P L D 1981 Karachi 377 (PLP)

It is the case of the petitioner that the Contractors submitted to the thief Resident Engineer statements of price variations of certain materials listed in the contract which were examined and the amount payable under the contract ascertained. The Contractors did not accept the Chief Resident Engineer's valuation of Material Price Variation Orders Nos. 2 to

12. Therefore, the Contractors by their letter dated 3‑4‑1979, referred the claims to the Engineer for decision. The Engineer after examining the same rejected the claims and communicated the decision by his letter dated 13‑6‑1979. It is claimed that thereafter, the Contractors had some discussions with the Chief Resident Engineer and in consequences thereof submitted their revised calculations to the Engineer by letter No. 178, dated 21‑8‑1979, addressed to the Engineer. This latter was followed by another letter of the Contractors dated 7‑10‑1979, the material contents whereof read as follows :‑ .. "NAPIER MOLE ROAD BRIDGE MATERIAL PRICE VARIATION ORDERS Nos. 2 to

12. This has reference to your letter No. DGW/MDJ/74010 dated June 13, 1979. Subsequently after receipt of your above letter we had extensive discussions with the CRE, on the subject. In consequence of those discussions we submitted revised calculations to him vide our letter No. 178 dated August 21, 1979. We have, however, not received, as yet, the CRE's consent to our submissions. Under the above circumstances we beg to inform you that if the submis sions vide our letter, referred to above, are not consented by the CRE, we intend to refer the matter to Arbitration, as per provisions of the Contract Clause No. 3.67 (2)." On receipt of the above letter the Engineer by the letter dated 26‑10‑1979, informed the Contractors that since the claim for reference to arbitration was received beyond the period of 90 days from the date of his decision, the same had become barred by time and the decision had become final and binding upon them. It is clear that the request for reference of the dispute to arbitration was made 24 days beyond the prescribed period as the Engineer's decision was communicated to the Contractors vide letter dated 13‑6‑1979 (Annexure 5 to the application) and the Contractors required the reference of the dispute to arbitration‑ vide letter dated 7‑10‑1979, reproduced hereinbefore. Therefore. under clause 3,67, sub‑clause (2) of the contract the Engineer's decision had become final and binding on the Contractor. However, it was submitted by Mr. Liaquat Merchant that under clause 3.68 (1) of the Contract notices were required to be given to the Contractors by sending the same to the Contractor's Head Office as well as to their local office by registered post, but the letter dated 13‑6‑1979 containing the decision of the Engineer was sent to the site office of the Contractors and not to the Head Office. There fore, it was contended that the decision of the Engineer could not be deemed to be a decision as envisaged under the relevant clause of the contract. However, the receipt of the letter is not denied and the same was acknow ledged by the letter of 7‑10‑1979, without any complaint that the same was not duly sent or addressed or that it should have been sent on both addresses. It was submitted by Mr. Ali Ahmed Fazeel that the letter was addressed at the address mentioned in the letter‑head of the Contractors, i.e. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road, Karachi from where alt the correspondence was carried on. The correctness of submission is borne out by the copies of the letters of the Contractors placed on record by both parties showing only one address. The Contract mentions the address of the Head Office as :‑ "Karim Chambers, Mereweather Road, Karachi." It is the case of the Contractors as stated in their written statement that the office at PECHS Drigh Road, Karachi remained Site Office until the com pletion of the site office at Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan Road and the Head Office remained as specified in' the contract documents. However, it i: admitted in paragraph 6 of the written statement that the Head Office was much before the date of the impugned letter containing the decision of the Engineer, was shifted to 10‑E Building, 177!2, Napier Barracks, Drigh Road. It is alleged that the applicants were, at all material times, fully aware of the change in the address of the Head Office. However, no documents whatever, have been placed on record to support the allegation that the applicants were aware of any such change. Mr. Fazeel also submitted that even if it is held that due notice of the decision was not given even then the claim is barred by time for in that case no decision would be deemed to have been communicated to the Contractors and in such case the Contractors should have required the applicants to refer the dispute within 180 days from the date of rejection of their claims. It is admitted position that the .claims were