1963. But no show‑cause notice before the cancellation of the allotment was sent to them as required by the proviso to section 11 of the Act. But we have already decided to remand these cases to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for fresh disposal after hearing, all the parties in accordance with the law. These notices may now be sent to them as well by the Chief Settlement Commissioner before the disposal of this case afresh.

20. For the foregoing reasons, we accept these revisions, set aside the order under revision and remand these cases to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, for decision afresh in accordance with the law. There shall be no order as to costs in these circumstances. A.E. Revisions accepted. Cases remanded.