preferred to the Engineer by the Contractors by their letter dated 3‑4‑1979. and, for the first time, the Con tractors required the reference of the claims to arbitration by their letter dated 7‑10‑1979. Therefore, request for arbitration was clearly made beyond 180 days and thus the decision of the Engineer had become final and binding in any view of the matter. It was however, submitted by Mr. Liaquat Merchant that the Contractors had submitted their revised claims alongwith their letter dated 21‑g‑1979, therefore, the reference of the claims by the letter. Dated 7‑10‑1979 was within time. It was further submitted that the question of mitation could be decided by the Arbitrators. Lastly, it was submitted by Mr. Liaquat Merchant that under section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the Court has power to extend the time provided for referring the disputes to arbitration. There is no doubt that under section 37(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, whenever a question as to limitation is raised before arbitrators they are bound to decide the same. However, Court can also decide the same under the provisions of section 33 of the Arbitration Act if determination of such ,4 question does not depend on disputed facts which under the terms of arbitration agreement have to be gone into by the arbitrators. As regards the submission relating to revised claims suffice it would be to say that they are not before me as only copy of the letter dated 21‑8‑1979 has been filed and not its enclosures and that they are yet to be submitted before the arbitrator. Whenever such claims are submitted before the arbitrators they %ill first have to decide the question of limitation if the revised claims include the : ejected claims. I would therefore, hold that the claims regarding Material Price Variation Orders had become final and bind ing. Since however, the revised claims are not before me, I cannot say to what extent the same include the original claims and therefore leave the question to be decided by the arbitrator. As regards the condonation of the delay there is no proper application before me stating the facts or reasons on the consideration whereof the delay could be condoned. Here I may mention that Mr. Ali Ahmed Fazeel during the course of arguments referred to an English decision in F. E. Hockway & Co. Ltd. v. H. W. Hooper & Co. (1950) 2 All E R

842. It is a very short decision. I may reproduce the same in extenso hereinbelow. It reads :‑ "Somervel, L. J., stated the facts and continued : Counsel for the buyers stresses the wording of section 16 (6) of the Arbitration Act, 1934, and submits that one has to consider solely the degree of hardship that may be caused. He says rightly that one factor in considering that is whether or not any hardship will fall on the seller. A seller who could say : "after all this time, it will be impossible to prove our case", would have a strong argument against the application being granted. The Seller here does not suggest that, but counsel for the buyers goes a stage further that I am prepared to go. He submits that, in con sidering what is undue hardship, what I may call the negligence of the buyers in failing to take any steps to claim the arbitration as provided for by the agreement is irrelevant. I do not accept that submission. I think the man who can say : "I did everything I could to comply with this provision" would have a case of greater 'hardship' than a man who has to say : "I forgot all about this clause, and it is entirely my own fault that I am out of time." It is less hard on him that he should suffer the consequences of his own neglect that it would be on a man who has taken every reasonable step to comply with the provisions of the clause. Therefore, I think this is a relevant circum stance. The inference I draw from the evidence is that the buyers forgot about this clause, and that is a factor which makes it difficult for them to show undue hardship. Dealing with the matter de novo, although it is near the line, I think that their application does not come within the section, and the appeal must be dismissed. Denning, L. J.; opined : If the delay was no fault of the buyers, it would no doubt, be an undue hardship on him to hold the clause against him but, if the delay is his own fault, the hardship may not be undue. It may be a hardship which it is due and proper that be should bear, because he may only have himself to thank for it. The delay is therefore, a relevant circumstance. Another relevant circumstance is that there is no evidence of any loss on any sub‑contracts and no evidence of any claims by sub‑buyers or any complaint by them. If there had been, the Court might have taken a lenient view of the delay and held that, notwithstanding it, there was undue hardship on the buyer, but in the absence of such evidence, I do not think this is a case where the discretion of the Court should be exercised." The above reasoning makes it clear that while considering the question of condonration of delay, Court has to consider the facts and circumstances of the case. Since there is no application containing facts on the basis of which the delay could be condoned, at this stage I cannot do so. But it will not preclude the contractors from making proper application which will be considered on its own merits. Now, I would take up the next ground. It is submitted that the arbitra tion was invoked by an unauthorised person. The arbitration was invoked by S. M. Naqvi, the Acting Project Manager by the letter dated 6‑1‑1980. In my opinion the ground is without any substance. Under clause 7 of Appendix 9 to the Contract, the Management of the joint venture vests in the Executive Committee and the Project Manager, and under clause 8 (ibid) executive Committee is authorised to invoke arbitration and under clause 9 (ibid) the Project Manager has to carry out the directions of the Executive Committee. It is the case of the Contractors that the Executive Committee had decided to invoke arbitration and accordingly authorised the Project Manager to invoke the same. There is no denial of these facts. I therefore, hold that the arbitration has been properly invoked. I would consider the third ground urged by Mr. Ali Ahmed Fazeel. It will be seen from the arbitration clause that under it any dispute or difference of any kind whatsoever, between the applicants or the Engineer and the Contractors, in connection with or arising out of the contract or carrying out the works in the first place has to be referred to and settled by the Engineer within the period provided therein and such decision is made final and binding upon the Contractors until the completion of the works even if not acceptable to them in which case, the Contractors are required to give notice within the time provided in the clause that the matters in dispute be referred to arbitration. However, if the matter or matters in dispute are referred to arbitration as provided therein the arbitrators are prohibited from entering upon the reference until after the completion of the works unless the applicants and the Contractors consent in writing that the arbitrators should enter upon the reference even before the completion or alleged comple tion of the works. The only cases where the arbitrators can enter upon the reference before the completion or alleged completion of the works and without consent are the withholding by the Engineer of any certificate or the with holding of any portion of the retention money to which the Contractors claim in accordance with the conditions set out in the contract to be entitled to, or in respect of exercise of Engineer's powers to give certificate under the clause 3.63 (1) of the Conditions. The disputes or differences for the decision of which Mr. Justice (Retd.) Yaqoob Ali has been appointed as arbitrator are not those which fall within the aforesaid excepted matters. It was contended by Mr. Fazeel that the works were not complete when the arbitration was invoked and in support of the contention he relied on two letters of the Contractors dated 23‑12‑1979 and 27‑12‑1979 that clearly show that on the date of 6‑1‑1980 when Mr. Justice (Retd.) Yaqoob Ali was appointed as arbitrator, or on 27‑1‑1980, when he was appointed as sole arbitrator the entire works had not been completed or even not alleged to have been completed and nothing appears on record to show that even on 29‑1‑1980, when Mr. Justice (Retd.) Yaqoob Ali entered upon the reference by issuing notice, the entire works had been completed or allegedly completed. I may here reproduce the material portion of the letters dated 23‑12‑1979 , and 27‑12‑1979. Letter dated 23‑12‑1979 states as follows :‑‑ "Re : Napier Mole Road Bridge Completion Work Programme. As desired by you, we are pleased to submit herewith a copy of our programme No. 106 for the balance work. The completion date in the programme is estimated on the basis that there are no more hold up and delays occurring 'beyond the control of the contractor. Further as stated in the high level meetings, work can be accelerated provided financial problems faced by the contractor due to non‑payment of the claims are settled earliest. Subject to acceptance by you of 'our con ditions stated, we shall mobilize all our resources ‑to complete the remaining works by 31st May 1980." Letter dated 27‑12‑1979, states as follows :‑ "Sub : Third Project of Karachi Port Reconstruction of the Napier Mole Road Bridge Request for Special Advance Payment Against Bank Guarantee Dear Sir, in the high level meeting of December 13, 1979; which was presided over by Major‑General Shafiq Ahmad, Federal Secretary, Ministry of Works and attended by the Chairman, IC. P. T. it was unanimously agreed that the progress of work must be expedited on the Project and MCC/CN agreed to the completion date‑May 31, 1980. However, to enable completion by this date, the Federal Secretary, Ministry of Works, requested K. P. T. to again help NCC/CN with further extra‑ contractual advance, as a special case, for expediting the progress of bridge works. At K. P. T.'s request it was agreed by NCC/CN that this extra‑contractual special advance will be kept in separate bank account, for the utilization exclusively for the acceleration of progress of the bridge works, and will be subject to check by K. P. T. at the time of monthly running bills. . Mr. Ali Ahmed Fazeel in suppost of his contention that the arbitrator could not enter upon the reference until after completion of the Works relied on Smith v. Martin (1925) 1 K B 745 . In this case the words `until after the completion of the works' used in Condition No. 32 of the Contract came to be con sidered. It was held that `the words in Condition No. 32 meant until after completion of the whole of the Works contracted for, and not merely until after completion of so much of the works as the' builder was under the circumstances bound to perform, `that consequently the arbitration was premature and the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award. In this case after considering the various conditions of the contract and the arbitra tion clause. it was observed by Bankes, L. J. as follows :‑ "It is by the light of those earlier conditions that we must read the arbitration clause. Condition 32, on which the present question turns. That condition provides that any dispute or difference arising between the parties is to be referred to arbitration, subject to this, that `such reference, except on the question of certificate'‑that is the withholding of a certificate ‑by the architect to which the builder claims to be entitled. and‑ this is not such a question‑"shall not be opened until after completion or alleged completion of the works' unless with the written consent of the, parties. As it is not in dispute here that the whole of the buildings contracted for have not been completed, the arbitration was premature. This construction of the contract may be kept out of money which is justly due to him for an unlimited time, unless he takes other steps to secure payment ; but he has chosen to agree to this contract, and we cannot do otherwise than act upon its plain meaning, and according to. that plain meaning I think it is clear that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award, and no leave ought to be given to enforce it summarily. The appeal must be allowed." This case clearly supports the stand of Mr. Ali‑ Ahmed. Fazeel and no conditions have been brought to. my notice by Mr. Liaquat Merchant which show that the arbitrator could enter upon the reference before the completion of the entire works except in cases where the applicants give consent or which relate to matters already mentioned hereinabove and provided in clause 3.67 of the contract. No doubt in the above‑cited. case the definition of the word `works' is not stated and‑it is not known whether this word was defined in the contract or not. However, Mr. Merchant relying on the definition of the word `works' given in the contract, submitted that it also means the entirety of all or individual structures which are to be constructed and maintained within the scope of the contract. However, the submission overlooks the control ling words "In so far as to be understood from the working of the test." Therefore, it is the context in which the word `Works' is used in any particular condition of the contract that has to be looked into to find out whether the word `Works' means the entire contracted works i.e. the bridge or the North Approach, main structure, and South Approach. So far as the arbitration clause is concerned, in my opinion, it clearly shows that the word `works' in this clause has been used for the works in its entirely and not for parts for if arbitration could be had in respect of parts or for main structure, South Approach or North Approach separately then it would not have been pro vided therein that the decision of the Engineer shall be final and binding upon the Contractors until the completion of the works. Further, if dispute in relation to each part on its completion was intended to be referred to arbitration then what was the necessity of providing that any dispute could be referred to arbitration even before the completion of the works with consent, moreso when the disputes in respect of the withholding by the Engineer of any certificate or the withholding of any portion of the retention money to which the Contractors claim in accordance with the condition set out in the contract to be entitled to or in respect of the exercise of the Engineer's power to give certificate under Article 3.63 (1) could be referred to arbitration without consent and before completion of the entire works. Further, the provision that all disputes and differences for which the eventual decision of the Engineer is not final and binding, shall be finally settled by the arbitrators would not have been there, if commencement of arbitration .proceeding was intended ‑before the completion of the entire Works. Word 'finally' is a keyword and cannot be lost sight of. Mr. Liaqat Merchant however argued that the bridge has three parts i.e. North Approach, South Approach and bridge works and each work is to be treated as separate item of work and the plan annexed to application shows that bridge work was already completed or had been substantially completed and the work relating to North and South Approaches was in progress. According to him these works would be completed by 31st of May, 1980 while the bridge work had already been completed in February, 1980. Dealing with similar contention in my judgment in J. Misc. No. 8/1980 in which the petitioners and the main respondents were the same, this is what I said .‑ "Mr. Marchant further argued that since in Appendix A to the Form of Tender. for completion of the Sheds and Berths two different periods have been provided and since liquidated, damages for late completion of berth and total of Works, the amount of Bonus for early completion .of the Berth and the Total Works and the Bills of Quantities for each of them were separately provided, therefore, the dispute in respect of each of them, on completion of any of them could be referred to arbitration separately. But in my opinion the answer to the question whether dispute or difference in respect of each item of works could be separately referred to arbitration will have to be answered on the language of the arbitration clause and if the language is clear and unambiguous, and to me it appears to be so, then the provisions which have been referred to by Mr. Merchant become irrelevant." Mr. Merchant also contended the question whether the Works were completed or not or the same have been substantially completed or not has to be determined by the Arbitrator and not by this Court. In support of this contention Mr. Merchant referred to the following passage from the judgment of my learned brother Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J. in Muhammad Azam Muhammad Fazil & Co., Karachi v. Messrs N. A. Industries, Karachi (1): "But if the challenge to the arbitration clause is founded on disputed question of interpretation of other terms of the contract, the decision of such a question would amount to usurping the jurisdiction of the domestic forum which the parties have chosen for adjudication of their disputes. Both on authority and principle it is proper to leave such question to be adjudicated and decided by the arbitrator." But the question under‑consideration is whether the learned Arbitrator. could enter upon the reference or not. It is a jurisdictional question and not the question of determination and interpretation of other terms or con ditions of the contract. In the instant case the exercise of jurisdiction by the C Arbitrator under the Arbitration agreement depends on completion or alleged completion of the Works. The question whether the Works were sub stantially completed is irrelevant to the question of exercise of jurisdiction by the Arbitrator. Further, if the exercise of jurisdiction by an arbitrator depends on the existence of certain conditions the existence of those conditions could only be D decided by the Court and not by the arbitrator. Here I may refer to some more observations of Bankers, J. L. in Smith v. Martin which appear at page 749 of the report. "The only doubt that I at one time entertained in this matter was whether having regard to the form of the contract, it might not be said that the parties, by giving the arbitrator power to deal with disputes arising on the construction of the contract, had empowered him to decide whether the works had been completed or not. But our attention was called to a case of Pethick Brothers v. Metropolitan Water Board (Reported in Rtidson on Building Contracts, 4th Edn., Vol. II, p. 456), in which it was held by the Court of Appeal that where a right to go to arbitration depends on the happening of an event, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide whether the event has happened. A finding therefore in the present case that the works were completed before the commencement of the arbitration was outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator." Mr. Fazeel also referred to Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Oesterreichischer Waldbesitzer Holzwirt Schaftsbetrieba Registrierte Genossen schaft. Mit Beschranktan Haftung (2). In this case the arbitrator after making enquiry as to their jurisdiction had given their award. It was observed by Devlin, J., at page 13 of the report as follows :‑ "If the plaintiff takes upon himself the burden of proving the award, and fails to prove that the arbitrators had jurisdiction, his action fails, and it is irrelevant whether the arbitrators thought or did not think that they had jurisdiction. Their finding is of no value to him. But if he proves that the arbitrators did have jurisdiction then he succeeds and his success is not destroyed because the arbitrators themselves went into the matter and came to the same conclusion which, ex hypothesi, was the right one. In short, any view which is expressed by the arbitrators expressly or impliedly in the award, any finding which can be called a finding that they had jurisdiction does not make the award any better, and likewise does not make it any worse. (1) P L D 1977 Kar. 21 (2) (1954) 1 Q B 8 This approach to the matter and the principles to which I have referred are, I think, substantially those which were laid down in the judgments in Rex v. Fulham, Hammeramith and Kensington Rent Tribunal. ex pane Zerek (1951) 2 K B 1) ; (1961) 1 T L R 423‑P.; (1951) 1 All E R 482) which was a decision of the Divisionai Court. The Court there was considering a similar question in relation to a rent tribunal and the circumstances in which a rent tribunal could properly inquired into matters affecting its own jurisdiction. I .think that the same principles apply to an arbitration Tribunals." I may also refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mr. Muhammad Jamfl Asghar v. The3mprovement Trust, Rawalpindi (1). It was observed by Kaikaus, J. at page 704 of the report as follows; . "A purely administrative officer who is empowered to pass an order if certain circumstances exist has no jurisdiction to determine those circumstances is an essential condition of the validity of his order. In respect of every order passed by him the Court can make an enquiry and if it finds that all the circumstances needed far passing the order were not present it will declare the order to be void. Of course, although the officer has been granted no jurisdiction to determine any facts he will have to ascertain whether the requisite circumstances exist for otherwise he cannot pass the order, but his conclusion as to the existence of those circumstances binds no body and it is open to any person affected to challenge his act on the ground that those circumstances do not in fact exist. An administrative officer or authority may be given, jurisdiction to determine some facts on proof of which he can pass an order and in that case he will act in a quasi judicial manner for the determination of those facts and his determina tion validly reached will support his order in relation to those facts. For instance the Government may be empowered to acquire property if it is "satisfied" of the existence of a public purpose for such acquisition. If the Government validly reaches a conclusion as to the existence of a public purpose its order will be legal provided of course that the circumstances which it has found to exist do in law constitute a public purpose. The Government still will have no jurisdiction to determine the connotation of `public purpose'. It is the Court which will determine what is meant by `public purpose'. So far as special judicial tribunals are concerned they are given jurisdiction to determine certain facts but they are not Judges of the facts which are the foundation of their jurisdiction nor can they define the limits of their own jurisdiction." I may also .refer to a recent judgment of Lahore High Court in Dald Khan and another v. Sardar Khan and others (2), wherein a learned Single Judge at page 108 of the report observed as follows :‑ "A tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by a wrong decision that a certain state of facts exists upon which the limits of its jurisdiction depends even though its decision is declared final by the Statutes, on the subject falling within the exclusive jurisdiction." (1) P L D 1965 S C 698 (2) 1979 C L C 104 The principles enunciated in the above quoted passages would, in ‑ my opinion, equally apply to exercise of jurisdiction by an arbitrator whose power to act as each depends on the existence of certain .. conditions. It‑ was so ruled in Christopher Brown, L. D. Therefore, this conten tion also has no force. I am therefore, clearly _of the opinion that on 29‑1‑1980, the works were not completed or allegedly completed and as such learned Arbitrator could not have entered upon the reference on that date. Now, I would take up the last ground. It was urged by Fazeel that on the facts and circumstances of the case appointment of Mr. Justice (Retd.) Yakoob Ali as sole arbitrator is liable to be set aside. In support of this ground Mr. Fazeel relied on Steel Brothers & Co. Ltd., Karachi v. A. Wahid(1), Central Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khyber Textile Mills Ltd. and others (2) and Messrs Kamani Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, Jabelpur and another (3). The expression `sufficient cause' used in section 9 of the. Arbitration Act, 1940 has not been defined in the Act. However, this expression is also used in various provisions of the Code of Civil Proccdure, 1908 and the Limitation Act. In relation to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure it was observed by Muhammad Sharif, J. , in Malik Mumtaz Ahmad an others v. Mst. Ilmtal Habib and others (4) chat "expression sufficient cause" is not susceptible of an exact definition and no hard and fast rule can be laid down to cover all possible cases. Each case must be Judged upon its merits and its peculiar circumstances. Now before I examine the circumstances in which Mr. Justice (Retd.) Yakoob Ali was appointed as sole Arbitrator, I .may refer to the cases cited by Mr. Fazeel.. In Steel Brothers & Co. Ltd. Karachi v. A. Wahid the opponents on the applicants' failure to appoint their arbitrator had appointed the arbitrator nominated, by them as the sole arbitrator. This appointment was set aside by Feroze Nana Ghulamally, J., on the ground that the applicants had failed to nominate within the statutory period their arbitrator due to confusion caused by lengthy correspondence between the parties. , In the second. case on the applicants' failure to appoint their arbitrator, the respondents had appointed the arbitrator nominated by them as the sole arbitrator. On an application made under section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, Fakhruodin G. Ebrahim, J., after stating the circumstances in which the applicants had failed to appoint arbitrator, observed that in those circum stances it could not be said that the applicants deliberately avoided to nominate their arbitrators and further observed that it was possible that they were tinder bona fide misapprehension that in the stated circumstances, occasion for them appoint their arbitrator had not arisen. In the third case it was observed that the moment the defaulting party satisfied the Court that it has not been obstructive or evasive and has acted with due diligence, the appointment of sole arbitrator should be set aside. (1) P L D 19.70 Kar. 173 . (2) P L D 1975 Kar. 147 (3) ‑A I R 1964 Madh. Pra. 268 (4) I' L D .1955 F C 178 (5). P L D 1939‑Kar. 87 I may also refer to another case of this Court, namely, Messrs M. Esmall jee & Sons v. The Federation of Pakistan ;5). In this case the mining lease of the plaintiff was cancelled by the Central Government. The plaintiff appointed as arbitrator under rule 80 of the Pakistan Missing Concession ,. Rules, 1949 and called upon the defendant/Government to appoint their arbitrator but they did not do so and contended that the matter was to be decided by the Central Government and was not to be referred to arbitration. Therefore, the arbitrator appointed by the plaintiff acted as sole arbitrator and gave an award. The Central Government applied for setting aside the award and realizing that the matter was to be referred to arbitration under rule 80 also prayed for permission to appoint their arbitrator. It was observed by Waheeduddin Ahmed, J. :‑ "In my opinion the contention of the learned counsel is not correct. The differences between the parties whether the dispute should have been referred to the Central Government or to the two arbitrators appointed by the parties was bona fides and I am inclined to the view that the matter was not free from doubt and the request of the defendants hat they should be allowed to appoint their own _ arbitrator is not without justification." Therefore, from the cases cited hereinbefore it is clear that the appointment of the sole arbitrator, on the failure of other party to nominate its arbitrator, could be set aside if the party in default satisfies the Court that it has not deliberately avoided to appoint its arbitrator or it was lacking under F some misapprehension, or confusion and was not lacking in bona fide by being obstructive or evasive or negligent. All these grounds are considered to be sufficient within the meaning of section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Now, I would consider the cause due to which the applicants' claim that they did not nominate their arbitrator. It has already been noticed that the applicants by their letter dated 19‑1‑1980, in reply to the letter dated 6‑1‑1980 from the Contractors whereby they required the Applicants to appoint their. arbitrator within 15 days, informed the Contractors that their request for arbitration was time‑barred under the relevant provisions of the contract. The stand of the applicants that the decision of Engineer in respect of the contractors claims referred to him for his decision vide letter dated 3‑4‑1979 has become final and binding, was correct and therefore, they were justified in ` '' refusing to nominate their arbitrator. Since however, I have left the determi nation of the question of limitation in respect of revised claims sent alongwith the letter dated 21‑8‑1979, to the arbitrators for the reasons already stated and subject to the limitation provided. I think it fair and just to set aside the nomination of respondent 2 as sole arbitrator and give an opportunity to the applicants to nominate their arbitrator. I, therefore, set aside the appointment of respondent No. 2 as the sole arbitration and allow the applicants two weeks time to nominate their arbitrator. The arbitrators shall enter upon the reference only on completion or alleged completion of the entire works and not before. S.Q Order accordingly.